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Abstract 
This thesis offers a commentary on the use of an embedded approach to 
explore variables impacting on employee safety culture at a large manufacturing 
plant. A mixed method approach was adopted in order to assess the safety culture of 
the company. The assessment stage consisted of point-of- work observations; 
unstructured individual interviews, semi-structured focus groups and a safety culture 
survey. This afforded a detailed insight into a rich array of context-specific variables 
impacting on employee perceptions of safety in the company, referenced to leadership 
style, incident reporting, rule breaking / risk taking, time pressure, communication 
and reactive approach to addressing safety issues. 
The safety culture assessment was followed by the development and 
implementation of two safety culture improvement programmes (interventions). Two 
matched pairs of departments (two experimental and two control) were chosen in 
which to conduct the interventions. The first intervention comprised a replication 
(with enhancements) of Zohar’s (2003) safety climate improvement intervention. The 
results indicated that low trust towards the management and the researcher, the face 
validity of the intervention, negative past experiences, insufficiently transparent 
communication and alienation engendered a high resistance to change. Seeking to 
address the shortcomings of the first, the second intervention represented a more 
organic approach, in which the improvement programme was designed to mesh with 
and complement established quality management systems. An improvement in 
employee safety performance was observed in the first month following its 
introduction, however, it is also possible that this was a consequence of a lean 
manufacturing intervention that took place at the same time.   
Variables affecting the intervention success were further explored though interviews 
with a sample of safety experts. This resulted in the development of a six stage model 
for successful safety culture intervention design and implementation.  
The insights gained from these studies were fed back to the industrial sponsor 
to contribute to corporate insight and understanding into variables impacting on 
employee safety culture and the design of successful safety improvement programs.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction of the Sponsor 
Company 
1.1. Emergence of the study 
This Ph.D. project has been developed by the University of Bath and funded 
by the SW RDA and also an industrial sponsor (manufacturing sector). The full 
research proposal may be found in Appendix A. 
1.2. Introduction of the Sponsor Company 
The sponsor company manufactures complex investment-cast turbine airfoils, 
complex ceramic cores and vacuum alloys. The early history of the company dates 
back to 1903, when it was established as a mining company in British Columbia, 
where it extracted copper. In 1958 the company merged with two others focused on 
metal processing and investment casting of dental, medical, industrial and aircraft 
parts. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the company acquired several aluminium 
fabricating companies. By the late 1960s one division of the company specialised in 
producing medical equipment and another in aluminium activities. In 1966 the 
company formed an alliance with a machining company from South Western England 
and in 1971 installed a moulding press and a kiln. In 1975 the site in South Western 
England built an alloy plant, manufacturing vacuum and air melted alloy. In 1976 the 
aluminium division formed a corporation. The company grew in response to 
increasing demands for its products. In 2000 it was acquired by a world leading 
aluminium manufacturer corporation and to date remains its division in the South 
West UK.  
The plant in South Western England consists of three sites: casting, alloy and 
core. The three sites produce different goods. The core site manufactures ceramic 
cores (Fig. 1) that are a necessary element in the production of airfoil turbines.  
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Figure 1. Ceramic core being machined and finished by hand. 
The alloy site produces aluminium bars (Fig. 2) that are used by other business 
as a raw material in the production of aluminium-based goods. 
 
Figure 2. Production process and the final outcome of alloy manufacturing. 
The casting site (Fig. 3) produces complex investment-cast turbine airfoils. 
 
Figure 3. Types of casting products. From left: equiax (many randomly orientated 
grains), directionally solidified (all grains aligned) and single crystal (one grain). 
The three operational units are complementary, as the production process uses 
ceramic cores and alloy bars for its casting operations. The casting process is multi-
staged and very advanced (Fig. 4). It includes manual work, heavy machinery, robots, 
furnaces and many other elements. 
Chapter 1 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 3 
 
 
Figure 4. The multi-staged process of manufacturing turbine airfoils. 
The final products find use in industrial gas turbines (75%) and jet engines 
(25%)1.  
 
 
Figure 5. Industrial gas turbine (left) and jet engine (right). 
The corporation, the current parent company, is of American origin. It 
manages 25 business units and alloy-based manufacturing in 450 locations in 36 
countries. It employed approximately 107 000 employees worldwide in 2007, 87 000 
in 2008 and 59 000 in 2009. The corporate sales revenue was 29 billion dollars in 
                                                 
1 Data for 2010. 
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2007, 27 billion in 2008 and 18.7 billion dollars in 20092. The economic downturn 
experienced in 2008-2010 affected the company’s profit and forced it to cut costs, 
which was reflected in a reduction of the workforce. These changes also affected the 
site. It employed approximately 1000 people in 2007 and this number was reduced to 
approximately 700 in 2010.  
The sponsor company is a major employer in South Western England, 
employing mainly local people. Blue-collar workers join the company first through an 
employment agency as temporary workers and are subsequently given a permanent 
employment contract if the company is happy with their performance. White-collar 
workers are employed through a process of selection organised by the company’s HR 
department.  
1.3. Hierarchical structure of the company 
The production-related departments can be characterised as consisting of four 
functional layers of personnel: (i) production operators. Their work is physically 
demanding; they work collectively in groups or shifts each assigned to discrete work 
cells (small units focused on a single stage of the production process). (ii) Each 
working group is supervised by a team, shift or cell leaders. These leaders tend to play 
an active role in the production process, routinely working collaboratively, side by 
side, with the production operators in their team. Additionally, the leaders are 
responsible for coordinating employees within their group, shift or cell. Team leaders 
are, in turn, line-managed by (iii) supervisors. Supervisor responsibilities include job 
planning, resource assignments, solving problems, and managing personnel within 
their department. As the first layer of line management, supervisors report to (iv) 
managers. Managers’ responsibility is to manage the department on a strategic level, 
manage financial resources or coordinate cooperation between departments. The 
production staff are supported by overhead staff working for HR, finance, engineering 
etc. For the purposes of this study all these functions were grouped as “Office 
positions”. Additionally as it is an international company, there are a number of 
people working on site temporarily or engaged in other functions not essential for the 
production process, or that could not be included to any of the groups listed above, 
they were categorised as “others”. 
                                                 
2 The employment and sales revenue figures were obtained from the official corporate website. 
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1.4. Safety performance 
One of the core values of the corporation is to continually improve safety, so 
every year new safety interventions are initiated (see Chapter 4). 
With regard to accidents, the number of “all injuries” and “reportable 
accidents (RIDDOR)”3 has been declining since 2007 (Fig. 6). 
 
Figure 6. Number of “all injuries” and “reportable accidents (RIDDOR)” in the last 
four years. 
1.5. Thesis structure 
The structure of this thesis is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Chapter 2 offers a literature review of contemporary research findings on 
organisational culture and safety culture.  
Aims: 
• To develop an understanding of organisational culture and safety 
culture, 
• To develop knowledge of safety culture interventions and insight 
on why they do or do not work, 
• To build up a background for developing and implementing safety 
culture intervention in the sponsor company, 
                                                 
3 The Health and Safety Executive in the UK requires employers, as a part of RIDDOR (the 
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995), to report to the HSE 
death and major injuries, over-three-day injuries, disease, dangerous occurrences and gas incidents. For 
a full list of requirements see HSE guidance: http://www.hse.gov.uk/riddor/guidance.htm. Retrieved on 
22.08.2010. 
220 228 
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• To identify areas for future research. 
Methods: 
• Available scientific databases were searched for relevant articles, 
chapters and books, 
• The information found was grouped in to topics and the content was 
synthesised, 
• The review of safety culture factors was based on the analysis of 
available meta-analyses of the subject literature. 
Findings: 
• There is no agreement regarding the definition of safety culture, 
• There may by many cultures within one organisation, 
• Management engagement is the most important factor affecting safety 
culture, 
• There are many ways to improve culture, 
• Further research is needed better to understand why some improvement 
interventions are successful while others are not. 
Chapter 3 offers a discussion over a methodological approach underpinning 
research in this thesis.  
Aims:  
• To set research objectives, 
• To develop most relevant research design for given research objectives 
and practical context on the basis of the understanding of 
epistemological paradigms, 
• To outline the main stages of the research 
Methods: 
• The relevant literature was reviewed, 
• The descriptions of the best practice were reviewed 
Findings: 
• The uniqueness of this project was discussed 
• Four research objectives were set focused on developing an 
understanding of what works and why and on reducing employee risk 
taking behaviour, 
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• The pragmatic paradigm and triangulation methodology were 
identified as most relevant for the given context, 
• Five main stages of research were identified with a detailed list of tasks 
for each stage.  
Chapter 4 discusses the process by which the researcher familiarised himself 
with the company.  
Aims: 
• To improve an understanding of the production processes and technical 
systems in the factory, 
• To appreciate the scope of workers duties in particular departments  
• To appreciate employees perspectives on safety culture(s)  
• To appreciate the risks associated with the socio-technical systems at 
the plant.  
 Methods: 
• An unstructured interview methodology was used to explore these 
issues.  
Findings: 
• The interviews elicited themes that needed to be investigated in a 
subsequent, more structured stage of research (Gillham, 2005).  
Chapter 5 offers a description of the qualitative assessment of safety culture 
in the sponsor company. 
Aims: 
• To broaden the insights gained by the preliminary studies  
• To gather the material that would be used as a base for the 
development of a questionnaire to assess the safety culture of the 
whole company and explore the distribution of safety culture 
components across departments. 
Methods:  
• Focus group discussions as suggested by a number of research studies 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Gillen, Kools, McCall, Sum, & Moulden, 2004; 
Weyman, Pidgeon, Jeffcott, & Walls, 2006).  
Findings: 
• Eight facets of safety culture of the sponsor company were identified, 
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• The strongly contextualised data obtained created a basis for the 
development of a safety culture questionnaire. 
Chapter 6 describes the process of the development of a safety culture 
questionnaire.  
Aims: 
• To provide a degree of triangulation of the results obtained in the 
previous study, 
• To identify the finite number of constructs that could be considered as 
elements composing the company’s safety culture and that could be 
compared with the themes developed from the focus group discussions, 
• To explore the distribution of themes across departments,  
• To inform the development of safety enhancement intervention. 
Methods: 
• Principal component analysis 
• Group comparison methods (t-test, one-way ANOVA, two-way 
ANOVA) 
Findings: 
• Principal component analysis of data from 2008 yielded four 
components, 
• The identified components related closely to those identified in 
qualitative studies, 
• There were differences between job functions and departments 
confirming the notion of sub-cultures. 
Chapter 7 reports two separate studies. The first describes the development 
and implementation of a safety culture intervention. The second one investigates the 
reasons behind the failure of the intervention. 
Aims – Study 1: 
• To develop a model and a process of implementation of a safety 
intervention developed based on the insight foundation built in the 
foregoing research studies.  
Methods – Study 1: 
• Review of relevant literature, 
• Quasi-experimental design, 
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• 360-degree feedback 
Findings – Study 1: 
• The model and a process of implementation were derived.  
• Despite best effort put into the development and implementation, the 
program participants refused to take part in the study shortly after its 
commencement.  
Aims – Study 2: 
• To investigate the reasons behind the failure of the intervention. 
Methods – Study 2:  
• Individual interviews with intervention participants and external 
experts. 
Findings – Study 2: 
• Interviews with the intervention participants helped to identify seven 
factors affecting motivations to participate in the study, 
• Interviews with external experts helped to identify a detailed process 
with a strong focus on the practicalities of the improvement programs 
implementation. 
Chapter 8 introduces a second intervention, implemented in a different 
department of the company.  
Aims: 
• To address the limitations of the previous study, 
• To develop a new model and a process of implementation of safety 
culture intervention. 
Methods: 
• Quasi-experimental design, 
• Standardised Work for Leaders (already existing in the company 
management system). 
Findings: 
• A statistically significant improvement in the experimental group was 
observed, 
• The potential causes of this improvement are discussed in depth. 
Chapter 9 offers a summary discussion of the results obtained in this research.  
Aims: 
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• To discuss the results of the investigation of the company’s safety 
culture, 
• To discuss the lessons learned from the implementation processes of 
two safety interventions, 
• To summarise the findings from chapters Three, Four, Five, Six and 
Seven,  
• To discuss how the findings of this study benefit current academic 
knowledge,  
• To make recommendations for business,  
• To suggest areas of future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
The costs of accidents and injuries reach billions of dollars and pounds in 
mature economies. Industrial accidents represent a cost to individuals, their 
organisations and society.  The cost to the United States' economy has been estimated 
to be $120.7 billion a year (National Safety Council, 1996). The cost to the British 
economy might have reached as much as £77 billion in 2004 (HSE, 2004). These 
costs may be even higher for countries with emerging economies. The cost for 
employers alone might have been between four and eight billion pounds in 2004. 
More recent research estimated the cost for employers in 2005/2006 between £2.9 and 
3.2 billion after exclusion of damage caused by workplace injuries and non-injury 
accidents (Pathak, 2008). It is not surprising then that a multitude of companies offer 
a variety of tools and approaches to improve safety and decrease the rate of accidents. 
A database search of companies in the UK (yell.com) provided 2533 companies 
associated with Health and Safety consultancy in the UK alone. However, the extent 
to which these companies’ solutions are evidence-based is questionable. If that is the 
case, the market is full of solutions of questionable effectiveness and companies 
without appropriate expertise choose the programs based on the selling points rather 
than hard evidence.  
One of the aims of this thesis is to add to the evidence base with regard to 
which safety interventions work and why. In order to achieve this, a sound theoretical 
background must be developed. The literature review will inform the development of 
safety culture interventions for implementation in the sponsor company. Additionally, 
it will help to develop the researcher’s notion of the field of culture, safety culture and 
interventions and also help to develop research hypotheses and identify a number of 
areas needing further research. 
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2.2. Organisational culture 
2.2.1. Definitions of organisational culture 
It is worth beginning by defining organisational culture with a broader 
definition of culture itself. The Dictionary.com (2010) defines culture as: “The totality 
of socially transmitted behaviour patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other 
products of human work and thought”.  
The Cambridge Dictionary of Psychology (Matsumoto, 2009, p. 146) defines it as: “a 
network of loosely interconnected knowledge  items produced, reproduced, and 
updated by a collection of interdependent individuals. An item in the network may 
refer to a certain declarative knowledge (know what: e.g., beliefs about the social 
norms) or a certain procedural knowledge (know how: e.g., thinking styles).” 
The definition of organisational culture directly refers to the general 
definitions mentioned above and worded by Schein (1996, p. 236), who describes “the 
set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a group holds and that 
determines how it perceives, thinks about, and reacts to its various environments”.  
In modern organisational studies organisational culture seems to be a pass-key 
to the majority of areas of organisational performance. It influences leadership 
(Baumgartner, 2009), information systems (Martinsons, Davison, & Martinsons, 
2009), the social responsibility of corporations (Ubius & Alas, 2009), human resource 
management (Grueso & Anton, 2008), organisational trust (Lawal, 2008) and 
management satisfaction (Lawal, 2008) to mention just the latest research. However, 
Brigges (1992), Choudhry et al. (2007) hold that the concept of culture has been over-
simplified in many organisational studies, mainly due to a notable diversity in the 
ways in which culture has been conceptualised and the range of culture paradigms 
used in organisational studies (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 
2004)  
2.2.2. Difference between organisational culture and organisational 
climate 
The history of organisational studies has developed two research paradigms - 
organisational culture and organisational climate - that focus on organisational 
settings and psychological variables. However, as these two research traditions refer 
to very similar sets of variables, there is an ongoing discussion (Alvesson, 1985; 
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Meyerson, 1991) over the questions of whether they examine the same phenomenon 
and which approach is the most adequate for the investigation of organisational 
settings. Proper distinction between these two traditions is very important from the 
point of view of a researcher as, on the one hand, the two traditions carry different 
epistemological assumptions and, as a consequence, preferences towards 
measurement methods and means of data analysis. 
Historically, the theoretical foundations of cultural studies were grounded in 
the symbolic interaction (Mead, 1934)  and social construction perspectives (Berger & 
Luckman, 1966), whereas the climate literature has its roots in Kurt Lewin’s (1951) 
Field Theory. According to Lewin (1951) behaviour (B) is a function (f) of a person 
(P) and environment (E): B=f(P,E). In his theory, to study organisational climate, a 
person must be analytically separated from the social context. Within this approach 
the “agents” of an organisational system, such as managers, are assumed but not 
studied directly. The “subjects” of that system, the employees or subordinates that are 
usually objects of study, work within the climate but do not create it. The effect of the 
system on individuals is examined, but the process by which this social environment 
is constructed is neglected. In opposition to the advocates of Lewinian theory are the 
supporters of the symbolic interaction perspective (Mead, 1934) and social 
construction perspective (Berger & Luckman, 1966) (foundations for cultural studies) 
who claim that an individual cannot be analytically separated from his environment 
and that he/she is an “agent” and a “subject” simultaneously. In this cultural approach, 
the recursive dynamics between an individual and the system are the primary topics of 
interest (Hatch, 1993; Rohlen, 1974). 
These two different epistemologies influence the research methods used, 
because if environments exist independently of an individual, as Lewin suggests, then 
it is more sensible to conceptualise, measure and compare them as social entities. 
However, if environments are considered inseparable from individuals and as unique 
social constructions, that creates unique meaning systems for their members (Lave & 
Wenger, 1990) and comparisons across settings are much more difficult if not 
impossible. For example, Joyce and Slocum (1984) argued that individuals sharing 
the same set of social-psychological variables should be regarded as sharing the same 
“climate”. On the other hand, Geertz (1973) suggests that meaning and symbolic 
representation can be understood only with respect to the specific settings and thus 
every culture is unique and must be investigated and described at the level that allows 
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an understanding of individual meaning and organisational symbolism. Therefore, 
studying culture requires qualitative methods and an appreciation of the unique 
aspects of individual social settings with an emphasis on the underlying assumptions 
(Kunda, 1992) and individual meaning (Pondy, Frost, Morgan, & Dandridge, 1983). 
By contrast, studying organisational climate requires quantitative methods to allow 
the generalisation of perceptions of observable practices and procedures across social 
settings (Guion, 1973).  
However, despite this arguably clear distinction between the terms, there is 
still a lot of confusion regarding their usage. A large number of articles can be found 
that apply quantitative research methods to the study of culture (Calori & Sarnin, 
1991; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Gordon & Ditomaso, 1992). It seems that, by 
applying survey methods to study the comparative dimensions of culture, these 
authors contradicted the epistemological foundations of culture research in 
organisational studies.  
Looking more closely at the subject literature and research undertaken it is not 
clear whether culture and climate represent two entirely separate phenomena or 
whether they represent the same phenomenon examined from different perspectives. 
For example, Schwartz and Davies (1981) developed a set of indicators that can 
reveal an organisation’s culture: decision making, communicating and organising. 
Interestingly, these dimensions overlap with the organisational climate dimensions 
developed by Taylor and Bowers (1972): decision making practices, communication 
flow and the organisation of work. Other examples refer to variables similar to culture 
or climate, like risk taking (Litwin & Stringer, 1968; Oreilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 
1991) or the concept of autonomy (Joyce & Slocum, 1982; Schein, 1985). There are 
even more fundamental similarities between the two approaches. Both perspectives 
attempt to address the problem of social context being simultaneously the product of 
individual interaction and a powerful influence on individual interaction (Ashforth, 
1985; Golden, 1992). Also, both perspectives are considered to be multilayered 
(Glick, 1985; Schein, 1985). Following an in-depth analysis of the differences and 
similarities between culture and climate, Denison (1996) concluded that these two 
research traditions should be viewed as a difference in interpretation of the same 
phenomenon rather than two different phenomena.  
Based on the arguments presented above, climate and culture will be 
considered in this thesis as two interpretations of the same phenomenon that call for 
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different research methods (qualitative for culture and quantitative for climate) to 
address differences in these interpretations. The terms “culture” and “climate” will be 
used interchangeably in this thesis. Further discussion regarding the relevance of these 
terms in safety science will be presented in the following sections of this chapter.  
2.2.3. Paradigms of organisational culture 
After many years of research there is still no consensus with regard to what 
exactly organisational culture is, or how to research it. There are many approaches 
that can be taken to understand this phenomenon, and many of them offer 
contradictory results. 
Three main paradigms can be distinguished. In the integration perspective, 
culture is a shared understanding. This approach seems to be the most popular one in 
the literature. Its supporters (e.g. Schein, 1985) hold that organisational culture has 
many manifestations, such as espoused values, formal practices, informal practices, 
stories about employees, rituals and jargon. Cultural manifestations are consistent and 
work as an integrative mechanism. One common culture in this approach is a sign of 
an organisation’s strength and diversity is treated as a signal of weakness. For 
example, O’Reilly et al. (1991) found that when there was higher similarity between 
values approved by managers and their subordinates, the job satisfaction of 
subordinates was higher and intention to leave was lower. This research advocates the 
main assumption of the integration approach, namely, that culture brings positive 
effects if it is unitised and strong. This approach also assumes that culture may be 
modified and used by management to influence the workforce (Schein, 1985). 
However, despite the popularity of this approach, it is not devoid of 
weaknesses: most studies focus on only one or two types of cultural manifestations 
such as values (Helfrich, Li, Mohr, Meterko, & Sales, 2007) instead of all of them. 
The consequent issue is that integration studies sometimes generalise from a single 
type of manifestation to the culture as a whole (Martin, 1992). There is also a 
measurement problem that refers to the attempts made to establish a causal 
relationship between organisational culture and organisational effectiveness (Yilmaz 
& Ergun, 2008). In reality, a company’s performance is affected by many non-cultural 
variables like economic conditions, product mix or competitors that should be 
controlled in such a study. Until then, any connection between culture and 
performance must be deemed unproven. Another methodological critique was made 
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by Alvesson (2002), who reviewed organisational culture studies to discover that most 
of these studies relied primarily on data from managerial and professional employees 
gathered by researchers who were employed by business schools and who, therefore 
presented the managerial point of view.  
The competitive approach to the integration perspective is a trend known as 
differentiation perspective,  which contradicts assumptions about unitary culture and 
emphasises that cultural manifestations are inconsistent and that consensus may be 
achieved only within sub-cultural boundaries (Young, 1989). Culture is seen as a 
product of social structures, determined by factors like division, department, 
workgroup (Choudhry, et al., 2007), profession, gender, class, ethnic group, nation 
(Richter & Koch, 2004) and hierarchy (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001). Cultures can 
coexist and some of them can be dominate over others (Richter & Koch, 2004). An 
example of this approach is provided by a study conducted by Bartunek & Moch 
(1991). They showed that five subcultures in a food production firm reacted 
differently to management’s imposition of a Quality of Working Life Intervention. 
An alternative approach called “ambiguity” or “fragmentation” states that 
interpretations of cultural manifestations are multiple – neither clearly consistent nor 
clearly inconsistent. Differences in meanings, values and norms are incommensurable 
and irreconcilable. The consensus is not organisation-wide nor is it specific to a given 
sub-culture.  In addition, during the continual process of developing meanings, 
members can orientate themselves differently at different times and stages (Richter & 
Koch, 2004). An example of the fragmentation approach is demonstrated by 
Robertson and Swan (2003) who studied highly educated consultants working in a 
knowledge-intensive firm where project work was fluid, complex and uncertain, 
making the acceptance of ambiguities unavoidable. The study demonstrated that in 
cultural research, the personal and subjective interpretation of ambiguities must be 
taken into consideration. This approach is in clear opposition to the two 
aforementioned perspectives and this contradiction is expressed by, for instance, 
Schein (1985), who dismisses the idea that ambiguity is a part of culture. 
Nevertheless, fragmentation research warns against the assumption that culture is 
defined by strongly shared values, interpretations and predictable behaviours (Martin, 
Frost, & O'Neill, 2006). 
It seems that these perspectives exist in conflict; however, none can be 
rejected, as all of them are supported by evidence, so it is not surprising that a meta-
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theory has been developed in an attempt to combine all of these approaches. Martin 
(2002), based on empirical evidence, demonstrated that all three perspectives may be 
found in any in-depth study focused on organisational culture and he assumes that 
when organisational culture is seen from these three perspectives a more complex 
understanding will emerge. This multiple configuration holds that different cultures 
can not only exist within the workplace, but can also overlap and interact (Richter & 
Koch, 2004). However, even though it is called a meta-theory, its weakness is that it 
is based on only the three major perspectives and ignores unclassifiable research 
(Martin, 1992). 
2.2.4. Layers and functions of organisational culture 
The existence of layers and functions of organisational culture was 
hypothesised by thinkers and practitioners like Keesing (1974) or Schein (1981, 1984, 
1985). Their ideas are based on theoretical insights and observations and no empirical 
evidence has been provided to support their statements. Nevertheless, their approach 
has been widely accepted by academics and practitioners and these authors are quoted 
in most text books about organisational psychology. Although there is no empirical 
confirmation of their ideas it is valuable to refer to these authors and their followers to 
analyse closely their arguments on the development of organisational culture research.  
According to Schein (1985), layers of organisational culture have different 
levels of accessibility. In the summary made by Glendon & Stanton (2000), layers 
were divided into three levels. The most accessible are (patterns of) behaviour, 
artefacts, language and stories. At the intermediate levels of accessibility are beliefs, 
values and behavioural norms that can be inferred from observed phenomena. The 
deepest level contains mental constructs that are named differently by different 
authors: underlying assumptions (Schein, 2004), fundamental assumptions, core 
values (Rousseau, 1990) and ideologies (Deal & Kennedy, 1986). They are often 
unconscious and may not be articulated (Glendon & Stanton, 2000).  
The functions of organisational culture were first described by Siehl and 
Martin (1984) and were later extended by Steven (1989) and Kreitner & Kinicki 
(2001). According to the aforementioned authors, organisational culture fulfils the 
following functions: 
1. It gives members an organisational identity and defines and maintains 
boundaries, allowing the identification of members and non-members. 
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2. It facilitates collective commitment. It provides shared patterns of 
affect, an emotional sense of involvement and commitment to 
organisational values and moral codes so that organisation members 
know what they are expected to value and how to feel. 
3. It promotes social stability. It provides patterns of cognitive 
interpretations or perceptions, so that organisation members know how 
they are expected to act and think. 
4. It shapes behaviour by helping members make sense of their 
surroundings. It functions as an organisational control system, 
prescribing and prohibiting certain behaviours. 
2.2.5. Effect on behaviour 
One of the functions of organisational culture is said to be the shaping of 
behaviour (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001). According to Argyris (1970) culture affects the 
type and quality of interpersonal relationships, which in turn affect people’s 
effectiveness. Certain shared cultural meanings define what are acceptable, natural, 
desirable ways of relating and acting in a given organisational context. Bate’s (1984) 
research findings suggest that certain cultural orientations have an important 
psychological impact, producing a sense of futility and pessimism in people.  An 
organisational culture can transmit to its members, a priori, the assumption that they 
are powerless – without their actually having to experience this at all. As a result 
helplessness becomes an internalised norm that is never tested and the resulting lack 
of change reinforces the initial cultural assumption. The culture is confirmed and the 
circuit between no action and no motivation is closed.  
Amsa (1986) demonstrated a strong relationship between organisational 
culture and “loitering” behaviours in a group of loom shed workers. The results of 
Marcoulides and Heck (1993) demonstrate that organisational culture affects 
organisational performance and productivity which is a direct consequence of 
behaviour. Carmeli (2005) demonstrated that an organisational culture that provides 
challenging jobs diminishes employees’ absenteeism and withdrawal intentions from 
the occupation job and the organisation. This relationship between dysfunctional 
culture and dysfunctional behaviour was confirmed by Balthazard, Cooke, & Potter 
(2006). Their results clearly demonstrate the positive effect of constructive cultural 
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styles, and the negative effect of dysfunctional defensive styles on operating 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
An indirect criticism of the relationship described above between 
organisational culture and behaviour is introduced by the systems theory, especially 
the open system framework represented by Katz and Kahn (1978), which would 
categorise the above research as reductionist, arguing that behaviour in organisations 
should be considered as one of the elements of the system. Systems thinking is a 
framework that is based on the belief that the component parts of a system can best be 
understood in the context of relationships with each other and with other systems, 
rather than in isolation. The only way fully to understand why a problem or element 
occurs and persists is to understand the part in relation to the whole (Capra, 1996). 
Burke and Litwin (1992), based on their extensive experience in delivering 
organisational change in large organisations, developed a model of organisational 
performance and change that uses an open system framework to operationalise the 
factors that may affect behaviour. The factors they propose to consider when 
investigating elements influencing behaviour are: 
• External environment;  
• Mission and strategy;  
• Leadership; 
• Organisational culture; 
• Structure; 
• Management practices; 
• Systems (policies and procedures); 
• Work unit climate; 
• Task and individual skills; 
• Motivation; 
• Individual needs and values;  
• Individual and organisational performance (behaviour). 
According to their model, every element from the list above influences all 
other elements. Therefore, to understand behaviour, the influence of all these factors 
should be considered and analysed not just culture. 
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2.2.6. Summary 
 The foregoing section provided a brief overview of our contemporary 
understanding of organisational culture and climate and provides the historical and 
conceptual backdrop to a safety culture paradigm. It draws heavily on the framework 
developed by Guldenmund (2000), who analysed an extensive number of literature 
studies about organisational culture and suggested six features of organisational 
culture: 
1. It is an abstract construct rather than a concrete phenomenon. 
2. It is relatively stable. 
3. It is something shared by groups of people. 
4. It consists of various aspects – different types of cultures can be 
distinguished within one company like: service culture, innovative 
culture, safety culture. 
5. It constitutes layers. 
6. It is functional – supplies a frame of reference for behaviour. 
The following section will introduce the concept of safety culture. Safety 
culture is considered a part of organisational culture and shares its properties. 
Therefore, safety culture should be discussed in the light of the above findings.    
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2.3. Safety culture 
2.3.1. Background and history  
The development of the safety culture concept is an effect of the evolution of 
safety management systems and understanding accident causation. The theories of 
accident causation have progressed through several stages in an effort to identify the 
root causes of system failures. The first stage, which spanned the period 1940-1960, 
was focused on machines and hardware improvements because, due to the rapid 
development of new machinery, most accidents were attributed to mechanical 
malfunctions (Cooter & Luckin, 1997). The second stage, which took place between 
1960 and 1980, focused researchers’ attention on human factors, because employees 
were seen as the weakest link in the system (Gordon, Flin, Mearns, & Fleming, 1996). 
The third stage considered the interaction of human and technical factors (Cooter & 
Luckin, 1997). The most recent stage considers organisational culture an influential 
factor (HSE, 2005a; Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002a, 
2002b). Zohar (1980), based on the work of Schneider (1975) on organisational 
climate, developed the concept of safety climate defined as “a summary of molar 
perceptions that employees share about their work environments…which acts as a 
frame of reference for guiding appropriate and adaptive task behaviours”.  
At around the same time as the disastrous nuclear accident at Three Mile 
Island (U.S.A.) in 1979 and Chernobyl (Ukraine) in 1986, public attention became 
focused on nuclear safety issues. The accident investigation in Chernobyl revealed 
many irregularities in organisational safety. The International Nuclear Safety Group’s 
(INSAG) Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl 
Accident, published by the IAEA as Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-1 in 1986, used the 
term “safety culture” for the very first time to describe a set of factors related to the 
organisational facets of safety (Choudhry, et al., 2007). INSAG’s publication made no 
reference to any academic literature. This case suggests that the term “safety culture” 
was not developed on the basis of organisational culture studies or other research in 
any other field (Choudhry, et al., 2007). The meaning of the term and its usage were 
undefined and left open to discussion and interpretation. The term “safety culture” 
was subsequently cited in major accident investigation reports, such as that of the 
Zeebrugge ferry sinking, the King’s Cross Underground fire, the Clapham Junction 
disaster, Piper Alpha (Clarke, 2000) and the structural break up and crash of 
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Continental Express Flight 2574 in Texas on September 11, 1991 (Wiegmann, et al., 
2004). 
As demonstrated above, historically, the two concepts of “safety culture” and 
“safety climate” were developed separately: “safety climate” had its genesis in the 
subject research literature and “safety culture” has been used arbitrarily by accident 
investigators with no reference to any scientific source of information (Choudhry, et 
al., 2007). 
It seems that the meanings of these two concepts were not distinguished 
explicitly and as a result they have been used interchangeably. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the origin of the term “safety climate” is related to organisational 
culture research heritage. Despite the vague heritage of the term “safety culture” and 
its confusion with “safety climate,” many authors attempted to distinguish these two 
terms. The next paragraph will introduce the differences. 
2.3.2. Safety culture and safety climate: distinction and definitions 
As these two terms – “safety culture” and “safety climate” – are being used to 
describe a similar phenomenon, they can be a source of confusion. The meanings of 
the two terms evolved alongside the development of safety management systems. The 
subject literature attempted on a number of occasions to establish a final definition of 
both terms and make an explicit distinction between their meanings.  
Wiegmann et al. (2002; Wiegmann, Zhang, et al., 2002a) analysed 18 articles 
that provide “safety culture” definitions and 12 articles that provide definitions of 
“safety climate”. They suggested a hybrid definition for the two terms: 
“Safety culture is the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public 
safety by everyone in every group at every level of an organisation. It refers to the 
extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for 
safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive to actively 
learn, adapt and modify (both individual and organisational) behaviour based on 
lessons learned from mistakes, and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these 
values”(p.8). 
“Safety climate is the temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to 
commonalities among individual perceptions of the organisation. It is therefore 
situationally based, refers to the perceived state of safety at a particular place at a 
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particular time, is relatively unstable, and subject to change depending on the 
features of the current environment or prevailing conditions”(p.10). 
Despite this analytical approach and summarised definitions, there is no 
common agreement on these definitions and the terms are still being used 
interchangeably in the literature (Jeffcott, Pidgeon, Weyman, & Walls, 2006). 
Therefore in the present work these terms will be used interchangeably as well. It is 
dictated by the arguments discussed in the previous section that climate and culture 
are facets of the same phenomenon. 
2.3.3. Components of safety culture  
Components of safety culture can be discovered using quantitative or 
qualitative methodologies. The quantitative approaches tend to use statistical tools 
such as Factor Analysis (FA), Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or Homogeneity 
Analysis (HOMALS) (Guldenmund, 2000) in order to identify the underlying 
structure (Wiegmann, et al., 2004) of the respondents’ tendencies to evaluate certain 
questions in questionnaires in a similar way (Guldenmund, 2000). The development 
of the dimensions and the final results depend on many methodological facets like 
question wording, style and number of items (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 
2000), different analysis tools like FA or PCA (Guldenmund, 2000), sample (size, 
composition), industry (Clarke, 2000), country of origin (Clarke, 2000) and the 
labelling of factors (authors have freedom in labelling factors and do not have to 
relate it to previous studies (Guldenmund 2000)). Idiosyncratic item writing (Flin, et 
al., 2000) and language used (Flin et al., 2000) can also be problematic. 
The aforementioned issues are responsible for a large number of dimensions 
reported in the literature. These factors also cause considerable disparity in the 
number of factors in different studies, which vary from 2 to 19 (Guldenmund, 2000; 
Flin et al., 2000) and are probably the reason for which different studies fail to 
confirm factor structures of previous studies (Guldenmund, 2000; Flin et al. 2000; 
Clarke, 2000).  
The meta-analysis of study results can be a solution to this problem. The aim 
of meta-research is to gather commonalities from a range of detailed investigations. 
Because names of factors are descriptive and strongly depend on the creativity of 
authors, a meta-analysis can be conducted only by using qualitative means to 
investigate its content.  
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There are two types of meta-studies available to identify the common 
components of safety culture. In the first type, authors compare studies that used 
variations of the factor analysis tool in order to explore or confirm the factorial 
structure of their data sets. In the second type, authors try to identify organisational 
indicators of safety culture based on a review of specific and detailed findings. There 
have been many recent reviews of the literature in this area. The spine of the literature 
review here is based on available review articles (N=6, which reviewed 62 papers all 
together – see Appendix B): three of them focused on comparisons of factorial models 
and another three sought to identify indicators of safety culture by reviewing other 
research papers and reports. It seems more valuable to review these reviews, 
especially in consideration of the fact that particular reviews cover only a fraction of 
the available materials and looking at a number of review studies may provide a more 
general insight into safety culture commonalities among a large number of scientific 
papers.  
A review conducted by Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis (2004) suggests that there 
are five main indicators of safety culture. Clarke (2000) analysed 16 studies that 
performed factor analysis and extracted the dominant themes common across the 
studies. It is worth mentioning that such meta-analysis is not a statistical one, but is 
based on analysis of labels and written descriptions of factors. She ended up with five 
main categories. A similar analysis was conducted by Flin et al. (2000). The authors 
analysed 18 studies and identified the five most common themes. Farrington-Darby 
(2005), after reviewing 15 studies, identified common factors. A literature review of 
10 studies conducted by Wiegmann et al. (2004) identified five indicators of safety 
culture and the report prepared for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2005b)  
identified five core dimensions. The table showing what papers were reviewed by 
each article may be found in Appendix B. Table 1 provides the names of the factors 
identified for every review paper.  
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Table 1. Comparison of safety culture dimensions identified in meta-analysis studies 
Dimensions identified in the meta -
analysis of studies that used factor 
analysis 
Dimensions identified in the literature 
reviews 
(Seo, et al., 
2004) 
(Clarke, 
2000) 
(Flin, et al., 
2000) 
(Farrington-
Darby, 
Pickup, & 
Wilson, 
2005) 
(Wiegman
n, et al., 
2004) 
(HSE, 
2005b) 
Co-worker 
safety support 
Work task/work 
environment 
Work pressure Reporting system Reporting 
systems 
Two-way 
communication 
Management 
commitment to 
safety 
Management 
attitudes 
Management/su
pervision 
Management 
commitment 
Management 
involvement 
Leadership 
supervisor 
safety support 
Management 
actions 
Risk Immediate 
supervisors and 
supervisor-
subordinate 
relationships 
Reward 
Systems 
Involvement of 
staff 
competence 
level of 
employees with 
regard to safety 
Individual 
responsibility 
and 
involvement 
Competence Individual and 
behavioural 
factors 
(involvement, 
competency, 
training, attitude, 
behaviour 
Employee 
Empowermen
t 
Existence of 
learning culture 
employee 
participation in 
safety-related 
decision making 
and activities 
Safety 
management 
system 
Safety system Rules and 
procedures 
Organisationa
l commitment 
Existence of just 
culture 
   Communication   
 
This summary shows that the common factor identified in all reviews, and 
therefore in all reviewed papers, was leadership (blue) and its different aspects 
(management attitudes and actions, commitment, involvement, supervisory support 
and relationship). The second most common factor was employee 
involvement/empowerment (red). Four out of six review studies identified it as 
common to most of the research papers they reviewed. There are a number of safety 
culture indicators identified by only two out of six reviews. These are: safety 
management system (green), competence (yellow), communication (violet), and 
reporting systems (orange). Nine out of 31 (29%) indicators identified by all reviews 
were unique. This suggest that despite very intense research effort focused on 
discovering what safety culture really is and what it is composed of, there still 
remains disagreement with regard to most indicators. The only factor identified by all 
studies is the importance of management being involved in H&S issues. The 
explanation of the ways in which management may support safety and the mechanism 
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underlying their effect on companies’ safety culture will be described in the next 
section. 
2.3.4. Safety culture and leadership 
The analysis of the common safety culture indicators, discussed in the 
previous section, revealed that only the leadership involvement was common to all 
reviewed studies. In order further to investigate the relationship between safety 
culture and leadership it seems justified to introduce the concept of leadership styles 
and their effect on safety culture, to analyse the effect of different functional positions 
(supervisors and managers) within a company on safety culture, and to analyse what 
specific managerial and supervisory behaviours affect safety culture. 
In recent years different dimensions of leadership research have been merged 
into two basic styles (HSE, 2005b; Judge & Piccolo, 2004): “transformational 
leadership” and “transactional leadership”. Transactional leadership refers to the 
nature of the relationship between a leader and his or her subordinates. A good 
transactional leader can reconcile his or her self-interest with that of the employees. 
The transactional leadership (Whittington, Coker, Goodwin, Ickes, & Murray, 2009) 
style has two main sub-dimensions: active (also called constructive) and passive (also 
called corrective or management by exception). Zohar (2002) added a third 
dimension: laissez-faire style, but Krause (2005) opines that this style is not a 
dimension of the transactional-active style, but refers to an abdication of leadership 
responsibility. Hence it is an effect of lack of leadership rather than a dimension of a 
particular leadership style.   
In the transactional-active style (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1998) a leader clearly 
communicates his or her expectations to his or her employees and then monitors and 
reinforces good performance. He or she is concerned with members’ welfare and 
seeks to identify their needs, desires and capabilities in order to offer motivationally 
relevant rewards. Such an approach results in a reduction of power distance and 
results in closer relationships between the leader and the subordinates. On the other 
hand, the transactional-passive (Bass & Avolio, 1997) style is deployed by a leader 
who waits until something goes wrong (detection based on active or passive 
monitoring) and reacting with the appropriate consequence (correction in relation to 
required standards). This style expresses a lower level of concern for workers’ welfare 
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and results in a poorer, non-individualised interaction between a superior and 
subordinate (Zohar, 2002b). 
The second leadership style - transformational - (also called relationship-
oriented, charismatic or inspirational (Krause, 2005)) is characterised by value-based, 
individualised interaction, resulting in greater concern for employees’ welfare 
(Simola, Barling, & Turner, 2010). This style is focused on the future and the 
development of relationships between leaders and followers. The role of a leader who 
deploys the transformational style is to inspire employees to go above and beyond 
their mere self-interest (Krause, 2005; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008).  
Leadership style is related to safety performance. Zohar (2002a) found a 
significant positive relationship between transformational leadership and safety 
climate (defined as supervisory communications with their subordinates about safety 
issues: r=.048, p<.01) and transactional-active leadership styles and safety climate 
(r=0.34, p<0.05). Moreover, there is a negative relationship between the transactional-
passive style and safety climate (defined as prioritising safety over production) (r=-
0.33, p<0.05) and the same dimension of safety climate and laissez-faire leadership 
styles (r=0.41, p<0.01) (see Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006). Zohar’s results 
indicated that the transformational leadership style positively influenced open safety 
communication, whereas transactional-passive leadership style increased the priority 
of production over safety. Furthermore, Zohar (2002a) found that the transformational 
style and transactional-active styles predict injury rate after controlling for risk in 
investigated departments, and that this relation is mediated by a dimension of safety 
climate related to communication. The results of multiple regression yielded the 
following values for the transformational style: TL(β)=-0.38, p<0.01; risk(β)=0.07; R2 
=0.14, p<0.05 and the following for the transactional active:  TAL(β)=-0.29, p<0.05; 
risk(β)=0.05; R2 =0.21, p<0.05 These findings were confirmed by Krause (2005) and 
Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway (2002). Moreover, research by Kelloway, Mullen, & 
Francis (2006) not only confirmed the above, but also demonstrated that the 
transactional-passive leadership style has a detrimental effect on both safety climate 
and safety consciousness. Authors applied structural equation modelling and indicated 
that safety-specific transformational leadership predicted safety climate β=.28, p<.01 
and safety consciousness β=.25, p< .01 and that these two variables were also 
negatively predicted by safety-specific safety leadership (safety climate: β=.-25, 
p<.01 and safety consciousness: β=-.33, p<.01). Their model accounted for 56% of 
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the variance of safety climate and 46% in injuries. These findings were confirmed by 
Mullen & Kelloway (2009) who found that providing training on transformational 
leadership to a group of managers in the health-care sector resulted in significant 
improvement in safety climate perceptions. The authors randomly assigned managers 
working in the healthcare sector to three training groups. One group was given 
training on general transformational leadership; the second group was trained in 
safety-specific transformational leadership and the third group, the control group, did 
not receive any training. The safety climate and skills of the leader’s were assessed 
before and after training. The results indicated that safety-specific training produced 
the strongest improvements: F(2,54)=2,69, p<.05 and that there was a significant 
effect of training on safety climate (F(2,10)=3,55, p<.05) (see also Parry & Sinha, 
2005).  Conchie & Donald (2009) investigated the interdependence between 
transformational leadership style and safety citizenship behaviour to discover that this 
relationship is moderated by the level of safety-specific trust (γ=.09, p< .05). The 
transformational style affected safety behaviour only when there was a high (simple 
slope=.30; t=2.28; p<.01) or moderate (simple slope=.22; t=1.94; p<.01) level of 
safety-related trust. There was no effect with low levels of safety-specific trust 
(simple slope=.14; t=1.03; ns). The reason behind that finding may be the role of trust 
which affects followers’ vulnerability to the leader’s suggestions. Yule & Flin (2002) 
found that two elements of the transformational leadership style (intellectual 
stimulation and idealised consideration) and one element of the transactional 
leadership style (contingent reward) were found to be significantly associated with 
lower accident rates. The evidence for this relationship is strong and is further 
confirmed by McFadden, Henagan, & Gowen (2009, p. 399), who found that:  
“The charismatic-inspirational leadership style is directly related to a culture 
of safety within the hospital, which is tied to the successful implementation of PSI 
(patient safety initiatives), and ultimately to improved PSO (patient safety outcomes). 
These PSO include the reduction in the frequency, severity, and impact of errors, as 
well as heightened awareness and understanding of errors.” 
These results suggest that the transformational style of leadership is of great 
importance, as it leads to improvements in safety performance and reduced injury 
rates, even in environments in which a low priority is assigned to safety. It is of great 
significance that training may make a conspicuous difference. This offers some hope 
that safety may be improved by improving the leadership style of the top 
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management. However, further research is needed to identify what type of training is 
most effective.  
Although every leader in organisational settings will have a specific leadership 
style, it is argued that different functional positions (directors, managers, supervisors) 
affect safety differently (Flin & Yule, 2004; Luria, Zohar, & Erev, 2008; Zohar, 
2000). Thompson, Hilton, & Wilt (1998) demonstrated that managers’ support for 
safety had different outcomes than supervisors’ support for safety: χ2(1)=51.69, 
p<.001. Namely, managers’ support was a mediator between organisational politics 
and safety conditions, whereas supervisor support for safety was a mediator between 
supervisor fairness and safety compliance.  
It is further argued that this divergence arises from differences in managerial 
and supervisory duties (Thompson, et al., 1998).  Zohar (2005) claims that these 
differences create two types of safety climate in a company. The first one – 
organisation level climate - is related to shared perceptions of institutional procedures 
created and implemented by managers. These perceptions inform employees of the 
desired role behaviour and suggest priorities for competing goals. The second one – 
group level climate - is related to workers’ perceptions of supervisory practices. The 
predictive validity of this construct was established by correlating organisational level 
safety climate safety audit scores (r=.46, p<.01) and group level safety climate with 
safety behaviour observations (r=.38, p<.01). 
It seems that the discussion of leadership styles, while informative, is still 
quite generic and does not clearly express what exactly supervisors and managers 
must do in order to improve safety climate. To address this limitation, the literature 
was examined to identify what types of behaviours are important for shaping safety 
culture in companies.  
2.3.5. Safety culture and employee behaviours 
Supervisory and managerial behaviours 
17 papers were found on the subject of supervisory behaviours and 11 papers 
examining managerial behaviours. The behaviours listed in these papers were coded 
by the researcher in order better to understand what classes of behaviour shape safety 
culture. This allowed the creation of a number of dimensions, or categories, of 
supervisory and managerial behaviours. The full list of categorised behaviours with 
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the literature sources can be found in Appendix B. The grey rows in the table below 
show corresponding areas – similar groups of behaviours in both groups that affect 
safety climate. The numbers in brackets indicate how many particular behaviours 
were identified in the literature review as belonging to a particular category. It seems 
clear from this comparison that there is more insight into the behaviours of 
supervisors than that of managers.  
Table 2. Numbers of supervisory and managerial behaviours identified in the subject 
literature 
Supervisors Managers 
Category Sub-category Category Sub-category 
Can be trusted (4)  Can be trusted (1)  
Does not turn a blind 
eye (7) 
 Does not turn a blind 
eye (2) 
 
Communication Discusses safety (6) Communication Discusses safety (3) 
Praises safety 
behaviours (8) 
Praises safety 
behaviours (1) 
Welcomes reporting 
safety issues (8) 
Welcomes reporting 
safety issues (5) 
 Explains/educates about 
safety (5) 
 Provides safety 
information (9) 
Provides safety vision 
(1) 
Repeatedly emphasises 
importance of safety 
(10) 
Sets consequences for 
behaviours (2) 
Provides feedback (3) 
Improves safety 
knowledge (1) 
 Considers safety 
important (8) 
 
Is fair (5)  Promotes peoples based 
on safety records (1) 
 
Cares about personal 
issues of his group 
members (3) 
 Prevents safety 
problems (2) 
 
 Allocates safety 
resources (3) 
   
Monitors / observes / 
controls behaviours 
(10) 
   
Engages employees in 
safety activities (9) 
   
Acts based on 
suggestion (4) 
   
Leads by example (6)    
 
There are some areas of safety-related behaviours that are common to both 
functional groups, such as discussing safety, praising safe behaviour and welcoming 
the reporting of safety issues. These are the elements of communication that, 
according to the literature, should be demonstrated by supervisors and managers. Not 
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turning a blind eye and building trust are other shared features of leaders in both 
functional positions. Here the similarities end. With regard to other components of 
communication, the role of the manager is to provide strategic safety information like 
statistics and informing personnel of new policies etc. The role of the supervisor is to 
provide a more contextualised understanding of safety by educating or explaining, 
emphasising the importance of safety, providing feedback on performance and 
reprimanding if necessary. The analysis suggests that, in order to enhance safety 
culture, supervisors should monitor the behaviour of their team mates while 
maintaining interest in their personal matters and trying to create a positive 
atmosphere of cooperation. Moreover, good supervisors engage their operatives in 
safety activities, welcome the reporting of safety concerns, and act on these 
suggestions. They also lead by example and do not use double standards.  
However, with regard to managerial behaviours, the literature is more vague. 
The listed behaviours are not very specific. The list of behaviours may be limited due 
to the fact, that it is difficult to investigate managerial behaviours as this group is not 
easily accessible. This limitation shows that further research in that field is necessary.   
Blue-collar workers behaviours 
When trying to analyse the relationship between safety culture and safe 
behaviour, the problem of the definition of safe behaviour is encountered. Is it 
reactive (avoiding danger) or proactive (removing hazards)? The problem of 
definition is crucial and it has profound methodological consequences related to 
measurement. There is no explicit definition of safe behaviour in the literature. This is 
because what is safe or unsafe is defined by the context of a particular workplace. The 
type of work, legal rules, local policies and procedures and managerial expectations 
define what behaviours are welcomed and which are forbidden.  
Another problem concerns the question of whether safety climate is related to 
safe behaviours directly or whether it is mediated by other factors. Research 
conducted by Glendon & Litherland (2001) supports a direct relationship between 
these two variables; however, there are a considerable number of studies 
demonstrating a non-direct relationship mediated by: production pressure (Hofmann 
& Stetzer, 1996), leadership (Zohar & Luria, 2003) or knowledge and motivation 
(Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000; Larsson, Pousette, & Torner, 2008; Neal & Griffin, 
2002).  
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Clarke (2006b), in her meta-analytic review of 35 studies, demonstrated that a 
positive safety climate is significantly correlated with better safety performance, and 
in particular with safety participation. However, looking more closely at these and 
newer studies not included in the review, a number of concerns emerge. Firstly, the 
research studies come from different countries: China (Zhu, Di, Gui, & Clissold, 
2010), Australia (Fogarty & Shaw, 2003), USA (Morrow et al., 2010) or Turkey 
(Omer & Selahattin, 2009), and this limits their generalisability. Further, most of 
these studies (except Cooper & Philips (2004), who applied observational methods) 
use self-report questionnaires to establish the rate of unsafe behaviours. This practice 
raises serious questions regarding the ecological validity of these studies, i.e. to what 
extent the behaviours reported by employees really took place in their work 
environments. Another difficulty is the validity and reliability of the measures 
originally developed in English-speaking countries and subsequently translated.  
Also, the definition of unsafe behaviour is not unified. For example, Wills, 
Watson, & Biggs (2009) discuss unsafe driving behaviour, Garavan & O'Brien (2001) 
discuss a variety of behaviours including breaking safety rules, communication or 
housekeeping. This lack of a clear definition of unsafe behaviour partially stems from 
the fact, that, depending on the industry, different behaviours are considered unsafe; 
this confuses the understanding of the concept of unsafe behaviour and limits the 
comparability of these studies.  
In addition, different studies use different safety climate measures that focus 
on a diverse range of dimensions. For instance, safety climate in the study of Morrow, 
et al. (2010) consisted of three factors: management safety, co-worker safety and 
work-safety tension, whereas in the study of Omer & Selahattin (2009), safety climate 
consisted of  five factors: PPE use, training, absence of work pressures, maintenance 
and spares and communication. Despite these limitations, the relationship between 
safety climate and safety behaviours remains positive in the majority of studies. The 
only study known to the researcher that failed to replicate this positive relationship 
was the one of Glendon & Litherland (2001).  
2.3.6. Safety culture and injury/accident rate 
The relationship between safety culture/climate and injury rate is complicated 
and unclear mainly as a result of the measurement issues. Different studies encompass 
different levels of analysis (Clarke, 2000):  
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• comparing two groups of employees within one company – with a high 
level of injury rate and with a low level of injury rate and comparing 
individual climate scores;  
• aggregating climate scores across teams, groups and departments and 
comparing with injury rates;  
• comparing high- and low- injury-rate companies on aggregated climate 
scores; and 
• some studies refer to injuries (lower severity) and accidents (higher 
severity). 
Different levels of analysis can result in different results. Another problem 
relates to gathering injury data. Different companies have different standards and 
different countries have different legal standards for reporting injuries and accidents. 
Thompson et al. (2007) give three reasons for which the accident rate is not a good 
measure of a company’s safety: 
• accidents are usually rare events, so the frequency of accidents can be 
statistically unreliable due to the restriction of variance; 
• accidents are not always under the control of job incumbents; 
• accidents are not always consistently recorded. Probst and Estrada 
(2010) demonstrated that for every reported accident there were on 
average 2.48 unreported accidents. 
Cooper (2000) adds that these type of data ignore the different exposures to 
risk inherent in occupations and that this can result in under-reporting or over-
reporting (see Thompson, et al., 1998). 
Taking these disadvantages into consideration, Zohar (2000) introduced a new 
outcome criterion called “micro-accidents”. This measure refers to on-the-job 
behaviour-dependent minor injuries requiring medical attention that meet the 
following criteria: 
• injury was suffered during the course of work activities; 
• injury was sufficiently severe to discount the possibility of an 
unjustified visit to the infirmary; 
• injury was suffered as a result of a role-related behaviour. 
Zohar listed the methodological advantages of this approach, arguing that 
micro-accidents: 
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• occur much more frequently than lost-work accidents and result in a 
homogeneous distribution as a function of time; 
• provide an objective measure of behavioural safety unaffected by 
sources of bias associated with self-reporting; 
• are strongly associated with lost-days accidents. 
 In his research, micro-accidents correlated significantly with lost-days 
accidents (r=.29, p<.05) and were significantly predicted by the safety climate scale 
(Zohar, 2000). However, the relationship between micro-accidents and major 
accidents is unknown and it is possible that they have different antecedents (HSE, 
2002). Also, Chmiel (2005) did not find a relationship between safety climate and 
micro-injury rates. However, he used a different method to measure micro-injuries – a 
self-report injury checklist (Chmiel, 2005), whereas Zohar gathered his data with the 
help of medical staff from the company’s infirmary (Zohar, 2000). It may be argued 
that independent medical examination of micro-injuries is a much stronger measure 
than self-reported survey, as the latter method is subject to a number of cognitive 
biases that may distort the results (see Chapter 7). 
Despite this limitation, many more studies use self-report measures (e.g. 
Bjerkan, 2010; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Nielsen, Rasmussen, Glasscock, & 
Spangenberg, 2008; Tomas, Melia, & Oliver, 1999) rather than information from 
companies’ databases (e.g. Varonen & Mattila, 2000; Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 
2006). Also, many studies investigating the impact of safety climate on accident use 
different measures made up of different dimensions, and this limits the 
generalisability of the findings. For instance, Neal & Griffin (2006) defined and 
measured safety climate as the degree to which safety is valued in organisations, 
whereas Nielsen et al. (2008) used a Danish safety culture questionnaire composed by 
leadership, organisational and worker factors. Furthermore, models that seek to 
establish the type of relationship between safety climate and injury rate / accident rate 
provide inconsistent results suggesting variously, for example, that accident rate is 
directly predicted by safety climate (Wallace, et al., 2006) or that relationship is 
mediated by safety behaviour and hazards (Oliver, Cheyne, & Tomas, 2002; Tomas, 
et al., 1999). Despite these limitations all of the studies cited above reported a positive 
effect (direct or indirect) of safety climate on the injury/accident rate. However, in 
order to empirically evaluate these studies it will be useful to quote here a meta-study 
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conducted by Clarke (2006), who noticed that the relationship between safety climate 
and accident involvement was moderated by the study design. After statistical 
analysis of 35 research studies she found that safety climate shows a small positive 
correlation with occupational accidents and injuries (p=.22), indicating that the more 
positive the safety climate, the lower the rate of injuries and accidents. 
2.3.7. Conclusions  
 In general, the literature indicates that there is little agreement regarding the 
definition of the safety culture and safety climate concepts. Moreover, some studies 
suggest that these are just different aspects of the same phenomenon, and therefore it 
was decided to use these terms interchangeably in this thesis. Also, it was apparent 
that safety climate / culture consists of a number of dimensions and that there is 
similarly no shared agreement on what factors constitute the concept of safety culture. 
The variety of factors obtained seems to suggest that there is no one generic structure 
of safety climate; rather, the dimensional composition depends on the specifics of the 
industry sector and contextual variables of particular companies. Despite the lack of 
agreement on the factorial structure, the majority of studies appear to agree that the 
most important factor of safety climate is management engagement; however, despite 
the numerous research studies in the subject, it remain unclear specifically what 
supervisory and managerial behaviours constitute that factor.  
The topic of safety culture is considered important as it is argued that it affects 
safety behaviours and accidents in companies. The articles reviewed seem to confirm 
that premise, as the majority of individual papers and meta-analyses confirm that 
relationship. However, the mechanism that underlies this relationship, and whether 
the impact of safety climate is direct or mediated by other elements, both remain 
unclear.  
Although research is needed to clarify these unknown elements, a number of 
attempts have been made to influence safety climate and improve general safety in 
companies. The next section will discuss these attempts in more detail. 
2.4. Safety culture interventions 
Hybrid definitions of safety culture, such as that offered by Wiegman et al. 
(2002), describing it as enduring value and priority placed on safety at every level of 
an organisation, suggest that there may be range of ways and strategies to improve 
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safety culture. The process of planned improvement of one or more aspects of safety 
performance related to perceptions of safety is called an intervention. Some 
interventions are focused on changing behaviour of line employees, others on 
modifying leadership behaviours and yet others on introducing a combination of 
socio-technical factors.  
2.4.1. Behavioural based safety 
One of the most popular methods of affecting safety performance (but not 
necessarily culture) is by changing the behaviour of particular groups of workers. This 
approach is widely used by the business sector and eagerly tested by academics 
(Geller et al., 1990; Krause, 1999; Tuncel, Lotlikar, & Salem, 2006). Different names 
for such methods are used in the literature: “organisational behaviour modification 
(O.B.Mod.)” (Pidgeon, 1998), “behaviour-based safety (BBS)” (Stajkovic & Luthans, 
1997) and “antecedents, behaviour, consequences (ABC model of behaviour, ABC 
framework)” (DePasquale & Geller, 1999).  
The theoretical foundations of this approach echo behaviourism with 
Thorndike's law of effect (1913), Skinner’s “principle of reinforcement” (1938), 
Locke’s task motivation (1982) and Latham & Lee’s goal setting (1986). 
Reinforcement theory links all of these human actions with environmental variables 
(antecedents and consequences), so that changes in environmental conditions affect 
behaviour and knowledge about these relationships and facilitate learning (Thorndike, 
1913).  
The first notes about the successful application of the ABC program that 
resulted in the modification of line-employees’ behaviours come from the early 1980s 
(Geller, 1984; Van Houten & Nau, 1983). This method has been constantly 
developing and today is used to change not only workers but also supervisors’ and 
managers’ behaviour (Krause, 2005).  
The  following are examples of the different methods that have been used to 
elicit behavioural change: 1. Goals (Marsh et al., 1995), 2. Feedback (Cooper & 
Philips, 1994), 3. Praise (Sigurdsson & Austin, 2006), 4. Training (Reber & Wallin, 
1984), 5. Tokens (Austin, Kessler, Riccobono, & Bailey, 1997), 6. A combination of 
the foregoing (DeJoy, 2005). Behaviour based safety is considered fairly effective. 
Stajkovic & Luthans (1997), in their meta-analysis of studies evaluating behaviour-
based safety interventions, indicated a significant effect of these programs on safety 
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performance (size effect=.51). These findings were confirmed by another meta-
analysis conducted by Krause et al. (1999), who analysed 73 companies that 
implemented behaviour-based safety programs and discovered that, on the whole, the 
sites involved benefited from a significant reduction in accidents compared to 
baseline (t (72)=7.31, p<0.0001). However, this figure may be distorted as the authors 
managed to obtain data from only 73 out of 229 companies identified for inclusion in 
the study. It may be argued that one of the reasons for not disclosing data about the 
effectiveness of the program’s implementation was its failure in the business context, 
demonstrating that failure of performance is avoided due to business image and 
financial issues. Although this is only a hypothesis, the figures on the effectiveness of 
behaviour-based interventions should be interpreted with caution.  
Despite these encouraging results, the behavioural approach to safety has a 
number of limitations. It will not be effective if employees do not have the necessary 
skills to perform their task safely (Sulzer-Azaroff, 1987) or if an organisation lacks 
requisite equipment or materials (Lingard, 1995). It often fails to involve contractors 
and so it does not cover all people on site (Marsh, 1995). Also, the expected level of 
resistance to BBS methods is high (Reber, Wallin, & Duhon, 1989). In order to 
reinforce safety behaviours, they need to be measured and monitored, so BBS systems 
tend to focus on easily visible and highly repetitive behaviours (Marsh, 2005). This 
may lead to missing rare behaviours or other actions that could have disastrous 
consequences. The majority of BBS programs do not attempt to improve managerial 
behaviours (Fleming & Lardner, 2002b) and if the management is not committed to 
the change program the failure of the intervention is very likely (Marsh et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, Deci (1999), in her meta-analysis of 128 studies on the effect of 
contingency-type rewards (like those used in the BBS programs) on intrinsic 
motivations, demonstrated that performance-contingent rewards significantly reduced 
internal motivation to perform tasks. Therefore it may be argued that BBS systems, 
although able to modify behaviours, may have a detrimental effect on employees’ 
internal motivation.  
2.4.2. Modifying supervisory and managerial behaviours 
Despite the recognition that management is the most important factor affecting 
safety culture, the literature on the modification of their behaviours is almost non-
existent. A unique approach to this problem was proposed by Zohar (2002, 2003). He 
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argued that instead of analysing antecedents and consequences by an external 
consultant (what is usually the case in BBS systems), an effective supervisor can 
deliver incentives and feedback as a part of his or her daily routine (Zohar, 2002). As 
a result the supervisor becomes responsible for safety and his or her supervisory 
practice is modified. To achieve sustainable change, the role definitions of employees 
at all levels of the hierarchy need to be changed. In their study, conducted in an oil-
refinery and canning and distribution companies, bi-weekly feedback was given to 
shop-floor supervisors (level-1) and their immediate superiors (level-2). The feedback 
evaluated reported interactions concerning safety between supervisors and their 
subordinates.  Managers (level-2) received comparative information about their 
supervisors and were trained to provide information to supervisors about their relative 
position in terms of the adequacy and frequency of their interactions. Senior managers 
(level-3) also received information about the impact of supervisory practices on an 
operative’s behaviour. This approach resulted in a change of role definition of 
workers and supervisors that became a self-reinforcing mechanism, sustaining change 
over time. This was evidenced by an observed steady increase of supervisory 
interactions with shop-floor workers (from 20-30% to 60-70% depending on the 
company), a concurrent steady decrease in unsafe behaviours (from 20-30% to 0% 
depending on the company) and a significant improvement in terms of safety climate 
after the intervention compared to the baseline. 
Zohar’s approach to the modification of safety behaviours is fairly new and no 
replication or critique was found in the available literature. However, it may be 
argued that Zohar’s intervention addresses only one aspect of safety, i.e. supervisory 
and managerial safety-related behaviours, analogues to what is called in the subject 
literature “management engagement”. As was demonstrated in the literature, safety 
culture concerns more factors than simply management engagement. Nevertheless, it 
is the only study known to the researcher that focused on changing supervisory and 
managerial behaviours. 
2.4.3. The socio-technical approach to safety improvements 
Another example of a project that focused on changing safety culture in order 
to reduce the accident rate was presented by Rasmussen et al. (2006). The authors 
considered an organisation as being a complex and adaptive environment in which 
physical problems are part of a wider strategy and include safety culture, psychosocial 
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environment and managerial issues. The intervention simultaneously pursued a 
number of different projects related to safety. 12 groups were established responsible 
for subprojects focusing specifically on: chemical products, PPE, new safety 
instruction for chemical and physical hazards, video recording, education and 
learning, employee courses, proactive safety organisation, information and 
communication, occupational medical examination, safety rounds and team 
production. Each project group contained two workers, two supervisors and one to 
two researchers. A steering committee was established to determine the overall 
priorities and economic issues. A group reporting to this committee was a project 
coordination group. Both groups (steering committee and project coordination group) 
consisted of four managers, four employee representatives and two researchers. 
Overall responsibility was assigned to the company’s manager. Additionally, once a 
year the group of researchers met with the senior management to discuss the progress 
of the intervention and establish a plan for the following year. The intervention was 
preceded by ethnographic work, individual interviews and focus groups with the 
representatives of all levels of the hierarchy, investigating issues relevant to every 
sub-project group. Further, a safety culture questionnaire was developed and 
administered. Each group responsible for a sub-project developed its own agenda for 
what change was needed and its progress was measured against it. Changes involved 
training on new technical and psychosocial skills, production changes, job role 
changes and many others. The project lasted for 3.5 years. It resulted in significant 
improvement in safety climate scores and lost-time accidents. This approach 
represents a holistic approach to organisational change, in which many aspects are 
modified. The change process takes a long time and involves substantial resource 
input by the company and researchers. 
Another approach to the cultural change of an organisation was presented by 
Fitzgerald (2005). Following the assessment of culture with an appropriate survey, 
which helped to identify potential issues, a meeting with the management was 
organised in order to discuss the results. At the meeting priorities for change were 
established (e.g. clarifying roles and responsibilities, hazard spotting, management 
engagement) and a plan was developed. The company in question rolled out a 
workshop program to increase awareness and win buy-in. The workshops improved 
reporting of near-miss incidents and the involvement of employees in auditing 
activities. In the next stage a safety culture survey was administered again. Based on 
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the data obtained a new improvement plan was developed. However, the exact actions 
were not described in the paper. Also, data were not provided on the improvements, 
on the leadership engagement or on difficulties with the implementation. This is a 
simplified approach, in which an action plan was being developed on the basis of 
safety culture survey results.  
A similar strategy, but with a differently designed change program, was 
introduced by Donald and Young (1996). Their goal was to improve attitudes towards 
safety. The authors organised departmental safety teams that met once a week and all 
members of staff were involved. Each team identified urgent safety issues and 
developed an action plan that was written down and team members were charged with 
responsibility for the plan. Additionally, action plans were developed for the 
management and region’s safety committee. Definitions of job roles and 
responsibilities were included in the plan. At every meeting of the safety committee 
the progress and successes were discussed. The minutes from the meetings were 
presented to the staff in the form of bullet points. Next, a senior manager developed a 
strategic action plan and visited sections of the organisation to discuss the plan with 
employees. Each team was provided with its own budget for resolving safety issues. 
In order to improve and clearly define the roles and responsibilities, a 2.5-day 
workshop was organised, focusing on the role of safety representatives and the role of 
section leaders. This intervention resulted in an improvement in attitudes towards 
safety, lost-time accidents, self-reported accidents and self-reported absenteeism. The 
limitation of the method was that safety-outcomes were measured through self-
reported questionnaires, which carries a risks of bias in the results. Also, the 
description of the intervention did not discuss stumbling blocks and barriers during 
the process of implementation and such information would be extremely useful.  
2.4.4. Unclassified 
There are also interventions that apply more selective and narrow tools to 
improve safety climate. For example Thomas et al. (2005) demonstrated that an 
intervention that encouraged executive directors in hospitals to do a monthly walk- 
round improved safety climate, but not significantly. Another intervention (Nielsen, 
Carstensen, & Rasmussen, 2006) obliged employees to report lost-time incidents, 
minor incidents and near misses, assuming that this would improve the company’s 
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ability to remove risks and hazards. The improvement in safety climate was 
significant.  
Also, safety climate may be improved through training. Harvey, Bolam, 
Gregory, & Erdos (2001) demonstrated that providing a one-day training session with 
the object of raising general awareness of safety issues and behaviours followed by 
the development of the improvement plan and participation in the action prescribed 
brought improvement in safety climate, but only in the group of higher-grade 
employees. Mullen and Kelloway (2009) demonstrated that providing training to 
senior managers on safety-specific transformational leadership resulted in a 
significant improvement of safety climate.  
2.4.5. Summary 
The examples of interventions presented above demonstrate a variety of tools 
applied to achieve the goal of improvement in safety culture and some of them pride 
themselves on reducing the number of accidents.  
2.5. General discussion 
The literature review presented above helps to understand that despite the vast 
amount of research in organisational culture and safety culture that has been 
conducted to date, there is no shared agreement with regard to its very basic elements 
and indicators. There is an ongoing and unsettled discussion over definitions, 
paradigms, layers and functions of organisational and safety culture. However, new 
meta-studies that are beginning to emerge suggest that different names (culture vs. 
climate) and different paradigms are actually just different sides of the same concept. 
Within this hot debate, however, there are areas of agreement. It is understood that 
cultural indicators are not easily accessible and are rooted in the deep psychological 
processes of individuals. A number of approaches offer ways of accessing these, from 
analysing layers of culture and deducing deeper layers based on superficial indicators 
(Schein, 1995), to analysing the language used by employees (McDermott & 
O'Connor, 1996). It seems that research and insight in the safety culture arena does 
not go that far and confines itself to easily accessible behaviours and attitudes of 
employees.  
Despite a history of more than 20 years of research, quantitative, survey-based 
methods dominate the safety culture field. Countless research papers are available in 
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the scientific data bases, but looking at meta-analyses there is very limited agreement 
with regard to the composition of indicators of safety culture. In fact, the consensus is 
limited to only one variable, namely, management engagement, in different shapes 
and forms. This finding fits well with the understanding of the process of creating 
organisational culture described by Schein (1995), in which the founder and other 
leaders create and then shape the culture of their organisation. In this light, 
management engagement could be the only factor of safety culture. All other 
variables identified might just be derivatives stemming from managerial actions. This 
might explain the variance in the number of identified indicators of safety culture in 
the literature, as all of them would be context specific, dependent on local 
management and not generalisable to other places. Research in leadership style seems 
to confirm this assumption. Style is an expression of managerial assumptions and 
values with regard to what is important to lead an organisation successfully, and is 
demonstrated through a number of context-specific behaviours and attitudes that are 
slightly different for particular functions and levels of hierarchy (as demonstrated in 
the analysis of managerial and supervisory behaviours reported in the subject 
literature to date – Section 3.4.). It is argued that these behaviours and attitudes 
express norms, values and priorities, and communicate expectations to subordinates 
about what is desired and through that process create a frame of reference for 
employees’ behaviours (as shown at the beginning of this chapter). Furthermore, it 
may be argued that managerial behaviours and attitudes shape a whole system of an 
organisation which is, as argued by Attwood (2006), the background for, and a source 
of industrial accidents and injuries.  
In the light of the foregoing argumentation and evidence, accepting the 
assumption that leadership is the primary factor of safety culture, safety culture 
interventions should focus on reshaping the impact that managers have on their 
organisation. However, it ought to be emphasised that there is a lack of research in 
this field for a good reason. It is difficult to arrange such change programs in practice 
for a number of reasons. The nature of directors’, managers’ and other leaders’ jobs 
usually require independence and creativity of them. Their responsibilities are 
unstructured and they are the people influencing others. This context may make 
behaviour-change methods irrelevant, as there are no specified behaviours to change. 
Rather there are guidelines to follow based on certain values and assumptions. 
Therefore, the approach of changing these underlying priorities requires special 
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means; possibly psychology-based coaching. A significant number of companies 
offering business psychology services and executive coaching may be “real-world” 
evidence supporting this assumption. Nevertheless, despite the available insight, BBS 
methodologies dominate in practice and research and there is only a handful of papers 
available reporting on culture change programs other than BBS. There is even less 
research focused on managerial change and no study was found that focused on 
change of the executive/top management group. This demonstrates that safety culture 
interventions do not address the source of culture directly, but rather attempt to affect 
it indirectly.  
The research and the discussion above demonstrate that there is a gap in 
knowledge with regard to the best ways of affecting the most important factor shaping 
safety culture leadership. 
2.6. Critical findings 
1. There is no shared agreement with regard to the definitions of “safety 
climate” and “safety culture”, and these terms can be used 
interchangeably. 
2. Companies may have many cultures at the same time. 
3. Culture serves as a frame of reference for behaviours. 
4. “Management engagement” is the only component of safety culture 
reported by the majority of subject research studies. 
5. “Transformational leadership” and “active-transactional leadership” are 
leadership styles that positively affect safety culture. 
6. Different functional positions affect safety culture differently and are a 
source of different types of safety climate. 
7. Safety culture is significantly correlated with safe behaviours and 
injury rates. 
8. There is a wide range of tools used to improve safety culture. 
9. Behaviour-based safety is the most popular change program, 
10. There is no shared agreement on what is the best way to improve safety 
culture. 
11. Further research is required in order to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the process of development and implementation of 
safety culture interventions. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, workplace safety culture is a facet of 
organisational culture (Guldenmund, 2000) and relates to the “shared perceptions 
among members of an organization with regard to organizational policies, 
procedures, and practices.” (Zohar, 2000, p. 587). The presence of a positive safety 
culture is reflected in significantly better safe behaviours (Clarke, 2006b) and lower 
injury rates (Zohar, 2000). Therefore improving safety culture has the potential to 
save employees’ health and lives, reducing hardship to employees and their families 
and reducing employer overhead costs. 
To date, the psychometric tradition represents the primary contribution to the 
research in this area, at least by volume, reflecting attempts to establish the factorial 
structure(s) of safety culture (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; O'Toole, 2002; 
Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997). Despite the fact that these studies 
arguably offer valuable insights into which variables are salient, the complexities and 
subtleties surrounding how they affect employees’ orientation towards hazards and 
behaviour in relation to risk remain under-explored and under-articulated.  It is held 
that insight and understanding at this level of detail is a key to the development of 
effective safety culture enhancement interventions. 
By contrast, there are relatively few academic studies that report attempts at 
intervention and the enhancement of safety (Zohar & Luria, 2003), and of these, the 
majority are restricted to the comparatively narrow focus of changing employee 
behaviour (Hickman & Geller, 2003; Hudson, 2007; Saari & Nasanen, 1989; 
Williams & Geller, 2000). A common feature of almost all intervention studies in this 
area is that they appear to gather very little evidence on why interventions were 
successful or unsuccessful. This is held to be important as it is likely that the research 
evidence base in this area is contaminated by a conflagration of interventions that 
failed due to shortcomings in the theory of change at inception, and those that failed 
Chapter 3 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 46 
 
simply due to shortcomings in their configuration or roll out, rather than some 
inherent conceptual flaw.  By inference, it is possible that some proportion of the 
transparent inconsistency in the research findings in this domain may be attributable 
to the relative paucity of evidence on the criteria for rolling out successful 
interventions. 
The lack of scientific research focused on the practicalities of delivering safety 
improvement programs has been recognised by a number of recent authors (Wirth & 
Sigurdsson, 2008), but the gap in knowledge is substantial and a number of research 
questions must be answered within the safety domain of safety culture improvement.  
This thesis aims to contribute to current knowledge by developing safety 
culture interventions, implementing them and reflecting on the implementation 
process, as well as evaluating their effectiveness. It is hoped that it will contribute to 
the knowledge base not only regarding the variables that shape workplace safety 
culture(s), but also in terms of understanding the criteria for successful 
implementation.  
3.2. Research objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to gather intelligence on the basis of volitional risk 
taking in the workplace and to use this insight to develop sustainable interventions 
that have a positive impact on safety culture. Achieving this objective will include: 
1. Deriving a detailed insight on the interplay of cognitive and socio-
cultural influences on employee risk-taking behaviour by investigating: 
1.1. the perceptions of safety-related variables of employees 
working  in different departments at different levels of the 
organisational hierarchy; 
1.2. the distribution of these variables in a large sample of the 
company’s employees. 
2. Reducing the incidence of employee risk-taking behaviour through: 
2.1. designing, implementing and evaluating safety culture 
enhancement initiatives; 
2.2. gaining insight into the process of the implementation of safety-
improvement interventions. 
3. Demonstrating improvements in safety performance. 
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3.3. Research design 
Research design, in general, is a guideline indicating research strategy and 
informing research actions. It helps to specify what kind of evidence is to be gathered, 
from where, and in what ways it will be interpreted. The section below will introduce 
three major epistemological paradigms and justify the choice of one of them. The 
discussion of corresponding methodology stemming from the accepted paradigm will 
be introduced, and will create a background for a description of the research stages. 
3.3.1. Epistemology 
In the literature there are two main approaches to research on safety culture / 
climate: quantitative and qualitative. The former usually uses surveys and the latter 
uses interviews, and in the majority of cases researchers use only one approach at a 
time. These two approaches are the derivatives of two separate epistemological 
paradigms: positivist and constructivist. The word “paradigm” was introduced by 
Thomas Kuhn (1970), an American philosopher who interpreted it as a set of beliefs 
shared by a scientific community together with their accompanying methods (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985). It is not a methodology, but rather a philosophy that suggests how the 
research is to be conducted. However, the most important is that a paradigm 
determines what research questions are legitimate and how they ought to be answered 
(Gliner & Morgan, 2000).  
Supporters of the positivist paradigm state that there is a single tangible reality 
that can be broken down into independent variables and that can be studied 
independently. A researcher and the object of inquiry are independent from each 
other. The aim of scientific inquiry is to develop knowledge in the form of “true 
statements” that are independent of the time and context. Scientific inquiry is value- 
and bias-free due to the use of objective scientific methodology (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). However, these are just assumptions about the reality developed on the basis of 
historical debates of philosophers (Kuhn, 1970). Scott and Usher (1996, p. 13) 
comment: “All of these assumptions have been critiqued. It could be argued for 
instance that in making a knowledge claim it is not simply a matter of appealing to 
logical and universal rules because, since all knowledge claims involve justification, 
they all have a social dimension. Claims are justified within contexts of collectively 
held conceptions about the world, and how to relate to it and know it. What we can 
conclude from this is that methods are embedded in commitments to particular 
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versions of the world (an ontology) and ways of knowing that world (an 
epistemology). These commitments are always held by the researcher, mostly tacitly. 
This means that no method is self-validating, separable from an epistemology and an 
ontology.”Additionally, epistemologies, defined as ways of justifying knowledge, are 
culturally, historically and value-driven but the positivist approach does not recognise 
these limitations (Kuhn, 1970). Most importantly, the positivist paradigm almost 
negate the value of subjective meanings developed by research participants, what 
seem to be quite important in the context of researching safety culture as 
understanding values of particular working groups may help to modify their 
behaviours.  
The constructivist approach is an alternative paradigm opposing the main 
assumption of the positivist approach. The constructivist paradigm differs from the 
positivist one with regard to the core assumptions about the nature of reality, the 
relationship between the knower and the known, the possibility of generalisation or 
the role of values in scientific inquiry. It states that scientific knowledge is 
constructed by scientists and does not derive from the world. There are multiple 
constructed realties. Knowledge is socially constructed and consciousness is a social 
construction. A researcher and an object of inquiry interact and influence each other, 
and are therefore inseparable. The aim of scientific inquiry is to develop working 
hypotheses for particular cases. Scientific inquiry is influenced by researchers’ values 
expressed in the choice of problem, framing the problem and choosing the paradigm 
with which to investigate the problem (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The constructivist 
paradigm brings a number of challenges that must be solved. Firstly, it may lead to 
relativity which in its extreme form is untenable (Gillett, 1998). Secondly it may lead 
to circularity of interpretations as the meaning of a research study depends on the 
meaning of the science and the meaning of science depends on particular studies 
(Scott & Usher, 1996). Furthermore, knowledge derived under this paradigm is not 
generalisable and never complete due to its dependency of the context. That creates a 
number of practical difficulties because even if one can develop some insight about a 
research subject it is not possible to use this knowledge in other context. The 
constructivist paradigm justifies and values gathering subjective, contextualised 
information but on the other hand it criticises collecting quantifiable results (Orlando, 
1998).   
Chapter 3 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 49 
 
Particular paradigms with their assumptions about knowledge and reality 
identify their preferred methods of inquiry. The positivist paradigm, with methods 
allowing for quantifiable results, definitely dominates the field of safety culture. 
Qualitative methods are used rarely and reluctantly, mainly due to the substantial 
amount of effort needed to analyse qualitative data. The supporters of one paradigm 
put themselves in a position of conflict with the supporters of the other paradigm 
(Reichardt & Rallis, 1994). However, House (1994) argues that the debate between 
the supporters of the paradigms stems from a “misunderstanding of science”, as both 
paradigms bring valuable insights in the process of “discovering the world”. 
The available evidence in the safety culture arena demonstrates that the use of 
both the positivist paradigm (and quantitative approach) or the constructivist 
paradigm (and qualitative approach) are justified and offer valuable insights into 
different elements of constructing safety culture: individual and group meanings as 
well as their distribution across large samples. In this context, a decision to use only 
one paradigm and approach is limiting and would restrain the development of an in-
depth understanding of the researched phenomenon. This argument is exceptionally 
strong in the light of the discussion about the relationship between climate and culture 
(see Chapter 2), which seems to suggest that these concepts are just the two sides of 
the same coin (Denison, 1996) and differentially reflect qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, which the majority of safety culture studies seem to avoid considering.  
Gliner & Morgan (2000) suggest that the choice of method (and thus 
paradigm) should be based on the purpose of the research. If the aim is to identify 
causes or predict behaviour, then a methodology supported by the positivist view 
should be applied. On the other hand, if the purpose of the research is to describe the 
participants’ beliefs fully, the methodology based on constructivism is more suitable. 
It is now important to remind that the objective of this thesis is to derive a detailed 
insight about employees’ perception with regard to safety variables as well as 
investigating the distribution of those perceptions so a change intervention could be 
designed for chosen working groups. Thus, the researcher requires an approach that 
would combine positivist and constructivist paradigms.    
The answer may be the pragmatist paradigm, which was introduced by Howe 
(1988). His main point was that qualitative and quantitative methods are compatible 
and as such researchers could use both of them in their studies. Pragmatism accepts 
both “objective” and “subjective” points of view. It admits that values play an 
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important role in interpreting results. It accepts external reality and chooses 
explanations that best produce the desired outcomes. This tenet was later supported by 
Brewer and Hunter (1989), who claimed that using compatible methods required the 
integration of different theoretical perspectives to interpret data, and also by Reichardt 
and Rallis (1994), who suggested that these two paradigms and its methodologies 
agree with the “principle of the under determination of theory by fact”. This states 
that any set of data can be explained by a number of theories.  
The pragmatist paradigm has become more and more popular in the scientific 
community in recent years. Establishing the Journal of Mixed Methods Research in 
January 2007 may be seen as one of the indicators of the growing popularity of this 
approach. Pragmatism promotes applied research, suggesting  that what is of interest 
and value to researchers should be studied in the way they deem appropriate, and the 
results should be used in ways that bring positive consequences within their value 
systems (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Pragmatically oriented theorists and 
researchers refer to mixed (triangulated) methodology, which contains elements of 
both quantitative and qualitative studies (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). Moreover, this 
insight is enriched by the conclusions of Denison (1996), who suggested that, as 
culture and climate may reflect the same reality but from different angles, the 
corresponding methodologies (qualitative and quantitative) historically assigned to 
these phenomena may in fact complement one another. Following the suggestion of 
Gliner & Morgan (2000), the choice of methodology should suit the purpose of the 
research. Therefore it is argued that a triangulated (mixed-method) methodology is 
likely to afford the richest insight into the set of variables affecting safety culture / 
climate, and as such would be the preferred choice of over a purely qualitative or 
quantitative approach. 
3.3.2. Triangulation methodology 
The term “triangulation” comes from Denzin (1978) and originally referred to 
a nautical process in which two points and their angles were used to determine the 
unknown distance to a third point. Denzin’s approach used different data sources to 
study the same phenomenon. A year later, Jick (1979) discussed “within-method 
triangulation” using multiple quantitative or qualitative research methods for the same 
research, and “across-methods triangulation”, was mixed qualitative and quantitative 
means of investigation in the same study.  
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Triangulation is a research approach that recommends using two or three 
different methodologies and study designs in order to double- or triple-check results 
and avoid the methodological limitations associated with single approaches. 
Triangulation usually mixes qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Glendon & 
Stanton (2000) cautioned that there are not many studies that implement triangulated 
methodologies and advances are required in this arena. This approach allows for a 
multi-level analysis of safety culture by conducting interviews, surveys, audits and 
document analysis (Choudhry, et al., 2007). 
In response to the methodological gaps in the literature with respect to 
justifying the use of mixed methodologies, Bailey and Hutter (2008) offered a linked 
trajectory of method triangulation (LTMT). Their technique seeks to combine two 
methodologies, starting with gathering qualitative data to get in-depth, contextualised 
insights and subsequently quantifying the results by developing and administering a 
survey on a large sample of respondents.  
Following the recognised limitations of using only one paradigm in research 
(House, 1994) and the benefits of a mixed-methodology approach in the pragmatist 
paradigm (Feilzer, 2010), it was decided to develop a triangulated approach to 
research in this thesis and to combine a number of different methods. The decision 
was also supported by the suggestion of applying triangulation within the safety 
culture domain (Glendon & Stanton, 2000), supported by the evidence of successful 
application of mixed methodologies (Bailey & Hutter, 2008).  
3.3.3. The uniqueness of the Ph.D. project 
In contrast to the mainstream psychometric tradition that dominates safety 
culture research, this study used an embedded approach. The researcher was located 
within the study organisation for three years. This degree of embeddedness offered an 
opportunity for what is thought to be a unique (in the safety culture field) level of 
exposure to the socio-technical complexities that characterise how risk is understood 
and reacted to by employees. The researcher presented himself to the management as 
a Ph.D. student whose task was to develop tools to develop the company’s safety 
culture further. The sponsor company used to sponsor students in the past and it was a 
common practice. There was an important consequence of being a student within this 
organisation – it meant not having authority, either formal or informal. Formal 
authority was linked to the position occupied in a company and the amount of power 
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that could be exercised over others. The informal authority was linked to the respect 
given by others due to knowledge or other attributes that were important within a 
given group. The difficulty of the researcher was that he did not have any of these; the 
researcher was not even an employee of the sponsor’s company. Furthermore, the 
researcher’s role was not clarified formally at the beginning, making it vague to all 
parties. The researcher was perceived by the management as somebody working for 
an external institution with his own agenda and who should not be engaged in 
operational routines. Furthermore, at the beginning of the studentship the researcher 
was unfamiliar with the concept of safety culture and so could not serve as a trusted 
advisor on this matter. The role of the researcher was not clearly described. On the 
one hand it provided an opportunity to the researcher to define the role in cooperation 
with others; on the other hand it created confusion about the nature of the cooperation 
between the researcher, the university and the sponsor company. However, despite the 
aforementioned challenges the embedded approach permitted an exploration of the 
micro-political and cultural aspects that are at risk of being obscured where more 
distal investigatory methods are applied. 
This approach was initially inspired by Beynon (1984), who, having had an 
opportunity to conduct a survey in one of Ford’s factories, was given access to the 
internal environment of this car production company. He described the shop floor and 
relations with management vividly, providing an extensive contextualised insight on 
the conflicts between workers, what bonds them, relations with stewards, apathy and 
contempt. Beynon demonstrated how rich the picture of employee relations can be if 
studied from within a company’s environment.  
Furthermore, having a desk in the company offered a unique opportunity of 
access to the representatives of all functional positions in all the company’s locations 
(buildings, departments, cells and lines) and allowed for the application of the mixed 
methodology discussed in the previous section. It allowed for an ethnographic 
approach to be undertaken by spending much time on the shop floor with people 
working physically (Brooks, 2005, 2008; Walker, 2010). It also allowed for the 
analysis of safety-related documentation (Richter & Koch, 2004). It also provided an 
opportunity for informal conversations and individual interviews with shop-floor 
employees (Naevestad, 2008; Parker, Lawrie, & Hudson, 2006) and with senior 
management (Gyi, Gibb, & Haslam, 1999). Furthermore, it allowed for group 
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interviews to be organised (Jeffcott, et al., 2006), followed by a safety culture survey 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000).  
This embedded perspective is based on the premise that sustainable safety 
improvement interventions benefit from being bespoke and rooted in contextualised 
insight (Jeffcott, et al., 2006; Weyman, Pidgeon, Walls, & Horlick-Jones, 2006). 
The methodological trajectory of this thesis was influenced by a recognition of 
a plateau in the research findings in the field of safety culture, in particular 
psychometric findings, the limited consensus among studies over key variables and 
insights from relatively recent qualitative studies that highlight the importance of 
context (Pidgeon, Walls, Weyman, & Horlick-Jones, 2003). Other influences relate to 
the socio-political context in the UK and discussions over the best approach to the 
application of academic knowledge in practice (Boud & Solomon, 2001). For 
example, “work-based learning” is said to highlight an array of benefits associated 
with conducting research in a position embedded in the work environment of the 
study population (Garrick & Rhodes, 2000).  
To summarise, the embedded approach applied in this thesis was inspired by 
past research and public discussions over the best approach to education, and was 
justified by the goal of triangulated methodology allowing for in-depth insight into the 
variables affecting employees’ behaviours and attitudes.  
3.3.4. Stages of research 
This section will provide an overview of a range of activities undertaken in 
order to achieve the research objectives. In general, this Ph.D. study was carried out in 
four main stages: background research, familiarisation with the company, deriving 
insight about perceptions towards safety (focus groups) and its distribution across 
departments and functional positions (safety culture questionnaire), developing, 
implementing and evaluating safety interventions.  
Phase 1: Background research (Chapters 2 and 3) 
• literature review, 
• identification of the core safety culture components discussed in the 
literature,  
• identification of a set of variables affecting safety culture, 
• developing the research strategy. 
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Phase 2: Familiarisation with the company (Chapter 4) 
• unstructured interviews with the sample of employees (N=69), 
• non-participant observations in production departments, 
• analysis of safety documentation, 
• analysis of past surveys, 
• analysis of past safety interventions. 
Phase 3: Investigating perceptions of safety and its distribution (Chapters 5 and 6) 
• focus groups 
o developing a question set based on insights from the literature 
and process of familiarisation, 
o organising pilot discussion , 
o organising focus groups, 
 N=6 with the operatives, 
 N=1 with supervisors, 
 N=1 with managers, 
o analysis of data. 
•  safety culture questionnaire 
o analysing and comparing insights from: 
 the literature review, 
 the process of familiarisation, 
 focus groups, 
o developing item pool, 
o piloting the survey, 
o administering the questionnaire, 
 N=443 in 2008, 
 N=227 in 2009, 
o data analysis. 
Phase 4: Developing, implementing and evaluating safety culture enhancement 
interventions (Chapters 7 and 8) 
• Intervention 1 
o identification of the research sample, 
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o identification of the tool measuring safety culture and related 
variables, 
o developing safety behaviours observational checklist, 
o developing the intervention model, 
o administering pre-test measures, 
o implementation of the intervention, 
o investigating the reasons for the failure of the intervention, 
 conducting individual interviews with intervention 
participants, 
 conducting phone interviews with external safety 
experts, 
o analysis of the interviews results. 
• Intervention 2: 
o identification of the research sample, 
o identification of the tool gauging safety culture and related 
variables, 
o developing safety behaviours observational checklist, 
o developing the intervention model, 
o administering pre-test measures, 
o implementation of the intervention, 
o administering post-test measures, 
o analysis of data. 
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Chapter 4 
Familiarisation with the 
Sponsor Company 
4.1. Introduction 
A primary aim of this Ph.D. thesis was to explore the variables that affect 
safety culture(s) at the company, with a view to developing effective safety culture 
improvement interventions.  
The research in this project was limited to one large organisation. All methods 
that were developed as part of this Ph.D. sought to aid in making changes in that 
specific context. Therefore the first question that was asked was: “What is the safety 
culture of the company” or potentially “What are the company’s safety cultures” if 
more than one were found. This was also the research question of data-collection 
stage of this Ph.D. (Chapters 4 - 6), which sought to familiarise the researcher with 
the phenomenon he intended to modify.  
There is some evidence in the safety culture literature that people’s 
perceptions of safety (as one of an array of variables that impact on behavioural 
norms) affect safe behaviours (Clarke, 2006b), indirectly having an impact on 
accident rates. Based on that information, it was assumed that through the 
modification of perceptions (safety culture) it was possible to impact risk-taking 
behaviours, which was at the centre of the attention of the company sponsoring this 
project.  
4.1.1. Aim 
To gain a contextualised, grounded insight into the nature and socio-technical 
context of work at the company. 
4.1.2. Objectives 
1. To gain an appreciation of: 
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a. the physical and managerial structure, 
b. the array of production processes and technical systems in each 
department at the site, i.e. production processes, technologies 
and human-machine interaction, 
c. the principal job roles and tasks performed by personnel within 
production departments. 
2. The principal hazards and risks associated with the production 
processes.  
4.2. Method 
A mixed-methods approach was adopted on the grounds that the 
complementary use of a range of data types would maximise insight and appreciation 
of the complexities of the subject matter (Marshall & Rossman, 1998) (see Chapter 
3). 
It was important for the researcher to familiarise himself simultaneously with 
the range of activities undertaken by the company as well as with its history in the 
areas relevant for the research. Two approaches were undertaken: active and passive. 
The passive one focused on the familiarisation with different types of documentation, 
including safety policies and procedures, the analysis of past safety interventions and 
the results of surveys conducted in the past. The active approach involved a 
combination of participative activities used with a view to gaining an in-depth, 
contextualised understanding of the organisation, its socio-technical systems, hazards 
and staff orientations to associated risks (Patton, 1990). This included participating in 
management meetings, observation of the production processes and unstructured 
interviews with employees. During this process a research diary was kept.  
The following sections will describe in more detail the familiarisation 
activities undertaken by the researcher, discussing the passive analysis first, followed 
by the active analyses. These stages were conducted simultaneously and they 
complemented each other.  
4.3. Familiarisation with safety documentation 
The written safety documentation of the sponsor company contained a wide 
range of information that guided the management and employees in their daily tasks 
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and set a framework for decision making when dealing with safety issues. From the 
legal point of view, the organisation was obliged to develop and keep certain safety 
documents, which will be described in the following subsections.  
4.3.1. A Health and Safety Policy 
A Health and Safety Policy is a plan detailing how the company is going to 
manage Health and Safety issues. It is a unique document for every company and 
usually consists of three sections: 
1. The “statement of intent” section sets out the company’s commitment 
to managing Health and Safety effectively. 
2. The “organisation” section states who is responsible for what. 
3. The “arrangements” section contains the detail of what the company is 
going to do in practice to achieve the aims set out in its statement of 
intent.  
As the company belongs to a multinational corporation, which was an 
American company, the main safety documentation was prepared by headquarters 
based on the requirements of OSHA (Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration), which is the American counterpart of British HSE (Health and 
Safety Executive). These documents were then interpreted and adapted by the 
business groups i.e. factories specialised in the production of similar products. 
Finally, their documents were interpreted by particular sites in different countries with 
special attention paid to the local and international (EU & ISO) safety requirements. 
The company interpreted corporate safety documentation and adapted it to the UK 
safety law and context of the site. A discussion of the content of the company’s 
extensive safety documentation is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the 
interpretation of the function of the extensive safety procedures will be provided in 
the discussion section at the end of this chapter.  
4.3.2. Accident database 
An accident database was managed by the sponsor company independently of 
other companies belonging to the same corporation, and it includes all reported 
injuries and accidents. All accidents and injuries (including RIDDOR - Reporting of 
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations - but excluding near 
misses) had to be reported to the headquarters using two means: updating an online 
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corporate database of accidents and sending summarised reports on a monthly basis. 
The accident rate in the company was presented in Chapter 1. The accident statistics 
show that the rate of accidents and injuries was declining with every year. Although 
no hard evidence is available, that may be due to a number of safety-focused 
interventions undertaken since the corporation bought the sponsor company.   
4.4. Analysis of past safety interventions 
4.4.1. Interventions introduced by corporate management 
The information about past safety interventions was based on the verbal accounts of 
the safety team members. It is believed that no safety intervention was introduced by 
corporate management other than the three described below. The information about 
past safety interventions was based on the verbal accounts of the safety team members 
(N=4) collected during individual interviews (N=4). 
Assessment in Motion (AIM)  
The program was introduced in 2005 and lasted about 2 years. Health and 
Safety officers trained a number of representatives from chosen departments. These 
individuals were responsible for the assessment of machinery guards and working 
behaviour in order to identify hazards that could potentially damage hands or fingers. 
They used assessment forms and risk assessment tools. The aim of their work was to 
suggest solutions and if necessary, to raise a ticket to engage maintenance help.  
Red Flag Program  
The main goal of this intervention was to engage the employees on an ongoing 
basis to detect hazards and raise tickets to maintenance in order to remove them. The 
program was introduced in the summer of 2005 and was closed in the winter of the 
same year. The program followed a number of steps: 
1. Health and Safety officers trained a handful of workers (appointed by 
department supervisors) from every department, 
2. individuals were asked to identify hazards in the working areas they 
were familiar with, 
3. individuals filled out a report form and forwarded it to the Health and 
Safety department in order to enter it into a database, 
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4. individuals hung a “red flag” on or near the hazardous place/element. 
The note included basic information about the reporter and the nature 
of the hazard. 
In comparison with AIM, this program focused on a wide range of hazards, 
including but not limited to hands and fingers.  
Injury Free Event (IFE)  
This program aimed to engage all workers to report near misses and unsafe 
behaviours. Mini-books containing short reporting forms were handed out to all 
employees. The idea behind this intervention is based on Heinrich’s concept of the 
safety triangle (1954), later tested and verified by Bird & Germain (Bird & Germain, 
1997), which described the relative frequency of near misses, property damage 
incidents, minor injuries and major injury, in a ratio of 600:30:10:1 respectively. It 
means that for every 600 near misses, ten minor injuries and one major injury occur 
(Bird & Germain, 1997). Thus, the number of near misses can be used as a diagnostic 
tool predicting major injuries.  
The program was implemented in the following stages: 
1. all supervisors from all departments were trained in what the initiative 
was about, and in how to use and fill out the mini-IFE book, 
2. supervisors were obliged to provide training to all of their subordinates 
and distribute mini-IFE books, one for every employee, 
3. a special data base, separate for every department, was prepared to 
allow the gathering of the reported information and help departmental 
managers to keep a record of what was resolved. 
 As far as the researcher was aware, no systematic evaluation was undertaken 
of any of these methods. The commentaries about the programs were obtained from 
verbal accounts of the safety team. In an applied, pragmatic context of business, 
usefulness and perceived benefit were used as evaluative criteria. The AIM program 
was perceived as effective but simply petered out. The reason provided by the safety 
team members was the lack of managerial ownership. The red flag program helped to 
identify and remove many hazards but was abandoned after about six months. 
Employees identified hazards with visible “flags”, but as the company failed to 
resolve many of them, they were still hanging 12 months after the first notice, causing 
the frustration of employees. The IFE program is still ongoing. Again, based on the 
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verbal accounts of the safety team members, it was suggested that the systematic 
evaluation of these programs was not undertaken due to alack of knowledge (how) 
and resources (who). 
4.4.2. Interventions introduced by the local management 
Local Safety Teams (LST)  
LST describes an initiative run from 2004 to 2006 in which every department 
had a group of volunteers that consisted of two line employees; one supervisor was 
chosen in order to detect hazards on a weekly basis and raise maintenance tickets (an 
internal tool of the maintenance department used to queue and prioritise tasks to do, 
reported by employees from other departments). The participants in this program were 
trained in hazard detection by the Health and Safety officers.  
The were several differences between this program and the Red Flag 
programme. Firstly, LST started earlier and was introduced by the local management. 
Red Flag was developed by an independent management group and implemented on 
site in South Western England. Further, the small LST team involved supervisors, 
whereas the Red Flag program was aimed only at shop-floor employees. Finally, the 
reporting systems of identified hazards were different.  
Tactical Safety Teams (TST)  
This program was an answer to the high number of accidents that occurred in 
2001 (about 750 incidents). It was initiated in 2002 by the plant manager and was 
completed in 2004. The main goal of this intervention was to improve discipline in 
the auditing of hazards and make managers responsible for safety. In every 
department one team was created and a departmental manager was responsible for 
selecting its members. The initiative was driven top-down in collaboration with the 
HR department. It included weekly safety audits and raising maintenance tickets. 
Every two weeks all intervention participants gathered for a summary meeting and 
particular teams presented the results of their work in front of other teams. According 
to a manager overseeing this program, shared events helped to maintain a high level 
of motivation and responsibility. In 2004 a person responsible for the intervention was 
replaced and the new leader was not able to maintain the program efficiently. The 
number of accidents decreased from 750 in 2001 to about 300 in 2004. This 
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improvement was attributed by the management to the intervention described above, 
but no rigorous systematic evidence was collected that could support the connection. 
4.5. Familiarisation with the results of past surveys 
There were two major surveys conducted at the company that sought to gather 
opinions from the majority of employees. The first one was called “People skills” and 
was administered in 2003 and 2004. The second one, “Global Voices”, has been 
administered once a year ever since 2006. 
4.5.1. People skills 
The initiative was started by the general manager of the plant and the Human 
Resources department. It aimed to identify the training needs of supervisors and 
managers relating to people-management and team-leading skills. An external 
company was asked to conduct 40 individual interviews to gather employees’ views 
on the company’s operations. The 40 individuals were chosen on an opportunity basis 
to provide a spread of perspectives from a range of departments. The demographic 
information about the sample was not available. The information about the reasons for 
the small sample was not provided in the report created by the consultants, so only 
speculative answers can be provided. Potentially, the managers recognised the need to 
assess their people skills (hence the survey) as they might have suspected this aspect 
of their performance was causing some tensions / conflict with the workforce. It is 
plausible that this conflict was responsible for the small sample, but this is just 
speculation. The interviews were followed by a survey targeted at all employees. The 
researcher did not have access to the questions asked during the interviews or to the 
results of the analysis of the interviews.  
Following the qualitative work, a pen-and-paper survey was administered, 
consisting of 57 questions relating to the business processes, management, 
communication, motivation and decision making. Additionally, there were questions 
that sought to gather opinions about possible improvements in the future. The 
response rate to the survey was approximately 10%. The table below shows4 the 
results from the survey obtained in 2004. The answers to these questions were on a 
binary scale (Yes / No). The survey included two open questions (“Q10 How well 
                                                 
4 Approval was granted by the quality department manager (on 08.06.2010) to quote the 
results from the ‘People Skills’ Survey in this thesis. 
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does your team work together to achieve objectives 1-5” and “Q13 How do you feel 
about working for the company?”) to which the respondents had to write down their 
answer. The written answers were grouped into three categories: positive, mixed and 
negative. The values in the table represent the percentage of “Yes” answers given by 
the respondents. The questions were sorted in ascending order.  
Table 3. Question set from the “People Skills” survey 
Questions from the survey 2004 
Q24 Do you think your efforts at work are appropriately rewarded? 23 
Q26 Is communication good in the company? 27 
Q18 Do you feel valued and respected by the company? 32 
Q23 Is the manager above them effective? 32 
Q27 Are you involved in decision making? 39 
Q28 Do you have input into decisions which affect your job? 40 
Q22 Is your immediate line manager effective? 41 
Q19 Do you feel valued and respected by your line manager? 48 
Q16 Do you feel professionally safe at the company? 55 
Q15 Do you feel emotionally safe at the company? 58 
Q9 Would you say your team achieves or exceeds your objectives? 62 
Q29 Do you feel free and able to offer suggestions on issues or for improvements? 63 
Q4 Have you received any on-going support and/or training for this role? 64 
Q11 Is your team effective? 66 
Q5 Do you have a job description for your present role? 69 
Q8 Do you know what they are? 71 
Q7 Does your team have any objectives? 74 
Q2 Is your present role clear? 75 
Q14 Do you feel physically safe at the company? 76 
Q3 Have you received any training before starting your present role? 81 
Q20 Do you feel valued and respected by your colleagues? 82 
Q31 Do you feel accountable as a member of your team? 82 
Q30 Do you feel accountable for what you do at work? 87 
Q6 Are you a member of a team? 92 
 
The five worst items referred to communication, rewarding efforts, respect 
from the company and managers, being involved in decision making and low 
perceived managerial effectiveness. The top five items regarded the feeling of 
belonging to a team, respect from colleagues, training and accountability. These 
results indicate that in 2004, the biggest issue for most employees was communication 
and the people skills of managers (involvement and respect), which were perceived to 
be unsatisfactory. On other hand, strong identification with team members and 
feelings of accountability for performed tasks were perceived the most positively.  
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4.5.2. Global voices 
“Global voices” was a survey managed by an external company, but unlike the 
“People Skills” survey, which was administered only locally, it was conducted 
globally, in all of the corporation’s locations. 
The objectives of the survey were to5 understand the level of engagement of 
the employees worldwide, encourage joint employee-manager communications, 
embed values and competencies into the corporate culture and promote an awareness 
of the corporate objectives and initiatives.  
A corporate team from many businesses and regions worked to develop the 
survey questions, which were customised to the corporation’s values and objectives. 
There are a total of 32 questions in addition to pre-selected demographic items. 
Questions are divided into 10 categories. The results are indicated in the form of the 
percentage of favourable responses6. Table 4 below shows the results of the company 
in the last four years in ten dimensions. 
Table 4. “Global voices” survey results from 2006 to 2009 
Dimension 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Employee engagement  38 42 32 33 
Management effectiveness 37 42 40 43 
Leadership / Vision 32 36 27 26 
Communication 33 38 36 42 
Growth and Development 35 38 37 39 
Involvement and Belonging 37 38 38 43 
Recognition 22 26 26 31 
Quality 51 46 44 48 
Safety 58 57 55 53 
Working Conditions 32 39 30 30 
 
The survey results in the table above indicate that the majority of the 
dimensions were rated fairly low by the employees. It means that the employees at the 
sponsor company expressed negative perceptions about a variety of elements of 
organisational performance. The highest scores were given to quality and safety, the 
lowest to recognition. This suggests that the employees appreciated the effort of the 
company to prioritise safety and quality, but were most unhappy with the perceived 
lack of respect and poor working conditions. The data are limited only to percentages 
and no statistical analysis results were available.  
                                                 
5 As stated in the survey documentation 
6 Percent Favourable - This is the percent of employees who responded "Agree" or "Strongly 
Agree" and / or “Rarely” and “Never” (a combination of the top two most positive responses) to the 
survey item within the report grouping. 
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4.6. Safety management meetings 
Being physically embedded within the company, and nested within the Health 
and Safety resources function for this and subsequent studies, provided an opportunity 
to gain a detailed appreciation of managerial orientations and practices on a daily 
basis. In addition to daily interactions with safety professionals and senior staff within 
the organisation, participatory activity included attendance at safety management 
meetings (N =10) that took place every day (for the discussion of daily issues) and 
monthly (for the discussion of strategic issues). This activity fostered the development 
of trust between employees and managers and an overview of the daily problems they 
faced at the time. The presence of the researcher at the meetings also communicated 
to management the support of the Health and Safety manager for the researcher. The 
developed trust was perceived by the researcher as an essential quality in the further 
cooperation with the management, helping it to communicate more openly and 
honestly. 
4.7. Observations 
The company had 52 departments with about 1000 employees working there 
in 2007 on two or three shift patterns. Observations of working practices were 
conducted in the majority of the production departments (e.g. Wax Moulds 
Production, Monoshell, Foundry, Large Finishing, Small Finishing, X-ray, EDM, 
Ceramic Core Production, Alloy Production). A number of observations in each were 
conducted. The observations aimed at familiarising the researcher with the work 
environments specific to particular departments. The researcher first needed to know 
the spatial arrangements of the particular divisions (where he could or could not go by 
himself), the machinery and the associated risks (e.g. not to go closer than 1m to a 
large furnace), the tasks employees were conducting and the associated risks (e.g. 
burns in the Large Wax department or cuts in the Large Finishing department), the 
equipment and tools used by employees, the role of particular organisational sections 
in the production process, the interactions between employees (content and quality) 
and technical aspects of the production process (materials used, processes applied). 
The observation schedule was not used, as access to particular areas was dependent on 
the availability of supervisors or other people who were able to devote the time to 
walk round with the researcher. The collected data consisted of information gathered 
about the aforementioned topics, supplemented by the researcher’s impressions about 
Chapter 4 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 67 
 
the interactions between employees and associated feelings. The data would not 
inform the research design, but rather were used as a means of inspiration and 
reflection on the challenges of working in this environment. Usually a departmental 
supervisor was asked to delegate an informed person to provide a guided walk 
through the department. It allowed questions to be asked, and an interactive style of 
learning. Every visit lasted 30-120 minutes. Information was written down in a 
research diary immediately after each visit. That activity helped the researcher to 
develop a better understanding of the work environment he was placed in. 
4.8. Individual interviews 
The shop-floor observations were supplemented with unstructured interviews 
with production staff and their supervisors (N = 69) with a view to eliciting 
clarifications of job roles, task elements and an initial insight into employees’ 
perspectives of hazards and risks. At this stage, unstructured, informal interaction was 
considered more appropriate than semi-structured or structured interviews, in view of 
the researcher’s limited insight into the subject matter at this stage, and of the 
potential for more rigid approaches to restrict the breadth and scope of emergent 
topics and issues.  
4.8.1. Procedure 
The interviews with shop-floor staff were designed to be unstructured in order 
to make the encounter as natural and uninhibited possible. Interviews were conducted 
with shop-floor operatives and front-line supervisors and managers. All interviews 
were with individuals and although conducted on the shop-floor, they benefited from 
the content of the conversation being masked by the background noise. All 
interviewees were volunteers, informed of the purpose of the research and offered 
assurance that any responses would be treated as confidential and not disclosed to 
their employer or any other party in an attributable form.  
The researcher’s early interactions with employees suggested that there was a 
low level of trust between the management and shop-floor employees. In this context 
the researcher did not want to be perceived as part of the management, as this could 
prevent access to vital information. Therefore, in order to elicit as much information 
as possible, the researcher presented himself to the employees as a Ph.D. student 
working for the university, trying to understand their struggles better. The researcher 
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adopted two main strategies for developing trust and rapport. The first one was to 
avoid being perceived as part of the company’s management. The second one 
required spending time with the participants during their work or during breaks and 
having many conversations on many different topics, which would reassure them that 
the information they share with the researcher would not be passed to the 
management in a form that would allow the identification of individuals. This strategy 
appeared to be successful and many trustful relationships were developed, but the 
downside of being perceived as a researcher was not being a part of management and 
not having influence on managerial decisions. 
While consideration was given to the use of video and audio recording during 
interactions with staff, it was felt that the methodological advantages that this might 
offer were outweighed by the need to enhance rapport and trust between the 
researcher and employees at this early stage in the research. Additionally, it was felt 
that interviews should not be structured in order to: 
• encourage a natural flow of conversation, 
• evoke terms and terminology used naturally by employees, 
• allow interviewees to lead the conversation to let them talk about the 
matters that are most important to them. 
Each interview commenced with a “naïve” ethnographic question, of the type: 
“What is it like to work for this company?” A research diary was used to keep a 
record of each interview. Diary entries were made immediately after each interview in 
order to minimise the risk of losing data. The diary was also used to record inferences 
drawn, ideas for future exploration and the proceedings of safety meetings and other 
significant events or changes at the site during the course of the study. There was no 
interview schedule. The aim of the conversations was to explore the aspects important 
to employees without structuring the conversation. Therefore the topics covered a 
variety of aspects related to working for the sponsor company that were important for 
particular individuals.  The interviews were conducted on a convenience basis. The 
interviews were dependent on the availability of the employees. Due to the nature of 
the interviews conducted on the shop floor, the content of the conversations was noted 
in a research diary and no verbatim data were collected. As this was a preliminary 
study of the range of subjects for subsequent more in-depth exploration, the analysis 
of the research diary content did not differentiate between the operatives and 
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managers – all were treated equally. Furthermore, the shop-floor operatives 
constituted 85% of the interviewed sample and provided the majority of information 
for the analysis. The exploration of the differences between different grades was 
conducted as part of the focus groups (see Chapter 5).  
While the approach to data gathering and recording in this initial study may be 
open to criticism, in particular with regard to the approach to recording responses 
through reflective field notes, rather than using audio recordings, the approach 
adopted reflects two considerations: (i) the desire to minimise any artificiality in these 
initial interactions between the researcher and workers at the site (in particular it was 
important to build rapport and trust with employees) and (ii) the nature of permissions 
that the researcher had from senior managers when gathering this data, were limited to 
familiarisation with socio-technical systems, while avoiding causing significant 
disruption to work activity. 
While, the intent was that this initial familiarisation phase of the research 
should focus on technical aspects of plant operations, it quickly became apparent that 
there was useful data emerging from these conversations, and that many details would 
be lost if not written down. Therefore a reflective research diary was used to capture 
as many details recalled from the conversations as possible.  
The early period of this Ph.D. project was crucial for the research in terms of 
building trust, both amongst employees and senior managers. Gaining the trust of 
senior managers, e.g. through minimising disruption to production, was seen as key to 
them permissioning later stages of the research.  As the researcher was not an 
employee of the sponsor organisation, the good will of the employees and 
management was perhaps the most important factor allowing the research to take 
place.  Failure to achieve this could have critically undermined the research. 
In essence, the approach adopted in the initial familiarisation data gathering 
phase resembled that adopted by Beynon’s (1984).  Beynon’s approach to interacting 
with employees was not driven by a schedule; he was instead adapting to constantly 
changing social interactions and his interviews with Ford’s employees were part of 
hours of informal conversations he had with them in a variety of settings.  
It was felt that the benefits associated with relationship building and winning 
trust outweighed the methodological shortcomings, particularly as more formal and 
rigorous approaches were planned for later stages of the research. The main 
limitations were related to the lack of verbatim recording of responses, a lack of 
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structure that minimised the scope for comparability, and limited information about 
the demographics.    
It can also be argued that there were advantages to adopting a very informal 
approach, particularly in the early stages of a project where salient features may be 
unknown to the researcher.  Interview schedules tend to work like a filter, tending to 
limit responses to the topics identified by the researcher (most likely from the subject 
literature), which may limit the opportunity freely to explore the topics important to 
people working in this organisation. Not structuring the approach to the interviews 
gave the researcher the advantage of asking questions that could not have been 
predicted and that stemmed from the discussed topics. This exploratory approach was 
not used for all stages of the research, and more formal group interviews were 
organised as a subsequent stage of the research to explore the discovered topics in a 
more systematic fashion. Additionally, in the context of this particular study, the term 
‘interview’ can be misleading. It conveys the meaning of a formal interaction between 
two parties, whereas in the context of this research it is used to describe informal 
conversations about things that were important to the employees.  
 
4.8.2. Sample 
The interviewees were approached on an opportunity basis, with care taken to 
reflect a representative array of job types and production tasks. There were a number 
of restrictions to sampling: 
1. the researcher could not interrupt production processes, 
2. the researcher could only engage on an individual basis, so as to avoid 
disturbing other employees, 
3. the researcher needed to avoid creating any health or safety risks by 
engaging with staff while they were performing hazardous tasks. 
The interviews were conducted from September 2007 to April 2008 and each 
lasted between 15 and 60 minutes. A breakdown of the sample by department and 
grade is given in Table 5.  
 
Table 5.  Breakdown of the sample by department 
Department No of operatives No of managers 
Wax room 9 4 
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Monoshell 6 2 
Mould Preparation 6 1 
Foundry 10 1 
Cleaning 4 1 
X-ray/Dispatch 4 1 
Ceramic Core 4 1 
Other7 5 N/A 
TOTAL 58 11 
 
4.8.3. Choice of method of analysis 
Thematic analysis was considered the most appropriate method for this study. 
The rationale for this was based on the fundamentally constructivist paradigm 
(discussed in more detail in Chapter 3) and on the nature of the data that could be 
gathered in the shop-floor context. Moreover, thematic analysis was considered to 
offer data at an appropriate level of detail with respect to the primary purpose of the 
study, which was to develop an insight and understanding of the context of the study 
and highlighting phenomena for subsequent more in-depth analysis using more 
structured approaches.  
4.8.4. Process of analysis  
The analysis of the research diary followed the five steps suggested by Braun 
& Clarke (2006).  
Step 1. Familiarisation with the data. 
Familiarisation with the data began at the stage of writing notes in the research 
diary. At the very beginning careful reflection on the content of the interviews was 
performed. During this initial stage of analysis diary notes were read and re-read. 
Step 2. Generating initial codes. 
The aim of this process was to attach short descriptors/labels (codes) to short, 
meaningful chunks of data from the diary. Meaningful pieces of text 
(sentences/paragraphs) were given short labels identifying the content of the particular 
fragment.  
Step 3. Searching for themes. 
The set of initial codes and their definitions were reviewed and searched for 
similarities and overlaps. Where equivalence and overlap was significant 
                                                 
7 The researcher also conducted interviews with people not directly involved in the production 
process and shop floor: with H&S representatives, Polish contractors working full time for the 
company and with the director of the Union.  
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consideration was given to merging these as constituent facets of higher order codes 
or themes.   
Step 4. Reviewing themes. 
All quotations that shared the same codes were collected together. The themes 
and quotations that related to each one were then reviewed in search for any 
inconsistencies. 
Step 5. Defining and naming the themes 
Groups of similar quotations were described. This process provided the 
definitions. Based on the definitions, the names for particular themes were chosen.  
4.8.5. Results 
The interviews provided a rich insight into employees’ commentaries on 
workplace safety and broader perspectives of employment in the organisation. In 
many instances safety issues were, perhaps unsurprisingly, embedded within broader 
orientations.  A substantial group of comments referred to the actions and engagement 
of management. Following the literature, all of these sentiments could be combined 
and entitled “management engagement”, as in the majority of the subject literature 
(Hahn & Murphy, 2007; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001; Mohamed, 2003; 
Prussia, Brown, & Willis, 2003; Silva, Lima, & Baptista, 2004; Thompson, et al., 
1998); however, it was decided not to select this method as dividing “management 
engagement” into more detailed categories (themes) better reflected the complexity of 
social and organisational interactions. 
COMMUNICATION 
Reports of barriers to the flow of information were widespread and multi-
faceted.  Moreover, it was apparent that the interviewees had clear expectations 
regarding what should happen and what would help them to perform their work. A 
recurrent and widely held perspective was that employees do not receive sufficient, 
appropriate or timely information on a whole range of issues. Cited examples 
included restricted or delayed access to more senior staff when pressing production 
(including safety) issues arise; additionally, it was apparent that there was little 
confidence in the provision for forwarding shop-floor concerns to higher levels within 
the organisation, or in the positive benefits arising from the issues raised by workers.   
 COMMUNICATION - Staff meetings 
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The following sentiments were expressed with respect to the shop-floor staff 
meetings.  These meetings reflect official company policy and are intended to provide 
a conduit for information to flow up and down the organisation via supervisors and 
line managers.  Sentiments expressed by both shop-floor operatives and supervisors or 
line managers were that there was limited confidence in the system, to the extent that 
questions are raised with respect to the utility of this process.   
Operative sentiments were characterised by limited confidence that their 
concerns would be addressed and worries that raising safety concerns would not meet 
the expected attention of supervisors (see: “people skills of leaders” theme). 
Supervisors transparently saw little value in these meetings, citing the fact that 
workers neither raise nor discuss any problems. Moreover, this culture of 
disengagement was said to be self-perpetuating, inhibiting the preparedness of new-
recruits to engage in discourse. As a consequence, supervisor and line manager 
motivation to promote and engage with the staff-meeting process appeared limited.  
 COMMUNICATION - Shift handover 
Effective communication between supervisors and line managers at the point 
of a changeover is necessary to exchange critical precaution or quality information 
and also to raise awareness of any safety issues that may have arisen during the 
previous shift.  In theory, a supervisor from shift A should gather information from 
supervisor B from a previous shift and then pass any relevant elements of this 
information to the operatives on the current shift. While it was not possible to verify 
the effectiveness of this process, it was widely held by employees that this is not 
happening to a satisfactory extent. The implications of this negligence could affect 
both production and safety. It also caused frustration as operators claimed that weak 
communication at shift handover makes their job more difficult; for example, they 
had to spend more time at the beginning of their shift trying to figure out what the 
previous shift did.  
 COMMUNICATION - Coherence 
There were a number of managers in each department responsible for different 
aspects of the production process e.g. quality, scrap management, quantity, 
engineering improvements, machinery, maintenance and others. Employees reported 
that they received contradictory orders from different managers. This insight suggests 
that employees believed and experienced that there was poor communication at the 
managerial level between different departments. 
Chapter 4 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 74 
 
 COMMUNICATION - Performance feedback 
A further aspect of communication mentioned by employees was not getting 
feedback on their performance either from supervisors and managers. It was important 
to employees, to know how they are doing, how are they being perceived by their 
leaders, both in general and in comparison to other co-workers. Feedback on 
performance is an important element of communication. It may be used as a source of 
both praise and corrections. Moreover, interactions between a leader (supervisors / 
manager) and a line employee aimed at the provision of feedback may serve as an 
opportunity to exchange other information (including personal interest), ask 
questions, raise problems etc. It has already been demonstrated in the literature that 
providing feedback may improve safety (Blackmon & Gramopadhye, 1995), safe 
behaviour (Marsh, et al., 1995), working conditions and ergonomics (Laitinen, Saari, 
& Kuusela, 1997) 
 COMMUNICATION - Leaders not communicating their actions 
This sub-theme refers to situations in which an initiative was undertaken by 
the line employees in order to identify hazards, report unsafe working conditions or 
communicate near-miss incidents. The impression expressed by interviewees was that 
after they report an issue, they receive no feedback on what is being done about the 
issue raised, so even if the leaders did their best to remove a problem, workers would 
not know about it. Also, it is probable that failing to communicate the actions taken 
may be perceived as management disregard, thereby causing employee 
disengagement.  
 PEOPLE SKILLS OF LEADERS 
People skills were defined by Rifkin (2002) as: (a) understanding oneself and 
moderating one’s responses, (b) talking effectively and empathising accurately, and 
(c) building relationships of trust, respect and productive interactions. This theme 
refers to the operatives’ perceptions of how well leaders in the company manage and 
deal with them. The sentiments varied depending on the department and shift, which 
directly reflected individual differences in the leadership styles of particular 
supervisors and managers. Being patient or losing one’s temper, being polite or 
screaming at people, being understanding or blaming people for mistakes, considering 
psychological factors that affect people or not - these were the dimensions of leaders’ 
people skills mentioned by people. It seemed natural that workers were appreciative 
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when they perceived that their leaders demonstrated good people skills, and were not 
if they perceived their leader to have poor people skills. 
 REPORTING 
There are two major categories of incidents that had to be reported. The first 
one includes injuries and accidents with bodily damage of an employee and the 
second one includes hazards and near misses. Reporting is an important part of the 
organisational learning process, i.e. continuously improving safety based on lessons 
learned from mistakes made in order to avoid them in future. Reporting was also 
recognised in the subject literature as an important factor, being a part of safety 
culture (Fung, Tam, Tung, & Man, 2005).  
Both shop-floor workers and leaders (supervisors and managers) openly 
indicated that reporting (in different forms), whether formal or informal, was an area 
of concern, as it did not happen as often as it is supposed to, as a result of which the 
data gathered did not adequately reflect the situation on the shop floor. It needs to be 
emphasised that all employees are required to report accidents and failure to comply 
with that obligation may result in serious consequences including a disciplinary 
measure or dismissal. Workers were very clear on the reasons behind their reluctance 
to report problems or incidents. With regard to reporting injuries that could be hidden 
from the sight of management, the most frequently cited reason was the amount of 
paperwork involved. These citations created a theme, discussed below. 
 REPORTING - Paperwork 
According to the interviewed employees, one of the reasons behind the 
reluctance to report injuries and accidents was the amount of paperwork involved. 
The same forms needed to be filled in, regardless of whether the incident was a 
serious accident or a minor finger cut. Filling out this form might take from one to 
three hours and required a worker, his supervisors, and in some cases witnesses or a 
member of the Health and Safety team. After the paperwork was done, a formal 
investigation was conducted by the members of the Health and Safety team and 
departmental leaders (supervisors or managers). The conclusions from the 
investigation were reported to the corporation. Also, the corporation supervised the 
implementation of counter-measures to avoid having a similar incident in the future. 
In general a high priority was placed on removing direct causes of accidents. Even 
though changing the paperwork requirement for minor cuts and bruises seems to be an 
easy solution, it was the company headquarters in the U.S.A. that was responsible for 
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setting and changing policies. In a conversation between the researcher and one of the 
corporate managers responsible for safety it was indicated that the corporation was 
interested in gathering as much information about both accidents and minor incidents 
as possible and they were not willing to change the policy. It was not surprising that 
workers were reluctant to go through that procedure if the injury or problem they 
wanted to report was not of very high priority. 
Another group of incidents referred to reporting, non-injury incidents, which 
were hazards with the potential to harm somebody or a free injury event in which 
somebody was almost injured but luckily avoided bodily damage. This type of 
incident was encountered more often, in relation to the size of the plant and the 
amount of hazards involved in the production processes, movement of people and 
mobile equipment etc. However, the priority for the removal of these hazards and 
direct causes of near miss incidents was not as high. The reported elements were not 
reported on a regular basis to the corporation and were managed locally. As dealing 
with this type of incident was more frequent the employees’ comments on the process 
were more varied. This type of incident might be reported in a number of ways: 
verbally or with help of special, short forms, handed out to every employee in a form 
of small book called Injury Free Event (IFE) books (see Chapter 5). An employee 
either had to tell his supervisor about a problem or used the form and hand it to his 
supervisor. Despite this opportunity, employees reported the low effectiveness of this 
process and their low motivations to be engaged in reporting.  
 REPORTING - Solutions were not provided or were provided with 
significant delay 
This waiting period, often with no information about the progress of the 
reported case, breed frustration and anger especially if the problem referred to 
elements that were necessary to do the job properly. It sometimes led to situations in 
which a worker was on the one hand expected to do his job safely according to the 
company’s expectations, and on the other hand, was not provided with the tools 
necessary to be safe (see also: “breaking safety rules” theme).  
Another negative consequence of these long waiting periods was expressed in 
the line employees’ perceptions that leaders (supervisors and managers) did not care 
about the reported issues. Employees attributed the causes of those problems to the 
departmental leaders - supervisors and managers. If the reported problems were not 
addressed in a timely fashion, the first reaction of workers was to say that leaders did 
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not react and nothing got done. Other issues described referred to the situations in 
which leaders forgot about reported problems or did not even engage, due to the 
paperwork involved. The interviewees also mentioned the effects it has on them. 
Cynicism and a decreased engagement and motivation to raise any problems were 
among the consequences discussed.  
Problem solving in such a large multi-departmental organisation often 
depended on more than one person. For example, to repair a tool or a machine, a 
worker must have first reported a problem to his or her supervisor. The supervisor 
then had to open a ticket on a computer and sent it to the maintenance department. In 
the maintenance department this ticket was put in a queue and a level of priority was 
assigned to the ticket. As maintenance has limited resources, the highest priority was 
given to the problems directly affecting the production process, such as a furnace in 
the foundry – (if it did not work the parts could not be cast). Hence in the case high-
priority problems, solving issues of lower-priority was usually postponed indefinitely. 
To make the situation even worse, there was no formal communication system with 
which to inform ticket-raisers about when to expect the repair or solution. If the 
problem was important to a given departmental manager, he could informally direct 
the maintenance manager to assign more resources to this particular problem and 
solve it. As this arisen in a number of departments at the same time, it provoked an 
interpersonal conflict between managers.  
BREAKING SAFETY RULES 
Breaking safety rules – the next theme – refers not only to shop-floor 
employees, but also to supervisors and managers. Employees agreed that sometimes 
they or their colleagues break safety rules. However, as the fact of breaking safety 
rules probably happens everywhere to some extent, the most important questions refer 
to the reasons behind this behaviour.  
BREAKING SAFETY RULES - Experienced employees and leaders broke 
safety rules 
A number of examples were provided in which more experienced workers 
broke rules. As old-timers were usually partially responsible for on-the-job training, 
by breaking the rules they did not serve as a good example and taught new-comers 
bad habits and set this undesired behaviour as an informal norm. Similarly with 
leaders (supervisors and managers), as they were seen breaking safety rules, workers 
did not feel compelled to behave differently.  
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BREAKING SAFETY RULES - Leaders turned a blind eye 
Some employees also reported that leaders sometimes turned a blind eye, 
unless the job was particularly dangerous. Usually it happened in a situation of high 
production pressure, but not exclusively. Some examples included breaking rules for 
the sake of convenience or avoiding additional effort in finding alternative ways of 
doing particular jobs. Often these initiatives were led by leaders or were tacitly 
approved.  
 BREAKING SAFETY RULES - Equipment was not properly designed 
Another issue provided by interviewees was related to inappropriately 
designed equipment that could not be used for certain jobs or was difficult or 
uncomfortable to use it. This aspect of the working environment was difficult to 
overcome by junior leadership and usually requires the engagement of senior 
management to order machinery replacement or provide repairs, which are frequently 
costly.  
 PRODUCTION PRESSURE 
Production pressure refers to the employees’ perception that pressure does 
exist and affects their work. As the company in question operated in the 
manufacturing sector, it earned profits from the large quantities of parts it produced. 
On the one hand, many managers were aware of detrimental effects of putting much 
pressure on employees and they officially, verbally communicated that they give 
employees time so they did not have to hurry. Although line employees confirmed 
that they were not being told to work faster, they emphasised that in their experience 
this pressure was exerted in indirect ways. It was not about performing their basic 
tasks faster, but rather controlling what the operatives did in the mean time and if a 
person was seen waiting or standing between production cycles waiting for a part to 
process, they were told to start sweeping the floor or engage in another substitute 
activity. As a  result, this pressure to work all the time and never rest was transmitted 
to the operatives, even without explicit verbal directions to that effect. 
 JOB SECURITY 
The company had a policy, which was regularly communicated to all 
employees, stating it was continually looking for savings and competitive advantage 
over its competitors. Some employees interpreted this information as suggesting that 
in a hard economic climate when labour prices go up the factory may be moved to 
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another country where the operating costs are lower. This fear was expressed by both 
managers and workers. It become very real after redundancies were applied in 2009. 
4.8.6. Summary 
Six themes were identified as affecting safety from the point of view of the 
employees: communication, leaders’ people skills, reporting, rule breaking, 
production pressure and job security. All of these themes had already been discussed 
in the literature. The study allowed a preliminary understanding of the complex nature 
of the close relationships between these factors. 
 Although based on limited evidence, due to both the restricted sample size and 
the limited scope for an in-depth probing of the responses, taken as a whole the above 
findings appear to suggest that the themes identified at the company are not very 
different from the accounts of other companies in regard to headline variables with 
potential to affect shop-floor safety culture. The identified themes have been 
highlighted in the findings reported by a number of quantitative studies (Glendon & 
Litherland, 2001; Mearns, Flin, et al., 2001; Mearns, et al., 2003; Taylor & Thomas 
III, 2003; Thompson, et al., 1998; Zohar, 2000). The strength of the grounded 
qualitative approach adopted in this study is argued to be that it has been possible to 
derive key insights not just of what is important, but also of how. Further, in what 
ways these problems occur and of the implications relating to their consequences. 
This type of insight is unavailable in quantitative studies and at the same time, crucial 
for developing safety culture interventions. 
4.9. Discussion 
This study aimed to familiarise the researcher with the environment of the 
company and identify areas related to safety that employees find important and 
problematic in the sense that they can affect their safety. A further purpose was to 
inform the development of a question set for group discussions in order to investigate 
the factors affecting the company’s safety culture systematically and in depth.  
Familiarisation with the safety documentation helped understanding that the 
company is very strict in its compliance with Health and Safety regulations. A very 
skilful, knowledgeable and experienced team was making sure that all new 
regulations accepted by the British Parliament will find appropriate compliance in the 
policies and procedures on the site. The extensive documentation stated in fairly deep 
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detail what was allowed and what was not. Furthermore, the impression of the 
researcher was that the company was emphasising the importance of compliance with 
the rules (at the level of management and shop-floor) with no much room for open 
dialogue with operatives. They were just expected to comply with set rules or face 
disciplinary measures. The understanding was that this approach will help to protect 
the health of the employees, but it was based on an assumption that they are neither 
able nor willing to care about their safety, and that in the case of injury they would try 
to manipulate a situation and seek the compensation. Although it was certainly the 
case that some individuals were caught lying about the details of an accident’s causes 
in an effort to obtain money from the insurer and the company consequently sought to 
protect itself from fraud, the researcher’s impression based on numerous 
conversations was that an assumption was made that all employees behave that way, 
and that they therefore had to be rigidly controlled with extensive, written and formal 
regulations. Possibly this approach served well in court but on the other hand it may 
have impersonalised the contact between safety department management and shop-
floor employees. Parts of the process of complying with legal regulations of the HSE 
were countless improvements of the work environment. However, the company also 
introduced a number of initiatives that were not derived directly from legal 
obligations but served a more general aim of hazard identification. It was attempted to 
engage shop-floor employees to spot hazards and report them to the management. The 
same goal was pursued by many means (interventions), such as putting yellow labels 
on broken machinery (red flag program) or providing extra time for chosen 
individuals to look for hazards. To date (mid- 2010) only the IFE program was being 
continued. All other interventions, as far as the researcher was informed, died out 
along with declining motivation of intervention participants. Also, the only evaluation 
of the effectiveness of these programs was the ratio of solved to unsolved problems. 
No other relation to injuries, accidents or workers’ perceptions was established. This 
may suggest that either employed staff had no appropriate knowledge and skill to 
develop an evaluation, or that it was the corporation that imposed the majority of 
safety actions. 
This impersonalised and compliance-focused approach was to some extent 
reflected in the past surveys of the company. The most negatively assessed elements 
were related to the respect towards shop-floor employees, managerial efficiency and 
involvement in decision making. Later, in the “Global Voices” survey, similar 
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elements earned negative scores. All these elements together offer a consistent picture 
of leadership and safety climate in the company. Individual interviews helped deepen 
the understanding of the subtleties related to leadership and safety. Specifically, the 
interviews linked many of the employees’ safety concerns with the various skills and 
attitudes of the company’s leadership. Not communicating effectively, inconsistent 
behaviours, turning a blind eye and a pervasive focus on paperwork all affect 
employees’ motivation to respond to safety initiatives positively.  
4.10. Critical findings 
1. The process of familiarisation with the company consisted of four 
stages, which included a review of the relevant documentation, 
observations, participation in meetings and interviews. 
2. Safety interventions from the past were initiated by either the corporate 
or local management and focused mainly on engaging employees to 
detect hazards and raise maintenance tickets. 
3. In 2003 and 2004 the company undertook “People Skills” survey that 
indicated that employees negatively assess management effectiveness, 
the amount of respect they receive from the managers and the extent to 
which they feel involved in decision making. However, they strongly 
identified themselves with the peer group and felt accountable for their 
jobs.  
4. Since 2006 the company has been administering the “Global Voices” 
survey in all its locations worldwide. In 2009 employees most 
negatively assessed the following dimensions: leadership / vision, 
working conditions, recognition and employees’ engagement. The most 
positively rated were: safety and quality, but only safety surpassed the 
threshold of 50%.  
5. The analysis of individual interviews with employees revealed six 
themes discussed by the workers: communication, leaders’ people 
skills, reporting, breaking safety rules, production pressure and job 
security. All had already been covered in the subject literature.  
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Chapter 5 
Qualitative assessment of 
safety culture 
5.1. Introduction 
Conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence from the preliminary investigation 
into employee risk taking (Chapter 4) identified a range of factors affecting safe style 
of working. These factors appeared indicative of the likely importance of a range of 
cultural and situational variables as dispositional influences on volitional risk-taking 
behaviour.  
However, questions might be asked regarding the generalisability of these 
findings to some broader basis for risk-taking behaviour in a range of different 
production departments and functional positions at the company, given that: a) the 
preliminary study was conducted on the shop floor during working hours and so the 
time available for interviewing employees was limited and conversations tended to be 
disrupted by production tasks and related noise, b) the conversations were not 
structured, c) the exploration of operatives’ understandings of risk and the basis for 
their motivations towards risk behaviour were restricted due to the lack opportunity 
for verbatim recording of their responses. Furthermore, it was felt that a more 
structured approach was required in order to provide insights allowing the 
development of a questionnaire to test the generalisability of findings. 
In an attempt to gain further insight into shop-floor workers understanding of 
risk, and the reasons they provide for volitional risk-taking, it was considered that a 
more detailed investigation into these variables was called for. Given that the research 
was principally exploratory in nature, combined with the researcher’s limited 
knowledge about safety culture for this particular site, it was considered that, at least 
in the first instance, a fundamentally organic, qualitative approach was needed. This 
decision was reinforced by the insights gained from freely associative approach 
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adopted during the preliminary study, the utility of this of approach within risk 
research, and other areas of social science activity having been highlighted by a 
number of authors, from a range of disciplines (Bailey & Hutter, 2008; Barbour, 
2007). Although qualitative investigatory approaches, of various types, are commonly 
encountered in social and cultural research, and this is the case for the growing 
contribution to risk research from these disciplines, it is perhaps notable that a number 
of the more recent studies of safety culture have also begun to adopt such approaches, 
at least during the early exploratory stages of their investigations (e.g. Gillen, et al., 
2004; Olsen, Bjerkan, & Nevestad, 2009) where the use of loosely structured, freely 
associative elicitation techniques forms an integral part of the method, typically, 
serving to inform subsequent aggregate, questionnaire-based, approaches to studies of 
public perceptions of risk.  
A potential advantage of adopting a qualitative approach at this stage within 
the present research was, considered to be that the richness of the data which this was 
likely to yield, when compared with more reductionist techniques. It was felt that a 
qualitative approach would provide benefits with regard to the researcher’s 
understanding of the complexities of the shop-floor work environment; the social 
relationships which permeate it and most importantly the context in which risk taking 
takes place.  
5.1.1. Aim 
The purpose of the study was to identify strengths and weaknesses related to 
safety in different departments and influences on how risk is perceived and reacted to 
by employees.  
5.1.2. Objectives 
1. To develop insights to underpin the development of a staff survey 
which when administered across the company’s divisions would allow 
for quantitative assessment of departmental safety culture profiles.  
2. To develop an understanding of strengths and weaknesses related to 
safety that employees face on regular basis, to inform the development 
of bespoke safety culture change / improvement interventions to be 
developed.  
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5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Design 
There is a spirited debate over the relative merits of individual or group 
interviews and their capacity for eliciting data from participants. Advocates of the 
former (e.g. Fischhoff, Bostrom, Jacobs, & Quadrel, 1997; Lynn, 1999) argue that 
group dynamics may suppress the expression of opinions of those individuals who do 
not feel confident or for any other reason may be inhibited from expressing their 
views in social settings. Others take a view that the group context may actually 
facilitate and stimulate disclosures that otherwise remain unarticulated (Frith, 2000). 
Potential inhibition of intimate details is actually the only strong argument against 
group discussions. There are more arguments supporting the application of focus 
groups, rather than individual interviews in organizational settings: a) they can 
provide a way of a quick gathering data from a large number of participants 
(Wilkinson, 2004), b) the dynamic of discussion is more akin to a naturalistic 
conversation and may extend to storytelling, joking, arguing, teasing and 
disagreement (Jarrett, 1993) which may also evoke vernacular responses (Bers, 1987), 
c) also, the group interaction allows respondents to react to and build upon the 
responses of other group members creating a “synergistic effect” (Stewart & 
Shamdasani, 1990). This may lead to more elaborated insights about researched 
phenomenon. This effect is supported with emotional involvement of participant 
which is seldom seen in one-to-one interviews (Gillham, 2005). In short, there is 
strong evidence that group elicitation techniques offer a number of advantages over 
individual interviews (Gillham, 2005).  
In summary, focus groups are widely regarded as an effective tool for 
exploratory purposes that can relatively quickly and easily provide an early indication 
of the range of views, attitudes and experiences of participants on a given subject.  
5.2.2. Sample 
Negotiating access 
The access to staff was negotiated with members of the senior management 
team, and they agreed to publicise the opportunity for employees to participate in the 
study. Relevant representatives of the trades union were informed about the planned 
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study and their approval and support were obtained. It was agreed with senior 
management that they would allow employees to leave their workplace for 60-90 
minutes to participate in group discussions.  
Sample frame 
Group interviews could not be carried out on the shop-floor due to the lack of 
an appropriate location, i.e. not enough space, permanent noise, many distractions and 
the presence of supervisors and managers. Therefore, an office area was chosen with 
discrete conference rooms. It was a concern that the presence of a supervisor at the 
meeting with the shop-floor workers could suppress their spontaneous expressions. 
Additionally, if supervisors were present confidentiality could not be maintained and 
so only peers from particular groups were invited. 
A pilot discussion, followed by eight focus groups was conducted during May 
and June 2008. Table 6 gives a breakdown of participants by department and job-role 
that took part in the study. The group discussions were department-specific, i.e. in 
each discussion involved employees from a single department.  
Table 6. Date and number of participants in focus group discussions from particular 
departments 
Department/ group Date Number of participants Number of employees 
in departments (2008) 
Small Wax – pilot 
group 
7.05.2008 3 103 
Large Wax 14.05.2008 12 117 
Foundry 22.05.2008 8 78 
Large pre-finishing 06.06.2008 8 52 
Alloy Plant 23.05.2008 10 84 
Ceramic Core 28.05.2008 7 62 
Maintenance 30.05.2008 5 56 
Supervisors 17.06.2008 5 28 
Managers 26.06.2008 3 22 
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 61 602 plus 419 
employees from other 
departments = 1021 
 
The number of people in each group was dependent on the number of 
volunteers who were able to secure release from their normal duties. It was agreed 
with the senior managers that the priority would be to focus on the largest 
departments employing the highest number of people. It was argued that by 
interviewing employees from the largest departments this would develop insight about 
safety issues concerning the majority of the workforce, as it was assumed that the 
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nature of problems would be shared by the majority of employees within particular 
departments. The number of all employees working within the eight largest divisions 
comprised nearly 50% of all workforce of the company (approximately 500 
individuals).  
Table 6 shows that the total number of focus group interviewees constituted 
6% of the total population of employees. As the focus groups participants were 
invited from the largest departments, it may be argued that the views held by the 
interviewees represented the views of the majority. No information about age or 
tenure was collected. The Human Resources department strongly suggested that the 
researcher should not gather demographic information about the participants of the 
focus groups, expressing concerns that the personal data could not be protected as 
expected by law (Data Protection Act 1998). The participants invited to take part in 
the focus groups came from the largest departments, in the hope that they would 
represent the majority of the workforce. No stratified sampling was employed to 
represent all departments. The groups consisted only of employees working at the 
same level in the organisational hierarchy in the same department, meaning that 
managers, supervisors and shop-floor employees were interviewed separately, and 
that shop-floor employees from different departments were also interviewed 
separately. The aim of the sampling was to get a spread of perspectives from a range 
of the largest departments and different job types in order to avoid systematic bias. As 
the names of individuals interviewed on the shop floor (see Chapter 4) were not 
recorded, it cannot be confirmed whether the same individuals were interviewed 
individually and in the group setting.  
Selection of a moderator 
Having developed a discussion protocol that would probe safety related topics, 
it was necessary to identify the most appropriate manner in which to conduct the 
focus group sessions. As Barbour (2007) opines there is no one best way to lead a 
focus group and an appropriate strategy should match both, the purpose of the 
research and characteristics of the group. 
Litosseliti (2003) suggests that a good group moderator should understand the 
topic of the discussion and have been in contact with the researched community 
before. In the interest of consistency the same person should also ideally lead all of 
the groups in a given set. In the current instance, the researcher was experienced in 
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conducting focus groups and had derived a high degree of familiarity with 
organisational, as well as socio-technical and physical aspects of the work 
environment. Therefore, the author was considered well placed to moderate the 
discussions.  
5.2.3. Materials 
In order to conduct the focus groups it was necessary to develop a set of 
questions that, on the one hand would stimulate discussion and further elaboration of 
topics identified in the preliminary study, while at the same time, encouraging debate 
so as not to impose constraints that would limit discourse to these issues. 
In order to identify a set of topics that could be discussed with the company’s 
employees a range of information sources were drawn upon: 
1. Research findings based on unstructured individual interviews 
conducted with employees of the company (see Chapter 4), 
2. Mainstream literature on safety culture (see Chapter 2), 
3. Consultations with experts - were not recorded verbatim, but aimed to 
inspire the researcher to explore aspects of safety culture that were not 
vividly presented by the subject literature. This approach can be 
potentially criticised however the context of the consultations must be 
understood. The researcher had a desk next to three other members of 
the Health and Safety team and was also talking to other managers on 
regular basis. The researcher was also in often contact with the 
academic supervisors. This meant that over a period of the first six 
months of the project, the researcher spent hours on informal 
conversations with experts and managers about a wide range of topics. 
Many of the discussed topics were related to the research and the 
researcher explored experts’ understanding of the matter, comparing 
their knowledge with the research findings, discussing and sometimes 
arguing on a variety of topics. This reflected the informal interactions 
in order to develop an understanding of a complicated subject 
(employee behaviour in an organisational setting). It was not possible 
to record every single conversation verbatim, and potentially it would 
not be possible to analyse that amount of text effectively. Furthermore, 
the conversations were not one-off events, but happened many times 
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over the course of every working day. It may be argued that this 
approach to data collection was unsystematic, and that could 
potentially be a true statement within a positivist paradigm (see 
Chapter 3). However, it may be argued, within the constructivist 
paradigm, that knowledge and meaning are developed by a researcher 
as the result of his interactions with the world around him, and it 
evolves with time and new information gathered. Therefore many 
conversations with the experts and managers had this character of not 
transferring knowledge from an expert to a learner, but rather of 
exploring different ways of understanding very complex phenomena. 
Many of the comments of the team members indeed inspired the 
researcher and challenged his thinking and helped to develop his 
understanding. This benefited the research process, as the researcher 
could ask more informed and relevant questions. The consulted groups 
included: 
a. Academics researching safety cultures (N=3) highlighted the 
importance of exploring what ‘management engagement’ 
means and how it is expressed / displayed in the real world, 
b. H&S specialists from H&S department in the company (N=3) 
highlighted issues of personal accountability of employees, 
violations of rules and risk taking.  
4. Consultations with the company’s executive managers, 
5. Findings from staff surveys conducted in the company in 2003-2007 
(People Skills Survey and Global Voices Survey) (see Chapter 4). 
These sources were supplemented by insights derived from the researcher’s 
embedded experience of staff discourses on safety and broader workplaces topics, 
socio-technical elements and working conditions. As it was decided to conduct focus 
groups with employees from different departments and functions across the company, 
the questions were appropriately phrased. For example: to investigate perceptions of 
leadership, shop-floor workers were asked about their supervisors, but supervisors 
were asked about their managers. A copy of the question set is provided in Appendix 
C. 
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5.2.4. Pilot discussion session 
In the first instance a pilot focus group was conducted. This procedure 
permitted testing of a number of practicalities related to conducting subsequent 
sessions: 
1. How to invite people to minimise the probability of refusal. 
2. Assessment of the appropriateness of the question set. 
3. Opportunity for the researcher to increase familiarity with the protocol. 
4. Opportunity to obtain feedback from participants on the researcher’s 
performance as a moderator. 
Questions were well received and initiated interesting discussion engaging all 
participants. Also the moderator and his style of leading the discussion appeared to be 
well received. The pilot session allowed an opportunity to hone logistic and 
procedures for conducting the focus groups. Also, it demonstrated that there was no 
need to find an external moderator. 
5.2.5. Procedure 
In order to obtain analysable data at an appropriate level of detail verbatim 
transcripts of group discussions were needed from the focus groups. This required 
audio recordings to be made of proceedings. British Psychological Society guidelines 
were followed with respect to the engagement with participating employees (BPS, 
2004).  
After the each group, the audio files were transcribed verbatim. Following this 
the audio files were ciphered, secured with password and stored at a back-up hard-
drive.  
5.3. Data analysis 
5.3.1. Selection of method of data analysis 
As Morgan (1993) states the analytical techniques adopted should be suitable 
to the intended aims of the research, logically and robustly derived. Thematic analysis 
fits the aims and objectives indicated at the beginning of this chapter to the highest 
extent comparing with other methods for qualitative analysis. Narrative Analysis and 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis were not used as the outcome of these 
methods is very descriptive and did not suit the need of developing a questionnaire. 
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The aim of this study also was not developing a theory, therefore Grounded Theory 
approach was not chosen. Content Analysis requires a set of pre-assumed 
themes/concepts that are later tested by means of word count. This also did not fit the 
goal of the research. Thematic Analysis allows for data reduction and the 
development of smaller number of underlying constructs, based upon theoretical 
linkages supplemented by evidence of apparent association between themes grounded 
in the transcript data itself. The process of analysis, in general terms has three main 
stages: (a) initial coding, (b) grouping interrelated codes in higher order categories, 
and (c) grouping interrelated categories in even higher order themes.  
5.3.2. Initial coding of transcripts 
Codes identify a feature of the data that appears interesting to the analyst and 
refer to the small excerpts of text that can be assessed in a meaningful way with 
regard to the analysing phenomenon (Boyatzis, 1998). The process of coding is a part 
of the analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994) as it allows organising data into 
meaningful groups. Coffey & Atkinson (1996) emphasize there is no right or wrong 
way of coding. Coding and theme searching is the process of disassembling and 
reassembling the data (Ezzy, 2002). Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest working 
systematically through the entire data set, giving equal attention to every bit of data.  
In this analysis every transcript was converted into a table to divide the text 
into smaller segments of information according to the individual utterances of 
particular participants. Also, the researcher’s contemporaneous notes were added 
where relevant in order to help with the analysis in later stages. The coding stage was 
conducted on a computer using a text processor. Each transcript (N=8) was coded in 
full. The coding process resulted in the development of 108 initial codes, where every 
code was a word or a short sentence describing the content of particular pieces of text. 
The full list of codes may be found at Appendix C. 
5.3.3. Identification of initial categories 
Braun & Clarke (2006), suggest that similar / intuitively associated codes 
should be collated together creating categories / groups of initial, interrelated codes.  
As the text extracts and codes were already in a table, each code could be separately 
copied and pasted into another file creating a new table. This process allowed the 
creation of new groupings that contained citations related to a common code/topic. 
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For example, codes like: “Supervision”, “Supervisory practices”, “Supervision – 
actions undertaken” and similar were identified in all transcripts. Next, every piece of 
text with an attached code related to supervision was copied separately to another file 
creating a table containing only pieces of text linked to a variety of aspects of 
supervision and supervisors.  
The operation was performed for each initial code. Unique codes that did not 
possess transparent linkages with others were put into miscellaneous category. This 
process resulted in 37 initial categories. The table below shows how codes were 
categorized and how the groups were titled.  
 
Table 7. A list of initial codes composing initial categories 
Names of categories Initial codes collated according to the topic they 
cover 
1. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION   Accident investigation (AI)  
 Investigation 
2. BLAME   Blame 
3. BLIND EYE   Blind eye 
4. CLAIMS  Claims 
5. COMMUNICATION   Communication  
 Communication – using posters 
6. CONTRACTORS  Contractors 
7. CONTRADICTORY MESSAGES   Contradicting messages  
 Contradictory messages 
8. CORPORATE   Corporate 
9. CUTTING CORNERS   Cutting corners 
10. FEEDBACK   No feedback  
 Need for feedback  
 Lack of feedback  
 Feedback – newsletter  
 Feedback – need for Feedback 
11. HEALTH EFFECTS   Health effects  (HE) 
12. HOUSEKEEPING   Housekeeping 
13. IFE   IFE 
14. IMPROVISATION   Improvisation 
15. LACK OF REACTION   Lack of reaction  
 Lack of reaction - consequences  
 Lack of reaction – postponed solution - 
Consequences of lack of reaction  
 Passivity,  
 Postponed reaction 
 Not effective resolving 
16. LACK OF RESOURCES   Lack of equipment,  
 Lack of resources  
 Lack of resources – lifting gear  
 Lack of resources – man power  
 Old equipment, Maintenance 
17. MANAGERS   Differences in priority – managerial 
decisions  
 Leadership,  
 Managerial skills  
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 Managers - LMX  
 Managers – no personal relation  
 Managers – people skills  
 Managers - skills managers  
 Managers,  
 Safety leadership, 
18. MOTIVATION TO WORK   Co-workers  
 External motivation  
 Money  
 Motivation to work  
 Motivation to work – co-workers,  
 Motivation to work - job itself  
 Motivation to work - money,  
 Motivation to work - pride  
 Motivation to work – variety of tasks  
 Preferred shift pattern 
19. OLD CULTURE  Old culture  
 Used to be better 
20. ORGANIZATION  Poor organization  
 Organizational learning  
 Organization of department 
21. PAPERWORK  Paperwork 
22. PHYSICAL CONDITIONS   Physical conditions (pc)  
 Pc – lack of room  
 Pc - lightning  
 Physical conditions (PC) – lack of spare 
space 
23. POSITIVE PERCEPTION OF 
COMPANY’S APPROACH TO 
SAFETY  
 Positive perception of company’s approach 
to safety 
24. PPE   PPE 
25. PRESSURE,   Pressure – from workmates  
 Pressure,  
 Production pressure  
 Time pressure, 
26. REACTIVE APPROACH   Reactive approach 
27. RECOGNITION   Recognition,  
 Recognition – advantages 
28. REPORTING OF ACCIDENTS   Reporting claims  
 Reporting hazards  
 Reporting,  
 Underreporting, 
 Minor injuries 
29. ROLE OF H&S   H&s  
 H&s role  
 H&S team  
 Role of H&S 
30. RULES BREAKING   Breaking rules  
 Rules breaking 
31. SECONDARY RISKS   Secondary risks 
32. SHIFT LEADER   Shift leader - role  
 shift leaders – limited power 
33. SUPERVISION   Supervision  
 Supervision  - lack of in nightshifts  
 Supervision – actions undertaken  
 Supervision – difficult to find them  
 Supervision - fairness  
 Supervision - inconsistency  
 Supervision – lack of and consequences  
 Supervision - not enough  
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 Supervision – not on the shop floor  
 Supervision – support for safety  
 Supervisory practices 
34. TRAINING   Training – safety on job limited  
 Training, 
35. TURNOVER   Turnover, 
36. UNDERTAKEN RISKS   Undertaken risks 
37. MISCELLANEUOUS  Emotions 
 Group consistency  
 Personal time  
 
The collation of text excerpts ascribed a common code allowed for a re-
focusing of the analysis aimed at the identification and naming of higher order codes, 
or themes (see next section). All text excerpts coded in a similar way were iteratively 
re-appraised and reviewed to consider how these similar codes may combine to form 
overarching categories. This process also helped in formulation of sub-themes (facets 
within each global theme).  
5.3.4. Identification of themes 
Following the recommendations advanced by Braun & Clarke (2006) relating 
to reviewing categories stage of the analysis and Patton’s (1990) regarding internal 
homogeneity, the process of reviewing and revising categories was taken to a further 
level. All the collated extracts within each category were read and reviewed and 
considered whether they appear to form a coherent pattern (theme). At the end of that 
process it was concluded that there was insufficient data to create themes from the 
following categories and so these were removed from the analysis: 
1. CLAIMS  
2. CONTRACTORS  
3. HOUSEKEEPING 
4. MISCELLANEOUS 
5. MOTIVATION TO WORK 
6. PHYSICAL CONDITIONS  
7. POSITIVE PERCEPTION OF COMPANY’S APPROACH TO 
SAFETY  
8. PPE  
9. ROLE OF H&S  
10. TURNOVER 
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The remaining 27 categories either were left unchanged or a number of 
categories were merged together (on the basis of conceptual relatedness) creating new 
themes. The table below shows which categories were turned into themes and which 
ones were merged together to create more general theme. 
Table 8. A list of categories composing higher level themes 
THEMES CATEGORIES 
1. COMMUNICATION  Communication  
Contradictory messages  
Feedback 
Lack of reaction 
Lack of resources 
Improvisation 
2. CORPORATE IDENTITY Corporate 
Old culture 
3. LEADERSHIP Managers 
Organization 
Shift leader 
Supervision 
Blame 
Blind eye 
Recognition 
4. PRESSURE   Pressure 
5. REACTIVE APPROACH  Reactive approach 
Accident investigation 
6. REPORTING  Paperwork 
Reporting of accidents 
Ife 
7. RULES BREAKING  Cutting corners 
Rules breaking 
Secondary risks  
Undertaken risks  
8. TRAINING  Training 
 
5.3.5. Defining themes and identifying sub-themes 
As Braun & Clarke (2006) suggest, the final stage of analysis should be 
focused on deriving definitions for the emergent themes and identifying the 
constituent sub-themes. In order to accomplish that analysis all text excerpts that 
belonged to each theme were reviewed one more time to identify the “essence” of 
what each was about. The names of themes and their definitions are shown in Table 9 
below. 
Table 9. Definitions of themes 
THEMES DEFINITION 
1. COMMUNICATION  Relates to all elements that affect the efficient flow of 
information between different levels of the 
organisational hierarchy. 
2. CORPORATE IDENTITY Relates to all these aspects where employees of the 
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company feel affected by the decisions and actions 
undertaken by representatives of the corporation 
owning the site. 
3. LEADERSHIP Relates to skills of managers, management style and the 
character of interactions between workers and 
managers. 
4. PRESSURE   Relates to the perceived causes and effects of felt 
different types of pressure. 
5. REACTIVE APPROACH  Relates to the situations where hazards are removed 
rather after accidents than before. 
6. REPORTING  Relates to systems supporting processes of reporting 
accidents and near-misses and reasons for 
underreporting. 
7. RULES BREAKING  Relates to reasons of cutting corners and aware acting 
against safety rules. 
8. TRAINING  Relates to the consequences of not providing sufficient 
training for new comers and other employees. 
 
5.4. Discussion and interpretation of the identified themes 
5.4.1. Communication - feedback 
The issues relating to communication are widely cited in the safety culture 
literature (Berends, 1996; Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Diaz-Cabrera, Hernandez-Fernaud, 
& Isla-Diaz, 2007; Fernandes-Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007; Fung, 
et al., 2005; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mearns, et al., 2003; Mohamed, 2003; 
Silva, et al., 2004). 
At the company, on the one hand, employees felt encouraged, by a variety of 
communication means, to report safety problems; on the other hand, they reported 
routinely not knowing what happened to the information they submitted: no feedback 
was given. An effort to provide extra information about risks and hazards to the 
management may be considered as involvement and there is a significant body of 
evidence, in empirical studies by Locke and Schweiger (1979) and Katzell and Guzzo 
(1983) suggesting that employee involvement increases job satisfaction and 
productivity (Fenton-O'Creevy, 1998). The core of interviewees’ complaints referred 
to the perception that the majority of the problems reported were not addressed, 
leading to a perception that employee concerns are not valued:  
“When we bring a safety issue up, what is the main reason that it is not done? 
Maybe you can ask that question and then come back to us.” [shop-floor 
employee 5, Ceramic Core] 
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“I have had issues where I have tried to pull out Health and Safety to 
management and nothing still has been done about it. And that is after two 
years.” [shop-floor employee 4, Large Wax] 
For employees the fact that Health and Safety expectations are formally 
communicated but not followed through becomes a contradictory message and affects 
their attitudes:  
“If you see all these problems going on, day after day, after day, and you get 
preached from higher levels they want to solve it, and nothing gets done about 
it, it must affect you mentally as well.” [shop-floor employee 6, Large Wax] 
Such a perception may exist for two reasons: either the resolution was not 
offered or no feedback was provided that it had been addressed. Delays in resolution 
can also be corrosive, in so far as they can transmit the implicit message that the issue 
is not a priority, and / or that it is not recognised as important by the organisation:  
“Eventually it’s done, but it takes too long” [shop-floor employee 9, Alloy 
Plant].  
“Leaking pipes get patched up but don’t actually get repaired” [shop-floor 
employee 2, Large Wax]   
 “They said you have to have new guns, because there is a vibration problem, 
it took them two years and you had new guns, exactly the same, different named ones, 
but a little bit of rubber stuck in there and that was it” [shop-floor employee 7, Alloy 
Plant].  
 “It is not classed as a priority; they don’t class it as a priority. But it is a 
priority because you are damaging your eyes” [shop-floor employee 12, Large Wax],  
“Do they care about our safety? Not much, don’t they? Oh yeah they do, they 
don’t want us to get hurt, but they don’t see that as a big issue compared to some 
other things” [shop-floor employee 3, pre-finishing]. 
Perceived lack of communication following their initiative causes disaffection:  
“Cause they don’t see anything being done, he reports something, six weeks 
later it still has not being fixed, you can look at it and what is the point” [shop-floor 
employee 11, Large Wax].  
“You have heard my cell leader saying to me: ‘Well, I will tell the manager’ 
but I don’t think it will make any difference” [shop-floor employee 2, Ceramic Core],  
creates passivity:  
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“So actually making a stand does not make any difference” [shop-floor 
employee 5, Large Wax],  
decreases motivation:  
“Well, makes you not report didn’t it? Cause it might be suited for 12 months 
anyway” [shop-floor employee 2, Foundry],  
and creates disengagement:  
“If you moaned once and then you have to moan again and again and again 
surely you just get bored with it” [shop-floor employee 1, Pre-finishing]. 
Edmondson (1996) has commented that when employees perceive that their 
concerns are not valued or addressed this tends to foster a negative climate that 
inhibits the willingness of both managers and employees to communicate freely and 
discuss mistakes and issues. The central role of communication in safety climate was 
demonstrated by Mohamed (2003), who found that effective organisational 
communication is related to a more positive safety climate. Limited feedback may 
have a range of negative implications for safety on the shop-floor: it can create 
disaffection and passivity in the group of shop-floor employees and may be a source 
of indifference of employees to formal communications, and this effect may hinder 
their motivation to participate in future safety improvements. 
5.4.2. Corporate Identity 
The company was bought by a multinational corporation in 2000. Therefore, 
“the old” culture of the company, policies, management structure, style of working, 
company values etc. were subjected to the challenge of harmonisation with the 
corporate perspective:  
“There is definite difference. There are, I would suggest, a number of people 
on site that are from the old school of the company and they know a different way of 
working and we have noticed the significant change with the corporation” [Manager 
1].  
This theme is very context-specific and probably time-sensitive; in ten years’ 
time it may be diffused to a large degree. However, this theme is important, as it 
affects the work identity and job security of employees who have worked here for a 
number of years: 
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“It feels like now that we are a part of a much larger entity and we are just a 
little square in a ledger and at some point somebody may put a cross in that ledger” 
[Manager 3].  
The new owner of the company is being perceived as an entity that is 
extremely focused on numbers and measuring different aspects of performance:  
“Corporate have this couple of people or team of people constantly trying to 
reinvent something, a new way of measuring something” [Manager 2].  
On the one hand, the focus on measures positively affected safety: 
“I think some of the things we have introduced, painful that they were, things 
like lock out tag out, full prevention, and I actually think those have been good things, 
painful to install but I think they are good things because educating people on this is 
the right thing to do.” [Manager 1]. 
On the other hand, measures are used to control managerial performance and, 
in the opinion of the managers, are used in a confrontational manner to pinpoint 
individuals not performing to the corporate expectations: 
“The measures are so damning on you” [Manager 3]. 
In addition to its outcome-based safety performance measures, the corporation, 
following the takeover, in its drive for continuous improvement, introduced a range of 
new programs and initiatives related to safety and other aspects of organisational 
performance (2004 – 2010, see Chapter 3). The parent organisation imposed its 
systems across all businesses in the group – and attempted to impose common safety 
systems and solutions – irrespective of the history of each site. Reports were 
encountered that this process caused people and resource overload:  
“You tend to know what are the number of resources available, which is not 
endless and the number of initiatives which are on the go. No person or no team of 
people can actually review the results from all of those initiatives” [Manager 2].  
There was also evidence of initiative fatigue– in instances where new 
initiatives are reportedly introduced without cancelling the previous ones. A number 
of managers portrayed a situation in which they felt under regular assault, being 
bombarded by new initiatives and interventions emanating from the parent 
organisation. In some instances, the sentiments expressed suggest that these “foreign” 
tools and techniques were of limited local relevance or value:  
“When you got all this chatter [about new programs] going on as well, I think 
it dilutes the effect of what is really important” [Manager 1].  
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What makes it even more difficult to manage is the perception that:  
“The corporation is very mechanical now, not personal” [Manager 3].  
The corporate approach to managing the site was widely characterised by 
senior managers as impersonal and focused on management by outcomes, with a 
number of potentially negative implications for safety, such as overloading available 
local resources (people, money, goods) with new initiatives and reducing the 
performance of older programs. That could be because the corporation is a large 
network of people who are responsible for different elements of performance to 
different extents. It is very difficult to build rapport with corporate representatives as 
in most cases they expect performance indicators that can be obtained with internal or 
external audits. While there may arguably be consistency gains from a homogenous 
corporate approach to managing workplace risks, this has to be balanced against the 
potential to decrease intrinsic engagement and ownership of risk management systems 
amongst local managers. In that instance there seemed to be a clash of cultures. The 
“solutions” imposed by the parent organisation did not seem to fit with the local 
culture as employees saw little value in them and were not motivated to participate. 
The shared perception was that managers are overloaded and are not able to address 
all expectations, partly because the corporation diverted resources from local safety 
issues.  
The theme “Corporate Identity” or similar was not found in the safety 
literature. However, the “clash of cultures” resulting from mergers and acquisitions is 
already known to researchers (Ashkanasy, 1995; Badrtalei & Bates, 2007; Baughn & 
Finzel, 2009) and advice is available on how to manage resources and people during 
organisational takeover (Pike, 2006). Although some evidence has been generated on 
the cultural difficulties of merging companies, no research was found analysing the 
impact of mergers on safety culture and safety performance. Therefore, it is argued 
that the “Corporate identity” aspect is a novel finding in the safety culture arena and 
requires further exploration. 
5.4.3. Leadership 
Reference to dimensions relating to the central role played by senior 
management leadership may be found in almost all studies of workplace safety 
culture: maintenance and management issues (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995); 
management overall concern (Janssens, Brett, & Smith, 1995); managerial safety 
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climate (Prussia, et al., 2003); management safety practices (Hayes, Perander, 
Smecko, & Trask, 1998); Management commitment (Hahn & Murphy, 2007); 
management support for safety (Thompson, et al., 1998); line management 
commitment (Fung, et al., 2005); managers’ attitudes and behaviours (Fernandez-
Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007); managerial safety climate (Brown, et 
al., 2000); perceived supervisor competence (Mearns, et al., 2003); supervisory 
actions and expectations (Zohar, 2000); supervisor safety (Hayes, et al., 1998); 
supervisor support for safety (Thompson, et al., 1998); supervisory environment 
(Mohamed, 2003); supervisor support (Seo, et al., 2004); supervisor’s role (Fung, et 
al., 2005); supervisory safety climate (Brown, et al., 2000); supervisor safety (Lu & 
Shang, 2005); supervisor trust and safety (Taylor & Thomas III, 2003); leadership 
style (Diaz-Cabrera, et al., 2007). The leadership dimension is widely acknowledged 
as one of the most important and influential factors affecting safety culture. In the 
current study, leadership is taken to refer to the orientations and behaviour of shift 
leaders, supervisors and managers8.  
LEADERSHIP - AVAILABILITY 
Shop-floor workers often reported encountering problems related to safety or 
production that needed supervisory attention, but portrayed a situation in which 
supervisors and line managers were rarely seen on the shop-floor and / or had limited 
time to devote to resolving shop-floor issues:  
“If have an issue you can phone the supervisor or you can better see him, but 
not everybody can see him. Sometimes he has to go away and a room has been left to 
somebody else, so that person may have something else to do, so you are always kind 
of chasing the issues. It’s not their fault, but you have to come out of your cell,9 which 
defuses the whole object of doing your work” [shop-floor employee 3, Large Wax].  
 “I think they have got a lot to deal with. They got more and more shared 
problems. I think they are overloaded” [shop-floor employee 8, Large Wax].  
 “I don’t really see a lot of them, they don’t get involved, they seem to be 
locked in an office and don’t really involve themselves with the operators I would 
say” [shop-floor employee 4, Pre-finishing].  
                                                 
8 The terms are explained in the glossary section. 
9 A cell is composed by 3-5 people whose work is synchronised and if one person has to leave 
the cell it stops all other people working in that cell.  
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They come down, but only really just passing through, cannot really involve 
with day-to-day running” [shop-floor employee 8, Pre-finishing].  
and would appreciate if managers were more available on the shop-floor:  
“It would be nice to see him on the shop floor a little bit more” [shop-floor 
employee 1, Foundry].  
The availability of supervisors and managers translates to the availability of 
resources to solve safety- and production-related problems, as these leadership 
positions hold decisional power to assign assets in order to resolve these problems.  
LEADERSHIP – PEOPLE SKILLS 
The operatives mentioned the importance of managers’ empathy towards 
them:  
“It gets so hot, you are sweating so badly, it makes your eyes sting, if you take 
your glasses off to clean it and he catches you with glasses off, he even gets a 
supervisor to tell you off or he does it himself. It’s not like: ‘Oh, the fans are not 
working’ but you know: ‘Put your glasses on!’” [shop-floor employee 4, Foundry].  
This attitude of managers towards workers is noticed even in routines as basic 
as greetings:  
“But managers would come and then look at a board where are productivity 
figures, and it is literally from here to about here (less than one meter) and they 
didn’t say good morning to two people who were virtually facing them. It is an awful 
thing to do, I think” [shop-floor employee 12, Large Wax].  
“I spoke to him I reckon nine times, said hello, nothing, and he spoke to me 
once and I was in the toilet and I thought maybe that is the way [with him]” [shop-
floor employee 2, Pre-finishing].  
The quoted situations indicate a limited degree of rapport and free exchange 
between supervisor / managers and staff. The implication for safety relate to barriers 
to the free exchange of information. However, such situations also have an emotional 
impact and may be a source of intimidation or low self-esteem:  
“Some people are approachable, some people treat you like a person, you 
speak to them like man to man, when others, they look down on you and I suppose you 
feel a little bit intimidated by them because they own that power” [shop-floor 
employee 6, Foundry].  
“They won’t speak to you. They just keep walking so we are nothing to them, 
we’re  just a number and that’s it” [shop-floor employee 6, Pre-finishing].  
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This sub-theme complements the previous one. Leaders not only have to be 
available, but they also need to demonstrate a positive attitude towards their 
subordinates as this positive character of the relationship affects the motivation of 
employees to reciprocate in a way desired by leaders (Lee, 2004). As was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, the relationship between leaders and subordinates is an 
important element of organisational efficiency and shop-floor employees expressed a 
desire to be able to remain in regular contact with their superiors. There is some 
evidence suggesting that the quality of these relationships, based on the rules of 
reciprocity, affect compliance with safety and engagement within safety matters 
(Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003). 
LEADERSHIP - INCONSISTENCY 
Leading by example and the consistent enforcement of safety rules across all 
departments and employees is widely cited as an important part of shaping operatives 
attitudes and behaviours (Hale, Heijer, & Koornneeff, 2003; Komai & Grossman, 
2009; Lawton, 1998). The focus group participants shared their perception that 
leaders sometimes turned a blind eye for the sake of production and improving output 
figures:  
“I think that probably a lot of people are aware of that but they turn a blind 
eye, because the production figures improve because of it” [shop-floor employee 5, 
Foundry].  
One of the reasons for citing for this was that production pressure results in the 
prioritisation of some actions over others, leading to the suggestion that managers and 
supervisors sometimes turn a blind eye to operatives’ unsafe behaviours and breaking 
rules where this allows production objectives to be met:  
“Very heavy moulds being put on high shelves and on low shelves. They try to 
blind-eye when they need to” [shop-floor employee 3, Large Wax].  
 “But when it suits managers, they just go underneath [where it is prohibited], 
oh yeah, but rules are rules, but it doesn’t bother them” [shop-floor employee 7, 
Ceramic Core].  
Another example (below) of inconsistent supervisory behaviour with regard to 
safety rules enforcement showed that the operatives were encouraged to undertake 
unsafe actions despite prior communication of the risks associated with that task:  
“I refused to move moulds before, because they are on right and you can’t put 
them on that place, because ergonomically you shouldn’t be lifting them. But instead 
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of that being, the supervisor just gets somebody else to do it, so somebody else comes 
along and does it” [shop-floor employee 8, Large Wax].  
Moreover, misgivings were expressed over the extent of compliance, and 
managerial commitment to compliance, again suggesting inconsistent supervisory 
behaviour towards the social legitimacy of putting safety first: 
 “They say Health and Safety is up there in the fore-front, but in reality it is 
not, to be honest. You can just go to my department, walk about, cooling was not 
working, doors leaking, cranes are not checked, it is endless really” [shop-floor 
employee 1, Foundry].  
The implementation of Health and Safety policies refers not only to the 
removal of physical hazards, but also to demanding compliance from people:  
“They are saying not wearing your PPE is disciplinary, you can walk around 
the room any time of the day and you will find someone not wearing, glasses on the 
head, or not wearing the jacket” [shop-floor employee 1, Large Wax].  
Although it is the job of departmental supervisors to ensure that all shop-floor 
employees comply with procedures, it seems to be difficult for them as they are afraid 
of how management may react to their putting safety before production: 
“I think sometimes it is very difficult to a supervisor to actually tell your boss 
that somebody is not gonna do something because you don’t want them to do it 
because you don’t think it is safe” [Supervisor 3]. 
“I have done it more than once and it put you at loggerheads with the persons 
in charge. I have certainly had a request for a certain job to be done and I said, hang 
on a minute, no he is not going to do that because it is not safe. And then you put 
yourself right in the firing line.” [Supervisor 4]. 
Another group of topics refer to the perceived extent to which supervisors treat 
people equally in regard to rule enforcement:  
“Doesn’t seem to be fair rules right across the board for everybody, even if it 
comes to PPE and safety things, some people, the majority of us wear it but there are 
certain individuals that never wear the overalls. Always have their glasses on the 
head, and they never get disciplined and it is just unfair” [shop-floor employee 11, 
Large Wax]. 
or deciding about privileges:  
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“Some people are allowed to have shift changes and some people aren’t, some 
people are allowed to do what they like, breaks and things like that and some people 
aren’t.” [shop-floor employee 6, Ceramic Core].  
Based on the above examples it may be argued that employees perceive an 
inconsistent message about safety from senior managers. Although there are rules and 
procedures, it seems that in some cases they may be seen as getting in the way of 
speedy production and so an expectation not to comply is being communicated 
indirectly.  
A number of shop-floor employees opined that sometimes there is silent 
approval not to comply strictly with safety rules and that may be promoted by both 
managers and supervisors. The inconsistency between formal expectations and their 
inconsistent enforcement may result in the development of the attitude: “we can do 
whatever we want until we are caught”.     
As the supervisors and managers are figures within the organisation who 
potentially model the behaviours of their subordinates (Komai & Grossman, 2009), 
any inconsistencies on their account in that respect can directly affect shop-floor 
employees (Simons, 2002). Operatives seeing their leaders breaking safety rules or 
agreeing to the rules being broken under their supervision may on the one hand 
provide permission for them to default to the quickest and easiest path, which 
routinely embodies greater risk, and on the other hand, may create cynicism towards 
policies and procedures and its enforcement attempts, hampering the effective 
development of new safety improvements. The interviewed employees indicated that 
they wished leaders to be available, demonstrate a positive, personal approach 
towards them and to display behaviours consistent with the current policies and 
procedures.  
5.4.4. Pressure 
Pressure is a widely recognised factor affecting safety behaviour (Brown, et 
al., 2000; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mearns, Flin, et al., 2001; Mohamed, 2003) 
and safety culture. In general terms, pressure in the manufacturing sector is created by 
the need to produce a requisite output within a finite time frame. Respondent accounts 
highlighted an array of contexts in which time pressure conflicted with safety 
considerations. According to the operatives, there are two main sources of pressure: 
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leaders and the work environment. Leaders’ expectations and priorities can play a 
role:  
“We all have an expectation that they know whether they have met a fair 
expectation so I don’t think we say you haven’t done enough, they know that 50 is 
your expectation.” [Manager 3]. 
“You have got the quality people are interested in quality only, they don’t care 
how many you produce until they are good, and then you put the other side of the 
coin, just bloody get out the monoshell [one of departments], get them done, so you 
are trying to keep both happy” [Supervisor 4]. 
 the control of work and verbal urging: 
“We have a mister ***, wandering around asking why production is slightly 
lower today than it was yesterday.” [shop-floor employee 2, Ceramic Core]. 
 “They always ask you how long. How much longer you gonna be? You can’t 
really say because you can get on the machine, you can bump into a problem that you 
didn’t expect.” [Maintenance employee 5]. 
“If you don’t do a certain amount, then they will say: hang on a minute, how 
come you did this yesterday but you only did this today” [shop-floor employee 10, 
Alloy Plant]. 
or close personal supervision: 
“Especially if you are trying to do a job, you are doing in a safe way and 
everything and you have got four supervisors from that department stood there 
watching you wondering why and what are you doing, so you have got pressure of 
them watching you.” [Maintenance employee 2]. 
However, attributing pressure solely to leaders would limit the understanding 
of its causes, as the interviewees indicated that elements of the work environment 
impose time and production pressure on workers as well. For example a lack of 
human resources puts more responsibility on individuals:  
 “[Without enough men in the department] You gotta be a bit quicker and it 
makes the job more risky”  [shop-floor employee 8, Foundry]. 
“I have got such a large number of people with basically rubbish skills, those 
[experienced] people are carrying the department, the ones that are skilled, and I 
think they really feel under pressure.” [Manager 2]. 
“Now there is imbalance between experienced and inexperienced people in 
there which puts a lot more pressure on the experienced ones because as well as 
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getting on and getting the numbers out and everything else.” [shop-floor employee 4, 
Foundry]. 
Moreover, time limits may be imposed by machines time cycles and 
breakdowns: 
“Once they got it in, then the pressure transfers to me, because I have got a 
certain length of time when I’m gonna cast it” [shop-floor employee 3, Foundry]. 
 “When it’s a breakdown of the machine that they are using for production at 
that time that means, I think, when you see when the pressure is there, in the 
background, ‘cause they will be saying: well how long is it going to take, what is it?” 
[Maintenance employee 1]. 
 Pressure may diminish workers’ attention and cause misjudgements: 
“’Cause you’re struggling to get the work done in the time, and because you 
are struggling to get the work done, you are not paying as much attention to 
everything going on around you which means accidents are more likely to happen.” 
[shop-floor employee 10, Large Wax]. 
“When you’re under pressure you make misjudgements.” [shop-floor 
employee 5, Large Wax] 
cause the violation of safety rules: 
“I experienced driving a fork truck with faulty brakes. Now I should have 
locked it out and tagged it out, but that would involve shutting the unit down and 
there is pressure not to shut that unit down. Production pressure.” [shop-floor 
employee 2, Foundry], 
limit time and resources to provide proper training to inexperienced people, as 
in the majority of cases on-job training is provided by more experienced colleagues 
from the same department: 
“Because it is such a high volume of work that we have got, you are not really 
given the time to come off your work station and actually look after these people 
properly. It’s a case to give a quick induction and then keep going back and checking 
on them but you are obviously expected to keep doing your work at the same time as 
checking somebody else.” [shop-floor employee 6, Ceramic Core], 
limit the regular maintenance of machinery: 
“We have got to have the machinery, of course if you havn’t got the machinery 
then production aren’t producing anything so this sort of push-pull sort of attitude 
between equipment and I think that maintenance need to understand that production 
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make the money and they need to keep it going, but production also needs to realise if 
they don’t stop at some stage to have the machines looked after, they will eventually 
stop working and this balance between maintenance and production in this company 
seems to be very sort of fraught with difficulties.” [Maintenance employee 4]. 
Production pressure is perceived by employees as having two main sources: 
leadership approach and the effectiveness of technical systems and resources. 
Interviewees held beliefs regarding the negative consequences of pressure on them 
and their work environment. Being under pressure may diminish the attention of 
individuals, making them more prone to mistakes, breaking or bending safety rules 
and spending less time on training new-comers, in the case of experienced operatives 
(Gaba, Howard, & Jump, 1994; Mearns, Flin, et al., 2001) or limiting the scope of the 
maintenance of machinery. In short, the consequences of high pressure are negative 
and may be a source of risk.   
5.4.5. Reactive Approach 
The reactive approach refers to employees’ perception that the company 
removes hazards after accidents take place rather than trying to prevent accidents. 
Fleming & Lardner (2002a) clearly divide the methods used to identify at-risk 
behaviours into proactive and reactive, where the latter is much poorer than the 
former. 
Marais, Saleh, & Leveson (2006) demonstrated that the reactive focus of many 
safety improvement programs results in the primary emphasis being placed on 
investigating previous incidents and accidents in an attempt to prevent future 
accidents. These efforts are not always fruitful. It has been suggested that excessive 
focus tends to be placed on preventing the recurrence of exactly the same accident, 
without taking sufficient account of the underlying systemic precursors and their 
generalisability to other hazards. Symptomatic solutions to accidents often only 
reduce the likelihood of that particular accident recurring; they do not eliminate the 
deeper structural deficiencies that led to the accident in the first place.  
An appreciation of this insight led Reason (1997) to typify his Reactive 
Approach to safety as a characterisation of organisational culture, this also being a 
feature of the safety culture maturity model (Lawrie, Parker, & Hudson, 2006). In 
each case a reactive approach is cast as an insufficient focus on prevention.  
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Participants often expressed the perception that the company was reactive to 
accidents but did not proactively seek and manage hazards: 
“If someone is injured in the event, generally something is done about it. But if 
someone is not injured in the event, then it is questionable to getting it sorted.” [shop-
floor employee 3, Large Wax] 
“They wait for an accident to happen before they actually do anything about 
it.” [shop-floor employee 6, Large Wax] 
“Because they get bitten up by the people above them if they don’t do it right, 
when somebody does hurt themselves it is like, oh my god we have got to be seen to be 
doing everything we can and everything else actually needs to be dealt with goes by.” 
[shop-floor employee 2, Large Wax] 
“No, they must be sitting around waiting for this opportunity, but they are not 
around in advance sorting this out.” [shop-floor employee 11, Large Wax] 
“There is a lot of focus when there is an accident, but prior to an accident 
there doesn’t seem be that much attention.” [shop-floor employee 3, Large Wax] 
 “But at the end of the day, instead of being Health and Safety, it’s more 
wealth and safety, because if it is cheap for them to fix it, they will fix it straight away, 
or if it is going to be very costly for them in a core case, somebody gets hurt by it, 
then they fix it.” [shop-floor employee 5, Ceramic Core] 
All of these voices clearly lay claim to there being more visible attention to 
hazards after an accident than before. This attention and turmoil is indicated by 
additional people coming to the departments: 
“But you see a Health and Safety officer when something like that happens 
[implied – but not at other times]” [shop-floor employee 6, Pre-finishing] 
“When there is an accident, you will see six yellow waistcoats there in an 
hour” [shop-floor employee 1, Large Wax] 
An examination of past practice reveals that the parent corporation tends to 
take a number of definite actions after a serious accident in any of its plants in the 
world. There is a strong expectation that every major accident or serious incident be 
investigated and reviewed at the corporate level. At the same time limited effort is 
being put into learning from non-injury occurrences and regular and careful 
observation of the work environment, possibly resulting in missing some potential 
causes of future accidents. As such, this theme is directly related to issues linked with 
reporting, which will be discussed in the next section. 
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5.4.6. Reporting 
Reporting accidents, injuries and near-miss incidents is a potentially very 
important element of organisational learning (Edmondson, 1996). It allows the 
identification of casual influences, typically embedded in some combination of the 
physical environment, technical and socio-technical systems. Therefore, the under-
reporting of accidents and near-misses is a serious problem for any organisation. 
There may be a number of reasons for which under-reporting may take place and this 
was explored with respondents. The literature reports that under-reporting may be 
related to the perception of risk regarding occupational hazards as those who felt most 
“safe” reported fewer accidents and near-misses (Mearns, Flin, et al., 2001). Other 
studies show that reporting accidents is correlated with organisational commitment 
and communication (Fung, et al., 2005). 
These are important findings, but they are generic. The qualitative data 
collected here allowed for a more in-depth and contextualised understanding of 
people’s motivations to withhold information about accidents and near-misses. 
REPORTING - ACCIDENTS 
There are many events that could be used to learn about hazards in the 
workplace. One of them is investigating the root causes of accidents. However, to be 
able to do that, employees first have to be willing to report them. While fatal and 
major accident data can be considered substantially accurate, complete and reliable 
(Attwood, et al., 2006), it is apparent that minor-injury and medical-room entry data 
are prone to a range of amplification effects (Cooter & Luckin, 1997). Focus group 
participants provided a number of reasons motivating the non-reporting of these of 
minor injuries / medical room entries. 
The disincentives cited included the degree of bureaucracy and form filling 
associated with the procedure. 
 “You have to write a report, and then somebody comes and talks to you about 
it, then you have to go through another forms-filling session and if all you have done 
is burn your arm on the hotplate it’s just not worth it. Because they then say, what we 
can do about it, well, I need to remember not to put my arm on the hotplate.” [shop-
floor employee 10, Large Wax] 
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“The first thing you done you have got the paper work out, and if he 
(supervisors) is unsure about anything he phones down to Health and Safety and gets 
them to come up and help with the forms” [shop-floor employee 4, Foundry] 
“I think as because the system is so time-consuming as well and amount of 
paperwork they have to fill in then half of us probably don’t even want to put the 
supervisor through that” [shop-floor employee 7, Foundry] 
Another inhibitory effect cited by the respondents was the fear of being 
blamed in case it was subsequently determined that the injury was the result of an 
employee’s mistake, rule infringement or volitional risk taking.  
“Sometimes it might have been your fault potentially, maybe you done 
something stupid” [shop-floor employee 8, Foundry] 
“One guy was disciplined for doing the wrong thing. He put himself at risk by 
putting his hand on the open die, come down anyway, he wasn’t badly hurt but he was 
disciplined. A problem in there with this part of disciplining somebody who has 
reported an accident, so what do you think that guy is going to do next time with his 
finger. Is he gonna report it?” [Supervisor 3] 
 
REPORTING – NEAR-MISSES / INCIDENTS 
At the company there is also a system that aims to gather information about 
safety incidents and near-misses. It is called IFE (Injury Free Event) and has a format 
of small books of A7 size, given to all employees, where every page may be used as a 
“ticket” to report problems or report unsafe behaviours of work colleagues. These 
“tickets” are given to supervisors who have a responsibility to enter the information 
from the ticket into a database. This database is reviewed by a department manager 
who has the decisional power to assign adequate resources to solve the issue. 
Participants shared a number of reasons for their resistance to this method of 
reporting. 
One of them is the lack of feedback about implemented solutions after the 
delivery of an IFE. It seems to be consistent with the communication theme 
suggesting that lack of feedback is detrimental for employee motivation and 
engagement.  
“I put an IFE in last week in my area, as my shift leader did and see how 
quickly it happens cause I put two or three job tickets for the same thing over the last 
12 months and have not been resolved.” [shop-floor employee 4, Pre-finishing]. 
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“When you look at the amount of dust that is flying around up there, that is the 
IFE every day, you breathing it in.” [shop-floor employee 6, Pre-finishing]. 
According to the operatives’ perception, it is easier and quicker to resolve 
small problems without reporting them. Putting additional time and effort into taking 
a book, filling out a ticket and handing it to a supervisor was seen as too laborious and 
counterproductive, especially if it was supplemented by the feeling that it may not be 
resolved or it may take a long time before a solution will be provided.  
“If you see something like that just not look and write but sort it out by 
yourself, what you can do, sort it out, you don’t have to keep writing everything down 
and then send them off, this is not right” [shop-floor employee 1, Pre-finishing]. 
“There was sweep and brush up fallen on the floor and they put a ticket, 
sweep and brush presents a trip hazard. Well, in the time it took them to write up that 
ticket they could have lifted it up and hung it on its place” [Maintenance employee 1]. 
Additionally, as the IFE form allows the reporting of a colleague’ unsafe 
behaviour it was felt that behaviour observation may be factor acting against a team 
and as such having a potentially detrimental effect on relationships among group 
members: 
“I don’t want to write in my little book oh B*** wasn’t wearing her earplugs, 
oh here you are, and make myself look good and make everybody else think, 
hheeeyyy, you wrote that out, why didn’t you just tell [her] she wasn’t wearing it, why 
didn’t you tell her she was overloaded in the impreg tank. Why did you have to write 
it down in a book? Me personally that is how I feel about it, and that’s why my book is 
in the locker, and I don’t say nothing.” [shop-floor employee 3, Ceramic Core]. 
The findings described above provide an in-depth understanding of people’s 
motivations that is, impossible to catch with a quantitative approach. This 
understanding is crucial for a successful attempt at subsequent behavioural change. 
The main effect of underreporting on safety is that it limits the amount of insight 
available to the company about risks and hazards present on the shop floor, as well as 
potential causes of accidents and injuries. Furthermore, it skews the accident data-
base, which may lead to inappropriate actions being taken or may contribute to a 
slowdown of the development of new safety interventions. 
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5.4.7. Rules Breaking 
The importance of having good, practicable and workable safety rules has 
been emphasised by a number of studies investigating the safety culture topic and 
accident investigation. Lawton (1998, p. 94), who published a paper on the reasons 
for rule breaking, states:  
“It is important to remember that violations occur because rules exist. Rules 
are one means by which an organization attempts to influence or control the 
behaviour of its employees. However, there are disadvantages to using rules as a 
means of organizational control, in particular, that rules require time, effort and 
resources to enforce. Furthermore, working to rules requires less understanding of 
the functioning of the system, making it opaque. This can cause blindness to new 
situations that do not immediately fit the rules. Rules also require restriction of 
behaviour, which may be perceived to reduce the skill required to do the job 
successfully. This loss of freedom can cause resentment, particularly when people feel 
that they are being watched all the time.”  
Flin, Mearns, Fleming, & Gordon (1996) provided evidence that attitudes 
towards safety rules predicted accident involvement, and it was supported by 
Mohamed (2003), who demonstrated that perception of safety rules influences the 
safety climate of a company, thus suggesting that attitude towards safety rules is an 
important factor shaping safety climate and possibly affecting injury rate.   
In the group of interviewees it appeared to be obvious for some individuals 
that breaking safety rules happens on the shop floor, so the discussion was more about 
the reasons for breaking rules. The most frequently recurring comments related to the 
perception of safety rules as inadequate or wrongly designed and limited in flexibility: 
“We wear helmet and there is no need for us in bullet cell, cause we haven’t 
got overhead cranes flying around as such over there”. [shop-floor employee 5, Alloy 
Plant]. 
“Some of the rules were made years ago, and there are better ways to do 
things and if somebody finds the better way to do it but maybe breaking the rule they 
may still do it, in their eyes it’s easier to do it that way”. [shop-floor employee 2, Pre-
finishing]. 
“And now they brought in a silly rule where you can’t use the top two steps of 
a ladder, the top step I understand, but the next two stepping steps you can’t use to 
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work anywhere. But they won’t let you have any taller ladders”. [Maintenance 
employee 5]. 
However, employees also understand the importance of rules and their 
protective function and, if they notice rule-breaking behaviour, they can prompt their 
co-workers to comply: 
“Where are your gloves?’ we prompt each other, but that one thing I can say 
about that, the older ones that have been here longer time they tend to keep 
reminding, sometimes I had to be reminded about my earplugs or be reminded about 
my glasses”. [shop-floor employee 6, Ceramic Core]. 
The utterances of participants suggest that if these rules are not being 
continuously adapted to the needs of particular divisions based on the insights of the 
shop-floor employees, it may lead to the rules not being followed, or to the creation of 
informal ones. It is worth emphasising that in such a complex, multi-departmental 
organisation there is a huge variety of production processes and thus rules to protect 
the health of employees. Therefore attitudes towards safety rules should be 
investigated, keeping in mind that these contextual insights are findings that apply to 
one department but may not be relevant to others. Based on that premise, it is argued 
that the approach to safety rules will be different in different departments, affecting 
safety to different extents.  
5.4.8. Training 
Employers in the UK are legally obliged to provide H&S training to their 
employees under “the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974” and “Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999”. The importance of training has been 
underlined many times by safety-related research. According to Graham, Ramirez, 
Finlay, Hoy, & Richards (1996), training determines work performance and efficiency 
and affects safety behavioural performance (Reber & Wallin, 1984). Fernandes-
Muniz et al. (2007) state that a company has a positive safety culture if it has safety 
management system and one of the crucial elements of that system is training and the 
quality of its delivery. Lack of adequate training is one of the latent variables leading 
to unsafe acts or human failures. Diaz-Cabrera et al. (2007) demonstrated that training 
is a part of safety culture and refers to the perception of employees of the type of 
training organised by an employer. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Lawrie et al., (2006), who provided evidence that training is an element of a 
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company’s safety culture. The perception of having a lot of safety training correlates 
with high scores in the safety climate scale (Lu & Shang, 2005), and trained people 
feel safer in their environment, as they know how to deal with hazards. Smith, Cohen, 
Cohen, and Cleveland (1978) reported that increased safety staff, safety committees 
and safety training were associated with low accident rates in companies. The 
importance of training is well demonstrated in the literature, but the literature cannot 
provide contextualised information about specific problems with training in the 
company or about the perceived consequences of not having a very good training 
system.  
During the focus groups, participants shared some of their concerns related to 
training. As the variety of jobs in the company is considerable, every single position 
involves a different set of safety-related risks and hazards. Knowing them is important 
to avoid injuries, but it requires the provision of context-specific information to new-
comers. According to the respondents there was no job-specific training in place 
(except mandatory and generic introductory Health and Safety training) and no person 
designated to provide on-job safety training within departments: 
“The only bit of safety advice I had when I went into the foundry was: ‘assume 
everything is hot and don’t touch it’, literally. And I had to rely then on the kindness 
of the lads who were actually working there to actually show me what to do. They did 
not have to if they did not want to” [shop-floor employee 1, Foundry]. 
“Basically you learn off the cuff, as you go along, basically, you self-teach 
yourselves” [shop-floor employee 7, Foundry]. 
“When I first came in, I spent two and a half days walking around, that is 
what I did, walk around, nobody showed me anything” [shop-floor employee 8, 
Foundry]. 
As a result, new-comers are not fully aware of the risks associated with their 
jobs. One of the causes of this situation is the fact that there is no designated person to 
run job-specific training. It is assumed that current employees will teach a newcomer 
what is necessary.  
That may be attributed to work design and the efficiency of managing 
resources by the management. However, it seems that in the company it is assumed 
that training will be provided by the experienced old-timers but they cannot do that 
due to the production pressure that they experience. The consequences of the limited 
scope of training strongly affect safety, as new-comers are not only exposed to 
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hazards with which they are not familiar, but they also do not know the procedures of 
how to behave in case of emergency, and their understanding of safety rules is 
limited.  
5.5. Discussion 
The process of learning about the company’s safety culture(s) involved focus- 
group discussions (N=8 groups) with the representatives from the largest departments 
and leadership groups (N=61 respondents). There were differences in the nature of 
work of supervisors, managers and shop-floor workers. The focus groups discussions 
reflected these differences. The participants talked about things most important to 
them, so managers talked about different aspects of work than supervisors and 
supervisors about different aspects of work than shop-floor employees. The main 
challenges for managers related to balancing corporate expectations, dealing with 
corporate managers and constantly high expectations. The supervisors focused on the 
difficulties of controlling the demands of production, interdepartmental 
communication and managing resources. The shop-floor employees talked about all 
other aspects identified in the analysis. It was felt that the particular groups were 
complementary, so it was decided to analyse them together. Thematic analysis 
resulted in the description of eight construct themes considered relevant to the 
characterisation of safety culture. The aim of the focus groups was to gather insight 
into staff perceptions with regard to safety and risk taking that could be quantified in 
the next stage of research in order to obtain information about the distribution of 
particular elements across departments. That information would inform decisions on 
the type of intervention and target groups by job role and function.  
The analysis of focus group discussions permitted the creation of eight themes 
affecting safety in different ways: communication, corporate identity, leadership, 
pressure, reactive approach, reporting, rules breaking and training. Each theme 
represents an aspect of organisational performance that has an impact on employees 
and their attitudes and behaviour. The results of the analysis of the focus group 
discussion closely resembled the results of the individual interviews analysis. Five 
themes were common to both analyses: 1. Leadership, 2. Reporting, 3. Breaking rules, 
4. Pressure and 5. Communication. The theme identified by the analysis of individual 
interviews but absent in focus groups discussion was ‘job security’. The analysis of 
the focus group discussions produced two themes that did not appear in the results of 
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the individual interviews: 1. Corporate identity and 2. Training. Almost all of the 
themes have already been recognised in the subject literature, except the “corporate 
identity” theme. It is unique to the situation in which the company found itself after 
being acquired by a multinational corporation of American origin, where after the 
merger two different cultures and working styles had to be merged and employees felt 
and are still feeling the difference between the new and the old company.  
However, what seems to be an important insight emerging from the analysis is 
the fact that the identified factors do not function independently and their separation 
makes sense only for clarification purposes. In fact, the elements of organisational 
performance described by every theme are mutually dependent and interconnected 
affecting each other. It is important to understand these connections to understand a 
complex system of variables affecting employees’ perceptions of safety. 
Communication and - in the context of the company - the perceived lack of 
feedback to the reported safety problems creates disengagement and limit the amount 
of information provided to the management about risks and hazards, and this affects 
reporting, as passive employees are less likely to use IFE books to report near-misses. 
As a result, the company has less information about hazards. However, there is one 
more consequence. The corporation sets an expectation of how many IFEs should be 
raised per employee per month. Not realising the goal may put some pressure on the 
management and, depending on their people skills (leadership theme), they may 
pressure shop-floor employees to produce more IFEs. It may have a detrimental effect 
on safety perceptions, as in such a case the IFE scheme becomes a tick-box exercise 
and not a meaningful tool allowing learning from the operatives’ experience. This 
target-based approach to the IFE scheme is a result of the corporate policy towards 
reporting injuries and near misses imposed on all plants worldwide (Corporate 
Identity theme). Additionally, it affects motivation to report injuries and accidents 
(Reporting - Accidents theme) as the amount of paperwork involved in that process is 
discouraging for many employees including operatives and supervisors. Despite 
admitting that some safety improvement schemes introduced by the corporation 
improved safety on the site and increased safety awareness, managers indicated that 
the approach to them and to these changes is in their eyes impersonal, does not 
recognise available resources and focuses strongly on paperwork limiting their time to 
interact with employees (Communication - Feedback theme and Leadership – 
Availability theme). Moreover, at the time of the interviews, it seemed that the 
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corporation placed more emphasis on investigating accidents than on their prevention, 
supervising managers more closely on the results of investigations, which was 
expressed in the operatives’ observations of how the company reacts to incidents 
compared to preventive actions (Reactive Approach theme). Another element of 
leadership, except availability, is inconsistency. Leaders, by leading by example, 
create norms and model behaviours, so turning a blind eye to employees’ risk taking 
or displaying other inconsistencies in relation to safety may justify to some extent, in 
the minds of operatives, breaking rules and cutting corners (Rules breaking theme). 
Furthermore, it may be argued that managers / supervisors display these 
inconsistencies as the result of straining under production pressure (Pressure theme) 
which is partially created by the corporation (Corporate Identity theme). With regard 
to production pressure, not only are managers susceptible to it, but they also become a 
source of pressure for shop-floor employees (Pressure theme) along with other 
sources of pressure in the work environment, like machine cycle times or staff 
shortage. The perception of production pressure is another factor driving the breaking 
of safety rules (Breaking Rules theme) among operatives. It also limits the time that 
experienced workers devote to training new-comers in the risks associated with 
particular jobs (Training theme). Limited training results in a lower awareness of 
safety rules, becoming a third factor contributing to the breaking of rules by 
employees. Additionally, not knowing what is allowed may limit confidence that a 
certain action did not break safety rules and increase the frequency with which safety 
incidents are reported (Reporting theme), just in case somebody interpreted it as rule 
breaking, which could lead to the disciplinary route. Incomplete training is also linked 
to limited knowledge about risks and hazards, so it increases the probability of 
injuries and accidents.  
The foregoing discussion sought to demonstrate that all the identified elements 
are actually interconnected and interdependent. Changing one of them affects many 
others. It is also unrealistic to think that any of the themes is a discrete entity that 
affects safety independently of other elements. This insight, which is a result of the 
researcher’s observations and informal conversations, as well as of formal research 
activities, suggests that investigating any of the themes in isolation limits our 
understanding of the organisation as a dynamic system.  
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5.6. Critical findings 
1. Conducting this study created a base for the development of the safety 
culture questionnaire described in the next chapter.  
2. The analysis identified eight factors related to safety at the company. 
These are: 1. Communication, 2. Corporate Identity, 3. Leadership, 4. 
Pressure, 5. Reactive approach, 6. Reporting, 7. Rules breaking, 8. 
Training. 
3. The majority of these factors have already been identified in the subject 
literature, except for Corporate Identity, which is very specific to the 
situation in which the company finds itself and affects safety to a 
significant extent.  
4. The themes create a network of interdependent variables affecting and 
influencing each other with the result that safety is affected by a 
combination of factors and not separate variables.  
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Chapter 6 
Quantitative assessment of 
safety culture 
6.1. Introduction 
A core aim of this thesis was to develop and implement safety culture 
interventions in order to improve the safety performance of the company. Although 
the insights from the focus groups were very informative, these were limited with 
regard to the generalisability of the conclusions. The qualitative data did not allow the 
creation of departmental safety culture profiles, which are essential for the 
development of safety improvement programs. Moreover, there is evidence in the 
literature that white-collar staff may perceive safety significantly differently to blue 
collar staff, and those divisions may have different cultures, so-called sub-cultures 
(Clarke, 1999b; Weyman & Clarke, 2003). The difference in perceptions of safety 
among different groups of employees may have a strong impact on the design and 
application of improvement interventions, so testing was called for. Additionally, a 
tool was required to benchmark and monitor the change in employee safety 
perceptions. Based on these premises, it was decided that the development of a safety 
culture questionnaire was an important stage in the development of an understanding 
of the company’s culture(s) and that this would complement existing insights into 
employees’ perspectives on safety culture. The resulting safety culture questions were 
embedded into the company’s annual staff survey and conducted in 2008. A principal 
component analysis was performed on data gathered in 2008 to establish the 
component structure for the safety culture questions.  
6.1.1. Aim 
To identify a finite set of underlying constructs that can be considered to 
characterise the core variables affecting the safety culture at the site. 
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6.1.2. Objectives 
• To generate a survey to address the above aim, to be completed by a 
sample of the company’s employees. 
• To explore the psychometric properties of defining influences on 
workplace safety culture.  
• Further to explore the range of components underlying employee 
orientations on risk-taking behaviour. 
• To provide a degree of triangulation with the previously gathered 
qualitative evidence (Chapters 4 - 5).  
• To develop a set of reliable sub-scales that can be used to benchmark 
the profile of variables affecting on safety culture at the site and test for 
demographic differences across the organisation.  
6.2. Questionnaire development 
The questionnaire items were designed to reflect the themes and sub-themes 
identified in the qualitative studies (Chapters 4 - 5) and were informed by theoretical 
insights gathered from the review of the literature (Chapter 2). The list of items for the 
questionnaire was strongly informed by the qualitative data, including the discussions 
with supervisors and managers, as well as with the shop-floor employees. There were 
also items sourced from the literature. Therefore it is argued that the range of 
statements was appropriate to assess different job groups. The Table 10 shows what 
items constituted particular dimensions. 
Table 10. Relationship between the results of the individual interviews, focus groups, 
safety culture questionnaire items numbers and subject literature 
Individual 
interviews 
(Chapter 4) 
Focus groups 
(Chapter 5) 
Questionnaire 
items numbers10 
Literature 
 Reactive 
approach 
5,7,22,30 (Fleming & Lardner, 2002a; Marais, et al., 
2006) 
Leader’s people 
skills 
Leadership 
(management & 
supervision) 
2,4,6,9,11,14,19
,20,25,27,28 
(Diaz-Cabrera, et al., 2007; Fung, et al., 
2005; Hahn & Murphy, 2007) 
Reporting Reporting 3,18,24,29 (Edmondson, 1996; Mearns, Flin, et al., 
2001) 
Breaking rules Breaking rules 13,23 (Flin, et al., 1996; Lawton, 1998) 
Pressure Pressure 10,12 (Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mohamed, 
2003) 
                                                 
10 The reasons for not translating all themes into survey items and reasons for unequal 
representation of the themes in the questionnaire are provided on pages 123-125. 
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Communication Communication 17,21,26 (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Silva, et al., 2004) 
 Training 15 (Fernandez-Muniz, et al., 2007; Graham, et 
al., 1996) 
Job security Corporate 
identity 
  
  Recognition - 8 (Brun & Dugas, 2008; Hansen, Smith, & 
Hansen Ries, 2002) 
  Accident 
investigation - 
16 
(Basnyat, Chozos, & Palanque, 2006; Kletz, 
2006) 
 
As a first step in the development process the constructs that emerged from the 
thematic analysis (see Chapters 4 - 5) were used as the basis for developing clusters of 
related items. Where possible use was made of verbatim quotes and adaptations of 
quotes as the basis of the constituent questions. This was used to create an initial 
battery of 250 items. 
A constraint on the number of questions that could be included in the survey 
related to the level of access that could be negotiated with the host organisation, as the 
only available option for data collection was to embed the concepts of interest as a 
component of the annual staff attitude survey. Embedding the safety climate items in 
this way brought advantages in terms of coverage and response rate, but had the 
drawback of placing a constraint on the number of items that could be included. 
Through consultation with senior managers, agreement was reached over the 
number of safety culture questions that could be included. This was set at a maximum 
of 30 questions. That decision was dictated by practicalities and financial 
considerations. It needs to be emphasised that taking about 1000 people off work for 
15-30 minutes (whether completing the survey on-line or via hard copy) was a 
substantial cost for the business to bear. Moreover, understandably the senior 
management team wanted to maintain a degree of influence over what questions 
would be asked of their employees. In the view of the researcher, presenting himself 
as a student helped to build rapport and trust, and this influenced the richness of the 
qualitative data. However, there was also a downside to this. It meant not having 
authority to influence decisions. An example of such difficulties was clearly observed 
during the process of deciding the final set of questions for the safety culture 
questionnaire. The senior managers had an interest in what questions were asked, as 
this could potentially inform their decision making, and they expressed some 
suggestions of what questions they would prefer to be included in the questionnaire. 
But the suggestions were not made in order to avoid getting answers on a particular 
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subject, but rather to get the answers to the questions important to the managers, and 
so the final set of questions was agreed on the basis of a consensus between keeping 
the validity of the questionnaire and answering some questions of the managers. Such 
a process of modifying the research design could potentially influence the validity of 
the method, as the process of transferring the content from the qualitative research 
into survey statements was affected by the external influencers; however, it was felt 
that building the relationships with managers and strong cooperation was as important 
as the validity of the questionnaire. Therefore the researcher allowed this influence to 
take place. 
Based on those limitations, the initial item set had to be substantially pruned. 
However, this limitation also brought a critical focus to the item selection process. To 
achieve this, it was decided to apply a number of iterative steps to hone and refine the 
item set.  
1. Unclearly and / or ambiguously stated items were removed. 
2. Semantically very similar items were clustered and appraised to select 
those that best reflected core concepts and the items worded more 
clearly were left. 
3. Items that would not have read-across / relevance to all departments 
were removed. 
4. Items that were considered likely to elicit socially desirable responses 
(e.g. self-serving attribution effects) were removed. 
This procedure reduced the number of items by approximately 50%, to 127.  
Prior to formal piloting, the draft question set was subjected to peer review by 
a panel of Health and Safety experts from the company (N=4). This process provided 
valuable feedback on the initial draft of the questionnaire, highlighting areas of 
ambiguity regarding semantics, as well as the technical content of question items and 
their appropriateness. This process reduced the number of items to 55. This list of 
items was then presented to members of the senior management team, who expressed 
their preference over which items they would like to find out the answer for. This 
process was important for the organisation, as the management had their own agenda 
of priorities related to safety and wanted the results of the questionnaire to provide 
information related to their priorities. While it could be argued that this level of 
managerial involvement might introduce a bias into the issues addressed, without this 
level of oversight the data gathering would not have been permitted. Additionally, it is 
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held that involving the senior management team in this way had the potential to 
increase their ownership of the results and increase buy-in to actions taken on the 
basis of the findings, including the interventions planned in later stages of the research 
(see Chapters 7 - 8). After these consultations the number of items was reduced to 31 
and minor amendments were made in accordance with the feedback given by 
managers.  
6.2.1. Cognitive piloting of the question set 
It was considered that the most appropriate strategy would be to conduct a 
detailed piloting exercise, involving direct feedback by means of interviews with 
employees. Due to the costs of taking workers off their work, feedback was derived 
from individual (interview) rather than group elicitation. Feedback from shop-floor 
employees was gathered via individual interviews with volunteers from each 
department (N=10). A total of ten respondents agreed to complete the draft 
questionnaire and highlight those items that they considered required revision 
pursuant to the following criteria: 
1. items that could be considered to contain ambiguities, 
2. items that lacked clarity or that were in any way confusing, 
3. items that were poorly written, unclear or otherwise difficult to 
understand, 
4. typographical errors and omissions, 
5. appropriateness of respondent – group demographic classification. 
The pilot sample consisted of ten people working in ten largest departments 
(Small Wax, Large Wax, Monoshell, Mould Wrap, Foundry, Small Finishing, Large 
Finishing, Cleaning, Alloy Plant, Ceramic Core). 
The conclusions that emerged from the process were noted by the researcher 
for subsequent revision and inclusion in the final draft of the questionnaire. This 
process revealed the need for a limited number of revisions to items and one item was 
removed, giving a revised total of 30 items. The opinions expressed by the pilot 
respondents were predominantly positive towards the questionnaire in terms of its 
format, the wording of the items and the issues that it sought to address.  
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6.2.2. Issues of response set 
The item set was further appraised with respect to the potential for bias 
attributable to the response, set i.e. “the tendency of a person to respond to questions 
in a particular way independently of the content of the questions or, as conventionally 
termed, items… for example, the tendency to agree rather than disagree, or the 
tendency to make extreme responses” (Rennie, 1982).  
Rennie (1982) recommends achieving balance by constructing the items in the 
set such that there are an equal number that are positively and negatively framed. 
Consideration was therefore given to the scope for the semantic reversal of items, 
with a view to producing a questionnaire with 50% reverse scored items. However, 
there was also a need to consider semantic elements, i.e. to avoid awkward-sounding, 
overly complex language or recourse to double negatives. 15 items were chosen for 
reverse coding (see Appendix D).  
At this stage in the development process the items were thematically grouped. 
However, in order to counteract response bias, due to the sequential ordering of 
thematically related items, the order of presentation was randomised for the survey 
using the randomisation function in the Microsoft Excel software package.  
6.2.3. Item scaling 
Questionnaire items were referenced on a five-point Likert scale, with anchor 
points of “Strongly Agree”; “Agree”; “Neither agree nor disagree/neutral”; 
“Disagree”; “Strongly disagree” with the five positions being ascribed simple 
weightings of 5,4,3,2 and 1 respectively. The Likert scale was chosen because it has 
been empirically demonstrated that this format has strong potential to produce 
distributions that can be treated as interval data (Carifio, 1978). Five- and seven-point 
scales are the most commonly encountered in the psychometric measurement of 
safety culture. As Colman et al., (1997) and Dawes (2008) demonstrated empirically, 
5- and 7-point scales appear to produce ostensibly equivalent results so the 5-point 
scale was chosen on the grounds of simplicity. The scale response anchors were taken 
from Vagias (2006). 
6.3. Selection of method of data analysis 
There are three main objectives of the analysis: 
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1. to explore and understand the structure of a set of variables related to 
safety culture, 
2. to reduce the data set to a manageable size while retaining as much of 
the original information as possible, 
3. to enhance the insight afforded by the thematic analysis of the variables 
affecting safety culture described in Chapters 4 - 5. 
Following precedents set by a number of safety culture studies (Berends, 
1996; Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, & Tomas, 1998; Cheyne, Oliver, Tomas, & Cox, 2002; 
Prussia, et al., 2003; Taylor & Thomas III, 2003), principal components analysis was 
considered to offer an effective approach that would address the study’s aims.  
Further justification of the suitability of principal components analysis is 
offered by Gorsuch  (1974) and Stevens (1992). These authors suggest that if the 
number of variables is 30 or more, and where communalities can be predicted to be 
low (<.4) and the primary intent is to characterise the data by identifying a small 
number of underlying dimensions referenced to the common variance (by precedent 
assumed to be 1), principal component analysis is the most suitable method (Field, 
2005). The software used was SPSS ver. 16 for PC. 
6.4. Sample size 
Ever since 2006, the parent corporation has conducted an employee survey 
called “Global Voices” in all its locations worldwide. Each company in the group is 
obliged to offer employees the opportunity to fill out the survey. The survey was 
anonymous and employees were not obliged to participate.  
Permission was obtained to add the safety culture questions to the 2008 and 
2009 Global Voices surveys at the plant. It was agreed that the results of the safety 
culture element would be made available to the company’s senior management team 
both local and corporate and that feedback would be provided to the participants in 
the form of a summary.  
As in previous years, all employees were made aware of the opportunity to 
complete the annual Global Voices survey through a number of means: 
1. graphically enriched emails sent to all email recipients in the company,  
2. specially prepared, eye-catching posters put on the notice boards in the 
majority of departments,  
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3. supervisors were instructed to publicise the opportunity verbally during 
shift start-up meetings. 
The communication included information about the time and date of the 
survey administration, the fact that the survey had both the management and the union 
support and that participation was voluntary and anonymous.  
Questionnaires (see Appendix D) were distributed over a two-week period, 
with respondents being given the opportunity to spend 15-20 minutes of paid time to 
complete them. Administrators were available in the early morning and in the evening 
to take account of the rotating three-shift system, so all employees had the opportunity 
to complete the questionnaire.  
The employee response rates for the annual Global Voices survey at the 
sponsor company (including the safety culture components) were 43% (N=439) and 
35% (227) for 2008 and 2009 respectively. It must be emphasised that the survey for 
this Ph.D. research was embedded in a larger survey over which the researcher had no 
control. This included representatives from the majority of departments and functional 
positions (blue-collar, white-collar and managerial grades). Table 11 presents the 
counts for each position. The chi-square statistic was significant, suggesting that the 
samples from years 2008 and 2009 differed χ2(5)=14.52, p<.05. In 2009, 50% fewer 
operators took part in the study.  
Table 11. Position cross-tabulation 
 Position Total 
 operator 
team/shift/cell 
leader supervisor manager 
office 
positions other  
Year 2008 Count 293 34 18 21 42 31 439 
 
 
% of Total 40.9% 4.7% 2.5% 2.9% 5.9% 4.3% 61.3% 
2009 Count 147 29 13 23 40 25 277 
  
% of Total 20.5% 4.1% 1.8% 3.2% 5.6% 3.5% 38.7% 
Total Count 440 63 31 44 82 56 716 
 
% of Total 61.5% 8.8% 4.3% 6.1% 11.5% 7.8% 100.0% 
 
The Table 12 shows how many employees took part in the survey from 
particular departments in 200811.  
                                                 
11 For both samples (2008 and 2009) only departments with more than 20 respondents were 
included for the comparison of inter-departmental differences (see section 6.10). 
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Table 12. Number of employees from particular departments that filled out the safety 
culture questionnaire in 2008 
2008 
Department Frequency 
Number of 
employees working 
in departments   
Response rate in 
particular 
departments 
ABS 1 6 17% 
Ceramic Core 34 62 55% 
Cleaning 
(prefinishing) 
4 61 
7% 
Core Removal 2 12 17% 
Despatch & 
Packing 
2 11 
18% 
Engineering 12 32 38% 
Foundry 38 78 49% 
Grain Inspection 7 10 70% 
HEA Chem Lab 3 6 50% 
HEA Maintenance 5 14 36% 
HEA Production 24 47 51% 
Heat Treatment 3 23 13% 
H&S 2 4 50% 
Large Finishing 35 52 67% 
Large Wax 47 117 40% 
Layout 2 4 50% 
Maintenance 4 56 7% 
Met Lab 3 11 27% 
Monoshell 19 50 38% 
Mould prep 8 33 24% 
Quality 3 16 19% 
Salvage 1 4 25% 
Small finishing 19 43 44% 
Small Wax 66 103 64% 
Stores & Goods in 2 7 29% 
Tool Room 1 8 13% 
IT 1 6 17% 
X-ray 1 33 3% 
Other 3 .7 17% 
Total 352   
Chapter 6 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 130 
 
Missing (no info) 87   
Total 439 1021 43% 
 
Table 13 shows how many employees took part in the survey from particular 
departments in 2009. 
 
Table 13. Number of employees from particular departments that filled out the safety 
culture questionnaire in 2009 
2009 
Department Frequency 
Number of 
employees 
working in 
departments   
Response rate in 
particular 
departments 
Ceramic Core 22 48 46% 
Cleaning 
(prefinishing) 
25 54 46% 
Engineering 10 31 32% 
Foundry 26 61 43% 
HEA Production 2 42 5% 
H&S 1 4 25% 
Large Finishing 2 45 4% 
Large Wax 36 83 43% 
Layout 4 4 100% 
Maintenance 6 24 25% 
Met Lab 1 10 10% 
Monoshell 1 38 3% 
Mould Prep 14 24 58% 
Quality 2 17 12% 
Small Finishing 7 32 22% 
Small Wax 27 58 47% 
Tool Room 1 6 17% 
X-ray 16 27 59% 
Other 0 35  
Total 203   
Missing (no info) 24   
Total 227 643 35% 
 
The detailed information about the non-participants was not available. 
However, the sponsor company was going through turbulent times of difficulties with 
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orders and the process of redundancies. One explanation for the lower number of 
participants in 2009 is that the job security concerns affected employees’ motivations 
to conduct activities that were outside the scope of their work. However, as no 
relevant data about the non-participants are available, these explanations can only be 
hypothetical. 
It was considered that the most appropriate strategy to adopt for the main 
analysis was to perform the analysis on the sample of operators (N=293 in 2008) as 
the primary sample frame, for the following reasons: 
1. They constituted the largest homogeneous proportion of the sample. 
2. They were exposed to risks to the highest extent on a daily basis. 
3. The majority of accidents involved members of that group. 
4. Clarke (1999a) demonstrated that despite a shared perception among 
the representatives of different levels of organisational hierarchy that 
safety is important, blue-collar workers, supervisors and managers 
differed significantly with regard to the relative influence assigned to 
the various safety issues (see also DeJoy, Murphy, & Gershon, 1995). 
There are a number of rules of thumb available in the subject literature 
regarding sample size for component analysis. Guertin and Bailey (1970) 
demonstrated that with smaller samples the random errors of the less reliable 
correlation coefficients increase the absolute size of the correlations in the matrix, 
which produces greater commonalities and more common-factor variance. Therefore, 
Comrey (1992) offers the following metric on sample size: 50 cases - very poor, 100 
poor, 200 fair, 300 good, 500 very good and 1000+ excellent.  
Another rule of thumb suggested by Kass & Tinsley (1979) suggests having 
between 5 and 10 participants per variable, up to a total of 300. However, other 
studies (Arrindel & van der Ende, 1985) concluded that neither differences in this 
ratio nor the number of observations affected component stability.  
On the basis of the above criteria, it was considered that the size of the data set 
should be suitable for Principal Component Analysis.  
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6.5. Pre-analysis checks for 2008 data 
6.5.1. Omission of low-correlating items 
The item initial correlation matrix was examined (as suggested by Field, 2005) 
in order to find items for which the majority of the significance values were greater 
than .05. No item was found fulfilling this criterion, so there was no need to eliminate 
any question at this stage of analysis.  
6.5.2. Assessment of the appropriateness of the correlation matrix 
In order to assess the appropriateness of the initial correlation matrix with 
regard to its suitability for performing a factor analysis, three statistical tests - the 
Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin test for sampling adequacy, the Barlett test of sphericity and 
examination of the diagonal elements of the anti-image correlation matrix - were 
conducted. Table 14 shows the results of these analyses.  
Table 14. KMO test, Bartlett's Test and the examination of the diagonal elements of 
the anti-image correlation matrix conducted on the 2008 data. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .941 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 4286.081 
df 435 
Sig. .000 
Examination of the diagonal elements of the anti-image 
correlation matrix. 
All values above .8 
 
Kaiser (1970) recommends accepting values greater than 0.5. However, the 
closer the value to 1.0, the better, as it indicates that patterns of correlations are 
compact increasing the chance that the factor analysis will yield reliable and distinct 
components.  
It has been recommended that Barlett’s test of sphericity be significant 
(Ferguson & Cox, 1993), as this suggests that the R-matrix is not an identity matrix 
and thus that there are relationships between the variables that may be included for 
analysis.  
The above checks confirmed that the data set was suitable for factor analysis.   
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6.5.3. Method of factor rotation 
In order to achieve a simple, orthogonal structure, Varimax was selected as the 
method of factor rotation, as this is considered the best of the orthogonal rotation 
procedures (Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987). The orthogonal type of rotation was used over 
the oblique factor solution as the latter requires the explanation of both latent 
dimensions underlying each factor and the latent dimensions underlying the 
correlations among the factors (Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987). As these explanations could 
not be provided at this stage of analysis, an orthogonal rotation was chosen. 
6.5.4. Suppression of low-loading items 
Although it has been argued that there is a precedent amongst researchers of 
setting an item loading inclusion criterion of >0.3, it needs to be emphasised that the 
significance of loading is dependent on sample size (Field, 2005). Stevens (1992) 
calculated that a loading greater than .298 for samples ≥300 is appropriate, but he also 
suggests applying a cut-off point of factor loading values at .4, as it would be 
appropriate for interpretive purposes. Additionally, Field (2005) suggests suppressing 
loadings lower than .4, as it simplifies the interpretation of the results. In the light of 
these recommendations, all items loading below 0.4 were suppressed from the rotated 
matrix output.  
6.6. Derived components – constituent items 
Tables below show the list of items for each of the derived components, 
generated from the sample of shop-floor workers. Discrete items are presented in 
normal type and cross-loading items in italics. 
Table 15. Initial principal component analysis – listing of items and their loadings, 
Component 1. 
Component 1 Loading 
Q.27 The supervisors in my department frequently check to see if all employees are 
obeying the safety rules 
.795 
Q.28 The supervisors of my department discuss how to improve safety with operators .720 
Q.25 The supervisors in my department lead by example in complying with safety rules .678 
Q.26 There are good communications in my department about safety issues .668 
Q.8 People in my department get regular praise for working safely .538 
Q.6 My supervisor regularly reminds operators to work safely .518 
Q.14 The managers of my department see safety as the number one priority when setting 
production speeds and schedules 
.424 
Cross-loading items 
Q.21 When you report safety problems the management of the department are quick to 
give feedback on what actions have been taken (Component 2) 
.489 
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Q.15 Newcomers in my department receive good-quality- training on the risks 
associated with their job (Component 2) 
.420 
Q.2 The management of my department are genuinely concerned about the health and 
safety of employees (Component 2) 
.453 
 
Table 16. Initial principal component analysis – listing of items and their loadings, 
Component 2. 
Component 2 Loading 
Q.4 Managers in my department place a high priority on fixing safety problems 
identified by operators 
.710 
Q.1 Most of the time I have all the necessary resources to do my job safely .694 
Q.7 In my department when you ask for safety things to be fixed they usually get 
sorted quickly 
.647 
Q.16 Accident investigations in my department are generally effective in identifying the 
root causes of incidents 
.546 
Q.22 In my department safety problems are only addressed when there is going to be a 
safety audit 
.530 
Q.17 In my department, what operators have to say about safety problems is not taken 
into consideration 
.437 
Cross-loading items 
Q.21 When you report safety problems the management of the department are quick to 
give feedback on what actions have been taken (Component 1) 
.406 
Q.15 Newcomers in my department receive good quality  training on the risks 
associated with their job (Component 1) 
.402 
Q.2 The management of my department are genuinely concerned about the health and 
safety of employees (Component 1) 
.554 
Q.10 In my department safety is sometimes sacrificed for the sake of production 
(Component 3) 
.431 
 
Table 17. Initial principal component analysis – listing of items and their loadings, 
Component 3. 
Component 3 Loading 
Q.12 Sometimes I feel under pressure from my workmates to work in an unsafe manner .790 
Q.13 People in my department often take risks by cutting corners with safety .771 
Q.23 In my department people regularly take risks to achieve output targets .679 
Q.11 The supervisors in my department sometimes encourage operators to take risks .639 
Q.9 The supervisors of my department sometimes allows “favourite” employees to 
break safety rules 
.565 
Q.20 In my department supervisors often turn a blind eye to unsafe practices .533 
Cross-loading items 
Q.10 In my department safety is sometimes sacrificed for the sake of production 
(Component 2) 
.571 
 
Table 18. Initial principal component analysis – listing of items and their loadings, 
Component 4. 
Component 4 Loading 
Q.29 Where I work people are reluctant to report minor injuries .743 
Q.5 There are some safety problems in my department that have not been solved for a 
number of years 
.599 
Q.30 In my department hazards only tend to be removed after somebody has had an .577 
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accident 
Q.19 The supervisors of my department tends to blame people who have an accident .555 
 
6.7. Naming components 
6.7.1. Component 1 
In Component 1, each item is related to leadership – both supervision and 
management. The constituent items relate to relational aspects of leadership, i.e. 
situations in which leaders directly interact with their subordinates by checking 
compliance with safety rules, discussing safety problems, leading by example, 
communicating, praising, reminding staff to work safely, and giving feedback. Two 
out of the three cross-loading (with  Component 2) items (Q.21 and Q.2) seem to have 
greater face validity with regard to Component 1 than item Q.15. Therefore these 
items were considered to be constituent element of Component 1. Based on the review 
of the content of items, this component was called “interactional leadership”. This 
component directly refers to the theme identified in thematic analysis in Chapter 5, 
called “leadership”, and the two categories appear to cover similar content.   
6.7.2. Component 2 
Component 2 includes six items. They appear to emphasise the managerial 
approach and degree of commitment ascribed to fixing safety problems, providing 
resources and investigating the roots of accidents (the flaws of the safety system that 
led to an injury), reacting to employees’ reports and reacting to corporate initiatives 
such as audits. One item (Q.15), cross-loaded on Component 1, was considered to 
have better face validity with Component 2 than with Component 1, as it referred to 
training on risks, so it was included in the group of items constituting the second 
component. These items refer to the theme “reactive approach” derived from the 
analysis of focus groups, which is about solving problems in reaction to accidents or 
corporate audits. As the second component is about timely “solving safety 
problems,” that is the name of the component. 
6.7.3. Component 3 
Component 3 consists of six discrete items and one cross-loading item (Q.10). 
The content of this item (Q.10) is very similar to the other six discrete items, and 
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since it has high face validity, it will be added to the group of six discrete items. All 
items refer to risk taking, breaking rules and working in an unsafe manner. To this 
extent it overlays the content of the “breaking rules” theme identified in the focus 
group study (see Chapter 5). The constituent elements of this component were 
therefore assigned the label of “risk taking”. 
6.7.4. Component 4 
Component 4 consists of four items that appear to represent two sub-themes. 
The first refers to blaming workers for having accidents and (possibly as a result) 
workers’ reluctance to report injuries. The second sub-theme refers to managers not 
solving safety problems and not removing hazards. However, looking beyond the 
literal meaning of the items, it seems possible to interpret this combination of items as 
being related to some sort of detachment that implies lack of involvement, disinterest 
and indifference on the part of employees. In this respect it may be that this 
component can be cast as relating to the spectrum of involvement/participation or 
engagement. The items suggest a lack of proactive response, perhaps almost a “sense 
of helplessness” on the part of employees, with plausible links to the concept of self-
efficacy. Therefore this component will be labelled “estrangement”. 
6.8. Summary of component structure 
The initial component extraction revealed a total of four components. These 
components were found to account for 51.734% of the total variance, as shown in the 
table 19: 
Table 19. Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
Component 1 – Interactional 
leadership 
4.439 14.798 14.798 
Component 2 – Solving safety 
problems 
4.128 13.761 28.559 
Component 3 – Risk taking 3.986 13.286 41.846 
Component 4 - Estrangement 2.966 9.888 51.734 
 
The table below shows the reliability of components expressed in terms of 
alpha coefficients.  
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Table 20. Reliability analysis 
Component No of items Alpha 
Component 1 – Interactional 
leadership 
8 .876 
Component 2 – Solving safety 
problems 
7 .852 
Component 3 – Risk Taking 7 .893 
Component 4 - Estrangement 4 .708 
6.9. Results 
6.9.1. Comparison of demographic grouping  
Given the exploratory nature of this study and the evidence of sub-cultural 
differences between different parts of the organisation (see also Chapters 4 and 5), the 
derived scales were used to test this formally. The subject literature and previously 
obtained results provide some suggestions with regard to areas for further 
investigation:  
1. Clarke (1999a) suggests that there may be a difference between 
personnel in functional positions with regard to their perceptions of 
safety, consideration was given to probing the differences between 
grades in hierarchy of the company.  
2. Fleming, Flin, Mearns, & Gordon (1998) and Weyman & Clarke 
(2003) suggest the potential for differences between parts of an 
organisation, functional units or departments. They refer to these 
dissimilarities as “subcultures”. Based on their findings, an exploration 
of variation between departments was conducted.  
3. As there are two data sets available from 2008 and 2009, the 
comparison between perceptions of safety culture obtained in two 
different time periods will be explored, as within the period between 
2008 and 2009 the company went through a number of changes 
(including redundancies and leadership modifications) that could 
possibly affect employees’ perceptions. Hence a comparison with 
regard to the differences between functional positions will be 
conducted using the previously derived component structure by means 
of one-way and two-way ANOVA. 
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4. Additionally, based on the same rationale, a comparison of the 
differences between different departments will be conducted. 
6.9.2. Comparison of job grades 
Survey respondents assigned themselves to one of five functional positions 
(operator, team/shift leader, supervisor, manager and office employee). While it could 
be hypothesised that there would be differences among groups, where these difference 
lay could not be established. Therefore, ANOVA with post hoc tests was applied to 
compare means between these groups on each of the components. Following 
established precedents (Field, 2005), component scores were derived by summing the 
rating of the each constituent item for every respondent on every component.  
As there were large differences between groups in terms of sample sizes, 
Hochberg’s GT2 test was used, as advised by Field (2005). Levene’s test revealed that 
the variances between components were not significantly different (Levene’s test not 
significant for all components, p>.05).  
The ANOVA results show that there were significant differences (<.000) 
between groups in the 2008 and 2009 data sets with the effect size12 range between 
.024 and .031 for 2008 and .035-0.46 for 2009. F values, sums of squares, degrees of 
freedom and means square are provided in Appendix D for all components in 2008 
and 2009. 
Hochberg’s GT2 test calculated for the 2008 data and Gabriel’s test for the 
2009 data provided information on differences between groups. Tables with 
comparisons between all groups, mean differences, standard errors, significance 
values and lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval are available in 
Appendix D. A common pattern emerged from the comparisons: for all components, 
groups of operators and team leaders differed significantly from the groups of leaders 
(supervisors, managers) and office positions. A detailed analysis is presented below. 
Component 1 – Interactional leadership 
2008 
There were significant differences between operators and supervisors (p=.002) 
and managers (p=.001). There was also a difference between a group of 
                                                 
12 Calculated with an equation of omega squared (ω2) (Field, 2005): 
 ω2 = SSM− (dfM)MSRSST+ MSR  
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team/shift/cell leaders and supervisors (p=.035) and managers (p=.024) (see Table 
21).  
2009 
There was a significant difference between a group of operators and 
supervisors (p<.000), managers (p<.000) and office positions (p<.000). There was 
also a difference between a group of team/shift/cell leaders and supervisors (p=.013)  
(see Table 21). 
The direction of the differences is easy to notice on the error bars with 95% 
confidence interval: 
Table 21. 95% confidence interval error bars of scores obtained by particular 
functional positions on Component 1 in 2008 and 2009 
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These results suggest that there is a significant difference (see results above) 
between perceptions of leaders’ safety-focused interactions between groups of blue 
collar and white-collar employees. Operators and team leaders perceive managers’ 
safety focused actions more negatively than managers themselves and office 
employees.  
Component 2 – Solving safety problems 
2008 
There was a statistically significant difference between operators and 
managers (p=.001) and office employees (p<.000). There was also a difference 
between team/shift/cell leaders and managers (p=.001) and office employees (p<.000) 
(see Table 22). 
2009 
There was a significant difference between operators and supervisors (p=.002), 
managers (p<.000) and office employees (p<.000). The group of shift/team/cell 
leaders also differs significantly from the following three groups: supervisors 
(p=.006), managers (p=.001) and office employees (p=.004) (see Table 34). 
The error bars (Table 22) show that, similarly to Component 1, the means of 
groups of operators and team leaders are lower than the means of managers and office 
employees. With regard to the content of the component, these results suggest that 
employees working physically perceive actions to solve safety-related problems as 
being less effective than groups of leaders.  
 
Table 22. 95% confidence interval error bars of scores obtained by particular 
functional positions on Component 2 in 2008 and 2009 
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Component 3 – Breaking rules 
2008 
There was a significant difference between operators and managers (p=.006) 
and office employees (p<.000). There was also a difference between team/shift/cell 
leaders and managers (p=.033) and office employees (p=.011) (see Table 23). 
2009 
There was a difference between operators and supervisors (p<.000), managers 
(p<.000) and office employees (p<.000). There was also a difference between team 
leaders and supervisors (p<.000), managers (p<.000) and office employees (p=.005) 
(see Table 23).  
The error bars again (Table 35) show the difference between physically 
working employees and leaders. These results suggest that operators tend to admit 
Chapter 6 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 142 
 
more frequently than leaders that people in their departments take risks and break 
safety rules.  
Table 23. 95% confidence interval error bars of scores obtained by particular 
functional positions on Component 3 in 2008 and 2009 
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Component 4 - Estrangement 
2008 
There was a significant difference between operators and managers (p=.002) 
and office employees (p<.000). There was also a difference between team/shift/cell 
leaders and managers (p=.002) and office employees (p=.001) (see Table 24). 
2009 
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There was a difference between operators and supervisors (p<.000), managers 
(p<.000) and office employees (p<.000). There was also a difference between team 
leaders and supervisors (p<.016), managers (p<.000) and office employees (p=.010) 
(see Table 24).  
With regard to estrangement (see Table 24), the results suggest that operatives 
and their co-workers team/shift/cell leaders feel more disengaged compared to 
supervisors, managers and office employees, indicating that they tend to feel blamed 
for having accidents and are reluctant to report injuries, also stating that there is a 
reactive approach to safety. 
Table 24. 95% confidence interval error bars of scores obtained by particular 
functional positions on Component 4 in 2008 and 2009 
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6.9.3. Interpretation 
In both the 2008 and 2009 data sets the pattern of differences was very similar. 
The strongest difference was between groups of operators/team leaders and groups of 
supervisors, managers and office workers. 
All the errors bars above show that blue-collar respondents (operators and 
team/shift/cell leaders physically working on the shop floor) have significantly lower 
scores on all four components compared to those in white-collar (office) and 
management positions. Additionally, investigating  the differences between 2008 and 
2009, it can be seen that in 2008 groups of operators/team leaders do not differ from 
the group of supervisors (except on Component 1) whereas in 2009 differences are 
apparent between blue-collar workers and other groups on all components.  
6.9.4. Two-way ANOVA 
In order to explore the potential interaction between the year of survey (2008 
and 2009) and a job grade (independent variable), a two-way ANOVA was conducted 
for each component. A Levene’s test was conducted in order to test for the 
homogeneity of the data, and this revealed a significant value for Components 1 and 
2. To address this issue, Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s tests were conducted. These 
tests modify F and the residual degrees of freedom, and by doing so deal with the 
problems arising from violations of the homogeneity-of-variance assumption. The 
significance value for both tests for Components 1 and 2 was below the p<.05 
threshold, so it allowed the null hypothesis to be rejected and effectively permits the 
continuation of the analysis. The pattern of results revealed by the two-way ANOVA 
for Components 1,2,3, and 4 was identical: there was a significant main effect of year 
and position on the component scores. Additionally, there was no significant 
interaction between the year and position. This indicates that people at different 
positions at the company were similarly affected by the changes occurring in 2008 
and 2009.  
6.10. Comparison of inter-departmental differences 
As mentioned earlier, there is some evidence suggesting the potential for 
cultural differences within the same company or even within organisational units 
(Fleming, et al., 1998; Weyman & Clarke, 2003). In order to test this premise, two  
one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the data obtained in 2008 and 2009. As was 
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the case with issues surrounding comparisons between job roles, at this stage of the 
investigation it was not possible to determine the direction of difference. Therefore a 
post hoc test was used to explore the differences.  
For the further analysis, only departments with more than 20±1 people were 
chosen.  Nine departments from the 2008 survey fulfilled this criterion, but only five 
departments from the 2009 data set fulfilled it. Levene’s test of homogeneity of 
variance was significant for Components 1 (.033) and 2 (.031) for the 2008 data set, 
which means that ANOVA’s assumption that variances are homogeneous was broken.  
Values of Levene’s Statistic, degrees of freedom and significance of the test for the 
2008 and 2009 data sets may be found in Appendix D.  
The ANOVA test revealed significant differences between all departments for 
the 2008 data set. For Component 1, the difference was expressed in F(8,277)=2.319, 
p<.05, ω2=.018, for Component 2 F(8,269)=7.807, p<.000, ω2=.040, for Component 3 
F(8,278)=3.627, p<.000, ω2=.026, for Component 4 F(8,269)=3.552, p<.001, 
ω2=0.26. Values of sum of squares and mean squares may be found in Appendix D.  
For the 2009 data set, the ANOVA test did not reveal differences between 
departments in Component 1 F(4,131)=.545, p>.05, ω2 =was negative and no square 
root calculation could be performed. For Component 2 F(4,129)=4.980, p<.001, 
ω2=.032, for Component 3 F(4,129)=2.834, p<.05, ω2=.022 and for Component 4 
F(4,130)=3.439, p<.05, ω2=.025. Values of sum of squares and mean squares may be 
found in Appendix D. 
The ANOVA results indicated significant differences between all components 
in the 2008 data set and between all components in 2009, except Component 1. 
However, ANOVA does not provide information on between which groups the 
differences are. Therefore, post hoc tests were conducted. The Games-Howell test was 
performed on the 2008 data set, as it does not rely on homogeneity of variance. For 
the 2009 data set Gabriel’s test was performed as advised by Field (2005) as the best 
test for comparing slightly different sample sizes. The significant differences between 
departments will be discussed below within every component. The values of mean 
differences, standard errors and the bounds of the 95% confidence interval may be 
found in Appendix D.  
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Component 1 – Interactional leadership 
2008 
There were significant differences between ceramic core and foundry (p<.05), 
mould preparation (p<.05). There was also a significant difference between the alloy 
production and mould preparation (p<.05) departments (see Table 25).  
2009 
There were no statistically significant differences between departments based 
on the 2009 data set (see Table 25).  
It is important here to refer to information included in Chapter 1 regarding the 
management structure and location set-up of the plant. The whole site is divided into 
four separate buildings that contain a number of departments responsible for different 
stages of production. The main building is responsible for the preparation of moulds, 
casting and cleaning cast moulds. The following departments belong to this building: 
foundry, large finishing, large wax, monoshell, mould preparation, small finishing and 
small wax.  Alloy production is placed in a separate building with ceramic core. These 
two departments are much smaller, employing about 100 people in total, which is a 
much lower number in comparison to the casting plant, which employed about 600. In 
terms of management structure, alloy production and ceramic core used to be 
managed by different directors and alloy production was financially independent. 
People in every day conversations refer to these differences by distinguishing their 
identities with saying “we” and “they”. It is also acknowledged by the management 
that there are important differences between alloy/core and casting. The managers 
attribute these differences to the relatively greater ease of managing smaller groups of 
people who, in this instance, also benefit from a superior availability of resources. 
Also, as these departments employ a smaller number of people, there is easier access 
to the management and more frequent contact, so there is a higher probability of 
developing personal relationships with leaders.  Additionally, the author’s experience 
was that there appeared to be higher group cohesiveness in this department as 
majority of people knew their co-workers personally, which cannot be said about 
some other departments, e.g. large finishing. Stronger identity with the workplace, 
stronger feelings of belonging and group cohesion may be partially responsible for the 
differences. However, these are the perceptions of the author based on long-term 
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observation and interaction with these departments, informal meetings and 
discussions and observations rather than empirical data.   
Table 25. 95% confidence interval error bars of the scores obtained by particular 
departments on Component 1 in 2008 and 2009 
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With regard to the perceptions of leadership and managers’ safety-related 
interactions with operatives, there were differences between ceramic core/alloy 
production and foundry/ mould preparation in 2008, but no differences in 2009 (see 
Table 25). In 2008 there was a clear division between organisational units. It is felt 
that this may also reflect differences between departments in terms of opportunities 
for direct interaction between managers and staff.  
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Note: Foundry and alloy production were later selected as the study groups for 
safety culture improvement intervention (see Chapter 7). This permitted further 
exploration and empirical insight into the nature of the differences.  
Component 2 – Solving safety problems 
2008 
There were significant differences between ceramic core and foundry 
(p<.000), large finishing (p<.000), large wax (p<.000), monoshell (p<.05), mould 
preparation (p<.001) and small wax (p<.009). There was also a significant difference 
between foundry and alloy production (p<.000), between alloy production and large 
finishing (p<.002), large wax (p<.05) and mould preparation (p<.001). Also between 
mould preparation and small wax (p<.05) (see Table 26).  
2009 
There were statistically significant differences between ceramic core and 
cleaning (p<.001) and large wax (p=.005) (see Table 26).  
Table 26. 95% confidence interval error bars of the scores obtained by particular 
departments on Component 2 in 2008 and 2009 
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Component 2 refers to a range of activities undertaken by the company to 
solve safety problems, remove hazards, identify the root causes of accidents and 
prioritise fixing the issues identified by operators. There is much diversification 
between departments. The most satisfied with the company safety management were 
ceramic core and alloy production – two departments in separate locations. However, 
even within the casting plant there were statistically significant differences between, 
for example, mould preparation and small wax. These differences clearly present the 
diversity of perceptions of employees in various departments. It is considered that this 
may be a reflection of how the departments differ in terms of their approach to 
solving safety issues even within the same company. Middle managers and 
supervisors are mainly responsible for undertaking safety management actions 
characterised in the questionnaire items, so it may be argued, as there are different 
groups of people managing departments, that the results mirror perceptions of the 
efficiency and engagement of leaders in fixing safety issues. An alternative 
explanation could invoke an unequal distribution of supportive resources such as 
money and maintenance within those departments. These differences are still visible 
in 2009, although a smaller number of departments took part in the study.  
Component 3 – Breaking rules 
2008 
There were significant differences between ceramic core and foundry (p<.01), 
and between foundry and large finishing (p<.05), monoshell (p<.01) and small wax 
(p<.01) (see Table 27). 
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2009 
There were no statistically significant differences between the departments 
based on the 2009 data set (see Table 27).  
Table 27. 95% confidence interval error bars of the scores obtained by particular 
departments on Component 3 in 2008 and 2009 
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With regard to risk taking and breaking safety rules there are again differences 
between different location units, as well as within the same organisational unit. Items 
that constitute this component refer to taking risks to meet production goals, 
informally allowed by supervisors. The foundry has the lowest score compared to 
other departments in the casting plant. The ceramic core, although different from the 
foundry, is at a similar level as other departments from the casting plant.  
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Component 4 - Estrangement 
2008 
There were significant differences between ceramic core and foundry (p<.01). 
Also, between foundry and alloy production (p<.01) (see Table 28). 
2009 
There were statistically significant differences between ceramic core and 
cleaning (p<.05) and large wax (p<.05) (see Table 28).  
Table 28. 95% confidence interval error bars of the scores obtained by particular 
departments on Component 4 in 2008 and 2009 
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The estrangement that is expressed in the reluctance to report injuries and the 
reactive approach to safety differs between the foundry and ceramic core and alloy 
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production. The foundry clearly has the worst results out of all the departments, 
creating a big gap between other departments. This again could be attributed to the 
attitudes and actions of the leaders managing those departments.  
6.10.1. Two-way ANOVA 
In order to explore the potential interaction between year and departments a 
two-way ANOVA was conducted for every component including year (2008 and 
2009) and department as the independent variables. Similarly to the comparison of job 
grades the pattern of results was identical for all four components, showing that there 
was a significant main effect of year and department on particular components, but 
there was no significant interaction between year and department. This suggests that 
people in different departments were affected by changes happening in the company 
in 2008 and 2009 to an equivalent degree. A table with the results of the analysis may 
be found in Appendix D. 
6.10.2. Discussion 
The presence of significant differences between different groups of employees 
in terms of their perceptions of safety culture appear to confirm the literature 
regarding the existence of so-called “sub-cultures” within the same organisational 
unit.  
Moreover, all four components refer in some degree to the direct or indirect 
engagement of leaders with safety. Therefore it may be hypothesised that the 
differences between departments stem from differences in leadership style, 
prioritising problems and solutions and abilities to build meaningful relationships with 
operatives. Additionally, it appears that leadership style is a combination of the 
individual properties of a manager or supervisor and the expectations and leadership 
style of their superior. However, this is a hypothesis for future research. 
 
6.11. Comparison of 2008-2009 differences within job grades 
6.11.1. Operator 
On average, perceptions of operators in regard to leadership (Component 1) 
and solving problems (Components 2) were higher in 2009 (F1: M=21.8, SE=.34; F2: 
M=16.6, SE=.3) than in 2008 (F1: M=20.7, SE=.29; F2: M=18.5, SE=.27). These 
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differences are significant (F1: t(348)=-2.32, p>.05; F2:t(349)=-2.52, p>.05) with an 
effect size13 of r=.12 for Component 1 and r=.13 for Component 2. 
6.11.2. Team/shift/cell leader 
There were no significant changes in the perception of safety-related 
components in the group of team/shift/cell leaders between 2008 and 2009. 
6.11.3. Supervisor 
There was a significant difference (p<.05) in the perception of risk taking 
(Component 3) in the group of supervisors between 2008 (M=27, SE=1.39) and 2009 
(M=30.9, SE=.88) with an effect size of r=.37, t(29)=-2.142. 
6.11.4. Manager 
There were no significant differences in the group of managers between 2008 
and 2009 with regard to any component. 
6.11.5. Office positions 
There was a significant change (p<.01) in the group of office workers with 
regard to the perception of leadership (Component 1) between 2008 (M=22.7, 
SE=.62) and 2009 (M=25.3, SE=.68) with an effect size of r=.29, t(80)=-2.777.  
6.11.6. Discussion 
The company involved in the study is part of a multi-national corporation that 
prides itself on having low accident rates and safety as one of the main company 
values. It is expected that all plants belonging to the corporation will have an on-
going programme of initiatives in order to improve the level of safety continually. 
Some of the safety initiatives are developed at the corporate level and imposed on 
plants (e.g. IFE books); others come from the initiative of local safety teams, and 
others stem from the engagement of particular managers and supervisors. This results 
in a complex array of different “interventions” that engage different people, in 
different ways, on different issues, going on at any one time. It was not feasible for 
the author of this research to follow or control every attempt made to improve safety 
in every department. However, to gather insight and understanding of the variety of 
                                                 
13 Calculated with an equation of r for t-test (Field, 2005): 𝑟 = � 𝑡2
𝑡2+ 𝑑𝑓 
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processes, regular informal interviews/conversations were conducted with various 
managers to find out about safety improvement actions. There were differences in 
terms of the array of safety improvement interventions that were live between 2008 
and 2009 across different groups of employees. As the majority of respondents come 
from departments not involved in the author’s intervention, the variables affecting the 
change were not controlled. However, it is possible to account for the differences by 
hypothesising about potential change triggers. Based on the afore mentioned 
conversations with managers, a list of formal safety-initiative-related actions 
undertaken by middle managers between 2008 and 2009 was created. It is worth 
emphasising that, from a practical point of view, it was not important to the company 
to attempt to measure all these initiatives, as that would consume a lot of resources. 
Hence it is not possible to deduce which, if any, of these initiatives and interventions 
had a significant impact on safety performance. 
Apparently, in response to the results of the safety culture questionnaire in 
2008 and the “Global Voices” survey performed at the same time, managerial 
awareness about safety-related issues and employees’ negative perceptions of safety 
culture had the effect of increasing the focus on ways to improve performance. As a 
result: 
1. More resources were assigned to addressing IFE issues raised. Every 
single IFE was reviewed personally by a senior manager who 
prioritised which one to solve first and assigned resources, often based 
on inter-departmental cooperation. Previously all IFEs were entered 
into a database and the maintenance department was responsible for 
fixing the issue. Additionally, departmental semi-craftsmen, previously 
responsible for solving production-related issues, were assigned to 
safety tasks, which meant better cooperation between IFE raisers and 
problem solvers. Information about solved IFE issues was fed back in 
writing or verbally to shop-floor employees.  
2. In the majority of departments, departmental safety representatives 
were appointed. Volunteers were asked to participate in that initiative. 
It required them working two days a week only on safety issues. Their 
work supports compliance with HSE policies on a departmental level. 
They were responsible for gathering data and maintaining safety-
related data bases, writing JSAs, supporting the IFE process (producing 
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communication, chasing actions) and conducting department-specific 
audits. 
3. A number of shutdowns were performed in response to safety hazards 
that needed the stopping of work in departments. These actions were 
communicated to employees. 
4. A number of disciplinary actions were conducted on employees who 
deviated from safety procedures. These were communicated to 
employees. 
5. Critical-four14 audits were performed jointly by managers, supervisors 
and often shop-floor employees on a weekly basis. A coaching element 
was involved to help supervisors and operatives understand why the 
company is looking at these hazards and get an opportunity to ask 
questions regarding employees’ opinions about safety and specific 
aspects of safety performance. The graph below shows the overall 
critical-four compliance scores based on the data gathered during the 
audits. Numbers on the X axis represent the weeks in a year. The 
initiative began in the 35th week of 2009 and was still running at the 
time of writing (September 2010).  
 
Figure 7. Critical-four compliance scores based on the data gathered during 
departmental audits. 
6. An initiative focused on increasing safety awareness through written 
and verbal communication about different sets of topics was 
established. 
                                                 
14 “Critical-four” refers to four types of danger that cause the largest number of accidents in 
injuries in the corporation worldwide. They are mobile equipment, log out tag out, fall prevention and 
confined space. 
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7. A number of JSAs (Job Safety Assessments)15 were reviewed with the 
help and insight of operatives. As a result, working practices were 
changed.  
8. A new senior manager was appointed at the beginning of 2009 
responsible for the production and safety of a number of casting plant 
departments.  
9. 5S16 program was improved and shadow boards17 were installed in the 
departments. 
10. A manufacturing manager with an IOSH diploma was seconded to the 
HSE department to support shop-floor safety initiatives when the 
Health and Safety manager was occupied with coordinating 
compliance on a legal and policy level. His job was to conduct audits, 
discuss with operatives, identify hazards and train and coach 
supervisors and managers. 
11. Leaders’ standardised work18 sheets were developed for senior, middle 
and junior managers, and included safety-related behaviours. 
12. All employees were invited to a powerful presentation made by a man 
who lost his vision in an industrial accident. It enhanced awareness that 
no person is immune to injuries, and hearing a real person who suffered 
such severe consequences describe how his life changed after the 
accident was a powerful emotional experience.  
13. In October 2009 the corporate safety director, with the help of the site 
HR department, organised a safety culture survey. After the survey 
they organised a number of focus groups with employees from 
different departments. Their findings were communicated only to the 
                                                 
15 It is a legal requirement that every job be described in terms of risks and hazards involved as 
well as counter measures against them. In the company these descriptions are called JSAs. 
16 5S stands for Sort, Set in Order, Shine, Standardise, Sustain. It is a part of the Visual 
Workplace program, and in turn comes from the Kaizen system belonging to the Lean manufacturing 
system, which focuses on the continuous improvement of all elements related to production and 
effectiveness. 
17 Shadow board is an element of the visual factory programme. Usually it is a large board 
with painted contours/shapes of tools that should be placed on that board to cover the shadows. It helps 
the easy visual identification of which tool is missing from the board and thus to maintain order. 
18 Leader-standardised-work is a list of duties developed for particular functional positions 
based on company priorities and responsibilities of that function. It helps people who use it to structure 
their day around core tasks and allows the progress they make to be monitored.  
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group of managers. As it was driven by corporate headquarters, it had a 
strong impact on leaders’ motivation to follow up the suggestions.  
14. A number of corporate-driven safety-audits were conducted that 
resulted in a strong focus by the plant on policies and compliance.  
Although at this stage of analysis we cannot definitively claim that attempts to 
address these components were responsible for the observed change, or which one 
was the most effective, it may be hypothesised that all these components combined 
could account for the differences. 
6.12. Comparison of 2008-2009 differences within departments 
For the departments with more than 20 respondents in 2008 and 2009, t-tests 
were used to explore changes across the time period. Only four departments fulfilled 
the condition of having more than 20 respondents in both 2008 and 2009. They were 
Ceramic Core, Foundry, Large Wax and Small Wax. All other departments could not 
be compared, as the number of participants either in 2008 or in 2009 was less than 10.  
6.12.1. Ceramic core 
There were no statistically significant differences between 2008 and 2009 
within the ceramic core department. 
6.12.2. Foundry 
There were statistically significant differences between these two time periods 
in respect of all four components. 
Component 1: 2008 (M=18.9, SE=.8), 2009 (M=22.2, SE=.9), p<.01, r=.32, 
t(62)=-2.75 
Component 2: 2008 (M=16.3, SE=.73), 2009 (M=20.4, SE=.56), p<.000, 
r=.46, t(61)=-4.073 
Component 3: 2008 (M=20.1, SE=.9), 2009 (M=22.8, SE=.87), p<.05, r=.24, 
t(61)=-2.015 
Component 4: 2008 (M=11.6, SE=.54), 2009 (M=13.7, SE=.7), p<.05, r=.29, 
t(61)=-2.409 
6.12.3. Large Wax 
There were no statistically significant differences between 2008 and 2009 
within the large wax department. 
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6.12.4. Small Wax 
There were no statistically significant differences between 2008 and 2009 
within the small wax department. 
6.12.5. Discussion 
We observed some improvement only in the foundry. The results from the 
safety culture survey itself cannot answer the question about the causes of this change. 
Again, insight from informal conversations with different employees may be of some 
use to hypothesise possible reasons.  
Except for the initiatives listed above (see Section 6.11.6), there are a number 
of components that could have affected the foundry department alone: 
1. There was a near-death incident in which an operative was accidentally 
locked in a vacuum chamber and was rescued only minutes before it 
started working (05.2009). This event emotionally affected the whole 
company, which brought in a group of investigators from corporate 
headquarters (05.2009), as well as a corporate business unit auditing 
safety (05.2009), but most importantly it was a very strong personal 
experience for employees that their colleague could have died.  
2. A safety technician who worked for the Health and Safety department 
for a number of years was placed full-time in the foundry during 
organisational restructuring. As he was a highly-respected individual 
with extensive knowledge and drive to solve safety problems 
practically, his presence could affect foundry workers’ perceptions.  
3. There were also comments from operatives and other managers that the 
foundry manager was very engaged in driving safety improvement.  
6.13. General discussion 
This chapter attempted to build upon and quantitatively advance the insights 
afforded by the qualitative study by developing a safety culture questionnaire based 
on the insights gained during individual interviews and focus groups.  
The questionnaire consisted of 30 questions and was distributed on two 
occasions, in September 2008 and December 2009. Principal Component Analysis 
was performed, with the aim of establishing the component structure of the 
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company’s safety culture. It turned out that the content of the components covered 
very similar themes as identified in the study discussed in Chapter 5.  
Principal Component Analysis conducted on the data gathered from the safety 
culture survey in 2008 on the total sample of N=293 extracted four components, 
named: 1. “Interactional leadership”, 2. “Solving safety problems”, 3. “Breaking 
rules”, 4. “Estrangement”.  
All of the extracted components appear to reflect parallels with the results of 
the qualitative study described in Chapter 5. They also appear to be aligned with 
findings from previous safety culture research. For example, Component 1 
“Interactional leadership” is similar to components labelled “management 
engagement” (Mearns, Flin, et al., 2001; Prussia, et al., 2003) and “Managers 
behaviour” (Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas  (2007). Component 
2: “Solving safety problems,” is analogous to “Accident prevention measures” 
(Mearns, Flin, et al., 2001), “Organizational learning with accidents” (Silva, et al., 
2004) and “Preventive planning” (Fernandez-Muniz, et al., 2007). The content of 
Component 3 “Breaking rules” is shared by “Frequency of general unsafe behaviour” 
(Mearns, et al., 2003) and “Safety Compliance” (Thompson, et al., 1998). Component 
4 “Estrangement” is analogous to components developed in the literature like: “Lack 
of commitment” (Lawrie, et al., 2006), “Satisfaction with safety activities” (Mearns, 
Whitaker, & Flin, 2001), “Supportive environment” (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) and 
Relationships (Glendon & Litherland, 2001).  
It may be argued that these four components characterise the safety culture of 
the company. In other words, these are the elements that are mutually distinct in the 
minds of employees. Therefore improving safety culture should focus on these 
elements. Additionally, the results of this component analysis tell a lot about the 
nature of safety in this large company and what is considered important according to 
the shared perceptions of employees.  
There were significant differences between two groups of operators/team 
leader and groups of supervisors, managers and office positions. The scores of the 
leaders of office employees were consistently higher/better than those of physical 
workers or their team leaders. These findings are consistent with other research in the 
field (Fung, et al., 2005). Although the authors of that study attributed differences to 
the diversity of education levels between the groups compared, it may be 
hypothesised, as the items from the questionnaire used in the company refer mostly to 
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the actions of management, that the differences stem from the fact that management 
tend to perceive their actions as being much more effective than is perceived by the 
physical workers. Another potential explanation could attribute the differences to the 
fact that shop-floor workers have everyday contact with hazards and the consequences 
of unresolved safety problems and these elements affect them directly and 
emotionally. Support for this conclusion appears to be provided by the results from 
the focus groups, where people clearly stated that some of the leaders do not interact 
with them about safety or that postponing the resolution of safety issues causes 
disaffection and estrangement.  
In terms of the differences between departments within the same company 
with regard to the perception of different safety dimensions, the results lend support to 
the thesis of safety “sub-cultures” (Weyman & Clarke, 2003) or “multiple climates” 
(Zohar, 2008) persisting within a single organisation. The departments that took part 
in the study differed with respect to different components. It may be hypothesised that 
these differences are the result of particular individuals in managerial positions who 
prioritise different elements of production and interact with their colleagues in 
different ways.  
Furthermore, the perceptions of different functional positions from 2008 were 
compared with the same groups in 2009. The t-test statistics revealed that the group of 
shop-floor employees in 2009 perceived the safety elements related to interactional 
leadership (Component 1) and solving safety problems (Component 2) more 
favourably than in 2008. Additionally, a group of supervisors indicated that in 2009, 
according to their opinion people took risks and broke rules less frequently than in 
2008.  
There was also an improvement in the perceptions of all four components in 
the foundry department. These differences may be attributed to a long list of 
initiatives undertaken by the company in various departments. The full list is included 
in Section 5.3.6. 
6.14. Critical findings 
1. The aim of this study was to quantify the findings from the previous 
qualitative studies and investigate the distribution of components 
within departments and functional positions in order to inform the 
development of a safety culture intervention. 
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2. The principal component analysis based on the data obtained in 2008 
yielded four components: leadership, solving safety problems, risk 
taking, and estrangement. 
3. All components referred to exactly the same elements of organisational 
safety as the themes obtained from the thematic analysis from the 
qualitative study.  
4. In terms of differences between functional positions, the strongest 
differences were found between operators / team leaders and groups of 
supervisors, managers and office workers. 
5. The notion of safety sub-cultures was confirmed with data showing 
significant differences between departments within the company. 
6. There was an improvement in safety climate in groups of operators and 
supervisors. This improvement was attributed to a large number of 
interventions and improvements that were implemented in the 
company between 2008 and 2009. 
7. The foundry was the only department that noticed a significant 
improvement in all the components of the safety culture questionnaire. 
The improvement was attributed to a large number of safety 
improvement programs implemented across the factory and additional 
resources provided specifically to the foundry to improve its safety 
record.  
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Chapter 7 
Safety Culture Improvement 
Intervention no. 1 
STUDY 1 
7.1. Introduction 
Finding ways to enhance compliance with safe practice and reducing 
volitional risk taking by employees has been a core objective of workplace safety for 
many decades. Despite major advances in engineering controls that guard or exclude 
employees from sources of harm, there will always remain elements that are 
fundamentally behaviourally based, reflecting normative influences that are 
intuitively malleable. 
To date the subject literature in this area has mainly been focused on 
discovering the definitive set of factors that define and affect workplace safety 
culture, this having been the primary academic intent. By comparison, relatively few 
studies have grappled with the challenge of developing interventions aimed at 
engendering cultural change and enhancement (see Marsh, et al., 1995; Pidgeon, 
2001)  
According to the meta-analysis conducted by Clarke (2006b), a positive safety 
climate is significantly correlated with better safety performance. At least one study 
also reports a weak but statistically significant positive correlation with occupational 
accidents and injuries (see Horberry, Gunatilaka, & Regan, 2006). Hence, by 
improving safety culture it is both intuitively and potentially possible to decrease the 
levels of accidents, ill health and dangerous occurrences.  
There is widespread agreement that managerial priorities and leadership style 
play a key role in defining workplace safety climate, as well as being key variables 
that affect employee safety behaviour (see for example Barling, et al., 2002; Flin & 
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Yule, 2004; Kelloway, et al., 2006; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009). The author was 
unable to find an academic paper challenging that premise. This reflects broader 
perspectives of organisational culture, that conceptualise this as a derivative of the 
values and attitudes of senior management (Schein, 2004). Also, the grey literature 
aimed at Health and Safety professionals is replete with articles indicating the core 
role of leaders in “defining” employee safety culture (Blair, 2003; Carrillo, 2002, 
2005; Geller, 2008; Krause, 2004; Krause, 2007; Williams, 2002). 
According to Zohar (2002b), front-line supervisors are the most influential 
group of employees affecting “group-level safety climate” in an organisation (see 
Burns, Mearns, & McGeorge, 2006; Cox & Flin, 1998; Fleming, 2001). Having 
examined the extensive evidence suggesting a strong influence of supervisory 
behaviours on safety culture in companies (see Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6), it was decided 
that there would be merit in devising an intervention that focused on the members of 
this group. 
Based on a review of the literature (see Chapter 2) and insights from previous 
empirical work at the company (see Chapters 5 and 6), a set of behaviours was 
identified that supervisors might be encouraged to adopt, which theoretically had the 
potential to result in the positive enhancement of subordinates’ safety performance 
(see Zohar, 2002b). According to Zohar's multilevel model of behaviour change 
(Zohar & Luria, 2003), subordinates, in an organisational setting, will tend to align 
themselves with a superior’s expectations towards their behaviour if (s)he pays 
attention to it. An in-depth description of Zohar’s intervention may be found in 
Chapter 2.  
Zohar’s intervention was the only – but very effective - study found in the 
subject literature that focused on modifying supervisory behaviours. For that reason it 
was decided to apply his methodology as a tool with a proven record of success. In 
Zohar’s study (2003) the application of upwards feedback resulted in a substantial 
improvement in safety behaviours and safety climate, and it was argued that 
extending the range of sources of feedback could produce even better results. From 
the range of tools and techniques reported as promoting transformational leadership 
(Day, 2000), the 360-degree feedback technique was considered a tool that was on the 
one hand could feasibly be applied in the company’s context, and on the other it was a 
tool widely used in safety culture improvement intervention (OGP, 2010). The 
intervention replicated Zohar’s approach to behavioural change by applying a multi-
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level methodology to improve safety climate (Zohar & Luria, 2005). This is the first 
known replication of that study. 
7.2. Method 
7.2.1. Negotiating access 
A number of meetings with managers and directors were organised in order to 
discuss their perceptions of the need for change and improvements, their willingness 
to engage and the availability of resources. At the time of this intervention’s 
preparation the company had two directors; one responsible for the Alloy and 
Ceramic Core (two separate departments but functioning as one business unit) and a 
second one responsible for the casting business unit (all other departments). They 
both volunteered that they would like to implement the proposed interventions within 
their units and it was agreed to design one intervention for the Alloy/Core business 
unit (Intervention 1, described in Chapter 7) and one intervention for one of the 
departments belonging to the casting business unit (Intervention 2, described in 
Chapter 8). Furthermore, it was agreed that the first intervention would be designed 
for the Alloy/Core unit. These interventions are discussed in chapters 7 and 8 
respectively.  
7.2.2. Identifying a department for an intervention 
It had to be decided which constituent department to choose. The directors 
concluded that in the Alloy department there was a higher level of risk, more hazards 
and in their view, a less positive safety culture, compared to the Ceramic Core 
department. Their perception was supported by the safety culture survey results (see 
Appendix E). Hence, it was concluded that the first intervention should take place in 
the Alloy department. 
7.2.3. Experimental and control groups 
It was agreed that, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
intervention, there needed to be another department with a similar level of hazards 
involved in which the same outcome measures could be applied but without an 
intervention, to act as a control group. The only department at the site that performed 
analogous jobs was the Foundry department. The management of the casting unit 
agreed to involve the Foundry in the study as a control group. According to the in-
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house safety experts (N=4), the level of risk and variety of hazards were comparable 
in both departments in terms of noise, exposure to molten / hot metal, machinery, 
fork-lift trucks, manual handling, exposure to infra-red radiation, man-made mineral 
fibre, dust, oil mist, slips, trips, arc flash, electricity, overhead cranes and falling 
objects. Moreover, both departments worked 24/7 and there were similar numbers of 
people working in a shift at any one time (about 10-15). 
The alloy production department produces alloy bars. The department has 
areas for storing chemicals, large furnaces to melt the metal, lines for the treatment of 
the bars, storage area for bars, an area for processing scrap and a yard for loading and 
unloading the products from lorries. At the time of planning the intervention the 
department was employing 84 people in total, including shop-floor, office support, 
chemical laboratory and management staff. 61 people were working on the shop-floor 
including maintenance.  
The foundry department is responsible for casting the parts by pouring hot, 
liquid metal into previously prepared forms. Within the department a number of large, 
multi-level19 furnaces are placed, as well as storage areas for the products. The 
castings are moved with fork-lift trucks. At the time of planning the intervention the 
department was employing 78 people, of which 73 were working on the shop-floor.  
Operations in both departments included melting super-alloys from pre-
determined formulae or pre-made billets under vacuum and pouring them into billet 
moulds or more intricate moulds for parts. The Alloy furnaces were larger and casting 
up to 15 tons per pour, whereas the foundry operations cast up to 100 kilograms at a 
time. The Alloy cycle time is longer - up to 8 hours per melt - whereas foundry cast 
cycles can be between 10 and 30 minutes. Foundry directional solidification (DS) 
casting furnaces also operate at the higher end of the operational temperature scale, 
casting at temperatures above 1500°C and are cooled by internal water lines. Any 
uncontrolled failure of these machines could be catastrophic. The casting foundry is 
less than 1/3 the size of the Alloy plant and also utilises gas-fired pre-heat furnaces 
operating at between 1050 and 1200°C.  
Many jobs in both departments involved operating heavy machinery, including 
furnaces, large over-head cranes, heavy hand-tools, driving mobile equipment, as well 
as conducting simple tasks such as housekeeping. Employees were exposed to red-hot 
                                                 
19 It means that a furnace is being operated from the ground and from the platforms about two 
and three meters above the floor.  
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molten metal, and the infra-red radiation associated with it, while moving the pieces 
from one place to another. With regard to management structure, there were 
supervisors responsible for the shifts. The role of the supervisors was bridging the 
groups of shop-floor employees and a group of managers. On the one hand foremen 
had to plan the job, assign the tasks, supervise the performance, look after their team 
and manage morale and motivation; on the other, they had to satisfy the expectations 
of managers and report work progress on regular basis.  
The Human Resources department strongly suggested that the researcher 
should not gather demographic information about the participants of Intervention 
One, expressing concerns that the personal data could not be protected as expected by 
law (Data Protection Act 1998). The only information that could be provided about 
the two groups (experimental and control) is that all participants were male and 
between 30-60 years old. The majority of them worked for the sponsor company for 
more than 5 years. They worked in their departments for the majority of this time. 
Their work required a fair amount of communication and cooperation. As the group of 
managers and supervisors was very small, all information about these individuals 
could lead to their identification and for this reason was not included. 
7.3. Design 
7.3.1. Intervention design 
Based on the unprecedented success of Zohar & Luria’s intervention (2003) 
and strong empirical evidence supporting the theory behind his claims, it is argued 
that Zohar’s model for the improvement in safety climate may be the best theoretical 
model available. Zohar’s method aimed to involve managers and supervisors in the 
intervention, and use them to affect the behaviour of the shop-floor employees. This 
matched closely one aspect of the safety culture of the sponsor company – leadership. 
The literature consistently suggests that leadership engagement is the most important 
factor shaping safety culture, and it was decided to increase the impact of the 
intervention by addressing this particular group with a method that was proven to be 
effective. In general, at the time of designing the intervention, the researcher had two 
options: either try to develop a novel, untested mechanism for change, or use (and 
enhance) the mechanism with already reported strong results. The question the 
researcher faced was: what had the higher probability of success? At the time of 
design, before the implementation, the answer seemed clear that more value could be 
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brought to the company by implementing a programme that has already proved its 
efficiency. Therefore it can be argued that the choice of the intervention was bespoke, 
as it targeted a variable identified in the literature and earlier investigation in the 
company as very important. Studies researching the effectiveness of multi-source 
feedback on performance usually apply surveys or questionnaires to gather data 
(Atwater, Waldman, Atwater, & Cartier, 2000). However, the majority of studies take 
feedback information only once, prepare a report with the results and provide it to the 
person(s) being assessed (Seifert, Yukl, & McDonald, 2003). However, as Zohar & 
Luria (2003) demonstrated, a single feedback session is not effective. Only feeding 
back the important information for a long period of time (10 months) brought the 
desired outcome. Therefore it was decided to provide feedback to supervisors and 
managers on a regular basis for the whole period of the intervention.  
The researcher’s intervention assumed the involvement of all levels of 
hierarchy to ensure the flow of expectations from the top. The main goal of the 
intervention was to improve the quality of safety-related interactions between 
supervisors and shop-floor operators in accordance with Zohar’s theory. In order to 
support the behavioural change of supervisors, the line manager must be engaged in 
the process. This engagement demanded timely, regular communication about the 
expectations towards new behaviours of supervisors. 
In order to help supervisors and managers develop their new skills, they were 
provided with multi-source feedback. The group of supervisors obtained feedback 
from operators, peers and managers and the group of managers obtained feedback 
from operators and supervisors. At this stage the researcher was involved in gathering 
feedback and calculating the summative results. The summated feedback was then 
delivered on a weekly basis to the group of supervisors and managers. 
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Figure 8. A graphical representation of the feedback-based safety improvement 
intervention. 
7.3.2. Background 
Based on the multi-level leadership theory (Zohar, 2002b; Zohar & Luria, 
2003), Zohar developed a safety intervention that involved supervisors and managers 
in order to improve the safety-related behaviours of operatives. In his intervention 
each supervisor received bi-weekly, personalised, upward feedback based on 
summated frequencies of safety-related interactions obtained from operatives with the 
help of short questionnaires. Each manager was provided with comparative 
information about all supervisors reporting to them and was asked to inform every 
supervisor about his relative position compared to other supervisors on a bi-weekly 
basis. Managers were also asked to discuss with supervisors the reasons behind 
success or failure, identify facilitators and inhibitors and set improvement goals for 
the subsequent two weeks. Senior managers received cumulative information about 
the progress of the intervention during scheduled meetings. The intervention was 
announced by the plant manager and lasted three months. Participation was voluntary 
and only 4% or less of operatives declined to take part in the study.  
Zohar’s intervention was implemented in two different companies: oil refinery 
and canning and distribution. Safe behaviours were operationalised in the first 
company as compliance with electrical procedures and moving within access zones 
without crossing designated paths, and in the second company as the use of protective 
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gear and housekeeping. The intervention resulted in a steady increase of safety-related 
supervisory interactions, rising in the first company from 35% to 50% at the end of 
the intervention and to 70% by the end of the 41st week. In the second company the 
intervention resulted in the rise of supervisory interventions from 225% to 40% and to 
65% by the end the 41st week. These changes suggest the modification of the 
supervisory role definition. In terms of unsafe behaviours, they dropped in the first 
company by 20% and in the second company by 30% by the end of the intervention, 
and kept dropping to almost 0% at the end of the last week of the follow-up. 
Significant changes in safety climate were discovered as a result of the 
implementation of the intervention. 
 
7.4. Measures 
In order to evaluate the intervention a number of measures were applied. At 
first, as the intervention aimed to influence safety culture, a questionnaire-based 
safety climate measure was chosen (Zohar, 2003) to establish the current state of this 
variable before the implementation of the intervention. Also, other related measures 
were chosen based on the literature review: leader-member exchange (LMX), job 
security and safety citizenship, as these were widely cited as having potential to affect 
employee workplace safety perceptions.  
In order to evaluate the effect of the intervention on safety behaviours and 
shop-floor performance, an observation checklist focussing on the behaviours of 
operatives and their consequences was developed (see Section 2.4.5 and the Appendix 
E). Finally, in order to implement the intervention, a 360-degree feedback tool was 
designed that focused on supervisory and managerial behaviours. All of these 
methods will be described in the following sections. All methods are attached in 
Appendix E. All the developed and applied measures will now be described and 
justification for their use provided. Coefficient alphas for each scale for the present 
sample are shown in Table 29. 
Table 29. Coefficient alphas for all used scales for the present sample 
Scale Coefficient alpha 
Zohar group level safety climate 0.92 
Zohar Organisational level safety climate 0.91 
Safety citizenship behaviour 0.95 
Leader – Member Exchange 0.86 
Job insecurity 0.90 
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7.4.1. Measure 1 – Safety Climate 
As Zohar’s multi-level model of behavioural change was used for the study, 
utilising his safety climate questionnaire was preferred to alternatives including the 
questionnaire developed as part of this thesis. The rationale was that the Zohar’s 
measure consists of items and scales focused solely on supervisory behaviours. 
Therefore it was felt that Zohar’s method will provide more precise measure of 
change than other, more generic tools. Moreover, Zohar’s  factorial structure has been 
confirmed by Johnson (2007). This measure was also used in the study conducted by 
Cooper & Philips (2004), who empirically established a limited link between safety 
climate and safe behaviours. It was also used in a study by Luria & Rafiaeli (2008).  
Zohar’s measure consists of two parts (see Chapter 2). The first part refers to 
organisational-level safety climate (perceptions of top management’s engagement 
with safety) and the second one to group-level safety climate (perceptions of 
supervisory engagement with safety). 
His organisational-level safety climate scale consists of 16 statements 
referenced to a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). He reports basing the items for this scale on the British Standards Institute’s 
(2000) safety management code, which is compatible with ISO-9001 and ISO-14001 
for quality and environmental management systems. The internal consistency 
reliability Alpha of this scale is 0.92 (Zohar & Luria, 2003).  
His group-level safety climate scale also consists of 16 statements 
accompanied by a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). Statements here refer to safety-related interactions between 
supervisors and operatives. The internal consistency Alpha of this scale is 0.95.  
7.4.2. Measure 2 – Safety Citizenship Behaviour 
Role definition refers to Graen’s (1976) theory of role making processes 
within complex organisations. He argued that employees develop a sense of their role 
based on their perception of what they are supposed to do, what they prefer to do and 
what they know how to do. This subjective understanding of job responsibilities is 
held to influence the behaviour exhibited by employees. As Morrison (1994) noted in 
commenting on the research of Graen (1976) and Salancik & Pfeffer (1978), 
subjective role definition is socially constructed rather than objectively defined.  
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Proponents of the theory hold that within the scope of a company’s 
expectations towards employees, there are formally described behaviours, as well as 
behaviours that are not formally defined. The latter type of behaviours is called 
Organisational Citizenship Behaviour (OBC). OBC is credited to Organ and refers to 
“individual behaviour that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by 
the formal reward system, and that in aggregate promotes the effective functioning of 
the organization” (1988, p. 4). 
OCB is an important concept because, according to Hofmann, Gerras & 
Morgeson (2003), citizenship role definition is significantly related to citizenship 
behaviour. Clarke (2006), referring to Gouldner’s (1960) theory of social exchange, 
emphasises that OCBs are promoted through the norm of reciprocity, whereby 
employees feel obliged to return favours in the light of positive treatment from others. 
Similarly, Organ (1990) observes that employees use OCB as a form of reciprocation 
for being treated fairly. The better the quality of the exchange relationship with the 
supervisor, the more likely it is that the employee will perform OCB. The employee 
uses OCB as a medium of exchange with the organisation (Lam, Hui, & Law, 1999). 
Morrison (1994) showed that an important driver of employees’ behaviour is their 
perception of whether a given activity is in-role or extra-role. It is held that if an 
employee defines an OCB as in-role, they are more likely to perform it, than if they 
define it as extra-role (Morrison, 1994). 
Role definition can contain safety elements. Safety role definition refers to 
what employees perceive as their own responsibilities with respect to improving 
safety for themselves and their co-workers (Turner, Walls, & Chmiel, 2005). The 
scope of safety-related duties included in formal descriptions of employee job roles 
tends to be limited, due to the nature of the work on the shop floor. Elements such as 
reporting minor injuries, near-misses or other forms of safety participation, which 
allow the organisation to learn and prevent accidents, involve a strong voluntary 
element, including behaviour beyond the employee’s formal role (i.e. OCBs) (Clarke, 
2006a) and are subject to cultural normative influences. Hence, in order to increase 
the rate of workers’ OCBs, it is necessary to create an environment where safety 
becomes included in their definition of in-role. The theory holds that OCB behaviours 
on the part of supervisors will engender reciprocal motivations amongst shop-floor 
employees, with benefits in terms of organisational learning with respect to hazard 
control performance and employee compliance with safe practice.  
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There are specified conditions that enhance the likelihood of safety OCBs 
emerging. Turner et al. (2005) showed that employees who perceived higher job 
demands were less likely to consider safety as part of their role. At the same time, 
employees with high perceived job control were more likely than employees with low 
perceived job control to consider safety as part of their role. This result is attributed to 
Karasek’s strain effect (1979), who demonstrated that a high-demand and low-control 
workplace substantially limits workers’ ability to solve problems or tackle challenges 
and contributes to the feelings of depression. Hofmann et al., (2003) demonstrated 
that employees will manifest OCBs related to safety only if there is a mature safety 
climate. In such instances a strong cultural emphasis on safety climate is said to create 
space for reciprocal behaviours. However, in a context in which there is a high level 
of LMX against a backdrop of a negative safety climate, OCBs are less likely to 
extend to the safety agenda naturally (Hofmann, et al., 2003).  
The “safety citizenship behaviour” tool (Hofmann, et al., 2003) was based on 
other measures of organisational citizenship behaviour (Van Dyne, Cummings, & 
McLean-Parks, 1995; Van Dyne, Graham, & Dienesch, 1994; Van Dyne & LePine, 
1998). It consists of 27 statements reflecting safety-related helping, expressing 
recommendations and opinions, stewardship and whistle-blowing referenced to a 5-
point rating scale with anchors of: Expected part of my job, slightly beyond what is 
expected for my job, moderately beyond what is expected for my job, much beyond 
what is expected for my job and definitely beyond what is expected for my job. The 
internal consistency reliability Alpha for this scale is reported as 0.98 (Hofmann, et 
al., 2003). 
The tool appears to have been used in the context of workplace safety research 
on at least two occasions. Turner, et al. (2005), for example, report that employees 
with a perceived high job demand were less likely to include safety in their role. 
Additionally, Didla, Mearns, & Flin (2009) report the finding that safety culture is an 
important factor affecting safety citizenship behaviours.  
7.4.3. Measure 3 – Leader-Member Exchange 
It has been established (see Chapter 2) that leadership is widely held to be the 
most influential variable affecting employee safety culture. Therefore, the control of 
this dimension not only seems to make a lot of sense, but is very important indeed. 
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In their review of leadership, Graen & Uhlbien (1995) concluded that the 
evidence could be grouped into three domains: leader, follower and relationship. 
“Leader” is cast as relating to the mix of personal traits, behaviours and characteristics 
of supervisors and managers. “Follower” – is cast as relating to the same elements, 
but for blue-collar workers. “Relationship” emphasises the ideal combination of the 
properties of leaders and followers to promote the desired outcome. 
Zohar (2002b) reports that safety culture may be improved by increasing the 
frequency and quality of interactions between supervisors and operatives. His results 
suggest that, by improving the relationship between leaders and followers, the safety 
culture may be advanced. Based on these arguments, the choice of a method focused 
on the quality of the relationship seemed to be justified.   
Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) has a long research tradition. It has been 
studied with reference to variables such as job performance (Dunegan, Duchon, & 
Uhlbien, 1992), staff turnover (Vecchio, Griffeth, & Hom, 1986), job satisfaction 
(Perrewe, Brymer, Stepina, & Hassell, 1991), organisational commitment (Nystrom, 
1990), organizational citizenship behaviour (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Hui, 1993), 
job climate (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989) and safety (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; 
Hofmann, et al., 2003). In each case LMX is reported to be positively correlated with 
performance.  
Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) provide evidence that high-quality interactions 
between leaders and operatives improve safety-related communication, are related to 
safety commitment and are negatively related to the frequency of accidents.  
Hofmann, et al. (2003) also demonstrated a positive relationship between 
LMX and safety citizenship role definitions, reporting that this relationship was 
moderated by safety climate and that both the LMX and safety citizenship were 
significantly related to safety behaviour.  
Following a testing of available measures, Graen & Uhlbien (1995) concluded 
that a seven-item scale was sufficient to capture the profile of LMX (Gerstner & Day, 
1997). The list of statements may be found in Appendix E. The scale asks participants 
to indicate the extent of their agreement with seven statements about their 
relationships with supervisors, referenced to a 5-point scale, using Likert-type anchors 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), where higher scores indicated 
the better quality of relations. Scale scores are created by calculating the mean across 
the seven items for each individual combined for all respondents to obtain an overall 
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construct score. Graen & Uhlbien (1995) report an internal consistency reliability 
Alpha of 0.94. The method was used by Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck, & Ray (2006) 
who reported a positive relationship between LMX and safety-related behaviours. 
Similarly Kath, Marks, & Ranney (2010) report a link between LMX and the quality 
of upward safety communication.  
7.4.4. Measure 4 – Job Insecurity 
The intervention study took place during the early phase of the world-wide 
financial crisis that began in 2007. As a consequence of the declining demand for its 
products the company began a process of downsizing, with enforced redundancies 
commencing in early 2008. In view of this, it was decided that it would be prudent to 
add a measure of employee perceptions of job insecurity to the body of evidence 
gathered. Increased job insecurity has been widely cited as having a negative impact 
on safety standards. Cited negative effects include reduced safety motivation and 
compliance with safety rules; and a focus on production (Probst & Brubaker, 2001). 
However, these authors conclude that a positive safety climate can attenuate 
the negative effects of job insecurity.  
The Job Security Index developed by Probst (2003) measures an individual’s 
cognitive appraisal of the future of their job with regard to the perception of the level 
of stability of that job. It comprises a series of adjectives that describe the future of 
the employee’s job. Respondents are asked to rate how well the adjective describes 
the future of their job, referenced to a 3-point scale, with anchors of “yes”, “neutral” 
and “no”. This type of response format was chosen as previous research findings 
indicate that it is easy for employees with a low level of literacy to understand and 
discriminate between categories (Roznowski, 1989). Probst reports an internal 
consistency Alpha of 0.97 (Probst, 2003). 
7.4.5. Measure 5 – Behavioural audit 
The behavioural audit would permit the generation of baseline and monitoring 
data on shop-floor safety standards. The behavioural audit measure was developed by 
the author, based on established behavioural safety measurement principles (Marsh, 
2005). All behavioural audit data were collected between 3 and 5 times a week by the 
researcher. The method and data gathered replicate those reported in Marsh, et 
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al.(1995). The checklist of unsafe behaviours and indicators of unsafe behaviours 
(antecedents) was used to calculate the safety performance level (see Appendix E). 
The development of the behaviour-based observation measures was based on 
the following: 
1. Discussions with shop-floor workers, supervisors and managers about 
what, in their opinion were the most important hazards / risks and risk 
behaviours.  
2. A review of safety policies and audit tools used by the company locally 
and worldwide. 
3. A list of desired behaviours, compliant with safety standards and 
policies, was created.  
4. A special form was prepared to allow data gathering. Observation of 
each item could be marked as safe (if a person complies with the 
content of an item), unsafe (if a person does not comply with the 
content of an item) or not applicable. The full form may be found in 
Appendix E. 
5. The behavioural checklist was piloted to confirm that all items were 
observable. The behavioural checklist consisted of a list of behaviours 
(e.g. using a ladder unsafely) or consequences of unsafe behaviours 
(e.g. trip hazard on the walkway). The piloting aimed to check whether 
all the items were easily observable. If the checklist contained 
behaviours that were very rare or were very difficult to observe, there 
would be no use of these items. The researcher visited the investigated 
departments five times and went through the list item by item. The 
piloting activities confirmed that all items on the list are easily 
observable and no item was removed from the list. As the checklist was 
not a tool for a psychological measurement, no psychometric properties 
were calculated. 
7.4.6. Measure 6 - Feedback forms 
Feedback is a popular tool within the organisational change domain as well as 
safety. It has an established history as a tool for engendering behavioural change in 
the workplace safety arena, but has tended to be focused on employees, rather than on 
managerial behaviours. Saari & Nasanen (1989), for example, provided graphical 
Chapter 7 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 177 
 
feedback to shipyard employees with regard to their housekeeping performance, 
claiming and accident reduction rate between 70% and 90%. Similar results are 
claimed by Leivo (2005), who provided graphical feedback to road maintenance 
personnel about the level of housekeeping. Additionally, Williams and Geller (2000) 
noted a significant improvement in safety performance after an intervention involving 
feedback based on behavioural observations. However, a word of caution is necessary 
here. These studies provided feedback to shop-floor employees based on observations 
conducted by an independent observer/contractor/researcher. The feedback was not 
personalised and presented aggregated results for groups, not individuals. This is an 
important detail as performance was not linked to particular individuals, so the 
responsibility for performance was spread equally among team members. Moreover, 
the afore mentioned interventions provided feedback based on observed performance 
and not based on how individuals are being perceived by their colleagues. Therefore 
the type of feedback in the interventions cited above is different to 360-degree 
feedback. The real cause of these improvements is also in question as a qualitative 
study conducted after a similar intervention (Marsh, et al., 1995) demonstrated that 
the participants of a feedback-type intervention were not paying attention to the 
content of the feedback and did not have knowledge about feedback information but 
improvements were noticed despite that fact.  
Criticisms of feedback-orientated behavioural-based interventions focused on 
employees alone centre around the premise that they seek to treat the symptoms 
(employee behaviour) rather than the cause (managerial behaviour) (Zohar, 2002b). In 
advancing their theory of multilevel leadership, Zohar & Luria (2003) caution against 
schemes in which reinforcement is only targeted at workers, as it is partial, 
insufficient and does not focus on addressing deeper causal influences, particularly 
the normative role played by immediate superiors. Zohar argues that within an 
organisational context it is a role of effective supervisors to provide training/coaching 
(antecedents), goal setting and feedback, and incentives such as personal attention and 
recognition (consequences) to operatives in order to modify their behaviours. The 
supervisory level must be supported by the third level – managers who have to 
communicate safety priorities even under work pressure. The multi-level concept 
refers to the process in which behaviours of employees at a lower level of hierarchy 
are modified by the leaders at a higher level of organisational hierarchy. In their 
study, Zohar & Luria (2003) delivered feedback to supervisors and managers from 
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blue-collar workers in order to change their behaviour. The feedback came from only 
one source. However, there is some evidence suggesting that involving more sources 
in the feedback process may bring better results (Atwater & Waldman, 1998). 360-
degree feedback refers to a method of gathering perceptions about an individual’s 
performance from all stakeholders – superiors, peers and subordinates (Warech, 
Smither, Reilly, Millsap, & Reilly, 1998). The claimed advantages of the approach to 
managerial performance assessment are that it offers a more complete picture of 
managerial performance than traditional linear forms of assessment (Atwater & 
Yammarino, 1997).  
However, a 360-degree feedback tool has limitations that must be highlighted. 
While there are widespread claims of its effectiveness Kluger & DeNisi (1996) 
demonstrated that 360-degree feedback resulted in a decrease in performance in one 
third of the interventions that they reviewed. It has been suggested that one of the 
reasons is that people have psychological defence mechanisms that protect them from 
information perceived as threatening (Chappelow, 1998). These findings are 
supported by Atwater, et al. (2000) who claim that only 50% of interventions that 
used multi-source feedback resulted in improvements. Despite these threats, 360-
degree feedback is now widely used in the leadership development arena, having been 
described as “perhaps the most notable management innovation of the 1990s” 
(Atwater & Waldman, 1998). London & Smither (1995) report that this technique is 
used by nearly all the Fortune 500 companies.   
Based on a combination of the literature insight (Zohar, 2000) and employees’ 
comments obtained during informal discussions feedback forms (see Appendix E) 
were prepared to provide information: 
1. From operatives to supervisors 
2. From operatives to managers 
3. From supervisors to managers 
4. From supervisors to supervisors 
5. From managers to supervisors 
During the informal discussion with supervisors and operatives, it became 
apparent that they valued the extent of freedom and flexible supervision, i.e. 
operatives were highly skilled and did not need permanent supervision and checking. 
Moreover, supervisors were working physically on the shop floor and could not spend 
the majority of their time on supervision. Therefore it was important to increase the 
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frequency and quality of safety-related interactions while still leaving room for the 
subjective perception of operatives of the intensity of the interactions with their 
supervisors. Therefore, instead of focusing on counting the numbers of interactions, it 
was decided to focus on the subjective perception of its intensity. Thus, participants 
were asked to indicate their response on a six-point, Likert-type scale where 1=Never, 
2=Rarely, 3=Occasionally, 4=Sometimes, 5=Fairly often, 6=Very often. 
7.5. Procedure 
Before the intervention began, a meeting with managers, supervisors and all 
operatives was organised in order to discuss the proposed intervention. The researcher 
introduced the idea of the intervention; the managers expressed their support for the 
initiative and operatives were asked about their opinion and potential issues they saw. 
Operatives asked a few questions to clarify the idea but no objection was raised. 
Additionally, written communication in the form of a poster with questions and 
answers regarding the intervention was put on the departmental notice board. 
It was agreed that observations of (un)safe behaviours would be conducted 3-5 
times a week between 2 and 5pm. The choice of time was important, as the pace of 
production changed during the day: it was higher in the morning and slower in the 
afternoon. Conducting observations consistently in the same time period minimised 
the influence of the production pace’s variation on the results of the observation. In 
order to establish the baseline of safety performance before the intervention began, 
observations were conducted for four weeks.  
It was agreed that feedback would be delivered to supervisors and a manager 
once a week on Fridays in a summated form. One day was needed to calculate the 
results and prepare the reports so Wednesday was chosen to gather feedback from 
available operatives and supervisors. Operatives were given an extra 10 minutes’ time 
after their regular break to stay in the break room to fill out the feedback forms. The 
participation in the intervention was voluntary. 
7.6. Results 
In Week 1, 17 operatives (3 from the morning shift and 14 from the afternoon 
shift) filled out the feedback forms. In Week 2, some operatives expressed the fact 
that they did not feel comfortable with completing the forms and would prefer to 
avoid doing it. They were reminded that we agreed on the procedures before the 
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intervention started. This time 10 people filled out the forms, but only from the 
afternoon shift. However, they raised the concern that they were afraid of being 
recognized or identified, as the researcher was collecting the forms in person. To 
address this issue, a sealed box was provided in a break room. In the third week no 
person filled out the form. Also, operatives refused to comment on their decision. 
They did not take the opportunity to extend their break , and did not explain to the 
researcher their reasons for the refusal.  
As gathering feedback was a core activity on which the intervention was 
based, the lack of information about supervisory and managerial behaviours 
threatened the continuation of the initiative. As no information could be delivered to 
supervisors and managers about the perceptions of their interactions with operatives, 
it was decided to stop the intervention and attempt to understand the reasons behind 
its failure (see Chapter 7, Study 2). No post-test measure could be administered due to 
strong resistance of employees to cooperate with the researcher.  
7.7. Discussion 
Despite the best effort made to reduce the potential of failure of the 
intervention, the operatives refused to participate in the program after the second 
week. Reflecting back on the process of the implementation, it is clear that a number 
of actions were undertaken in order to nest the intervention within the department. In 
the light of practitioners’ advice (Edwards & Even, 1996; Ward, 2006), many of the 
crucial points for success were applied: the purpose of the intervention was 
communicated to the management and other employees, it appeared that they engaged 
in the process, the process was piloted and validated, the confidentiality of the 
answers was guaranteed, the process of filling out the questionnaires was simple, 
feedback was provided in a timely manner and both supervisors and operatives were 
granted extra time off the shop floor to participate in the program. However, it is 
possible that not all elements were addressed.  
The main focus during the negotiations was on winning the buy-in from the 
managers, as according to Zohar & Luria (2003) they are responsible for engaging 
operatives. At the time of the intervention’s development it appeared that the 
researcher should cooperate with operatives to a minimal extent, as the management 
would work on winning their hearts. Also, it is possible that, although the purpose and 
stages of the strategy were communicated, the information was not detailed enough. 
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Moreover, the supervisors were not trained in demonstrating new behaviours, which 
could be another flaw of the design that affected the process of implementation.  
However, in most cases, when discussing the reasons for failure of the 
feedback programs, it is argued that the most vulnerable group is the group of 
receivers of feedback, as they struggle the most (Smith & Fortunato, 2008). 
Conversely, in the case of this intervention, the group that resisted the process was the 
group of feedback providers, not the receivers and maybe the direction of feedback 
was an important variable affecting employees’ motivation to participate in the study.  
Atwater, Brett, & Charles (2007) discuss some factors related less to the 
feedback receivers and more to the process of implementation. They suggest that the 
level of trust, cynicism and integration of the intervention with other activities and the 
perceived need for change may affect the success of an intervention. 
Another possibility is that the type of intervention was not appropriate for the 
current level of safety culture maturity of the organisation. According to the report 
prepared by the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP, 2010), 
interventions based on feedback should not be applied in organisations that are at 
pathological and reactive levels of safety culture maturity, because the level of trust at 
these levels is too low and employees may undermine the intervention, perceiving it 
as a threat.  
Despite the fact that a number of potential reasons may be provided, without 
an in-depth investigation into the operatives’ subjective perceptions and other 
variables, they would only be speculation. Therefore it was decided to explore the 
reasons for failure in order to understand what happened, and whether the reasons are 
predicted by the existing literature. Two series of interviews were conducted: one 
with the operatives who took part in the intervention and the second one with a safety 
professional whose profession is the implementation of similar programs. The process 
and results are described in the next section. 
7.8. Critical findings 
1. Based on the literature review (see Chapter 2), the focus groups (see 
Chapter 5) and the safety culture questionnaire developed (see Chapter 
6), it was concluded that an intervention focused on the behaviours of 
supervisors and their superiors may be the most powerful (see Zohar & 
Luria, 2003). 
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2. A before-and-after test with an experimental group design was chosen 
as the most appropriate for the assessment of the effects of an 
intervention. 
3. The alloy department was chosen as an experimental group and the 
foundry department as a control group. 
4. Six measures were identified to gauge the effects of the intervention: 
multi-level safety climate, leader-member exchange (LMX), safety 
citizenship, job security, behavioural observation checklist and the 
360-degree feedback tool. 
5. The baseline before the beginning was established with the available 
measures. 
6. Information about supervisory and managerial behaviours began to be 
gathered from the blue-collar employees and supervisors with the use 
of the 360-degree feedback tool and was then delivered to the group of 
supervisors and managers.  
7. After the second week of the intervention the shop-floor employees 
declined to provide further feedback and, as the feedback was the 
conceptual core of the intervention, the initiative had to be stopped. 
8. It was decided to investigate the reasons and motives behind the 
resistance. The results of that research are provided in the Study 2 (see 
Chapter 7, Study 2).  
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STUDY 2 
7.9. Introduction 
Although the intervention described in Study 1 (see Chapter 7, Study 1) was 
very similar, in terms of the process, to Zohar’s very successful study, it failed to 
maintain the employees’ engagement, which was the base of the intervention. The 
subject literature offers a number of recognised sources of disruption of the 
implementation of feedback programs, but none of them relates to a safety 
intervention. Although the insight from the scientific articles is useful and inspiring, it 
is conceptually disconnected from the type of intervention implemented in the 
company. Even if a list of barriers obstructing the success of safety interventions was 
provided, it still probably would not provide the exact set of reasons that affected the 
employees in this particular study.  
The intervention designed for this thesis had a very positive beginning, with 
strong engagement of managers, but with a very abrupt ending. It was worrying that 
the application of most of the suggestions available in the literature produced such an 
unsuccessful outcome. The discussion in the Study 1 of this chapter attempted to offer 
some variables already recognised by the literature as threatening to feedback-based 
interventions. However, without an in-depth exploration, they remain mere 
suggestions and hypotheses. This is why it was decided to conduct a number of 
interviews with the participants of the intervention, hoping they could shed some light 
on the reasons that caused their resistance. However, it was decided to broaden the 
perspective and also engage a group of experts, since as shown by the failure of the 
intervention, it was apparent that the subject literature omitted some variables that 
affect the success of the implementation of safety-related interventions. The 
methodology and results will be described for both groups of interviewees 
(participants and experts) subsequently, and a summarising discussion for all findings 
of this chapter will be provided at the end.  
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INTERVIEWS WITH THE INTERVENTION 
PARTICIPANTS 
7.10. Method 
7.10.1. Participants 
Four people, with whom the researcher had the best relationship based on 
personal trust (operatives N=2 and supervisors N=2), were asked to participate in the 
interviews. The trust issue was crucial here as it was predicted to determine openness 
and honesty during the interviews. Interviewees were asked for permission to be voice 
recorded. It was explained to them that this process may be of great assistance to the 
researcher and his studies. One person did not agree to be voice recorded but allowed 
the researcher to take notes, but without exact quotations.  
7.10.2. Materials 
The main purpose of the interviews with the intervention participants was to 
understand their subjective perceptions of the whole process and the reasons behind 
their resistance. Therefore prompts were developed based on the history of the 
implementation process to investigate the cognitive and emotional elements driving 
the behaviour of employees. The full set of prompts may be found in Appendix E. 
7.10.3. Procedure  
Individuals were informally approached during their break and invited to talk 
to the researcher in one of the conference rooms face to face. The management 
granted permission for employees to take the time off the shop floor. The data were 
transcribed verbatim from a voice recorder to a computer text editor.  
It was decided to apply thematic analysis to the data set. The description of the 
method and the detailed reasons for its application were provided in Chapter 5. The 
process of analysis was analogous to the one conducted in Chapter 5 for the analysis 
of focus group transcripts and had a number of stages: 
1. All transcripts were coded in full by the researcher. The table below 
shows a full list of codes developed and used during the coding 
process. 
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Table 30. A list of codes that emerged from the initial coding process 
Fear of being identified  No trust towards management  
Fear of using info against operatives  Not a part of job  
Perception of duties  Lack of trust towards the researcher  
Transparency of intervention  No trust towards researcher  
Face validity  Negative past experiences  
Transparency of the intervention  Communication of the intervention  
Perception - Intervention as a threat 
for relationships  
Couldn’t take more information on  
No perceived benefit for operatives  Negative perception of management 
Alienation/disaffection  
 
2. The codes that were the same or similar were collated together jointly with 
the text excerpts they were describing. It allowed the creation of nine 
categories/themes. The table below shows how codes were categorised and 
how the groups were titled.  
Table 31. The initial codes grouped in categories 
Names of categories/themes Initial codes collated according to the 
topic they cover 
Trust towards management  Fear of being identified 
No trust towards management 
Fear of using info against operatives 
Perception - Intervention as a threat for 
relationships 
Role definition Perception of duties 
Not a part of job 
Transparency of communication of the 
intervention 
Transparency of intervention 
Transparency of the intervention 
Communication of the intervention 
Face validity Face validity 
Alienation Alienation/disaffection 
Trust towards the researcher Lack of trust toward the researcher 
No trust towards researcher 
Other No perceived benefit for operatives 
Couldn’t take more information on 
Negative perception of management 
 
3. In the category “Trust towards management,” two sub-categories were 
distinguished: a) fear of being identified and b) fear of using 
information against operatives.  
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7.11. Results 
TRUST TOWARDS MANAGEMENT 
Trust issues have already been identified in the literature as one of the crucial 
concepts affecting coherent cooperation between management and subordinates. Trust 
is a mechanism used by managers to create openness and honesty and, ultimately, a 
better efficiency of a workgroup (Mollering, Bachmann, & Lee, 2004). Trust towards 
top management affects work satisfaction (Perry & Mankin, 2007), commitment to 
the team (de Gilder, 2003) and performance (Mayer & Gavin, 2005). In the field of 
safety it has also been recognised that trust plays an important role. Burns, Mearns, & 
McGeorge (2006) argued that trust plays a crucial role in safety culture. Jeffcott, 
Pidgeon, Weyman, & Walls (2006) and Conchie, Donald, & Taylor (2006) suggested 
that trust is an important characteristic of safety performance. It has even been argued 
that safety-specific trust is a separate construct, distinct from other types of 
organisational trust (Conchie & Donald, 2008), and that it moderates the relationship 
between safety-specific leadership and safety citizenship behaviour by increasing 
subordinates’ willingness to follow supervisory influences (Conchie & Donald, 2009). 
Despite the fairly deep understanding of the role of trust and its effect on 
safety-related activities not much attention has been given to the role of trust in safety 
improvement interventions. Some indicators that the level of trust towards 
management may affect the success of organisational change programs may be found 
in practitioners journals (Barrier, 1998; Gerald, 1994; Phillips, 2003), but they are 
based on the knowledge and experience of practitioners and not on research findings. 
A recent study of Neves and Caetano (2009) showed that trust mediates the impact of 
affective commitment to change and continuance commitment to change on 
performance, organisational citizenship behaviours and turnover intentions, but the 
insight was not related to safety interventions.  
The intervention participants in the alloy department indicated that trust 
towards management was one of the factors that affected their engagement. However, 
it appeared to have two distinguishable sub-categories. It was: a) fear of being 
identified, and b) fear of information being used against individuals.  
a) Trust towards management – fear of being identified.  
Shop-floor workers stated that the resistance was partially caused by the fear 
that the information they provided would lead to the identification of individuals. 
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Although before the intervention an effort had been made to explain that they could 
not be identified based on their answers and that data would be provided to the 
management only in the form of collated charts, it remained an issue. These opinions 
were expressed in the following way:  
“I was afraid of being identified based on the forms we filled out”; “I was 
concerned that the management would get access to the information I provided”. 
b) Trust towards management – fear of information being used 
against individuals. 
Fear of being identified was supported with the concern of being somehow 
punished for revealing information about interactions between workers and 
supervisors. Operatives thought that workers and supervisors could be affected.  
“We were suspicious that this may be used against us”; “We were afraid that 
information we provide could be used against our supervisors”.  
Two examples provided that could explain this attitude were negative 
experiences from the past regarding providing information about workers. The 
researcher was told a story in which the company overreacted to a piece of 
information and disciplined somebody, although it was felt by other employees, that 
others had not been disciplined for similar things in the past. Another contextual 
variable was the fact that the intervention started when the global financial crisis was 
in full swing, making the threat of redundancies very real. Therefore they did not want 
to risk revealing any information that could possibly, in their perception, act against 
them if the company was to undertake a staff reduction initiative. 
“If you reveal a safety problem the company may overreact and discipline 
somebody”; “The economical climate is uncertain so revealing any safety 
information could be used against us”. 
TRUST TOWARDS THE RESEARCHER 
The word “researcher” could be replaced with a “change agent,” as it better 
describes the function of the leader of the intervention. There was no paper known to 
the author discussing the role of trust towards a change agent during the process of 
organisational change intervention. Some advice for change agents may be found in 
the literature (DeRose, 2004; Falck & Barnes, 1975; Schein, 1997). However, none of 
these texts is research-based.  
Although there is no research-based information about the discussed topic in 
the literature, the safety intervention participants indicated clearly that it was one of 
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the reasons for their resistance. Operatives were suspicious that the researcher was 
acting to gather information about supervisors and managers. This belief resulted in 
their reluctance to share information with the researcher and cooperate.  
“I had an impression that you gather info about management and supervisors’ 
performance under cover of a safety initiative”; “We thought you were trying to 
check up on supervisors and management”; “We did not trust you”; “We did not feel 
we can share the information you asked us about with you”. 
ROLE DEFINITION 
The perceived range of duties refers to the concept of organisational 
citizenship behaviour already discussed in Section 6.3.1.2. It appeared, based on the 
reactions of employees and their comments, that their roles were rigidly defined. 
Operatives came to work to conduct production-related activities only. They were 
happy to help a student with a university assignment,20 but participating in an activity 
that required more paperwork was beyond their scope of duties. As the intervention 
needed their effort in a way that the operatives were not ready to accept, it triggered 
their resistance. It was expressed in opinions such as:  
“Filling out questionnaires is not a part of my job”; “We are here for to work 
not filling out forms”; “We did not have time to fill these forms out”; “We were 
rushing filling the forms out as there was pressure on us”. 
FACE VALIDITY 
This theme shows that an intervention developed mainly based on a theoretical 
model did not fit the very distinctive work environment according to the perceptions 
of operatives and created significant resistance. They indicated this fact by saying: 
“I thought questions were not directly related to safety”; “We already had 
intensive communication about safety and we didn’t need more”; “Providing 
feedback to supervisors every week did not make sense because we would just assess 
their moods not actual skills or behaviour”; “We did not want to hear from 
supervisors “work safely” more often than we did already”; “If we have a problem 
with a supervisor we tell them straight away and we don’t need to fill out forms to do 
that”; “I didn’t want a supervisor to remind me to work safely if I do my job safely”; 
“If we have a problem with a supervisor we go directly to the management and we 
don’t need to fill out forms to do that”.  
                                                 
20 The company invites students on a regular basis for industrial placement, so employees 
were used to meeting students. 
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The experience of the researcher was that every department in this large 
company was very distinctive with different leaders, people, problems, financial 
resources, needs, group cohesion and motivational levels (see Chapter 6). Developing 
change interventions based solely on theory rather on contextual insights and 
variables risks failure because to achieve improvement, these very contextualised 
elements must be addressed according to the needs of particular departments and the 
people working in them. These conclusions are important in the light of the research 
indicating that one of the main factors affecting the success of a behavioural 
intervention is the level of participant involvement (Geller, et al., 1990) and this 
involvement is not likely to happen if the needs of individuals and groups are not 
directly related (Schwarzer, 2008).  
NEGATIVE PAST EXPERIENCES 
According to Vroom (1964) and George and Jones (2001), negative 
experiences from the past create expectations of negative experiences in future in a 
similar context. Workers recalled a number of examples of interventions from the past 
that either did not change anything in their perception or resulted in disciplinary 
actions against individuals. Therefore they were expecting a similar outcome from 
this intervention and, as they wanted to avoid the negative experiences, they resisted 
engagement.  
“There was a number of safety initiatives before and most of them did not 
work”; “We had been let down so many times so we didn’t believe anything would 
change with your initiative”; “Most of safety initiatives in the past led to disciplining 
somebody and we didn’t want that from your initiative”. 
TRANSPARENCY/COMMUNICATION 
Despite our best efforts to communicate various aspects of the intervention, 
apparently the desired level of shared understanding of the premises behind the 
initiative was not achieved in the group of operatives. It was expressed in words such 
as: 
“We didn’t quite understand what it is all about”; “We did not get enough 
information at the beginning about what was actually happening”; “The whole 
process was confusing”; “The language you used was not clear for us”. 
This theme emphasises the importance of achieving a good and in-depth 
understanding of the rationale supporting an initiative in the group of operatives. As 
Allen, Jimmieson, Bordia, & Irmer (2007) showed, organisational change increases 
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uncertainty and demonstrated that information-rich communication may reduce that 
effect.  
ALIENATION 
The concept of employees’ alienation in their workplace has a long history. 
Marx (1932) suggested that alienation at work represents a loss of individuality and 
that this loss is something negative that should be avoided. Work alienation occurs 
when workers perceive work as detrimental to their values needs and well-being 
(Kanungo, 1982; Wegner, 1975). Employees express alienation by not asking 
questions, answering back or questioning management authority. The consequence of 
that is stronger rigidity, job dissatisfaction and a low level of organisational 
commitment (Cummings & Manring, 1977; Efraty, Sirgy, & Claiborne, 1992; 
Kakabadse, 1986). Seeman (1971) argued that alienation is a multi-faceted concept 
and includes sub-components: powerlessness (i.e. lack of control), meaninglessness 
(i.e. inability mentally to connect one’s contributions to a larger purpose) and self-
estrangement (i.e. when work is used only to fulfil external needs rather than being a 
source of self-expression). It is argued that the reasons behind alienation are 
centralised decision making, formal rules, policies and procedures that leave little 
space for individualised decisions (Moch, 1980; Mottaz, 1981). Other factors 
influencing alienation are the type of organisational structure (Ramaswami, Agarwal, 
& Bhargava, 1993) and leadership style (Shamir, Zakay, Breinin, & Popper, 1998) 
The alienation of workers described in this chapter’s intervention was 
expressed in words such as: 
“We have done this work for years and there was no need to change 
anything”; “This initiative couldn’t change anything anyway”; “You wanted too 
much from us”; “We didn’t want to contribute to the creation of even more bars and 
charts”. 
As indicated by the above short literature review, alienation was expressed in 
the lack of motivation and empowerment. Although alienation is fairly well described 
in the literature, it was not discussed in the context of predicting the success of 
behavioural change intervention and, as indicated, it may play a crucial role in the 
process of implementation. 
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7.11.1. Summary 
The analysis of the interviews with workers who took part in the intervention 
resulted in the development of seven themes that were considered by participants as 
having the biggest impact on them and their disengagement. All identified variables 
could be found in the literature as affecting employees’ motivations, but they were not 
recognised as factors affecting the success of the implementation of safety 
interventions.  
INTERVIEWS WITH THE PANEL OF EXPERTS 
7.12. Method 
7.12.1. Participants  
As the aim of this study was to gather a wide range of perspectives on the 
process of the implementation of safety interventions it was decided to find and 
contact experts from different fields of expertise. There is a variety of professional 
groups on the market that work on improving safety in companies. Firstly, there are 
consulting companies that offer behavioural-based safety programs commercially. 
Another group of experts serves companies internally. They work full-time for one 
company trying to improve safety. Knowing that leadership is the core element of a 
successful change, there are groups of professionals working on leadership change, 
not necessarily focused on safety, called leadership coaches. They help to understand 
personality profiles, underlying assumptions, structures of beliefs and other 
psychological elements that may affect the behaviour of leaders. Finally, there is a 
group of academics who research safety culture and evaluate the effectiveness of 
safety interventions.  
In order to find experts from the groups of specialties described above, an 
internet search was conducted that allowed the identification of a number of 
companies and individuals. That generated a list of companies and allowed 
identifying their contact details. An email message was then sent to all email 
addresses identified in the search containing an introduction of the researcher and the 
research itself. 16 individuals responded to the email - representatives of four 
professions: safety culture scientists (N=3), safety managers of large companies or 
corporations (N=4), directors of safety consulting companies (N=4), and leadership 
and organisational change coaches (N=5). The last group, although not directly 
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related to safety, had much to say about changing leadership and management 
engagement, which are recognised as factors of the strongest power to modify the 
safety culture of a company (e.g. Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007; Mohamed, 2003). All 
individuals who responded to the researcher’s email and indicated an interest in 
participating in the research were interviewed. Names and achievements of the 
interviewees may be found in Appendix E.  
7.12.2. Design  
The main goal of the interviews was to understand what are the most common 
barriers to the successful implementation of safety interventions, what factors support 
that process and what would the experts do step by step if they were asked to 
implement an intervention in a large company. Two assumptions had to be made 
before the start of the data-gathering process. The first was that directors and 
consultants are very busy professionals and would only agree to a short interview. The 
second was that face-to-face meetings would not be possible, due to the disparate 
national and international locations of these individuals. It was decided that a 30-
minute telephone interview would resolve these limitations. A special microphone 
allowing the recording of telephone calls was obtained. All interviewees were 
provided in advance with a list of five questions that would serve as prompts during 
the conversation: 
1. Could you please briefly introduce yourself and tell me a few words 
about your work experience? 
2. If you were asked by the senior managers of a large company to 
modify the behaviours of supervisors and middle managers, how would 
you tackle this challenge step by step? 
3. How can we win the engagement of leaders towards a new change 
initiative introduced in a company? 
4. What  are the most common obstacles in the process of leadership 
behaviour change? 
5. How can these obstacles be overcome? 
 
It may be argued that such interviews should be conducted even before the 
first design of an intervention. However, neither the literature nor safety experts in the 
company suggested that there may be a need to develop a strategy for the 
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implementation of an intervention. Instead, these two sources of information focused 
strongly on the method itself discussing concerns over “what method” rather than 
“how to implement it”. As the researcher relied mostly on these two sources of 
information when developing the concept of an intervention, he simply was not aware 
that the information available was not sufficient.  
7.13. Procedure  
The interviews with experts were mainly focused on obtaining information 
about the process of implementation of an intervention. Therefore the interviews 
sought to invoke the approach of experts to the behavioural change of employees and 
leaders in companies, detailing what to do and how to do it. The ultimate goal of this 
analysis was to create a meta-model of the process of safety intervention 
implementation based on the merged models of particular experts, not a list of themes. 
Different experts, depending on their field of expertise, focused on different elements 
describing what works for them in determining the success of a change process. For 
example, the approach of management coaches differed from the approach of in-
house safety experts. There was an almost complete absence of overlap between their 
responses and suggested stages. However, the value of this study lies in appreciating 
the various styles of approaching a similar problem. It is also worth highlighting the 
fact that interviewees did not have a list of steps ready with them, but rather were 
constructing the structure of the process of implementation of a safety intervention 
during the conversation reacting to the probing questions asked by the researcher (see: 
process of verbalisation: Scholl, 2009). The outcome of such semi-structured 
discussion was lack of solid/rigid structure of the process. Experts tended to use 
metaphors, provide examples of their practice, change subjects of discussion, offer 
digressions, mention elements unrelated to the topic of discussion or finally get back 
to the early stages of the process of implementation during the discussion of late 
stages. As a result, the suggested stages of the process were not given in a 
chronological order.  
The task of the researcher was: 
1. To filter particular steps suggested by particular experts from all 
unrelated content such as digressions, unrelated examples etc.  
2. To arrange these steps in chronological order.  
3. To develop, for every person, a list of stages they recommended.  
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4. To merge all stages suggested by individuals into one central guide of 
what to do step by step in order to implement an intervention 
successfully.  
 
7.14. Results  
The merged instructions allowed the extraction of six stages of the 
implementation process.  
1. Preliminary contact with senior management. 
2. Assessment of the safety management system and safety culture. 
3. Work with senior management. 
4. Work with the Union. 
5. Work with middle management and supervisors. 
6. Work with shop-floor employees. 
Every stage will now be broken down into steps. 
PRELIMINARY CONTACT WITH SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
The main goal of this stage is to understand the concerns of senior 
management and establish first contact. The panel of experts suggested focusing on 
the following elements during this stage: 
1. Engage with the people who are asking for the work – senior managers  
a. What is the issue for them 
b. What is the culture that surrounds the behaviour 
c. What are the values of the organisation 
d. What are the formal and informal norms 
2. Explore the thinking patterns and belief structures of the senior team 
who is promoting the change. 
3. In the case of selling a ready-product, focus on indicating that 
problems in a company result from not having a behavioural program 
(or other program). 
4. Agree to conduct a behavioural program. 
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ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND 
SAFETY CULTURE 
The main goal of this stage is to recognise the quality of the safety 
management system and safety culture, as these are the factors that affect the 
implementation of an intervention. The detailed support for this is presented below: 
1. Perform complete audit of the safety management system that the 
company has in place. Risk assessments, policies and procedures. 
2. Ensure that the safety management system works well and has all the 
components. 
3. Recognise culture: 
a. Organise focus groups or structured interviews and/or a 
questionnaire with as many levels as possible and investigate: 
i. What people say and think (as change requires the 
constructive challenging of underlying beliefs and 
assumptions). 
ii. What are the barriers for safety according to the 
workforce. 
iii. What do you have to do and what do you have to pay 
attention to in order to be successful in the company. 
iv. What behaviours tend to be rewarded around here. 
b. Recognise safety maturity level. 
c. Recognise national culture. 
WORK WITH SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
1. If possible take the group of senior leaders away from the organisation 
for at least a day or organise an alternative, day-long group meeting. 
2. Show what the intervention is about and build an understanding of how 
it will work, what is involved and, what the benefits are (including 
financial ones). 
3. Use examples of previous interventions and case studies. 
4. Discuss research on motivation (why people do anything).  
5. Play what if we do not do it. 
6. Feed what you found to the managers and check that you got it right. 
7. Discuss with senior managers: 
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a.  That they are part of the issue, part of the system and therefore 
part of any changes needed. 
b. What they have tried so far. 
c. What they are trying. 
d. In what ways SL are complicit in creating the situation that they 
currently have and do not like. 
e. What behaviours they (senior leaders) have to model to see 
change in the staff group. 
f. Research on giving negative feedback. 
g. Establish with them positive consequences for all major roles. 
h. Provide information on what the organisation will get and what 
they can expect to see happen. 
i. Present the theory of managing change (what happens 
psychologically to people going through change and transition) 
and link that to the behaviours that they must start 
demonstrating.  
j. What is necessary to support the change – how senior group can 
reinforce the change. 
k. What are the things blocking the way. 
8. If possible, practise new behaviours and provide new experiences for 
SL through role-play exercises. 
WORK WITH THE UNION 
1. Obtain the buy-in of the Union. 
a. If you have successfully cooperated with unions in the past, 
provide contact details to the union with which you are 
cooperating at the moment so that it can obtain positive 
references of your past work. 
WORK WITH MIDDLE MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 
1. Form project teams. 
2. Choose a champion. 
3. Organise meeting/event/training session for middle managers: 
a. Invite senior, credible person(s) to the meeting 
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b. Do a lot of warm up exercises to develop trust (as trust is a 
condition for honesty and openness). 
c. Discuss what they think need to change and what support they 
need. 
d. Provide skills/techniques (training): 
i. How to communicate. 
ii. Why people do anything/motivation. 
iii. How positively to reinforce correct behaviours. 
4. Establish processes for them to practise these skills. 
5. Develop measures for these skills with them. 
6. Assess them against these measures. 
7. Develop disciplinary procedures for non-compliance. 
8. Be prepared to move non-complying individuals. 
WORK WITH SHOP-FLOOR WORKERS 
1. Organise a (series of) meeting(s) with shop-floor employees: 
a. Mix employees from different working groups. 
b. Identify (by asking managers) who is the most influential in 
positive and negative way in particular working groups. 
c. Let them come up with ideas, choose the best ones and trial 
them to see which one works best. 
2. Get the workforce involved in understanding the problem and 
providing their reasons for why people have accidents. 
3. Raise awareness of why it is important for that change to occur by 
communicating: 
a. What is going to happen.  
b. Why it is going to happen.  
c. What the benefits are.  
d. Engage people in communication processes. 
4. Build trust.  
5. Whatever shop-floor workers decide, it needs to be signed by the 
management. 
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7.14.1. Summary 
As the experts come from different fields of expertise their working methods 
differed, but the majority of them agreed on the basic three step approach: 1. Discuss 
with senior leadership their needs, 2. Investigate organisational/safety culture, 3. 
Engage others (middle management, supervisors, operatives) in cooperation. Despite 
this generic agreement every person offered a different set of tools and 
recommendations on how to approach the problem in detail. Hence with respect to the 
ways of cooperation with different groups of employees, there was no agreement 
between the experts. This is not surprising if consider the fact that experts have to sell 
their skills and do this by demonstrating the uniqueness of their approach compared to 
other companies on the market. 
7.15. General discussion 
The failure of the intervention left the researcher with a big unknown 
regarding the reasons behind the intervention’s lack of success. The interviews helped 
to approximate the barriers that blocked the process of the intervention 
implementation. Two sets of interviews were designed to obtain different types of 
insight. Conversations with employees sought to gather a number of factors/themes 
that, according to the change participants, affected their motivation to take part in the 
program. On the other hand, interviewing experts intended to understand the process 
of implementation (what to do step by step and how to do it) rather than a specific set 
of factors affecting implementation. Therefore, to some extent the results of these two 
studies are difficult to compare.  
With regard to the interviews with operatives it became apparent that the level 
of trust towards management and the researcher was not sufficient to maintain the 
cooperation. Additionally, negative past experiences, limited role definition, the face 
validity of an intervention, communication issues and alienation were obstacles from 
the point of view of shop-floor workers and supervisors. Although these variables are 
known in the subject literature, as discussed in Section 3, there is no study known to 
the author suggesting the assignment of these factors before the implementation of a 
safety-focused intervention. Despite the fact that the management is widely 
recognised as the factor shaping and affecting not only safety in general (Wirth & 
Sigurdsson, 2008) but also the success of the implementation process (Cooper, 2006), 
the number of safety-related interventions focused on improving safety leadership and 
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changing managers’ behaviours is incredibly limited compared to the number of 
studies devoted to changing employees behaviours (see Krause, 1999). Although the 
understanding of behavioural interventions focused on operatives is fairly well 
developed, there is not much insight about the process focused on altering 
supervisory/managerial behaviours. In this light, the failure of the intervention was in 
fact beneficial, as it provided an opportunity to explore what is recognised in the 
literature as a gap in knowledge (Wirth & Sigurdsson, 2008). However, despite the 
very informative character of the results of the interviews with the participants of the 
intervention, there are certain limitations that need to be discussed.  
Firstly, it is argued (Gibbs et al., 2007) that the sample for a qualitative study 
should represent a variety of researched subgroups and be diversified in order to 
comprehend cases that do not fit the currently developing understanding. An attempt 
was made to address this issue, so 50% of the interviewed sample comes from the 
supervisory group and 50% from the group of operatives. With regard to the 
diversification of the respondents, it is important to emphasise the context in which 
the study took place: after the intervention, the majority of operatives completely 
refused to cooperate and there was no possibility for the random drawing of the 
individuals. Instead, the researcher received a favour from the individuals with whom 
he had the best relationship and who, despite feeling resistance, decided to spend 
some time explaining their perspective on the process. In that context, it is argued that 
their agreement to talk to the researcher is an advantage rather than a limitation. 
Nevertheless, in terms of theoretical requirements, the sample diversification is 
certainly limited. 
With regard to the size of the sample Crouch and McKenzie (2006) argue that 
since qualitative research “scrutinizes the dynamic qualities of a situation (rather than 
elucidating the proportionate relationships among its constituents), the issue of 
sample size – as well as representativeness – has little bearing on the project’s basic 
logic,” thereby defending small samples. However, the problem of data saturation 
may be raised. Interviews should be conducted until no new issues emerge (Gibbs, et 
al., 2007). This is certainly a disadvantage of this study. It is unknown whether other 
operatives could provide additional insight into the motives that affected the 
intervention. It may be argued that as the operatives work in fairly small groups (3-10 
people per shift), they discussed the problem within their groups and the interviewees 
expressed shared concerns. However, this assumption does not have any empirical 
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validation. Undoubtedly, as the results are very contextual, they cannot be generalised 
to other populations.  
Another concern refers to the so called response distortion processes. These 
are cognitive filters that may deform the answer of an interviewee. The relevance of 
this concern is high in this case as interviewees were drawn from the sample of 
participants engaged in the intervention that failed. Therefore it is expected that they 
would be emotionally engaged and for a number of reasons their responses could be 
distorted by the filters. Scholl (2009), an experienced qualitative market researcher, 
discusses five filters that contribute to the misrepresentation of the respondents’ 
attitudes. Thee are: forgetting, suppression, verbalisation, justification and pleasing. 
All of them could have affected the respondents in this study. As the interviews took 
place a few weeks after the intervention finished, their memories might have faded 
and knowledge may have been compromised. As a result, their reported recollections 
may have omitted some elements. However, it is argued that memories affected by 
strong emotions are more easily recalled and are retained in the accessible memory 
for longer (Richards & Gross, 2000). Suppression is a process that takes place in order 
to suppress the attitudes that seem less acceptable. It may be argued that, due to the 
low level of trust towards the management expressed by the interviewees, they 
suppressed the information that they were afraid to disclose. It may also be possible 
that two themes in particular - role definition and alienation - were biased by the 
process of justification, as only these two refer directly to the motivations of 
operatives. Justification is a cognitive response filter that occurs when respondents 
feel under some pressure to sound reasonable. Motivation to please the researcher 
might have also existed. However, all of these suggestions are speculative and, 
despite the risk of response-distortion processes, the data are still novel and valuable. 
Nevertheless, caution must be exercised in interpreting or generalising the findings.  
With regard to the interviews with the safety professionals, the results 
presented in this chapter are unique in the sense that the “know-how” of experts is 
usually kept within their businesses and serves as a selling point and as such is not 
willing revealed to the public. An additional distinctive feature of these results is the 
focus on the process of implementation instead of on themes. Insight into what to do 
and in what order is much more informative and helpful for practitioners than only a 
list factors that support or obstruct the process.  
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The analysis of the interviews showed that there is substantial variation and 
minimal agreement between the representatives of different safety-related professions 
with regard to the stages of implementation. This is surely affected by the fact that 
professionals functioning in the free market must differentiate themselves from their 
competitors and develop unique approaches. It may also be affected by the fact that 
different professions (e.g. safety manager and leadership coach) occupy different 
niches and are potentially employed in different types of projects. For example, 
traditionally, safety managers are responsible for the formal aspects of safety in 
companies, such as procedures, policies and legal compliance, and leadership coaches 
help senior leaders to improve their self-awareness and leadership style. However, 
merging these different styles of approach leads the development of an in-depth 
understanding of a variety of problems and ways to solve them.  
It is apparent from the results of the interviews with the experts that the main 
focus is placed on cooperation with the management at different levels of the 
hierarchy. This is understandable, considering that all managerial/supervisory 
positions have power that they can use to support of oppose an intervention, and 
without the engagement of leaders a change program is doomed. It seems that the 
main focus in the cooperation with the management is placed on developing mutual 
trust within subgroups and between levels of hierarchy, investigating their needs, 
increasing awareness of individuals with regard to the process of 
organisational/behavioural transformation, providing training for new skills and 
jointly developing an improvement plan. But all of it is targeted at more efficiently 
managing the workforce. The workforce itself must be supported in order effectively 
to cooperate with the management staff who provide the direction of changes. The 
support may be expressed, according to the experts, by involving operatives in the 
design of a change program, communicating in detail a variety of aspects related to 
the anticipated intervention and building trust.  
However, does the insight provided by the experts overlap with the barriers 
that affected the researcher’s intervention? The answer is positive, although the 
overlap is not literal. As the experts provided the insight about the process of 
implementation and the intervention participants provided a number of reasons, these 
are two different types of information. However, it may be argued that the panel of 
experts suggested some steps in how to avoid the difficulties encountered during the 
intervention attempt. The transparency/communication theme is addressed in points 
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6.1.1. and 6.3. (in the section discussing the results of the analysis of the interviews 
with the experts), where, by raising awareness and mixing working groups, the 
problem of resistance due to lack of information would be limited. Point 6.1.3, in 
which operatives are allowed to develop their own ideas that, are later tested, 
addresses the issue of face validity. Point 6.2, suggesting educating the workforce on 
why people have accidents and helping them understand the problem, may possibly 
affect their role definition. Identifying and engaging the most influential individuals 
seeks to prevent alienation/passivity. Choosing a change champion (point 5.2.) – a 
trusted member of a team – is to improve trust towards a change agent. It is difficult 
to improve trust rapidly or erase memories of negative past experiences. If the trust is 
low and the past was rich in negative events, it may take as much as two years to 
improve those variables.  
The problem of the best practice of implementation of safety interventions is 
virtually non-existent in the subject literature. The only process map known to the 
researcher was published by Wirth& Sigurdsson (2008). However, it was based on the 
authors’ experience rather than on any systematic investigation. It is also narrowed 
exclusively to a behavioural process that aims to change operatives’ behaviours and 
not managerial behaviours. The process consists of 20 steps in a defined order. In 
short, the authors suggested to initiate the process and obtain buy-in, conduct risk 
analysis and provide feedback to the management and the operatives, develop and 
revise a behavioural checklist and feed that back again, provide safety training and 
observer training, conduct observations, provide feedback to both groups, organise a 
meeting of the safety committee, compile and post safety data, celebrate success, 
reinforce the process, provide feedback on the process and review the process. The 
two steps that are mentioned in the paper but not by the interviewed experts were 
“celebrating success” and “revising the process”. Both steps appear to make sense and 
are worth adding to the list of steps that must be undertaken in order to implement a 
safety-focused intervention effectively. All these findings offer a novel interpretation 
of the failure, and challenge Zohar’s model of behavioural change.  
The developed intervention (see Chapter 7, Study 1) was largely based on the 
theory of multi-level leadership, which, from a theoretical point of view, seems to be 
very strong and relevant. Zohar’s intervention, developed on the basis of this concept, 
was very effective. However, the failure of the application of a very similar program 
of change of operatives’ behaviours by engaging supervisors and managers showed 
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that there were factors that influenced the process of implementation that were not 
described in Zohar’s study.  
The failure of implementation of the intervention (see Chapter 7, Study 1) 
showed that, despite following the theoretical models from the literature with added 
insights from the company, the intervention not only failed, but was also perceived as 
unwanted and inadequate within a department.  
What is striking in the description of the process of the implementation of 
Zohar’s intervention (2003) is the fact that he introduced a concept to the company 
and everyone not only agreed to take it on board, but fully engaged in the process 
(except 4% of the workforce). The whole process of implementation was seamless 
and smooth. Participants behaved like programmed robots. There were no difficulties 
with time pressure, with production priorities competing with the intervention, with 
interpersonal conflicts, with trust towards management etc. All these problems were 
encountered during the intervention designed for the purpose of that thesis and they 
were predicted by the panel of experts. A question may be raised on the reason behind 
these differences. A number of potential answers may be suggested: 
1. These variables were ignored by Zohar and not included in his paper, 
despite existing in the companies with which he cooperated; 
2. The companies in which he implemented his intervention incorporated 
his ideas in a perfect way, and no such difficulties emerged; 
a) Possibly the organisational and/or national culture in which 
Zohar’s intervention took place promoted a hierarchical top-
down approach. It may be assumed that Zohar conducted his 
research in Israel, where he works. According to one of the 
panel experts, a strong top-down approach would be accepted 
only in some cultures:  
“Quite often we have multinational companies that are either American or UK 
led. We are moving to a country without an earned cultural belief and you have to 
lead by observing that particular culture. So, for example, in Singapore there is a very 
strong compliance culture, so doing something like behaviour-based modification and 
root-cause analysis is not a problem; the issue you would have there is usually a delay 
in response. With Malaysia and to some degree China, those regions, what we have is 
honour. They never publicly want to be displayed or embarrassed, so things like doing 
one-to-one feedback must be done very carefully if at all. What we may look at is 
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peer feedback, where you take measures, collect the information and give it to the 
group rather than to a single individual. The Chinese in particular are very proud 
people and you have to remember that sometimes political frameworks, whether it is a 
police state or democracy, are a major factor in how people behave. When you go to 
the Middle East you will see similar issues about faith and pride, but you may 
consider looking at group feedback. When you go to the West Indies it is a very 
hierarchical, very competitive, very individualised kind of society, so you are going to 
try constructing things again differently, not worry about the collective whole.”  
Following this lead, an Internet search was conducted in order to identify some 
clues about what may be the Jewish working culture. The Jewish Agency for Israel 
(Feierstein, 2010), an organisation that coordinates the employment of foreigners in 
Israel, describes the style of solving problems at work in the following words: 
“At work, Israelis tend to prefer to resolve differences through direct 
communications, often conducted in a spontaneous manner with demonstrative forms 
of speech, including the use of confrontation, speaking loudly, and direct criticism.”  
It seems that this short note very accurately mirrors the approach that Zohar 
took. What is even more interesting is the continuation of this note targeted to 
Americans: 
“Since Americans tend to favour indirect communication styles and a more 
formal manner of speech than their Israeli counterparts, you may find yourself feeling 
overwhelmed, defensive or upset during such demanding encounters.” 
It would appear that Israeli officials have recognised what effect this direct 
style of communication has on people from different cultures. Although this is just a 
generalised note that which cannot serve as a descriptor of the working cultures of the 
particular companies that cooperated with Zohar, it provides an extremely valuable 
insight into how national culture might affect safety intervention. It also introduces 
the notion that the intervention failed because the intervention type was not 
appropriate, not only for the culture in the company, but also for the national culture 
of the UK.  
The process of implementation of safety improvement intervention described 
in Zohar’s paper does not discuss the variables that determined the success of the 
implementation of the intervention for this study, or the variables discussed by experts 
as crucial in the process of implementing such an intervention. 
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In the light of the evidence on why the intervention based on Zohar’s model 
did not work, two hypotheses may be offered. The first one is that Zohar failed to 
discuss (or even maybe consider) a number of variables. The second one is that the 
national culture played such an important role that the same method could result in 
substantial improvements in the Middle East and fail in the UK.  
From the interviews with the change participants, it became apparent that there 
were many factors playing a role in their engagement that were not mentioned in 
Zohar’s study. According to the panel of experts, the process of implementation 
(regardless of method/tool/theory for change) should include a number of stages and 
involve a number of groups. Preliminary contact with senior management should be 
established in order to recognise their needs and their thinking patterns, and to obtain 
their perceptions and agree to the type of program. Next, an extensive assessment of 
the safety management system and safety culture should be performed in order to 
establish the position of the company and potentially other problems that should be 
solved before the implementation of the intervention. Senior management should then 
be involved in the process of developing the intervention that they can expect in the 
organisation, discussing their role in the process and the ways in which they can 
support the process. They should be trained in what is involved in the behavioural 
transition and how to react to problems. Independently, the union should be engaged 
and should support the process. Following that, middle managers should be involved 
in the process of preparation by forming project teams and choosing a champion. 
Training should be provided in how to reinforce correct behaviours, how to 
communicate, build trust and other related skills. They should be informed of what 
they can expect happen. Finally, the group of shop-floor workers should be prepared 
to participate in the intervention by discussing with them their needs, gathering and 
implementing their ideas and identifying and engaging the most influential 
individuals.  
Based on the findings presented above, it is suggested that future research 
should focus to a greater extent on the development of interventions focused on 
changing managerial and supervisory behaviours, especially if those are recognised as 
the most important factor shaping the safety culture(s) of companies. Within that 
process, special attention should be paid to the development of best practice strategies 
and identifying barriers for change, ways to overcome them and a set of conditions 
under which the barriers occur and may be counter-measured. 
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It also appears that national cultures determine what types of communication 
can be used and thus what type of feedback can be used. As feedback is one of the 
main tools used for behavioural change it is crucial to understand in what countries a 
certain type of feedback is preferable and most effective. The most common barriers 
for change in different cultures and the best ways to overcome them in different 
cultures must be established.  
Additionally, it is suggested to look more closely at the strategies employed by 
different professionals that aim to modify organisational/safety culture(s), behaviours 
of line employees, supervisors, managers and directors. It is argued that practitioners 
hold very valuable experience that could be investigated in-depth and tested for 
efficiency.  
7.16. Critical findings 
1. In response to the failure of the safety intervention (see Chapter 7, 
Study 1), an investigation was undertaken to understand the reasons for 
employees’ resistance, which included interviewing the intervention 
participants and external safety experts. 
2. The intervention participants indicated that the following factors 
influenced their motivation to participate in the intervention: the level 
of trust towards management and the researcher was not sufficient to 
maintain cooperation. Also, negative past experiences, limited role 
definition, the face validity of an intervention, communication issues 
and alienation were obstacles from the point of view of shop-floor 
workers and supervisors.  
3. The interviews with safety experts allowed the extraction of six stages 
that should be followed in order to implement a safety intervention 
successfully: initial contact with management, recognition of safety 
management system and organisational culture, cooperation with 
senior management, and cooperation with Union, cooperation with 
middle managers and supervisors, cooperation with blue-collar 
workers.  
4. The factors identified by the change program participants and the 
stages of implementation indicated by the experts were not discussed in 
Zohar’s original study. 
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5. It is hypothesised that Zohar did not mention these factors in his paper, 
or that these factors do not play an important role in Israeli culture.   
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Chapter 8 
Safety Culture Improvement 
Intervention no 2 
8.1. Introduction 
The intervention described in Chapter 7 used a model of influencing employee 
safety behaviour based on theoretical models drawn from the literature (Zohar & 
Luria, 2003). The decision to focus the intervention on front-line supervisors was 
rooted in insight from earlier qualitative work (see Chapter 5) and supported by a 
model from published findings, specifically from (Zohar, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Zohar 
& Erev, 2007; Zohar & Luria, 2003).  
Intervention One targeted the supervisors and managers (as suggested by 
qualitative research and the literature review), but failed for a variety of reasons (see 
Chapter 7), including a low level of trust towards the managers and the researcher, 
negative past experiences, limited role definition, low face validity of the intervention, 
communication issues and alienation. Furthermore, the interviews with experts 
provided an extensive list of suggestions on how to increase the likelihood of success 
of an intervention implementation. The list of the identified elements was long and 
varied. The identification of factors responsible for the failure of the first intervention 
did not provide much insight into how to improve trust, improve face validity, 
communicate better or reduce the level of alienation. The interviews with intervention 
participants did not reveal what culture is, or how to change culture. It only helped to 
identify barriers that prevented a certain programme from being implemented in a 
certain context. The main premise suggesting that the culture of a group of employees 
in a work environment is shaped by the behaviours of leaders (supervisors and 
managers) remained unchanged. Therefore the main goal of the second intervention 
was similar to the goal of the first intervention – to attempt to modify the leaders’ 
behaviours.  
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The researcher faced a difficult challenge on how to translate the lessons 
learned from the implementation of the first intervention to the second intervention. 
Firstly, without a clear answer on how to do it, a literature search was conducted, 
aiming this time at project management and change management studies in order to 
identify some guidance on increasing the chances of success. The literature search 
helped to conclude that new programmes should be closely integrated with the 
existing management system (see the review below), which potentially could help to 
address some of the barriers identified in Intervention One. Strong integration with 
the existing system could help to increase the face validity of the programme. There 
was the potential that only amendments to the existing system would not be perceived 
as new and unfamiliar. Furthermore, in order to address the issue of communication 
and trust, the barriers identified in the previous study (see Chapter 7), the researcher 
decided to spend more time with supervisors and managers and involve them in the 
design of the intervention. It was hoped that the potential issue of the role definition 
of supervisors and the departmental manager (another barrier identified in the 
previous study, see Chapter 7) would be affected by the engagement of senior and 
middle managers (as suggested by interviewed experts, see Chapter 7), who were 
provided with regular reports on the progress of the intervention. There is another 
approach towards the design of change programs within organisations-based on the 
notion of integrating the design of change methods with the context of particular 
departments - that is said to be more effective from the project-management point of 
view. Engwall (2003) argues that procedures employed to achieve change within 
organisations need to be looked at from the perspective of previous and current 
activities, plans for the future, operating procedures, traditions and cultural norms. His 
research findings suggest that the better the alignment of a program with established 
ideas, structures and patterns of behaviours within an organisation, the higher the 
probability of a smooth and successful execution of a project. Similarly, Lehtonen & 
Martinsuo (2009) analysed two complex organisational change programs and 
discussed the advantages of program-parent integration, demonstrating that an 
understanding of context is essential for success. A limitation of these studies, 
however, is the qualitative, ethnographic methodology based on observation and 
description of only two case studies. This issue was partially addressed by 
Pellegrinelli, Partington, & Hemingway (2007), who analysed the way in which 
projects were implemented in six large private and third sector companies. Their 
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findings suggest that successful change programs were constantly reshaped and 
rearranged, in an iterative manner, to fit the particular moment and situation. 
Furthermore, Maaninen-Olsson & Mullern (2009), based on an analysis of 
successfully managing high-tech projects, concluded that context is a fundamental 
element (see also Ferns, 1991).  
A limitation of these studies is the fact that they do not compare the 
effectiveness of integrated and non-integrated, projects but only describe ongoing 
programs. Nevertheless, it appears that the majority of papers on the subject are in 
agreement regarding the benefits of the integration of intervention design with 
established organisational structures, systems and cultural norms.  
 In the manufacturing sector, survival is directly related to the efficiency of 
production capabilities. In an atmosphere of harsh competition, companies must 
continually improve efficiency and quality while at the same time reducing costs. The 
sponsor company uses a number of strategies to achieve this including an approach 
called Continuous Improvement (CI). According to Sim & Roger (2009), CI “is 
defined as any methodology or program that continually strives to improve any and 
all processes through an increase in quality, delivery, productivity or customer 
satisfaction and/or a decrease in lead-time, cycle time, cost or scrap” (p. 38). The CI 
approach includes Total Quality Management (TQM) and lean production tools. Both 
were applied in the study organisation and its parent group. 
TQM includes a philosophy and assumptions about successful work as well as 
applicable tools and processes to put into operation. The first assumption behind 
TQM is that the businesses that produce higher-quality products will be more 
successful than the companies that compromise on quality (Hackman & Wageman, 
1995). Lean manufacturing as a concept and method of production improvement was 
originally developed by two Japanese engineers, Taiichi Ohno and Shigeo Shingo, for 
the purpose of increasing the efficiency of production in Toyota factories in Japan. 
The system has been widely adopted by large companies in the U.S.A., UK and other 
countries (Arnheiter & Maleyeff, 2005). Lean production has a number of goals 
(Pettersen, 2009): (a) to produce products with fewer defects, (b) to improve value by 
reducing waste, and (c) to achieve high quality and low cost in a short time. Lean 
production system proponents offer a number of tools and techniques designed to 
achieve the above goals. The most widely adopted 31 principles are listed in the 
literature review conducted by Pettersen (2009).  
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One of these tools is “Standardised Work”. It is very important to automate as 
many stages of production as possible (Liker, 2004) in order to improve the speed and 
quality of the production process. In classical understandings of the lean production 
system, the term “Standardised Work” refers to a very detailed description of every 
step of work conducted by operatives (Ohno, 1988), including material (stock), 
machines, work sequence and timings. Work standardisation plays a very important 
function in the continuous production process (Dennis, 2002). It ensures process 
stability, allows organisational learning, audit and problems solving, employee 
involvement and training. More recently, however, Mann (2005) suggested the 
development of standardised work for leaders as well (including supervisors and 
managers), along with the standardisation of the work of shop-floor employees.  
The standardised work for leaders is simply a list of their responsibilities 
structured on an hourly/daily/weekly/monthly basis. Every item on the list is set in 
agreement with the superiors and subordinates of a person for whom the list is 
designed. Every item must be unequivocal and is assessed with a binary system: 
“done” versus “not done”. The job of a leader using the standardised work sheet is to 
go through it item by item within specified time frames and mark which tasks were 
done and, if not done, to note why not. The main function of the standardised work 
for leaders is to make their daily/weekly/monthly responsibilities structured in order 
to switch their attention from outcomes to the process of –production. The items focus 
on keeping the flow of production and support other elements of the lean production 
system. For team leaders the ambition in the company is to define 80% of their time, 
for supervisors about 50% and even less for middle and senior management. The big 
advantage of using standardised work for leaders is said to be the ability to recognise 
weaknesses in the production support process. A supervisor’s list is reviewed 
regularly by his/her manager and based on the written record, they can easily identify 
the problematic areas. Additionally, every person clearly knows what is expected of 
them and how to perform their duties. In the case of personal changes within a 
department, the flow of work is kept going, as new comers continue to perform the 
most crucial actions according to the list. 
 Keeping in mind the importance of the benefits of designing change programs 
that fit well with established cultural and socio-technical norms, an attempt was made 
to configure a more organic safety improvement intervention that is context-driven 
rather than theory-driven. To this end, an avenue that was considered was to explore 
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the scope for aligning a safety intervention with established and valued management 
systems. This was thought to bring at least two benefits: firstly, it would link the 
intervention to established practices, rather than attempting to introduce new, 
additional and unfamiliar practices; secondly, it had the potential to integrate safety 
more closely within the broader productive process, rather than treating it as an add-
on or separate activity. 
It was argued that out of all available management and lean manufacturing 
methods used in the company the standardised work for leaders offers the highest 
relevance to achieving intended goal which was the modification of supervisory 
behaviours and improvement in interactions about safety with shop-floor employees.  
As the researcher was the only person coordinating, supporting and evaluating 
the intervention, it was decided, due to time and resource constraints, to limit the 
intervention to only one department and choose a second one as a control group. 
Therefore, identifying the appropriate department was the first stage of the research 
process.  
8.2. Method 
8.2.1. Identifying the appropriate departments for an intervention 
In February 2009 a new shop-floor manager was recruited to a large finishing 
department. This presented an opportunity to explore innovative ways of enhancing 
safety. 
“Large finishing” relates to the size of the products (metal casting) being 
manipulated and worked on, rather than the size of the department. The finishing of 
castings is a high-hazard activity, involving the use of blasting media, removal of 
flashing surplus metal and trimming/finishing using mechanical belt grinders. In 
addition to this, there are hazards associated with supporting tasks, especially 
mechanical and manual handling activities. The principal hazards relate to rotating 
machinery and equipment, product and materials handling systems, e.g. forklifts, 
manual handling, chemical exposure and noise. 
With regard to the control department, the most hazardous task was Electrical 
Discharge Machining (EDM), which will be described in some detail here due to its 
salience in subsequent sections. Commonly known as spark erosion, it is essentially a 
type of grinding/abrasion process; a typical task consists of removing a component 
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from a storage rack and, submerging it in a hot oil bath before abrading the surface 
with the spark erosion ‘gun’. This includes the manipulation of the component in the 
tank and its removal on completion. The hazards associated with this process include 
electric shock, inhalation of oil mist and fume exposure, manual handling, noise, slips 
and trips and fire.  
The Human Resources department strongly suggested that the researcher 
should not gather demographic information about the participants of Intervention 
Two, expressing concerns that the personal data could not be protected as expected by 
law (Data Protection Act 1998). Similarly to the description of the participants of 
Intervention One, only very generic information can be provided about the employees 
of the two departments (experimental and control groups). All participants were male 
and between 30-60 years old. The majority of them worked for the sponsor company 
for more than 5 years. They worked in their departments for the majority of this time. 
Their work required a fair amount of communication and cooperation. As the group of 
managers and supervisors was very small, all information about these individuals 
could lead to their identification and for this reason was not included. 
 
8.3. Materials 
8.3.1. Developing standardised work safety criteria for leaders  
It needs to be highlighted at the outset that the implementation of the 
standardised work for the leaders focused on production processes had begun two 
months before the researcher’s intervention started. Therefore it was a new program 
in this particular department. The researcher contributed to its development by 
identifying safety-related elements that could be added to the SWFL tool.  
A meeting with the departmental manager was organised to discuss the idea of 
merging standardised work for leaders with safety items. It was agreed that, in order 
to maximise the potential for engagement of supervisors and win their support / 
ownership for the intervention (Moch, 1980), they should contribute to its 
development, specifically of the safety elements that would be added to the list of 
assessed criteria. Following suggestions from the literature (Hilyer, Veasey, Oldfield, 
& McCormick, 2000) with regard to training development a workshop-based meeting 
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was organised for front-line supervisors with the objective of developing a list of 
safety-related behaviours that the supervisors would agree to exhibit.  
During the supervisory workshop participants were:  
1. given instruction in the form of a short lecture summarising key 
insights on employee risk taking, including what safety culture is and 
the influence of leadership on employee behaviour;  
2. asked to identify a range of changes in supervisor behaviour that, in 
their opinion, could have a positive impact on shop-floor workers’ 
safety behaviours; 
3. shown the list of behaviours identified by Zohar (2002b);  
4. engaged in a discussion of both lists, leading to the identification and 
agreement of a set of supervisory safety enhancement behaviours.  
Following that workshop, a meeting with a member of the senior management 
team and supervisors was organised to agree on a definitive set of supervisor 
behaviours. The discussion resulted in the definition of the set of behaviours given in 
Table 32. 
Table 32. A set of safety-focused behaviours identified with supervisors 
1. Check to see if all shop-floor workers are obeying the safety rules.  
2. Discuss with workers how to improve safety.  
3. Spend time helping workers learn to see problems before they arise.  
4. Use explanations (not just compliance) to get worker to act safely.  
5. Say a “good word” to workers who pay special attention to safety.  
6. Remind workers who need reminders to work safely. 
 
A central principle of the standardised work perspective is that items must be 
worded in a way that allows for binary assessment - YES or NO - based on the 
premise that problems should be unambiguously and easily identifiable. Moreover, as 
other items in the standardised work for leaders related to the production process are 
worded in such a way as to allow binary assessment, the safety items, in order to fit 
the layout, had to be adapted to that format. The wording of the items was adjusted to 
meet this criterion: 
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Table 33. A set of rephrased safety-focused behaviours identified with supervisors 
1. Did you observe that everybody in the department was obeying all 
safety rules? 
2. Did you interact with an operator to share any of his/her ideas to 
improve safety? 
3. Did you check with an operator if he/she noticed any environment 
issue that can potentially harm his/her workmate? 
4. Did you educate an operator about the hazard related to the work 
being performed? 
5. Did you recognize an operator for performing the task to the safety 
standards? 
6. Did you educate/remind an operator on any of the safety rules? 
One more item was added to the list: 
7. Did you check with an operator if he/she came close to injuring 
themselves?  
Item 7 refers to the Injury Free Event (IFE) program running in the department 
during the period of the intervention’s implementation (see Chapter 5). The main goal 
of this system is to identify hazards and risks in the work environment, identify root 
causes and remove them. As the focus groups (Chapter 5) and the safety culture 
questionnaire (Chapter 6) showed, there was resistance towards the use of the IFE 
system. From the management point of view, IFE books help to track risks and 
hazards and allow the systematic review and removal of critical dangers. As workers 
did not want to use the IFE books, it was argued that personal and frequent interaction 
between supervisors and workers about risks and hazards may help to identify them. 
The IFE books could then be used to record the nature of a hazard and enter it into the 
computer system to allow the raising of maintenance tickets and to be used for data-
gathering purposes. The standardised work for leaders with the identified safety items 
may be found in Appendix F. 
8.4. Procedure 
The intervention consisted of adding the seven behaviours to the standardised 
work for leaders used by supervisors in order to encourage frequent verbal 
interactions with workers on the topics covered by the list. 
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Each supervisor was asked to go through the whole checklist at least three 
times a week (as agreed with them and their manager) and approach seven shop-floor 
workers a day, during their shift, and discuss at least one item from the list with at 
least one employee. The supervisors were instructed that they should tailor their 
discourse with each employee to reflect the degree of observed compliance with good 
practice, so if a supervisor saw somebody working according to the safety rules, he 
should praise them (one item), and if the supervisor saw somebody breaking a safety 
rule, they should remind them about working safely, and so on. The supervisors were 
asked to record on paper a short note describing each of the specified interactions with 
each employee. The routine was carried on for 20 weeks. A manager of the large 
finishing department was asked to check the compliance of supervisors at the end of 
every week and, in the case of non-compliance, to investigate the reasons for it. The 
researcher agreed to meet with supervisors and their manager at the end of every week 
to collect the “Standardised Work for Leaders” sheets and discuss any issues or 
difficulties in applying the scheme with participating supervisors. 
8.4.1. Impact Measures 
The evaluation had a pre- and post-test design, with evidence of change being 
derived from employee perceptions of multi-level safety climate, Leader-Member 
Exchange, Safety Citizenship and the Job Security questionnaire. This was 
supplemented with a behavioural audit check list that provided the monitoring of 
employee behaviour change. These were exactly the same methods used in the first 
intervention (see Chapter 7) and the rationale for its use may be found in Chapter 7.  
As the new behavioural checklist had to be developed to reflect department-specific 
hazards (see Appendix F), the method application was the same as described in detail 
in Chapter 7.  
For the purpose of gathering pre-test data, the observations of safety 
behaviours were conducted for four weeks before the start of the intervention and 
were continued until the 24th week of the intervention. Observations were conducted 
3-5 days a week and an average score was calculated for each week. Each observation 
session lasted up to 30 minutes. 
The pre-test questionnaires were administered in mid-March 2009 in the Large 
Finishing department and in EDM at the beginning of April 2009. The different dates 
reflect local arrangements with departmental supervisors who had to choose the 
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timing so that it did not adversely affect the production processes. Post-test 
questionnaires were administered in the 24th week of the intervention (second half of 
November 2009) in the Large Finishing and EDM departments.  
8.4.2. Difficulties with the process of implementation  
Despite the supervisors’ expressed willingness to follow the process outlined 
above and interact with operatives according to the themes stated on their list, and 
despite their managers’ agreement to monitor their compliance, in most weeks they 
failed to perform their tasks according to the agreement. In most of the weeks, when 
the researcher saw them at the end of a week, the supervisors apologised for not 
completing the task but promised to complete it the following week. However, at the 
end of each subsequent week, the pattern was repeated, despite commitment from 
their manager to encourage adoption, the weekly review of supervisor responsibilities 
and the discussion of the reasons for failure to complete the defined instructions with 
shop-floor staff. The process of trying to engage supervisors to adopt the intervention 
took 20 weeks, and in that time they returned eight sheets out of 60. Also, as far as the 
researcher is concerned, the supervisors also failed to follow other items from the 
SWFL tool, not just those related to safety – demonstrating challenges related to 
people management at the company.  
8.5. Results 
8.5.1. Observations 
Observations were conducted in both departments three to five times per 
week. Safety performance expressed as a percentage value (ratio of observed safe 
behaviours to all observed behaviours multiplied by 100) was calculated for each day 
and these scores were averaged for each week and plotted on a graph on a computer. 
Figure 12 presents the averaged weekly results of observations, where the first four 
points are the four weeks of the baseline. The graph shows much variance within the 
large finishing department from week to week, varying from 55% to 75%, whereas 
observations from the EDM department are less varied. The calculations of the results 
will be discussed in the following sections.   
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Figure 9. Average weekly safety performance for experimental and control group. 
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA for the cleaning department (experimental 
group) 
For the purpose of statistical analysis one-way repeated-measures ANOVA 
was used. Observations from every month created one variable. The order of 
observations was matched; it means that the first observation in Month 1 was matched 
with the first observation in Month 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and similarly for the second 
observation and the subsequent ones. This was important, as in one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA the effect of manipulation is analysed on the basis of within-
participant variance, not between-group variance (Field, 2005). 
According to Mauchly’s test, the assumption of sphericity was violated (χ2(14)=26.65, 
p<.05). For that reason the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε=.52). The results show that the behaviour of 
employees differed significantly in particular months F(2.61, 20.94)=3.62, p<.05, 
ω2=.2821 (see Appendix F). 
In order to identify which months differed, two types of contrasts were tested. 
Firstly, “simple contrast” was applied to compare months in which intervention was 
taking place with the first month (base line). There was a statistical difference (p<.05) 
                                                 
21 Calculated according to the equation (Field, 2005): 𝜔2 = [𝑘−1𝑛𝑘 (𝑀𝑆𝑀−𝑀𝑆𝑅)]
𝑀𝑆𝑅+
𝑀𝑆𝐵𝐺−𝑀𝑆𝑅
𝑘
+[𝑘−1
𝑛𝑘
(𝑀𝑆𝑀−𝑀𝑆𝑅)] 
where: k – is the number of months in the intervention, n – number of observations in every month, 
MSM – mean square for the model, MSR –residual mean square, and MSBG –between group mean 
square. 
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between the first month and all other months: Month 1 vs. Month 2 F(1, 8)=5.55, 
p<.05; Month 1 vs. Month 3 F(1, 8)=18.87, p<.005; Month 1 vs. Month 4 F(1, 
8)=7.04, p<.05; Month 1 vs. Month 5 F(1, 8)=28.58, p=.001; Month 1 vs. Month 6 
F(1, 8)=7.68, p<.05 (see Appendix F). 
These results suggest that in the Cleaning department the behaviours of 
employees in May (the first month of the intervention) and the following months 
improved significantly compared with April (base line).  
In order to establish whether the improvement was stronger in each subsequent 
month compared to the previous one, the “repeated contrasts” measure was applied. 
“Repeated contrasts” allowed the comparison of Month 1 with Month 2, Month 2 with 
Month 3, and so on. The results indicated that there was only a difference between 
Month 1 and the Month 2 F(1, 8)=5.55, p<.046 (see Appendix F). 
The findings suggest that the behaviour of employees improved significantly 
in May (the first month of the intervention) compared to April (base line) and then 
stayed at approximately the same level until the end of the intervention. 
One-way repeated-measures ANOVA for the EDM department (control group) 
Mauchly’s test was not significant, confirming the assumption of sphericity of 
the data (χ2(14)=15.87, p<.05) (see Appendix F). 
The results show that there were no significant differences between particular 
months during the baseline period of the intervention F(3,40)=1.59, p>.05, ω2=.02722 
(see Appendix F). 
8.5.2. Questionnaires  
Two-way ANOVA analysis for the cleaning department (experimental group) and 
EDM department (control group) 
In order to check whether the intervention had any effect on the perceptions of 
shop-floor workers regarding their leaders (organisation and group levels safety 
climate and LMX) as well as their perception of job security and the perceived scope 
of their responsibilities, a two-way ANOVA analysis was conducted, comparing the 
results obtained before and after the intervention in an experimental and control 
groups. The Levene’s test was conducted in order to test for the homogeneity of the 
                                                 
22 Calculated with the same equation as the effect size for repeated measures one way 
ANOVA for the cleaning department.  
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data and it resulted in significant values for “group level safety climate”, “job 
security”. To address this issue Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s tests were conducted 
in order to modify F and the residual degrees of freedom in order to address violation 
of the homogeneity of variance. The performed tests resulted in significant values for 
both variables below p<.05 threshold allowing to reject the null hypothesis and 
continue the analysis.   
The results showed that there were two significant main effects only for the 
“safety citizenship” variable suggesting the differences between pre-test / post-test 
(F(1,87)=5.85, p<.05) and between experimental and control groups (F(1,87)=5.42, 
p<.05). There was no significant interaction effect between the impact of the 
intervention and the groups (departments) for that variable. There was not any 
significant main effect or interaction effect for any other impact measure. The detailed 
results of the analysis can be found in the Appendix F.  
In order to break down the main effects post-hoc analysis should be 
performed; however post-hoc tests could not have been performed as there were less 
than three groups. Therefore, a t-test was conducted for “safety citizenship” variable 
to compare pre-test and post-test in experimental and control groups (see Table 34).  
Table 34. T-test analysis for experimental and control groups for “safety citizenship” 
measure. 
Safety 
citizenship 
Pre-test, N=36 Post-test, N=21 Pre-test, N=16 Post-test, N=18 
M=69.47 SE=3.71 M=54 SE=5.42 M=54.43 SE=6.65 M=46.16 SE=3.09 
t(55)=2.42, p<.05, r=.3123 t(32)=1.17, p>.05, r=.20 
 
The results show that “safety citizenship” improved significantly in the 
experimental group (the lower the mean, the more safety-related behaviours 
operatives consider a part of their job) after the intervention, compared to the 
baseline. There was a non-significant improvement in the control group with regard to 
that variable.   
 
Correlation procedure for the impact measures 
In order to explore the covariance between the impact measures (see section 
8.4.1.), a correlation procedure was conducted on the data gathered from experimental 
                                                 
23 Effect size calculated according to the equation (Field, 2005): 𝑟 = � 𝑡2
𝑡2+𝑑𝑓
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and control groups (cleaning and EDM departments), before and after the 
intervention.  
The test of normality of distribution for particular variables turned out to be 
significant for three out of five variables suggesting that the data for Job Security 
(p<0.000), LMX (p<0.05) and Safety Citizenship (p<0.005) were not normally 
distributed. The significance values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test may be found 
in Appendix F. 
As the data were not normally distributed, the non-parametric test for 
correlation coefficient had to be used. Out of two commonly used coefficients - 
Spearman’s r and Kendall’s tau - it is argued (Howell, 2009) that the latter provides a 
better estimate of the correlation.  The results of the correlation procedure may be 
found in Appendix F. 
The results showed that organisation-level safety climate correlated strongly 
with group-level safety climate (τ=.55, p<000) and Leader-Member Exchange (τ=.24, 
p<001). Group-level safety climate correlated strongly with Job Security (τ=.34, 
p<000) and Leader-Member Exchange (τ=.37, p<000). Additionally, Job Security 
correlated significantly with LMX (τ=.23, p<005).  
Regression analysis for the impact measures 
As the sponsor company was going through long and painful process of 
redundancies before and during the intervention, it was expected that this protracted 
situation would affect employees’ perceptions of job security. Strong job insecurity 
my decrease safety motivation and compliance with safety rules (Probst & Brubaker, 
2001), so it was considered justified to check whether that variable predicted changes 
in other impact measures.  
In order to check whether “Job security” predicted the strength of “Group-
level safety climate,” a simple regression analysis was conducted. It turned out that 
“Job security” accounted for 27.6% of the group-level safety climate variation (see 
Appendix F). 
Based on the analysis of variance (see Appendix F), it can be concluded that 
“Job security” predicts “Group-level safety climate” F(1)=30.08, p<0.000. 
The same analysis was conducted to test whether “Job security” predicts the 
strength of “LMX”. The predictor accounted for 16.2% of variance in LMX (see 
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Appendix F) and predicted the outcome of LMX significantly F(1)=14.87, p<0.000 
(see Appendix F). 
“Job security” also significantly (F(1)=8.52, p<0.005) predicted 
“Organisation-level safety climate,” but accounts for only 8.7% of the variance (see 
Appendix F). However, job security did not predict Safety Citizenship scores 
F(1)=0.75, p>0.5 (see Appendix F). 
8.6. Discussion 
The repeated-measures one-way ANOVA demonstrated that the behaviour of 
employees changed significantly compared to the baseline in the experimental group, 
but there was no equivalent change in the control group. As discussed earlier, 
supervisors followed the program of the intervention to a minimal extent, providing 
only eight “Standardised Work for Leaders” sheets during the period of six months. It 
is unlikely that they completed more sheets than they returned, as they mentioned 
many times that they did not do it due to lack of time. This suggests that the 
intervention was unlikely to have a significant impact on supervisor behaviours, and 
ultimately the behaviour of shop-floor workers.  
Based on these results a number of questions may be raised:  
• If not the intervention, what affected employees behaviours as 
evidenced by the observation data? 
• If not the intervention, what affected the safety citizenship of shop-
floor workers in the experimental group? 
• If not the intervention, what could account for the apparent change in 
employee perceptions of safety climate? 
• Why did the intervention fail to work as intended? 
A possible answer to the first point is: the impact of a production-
improvement intervention that began at the same time (May, 2009) as the researcher’s 
safety intervention in the experimental-only department. The production-related 
initiative focused on implementing a number of changes in order to reduce the amount 
of inventory in the department and increase the output. The departmental intervention 
was led by the departmental manager and was supported by a Rapid Operational 
Improvement Programs (ROIP) team. The ROIP team was created by the corporation 
in order to support the operational processes of plants which that struggle to achieve 
their maximum manufacturing potential. The team consisted of multi-national experts 
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in Management Systems and Lean Manufacturing. The team was invited to the 
company to redesign production processes in the Wax and Foundry departments; 
however, it also supported the Large Finishing department. In May (the same month 
as the beginning of the researcher’s intervention) the large finishing department 
initiated a number of Lean Manufacturing Initiatives (LMI): 
1. Help chain – the idea behind the program was to provide operatives 
with a tool for asking for help when they encountered a production 
problem, the aim being to solve the problem immediately. The 
operatives were given a visual sign to call their shift leader for 
assistance. If the shift leader could not resolve the problem immediate 
contact should be made with the supervisor. If a supervisor could not 
solve the issue, a departmental manager was called in and ultimately a 
senior manager. The main goal of the initiative was to solve problems 
that interrupt or have the potential otherwise to disrupt the production 
process. This initiative may have affected employees’ perceptions of 
the effectiveness of solutions provided by the company for the 
problems they reported and reduce their frustration. However, no 
measure of this variable was applied, so no relationship can be 
demonstrated. It addressed a number of problems indicated by 
employees, which were described in the Chapter 5 and expressed 
during individual interviews (see Chapter 4).  
2. According to the experimental departmental manager, he and 
supervisors spent up to three times more time on the shop floor 
interacting with employees regarding production issues, observing 
employees working and analysing the production process than they had 
prior to the introduction of the LMI. Although the main focus was on 
production, it is likely that safety elements were picked up 
spontaneously during that process.  
3. The introduction of the KANBAN pull system. A single work-station is 
set up in such a way as to allow suppliers visually to identify whether 
any components are needed to keep production going in that 
workstation without engaging an operator. As a part of this initiative, 
the floor around the machines and work stations was painted using 
different colours to indicate places for parts ready for processing and 
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ready for another stage of production. The implementation of this 
initiative had the potential to enhance the degree of control over 
inventory in the department and improve housekeeping, as every 
component, box or case had its own clearly designated place. This is 
clearly one of the elements likely to have a positive impact on 
housekeeping performance, as evidenced in the observation measures.  
4. “Setup Time Reduction” and “Just-in-Time production” were 
implemented to complement the KANBAN pull system. This helped to 
smooth the flow of a part through particular stages of production. 
5. The overall look of the department was improved. The walls, floors 
and walkways were painted. Additionally, a program of cleaning 
machines to improve its appearance was applied.  
6. A standardised work through visual management program was 
implemented. For every stage of the production process a list of crucial 
checks was developed and put on a notice board or a wall in an 
appropriate place close to that stage. Supervisors and manager had to 
walk from board to board, go through the list and mark with one colour 
the status of every check. Green was OK, Orange – caution, RED – 
needs immediate attention. This system allowed a better control of the 
processes. 
As far as the researcher is concerned the implementation of the SWfL was 
abandoned a few months after the end of the intervention. In general, the 
improvement of production efficiency through the application of the lean 
manufacturing system is related to the reduction of inventory in the department and 
the increased output. It seems likely that a side effect / by-product of the production-
focused intervention was improvements in the standards of housekeeping and 
consequent reductions in housekeeping-related hazards. The combined effect of the 
implementation of the above initiatives may be responsible for the observed 
improvement in safe behaviours, as it reduced the number of hazards in the 
department, especially those associated with housekeeping.  
While the above production changes seem likely to have contributed to 
improved safety performance in terms of the check list criteria, this does not 
immediately account for the measured improvement in safety citizenship. 
Additionally, the question arises as to why this was the only cultural variable that 
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exhibited a significant change after the intervention compared to the baseline. It may 
be hypothesised that the LMI production initiatives reduced the frustration of 
employees with regard to their daily routines, materially improved working conditions 
with respect to the presence of hazards and being provided a timely and well 
resourced resolution of employee-raised issues. It appears possible that this change 
could lead to enhanced employee perceptions of organisational citizenship, including 
safety citizenship. However, as the impact of these initiatives was not measured, the 
hypothesis cannot be confirmed.  
Despite the fact that the improvement in the safety citizenship measure was 
the only one that was significant, it was observed that the mean values for safety 
climate and job security are lower at time two, although non-significantly, indicating 
that the perception of departmental and organisational leaders with respect to their 
safety engagement declined. On the one hand it may be hypothesised that this change 
may be a result of a measurement error; on the other hand, at the time of the 
implementation of the intervention the company was going through a difficult process 
of redundancies in order to reduce production–related costs. Within that context the 
deterioration of job security is an expected effect and this is what the data show. The 
employees’ perceptions of job security, measured by the “job-security scale”, 
worsened after the intervention in comparison to the baseline. These results could 
possibly be explained by the changes in supervisory duties that took place during that 
time. The departmental supervisors were engaged in two-fold responsibilities. On the 
one hand, they were engaged in the intervention focused on improving the production 
figures through the implementation of lean manufacturing elements. On the other 
hand, during the redundancy process the supervisors were obliged to assess every 
employee and suggest to the senior management who should be made redundant. 
Supervisors themselves were also at risk. The strong focus on production-related tasks 
may have potentially reduced the amount of time and attention allocated to safety. 
Additionally, deciding who will be made redundant may be expected threaten the 
relationships between operatives and their supervisors. These two effects could be 
gauged by the measures: group level safety climate and LMX. The results show that 
the safety climate declined, but not the LMX. A potential explanation of why the 
process of the redundancies did not affect the relationships between workers and 
supervisors may be the fact that the post-test survey was administered shortly after the 
process of redundancies was finished and all people designated by supervisors had 
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left. The people who stayed may have felt saved or chosen by their supervisor. 
However, with regard to safety climate, the production intervention was still running 
so limited time was spent directly on safety. Furthermore, with regard to the 
decreased safety climate, the exploratory analysis was conducted in order to find the 
covariance with other variables. The findings show that job security correlates 
significantly with group-level safety climate (p<.000) and Leader-Member Exchange 
(p<.004). In order to confirm whether job security affected safety climate, a simple 
regression analysis was conducted. The results of that procedure showed that job 
security significantly predicts group-level safety climate, organisational-level safety 
climate and LMX but it did not predict the safety citizenship improvements. 
Therefore it may be argued that the effect observed in this study may be attributed to 
the production improvement intervention.  
If that was the case, this finding would have two profound consequences. 
Firstly, it would suggest, contrary to many studies (Janssens, et al., 1995; Mearns, 
Whitaker, et al., 2001; Zohar & Erev, 2007), that the reduction of hazards and risk 
may be achieved in accordance with the improvements in production speed and 
efficiency. So far in the literature it has been argued that, in order to increase 
production figures, pressure had to be put on workers and their leaders. In that 
context, safety competes with production for time and resources, and often loses that 
competition. In a production pressure situation, workers cut corners in an ttempt to 
save time, and are more stressed and less careful. This may result in accidents and 
such production pressure is a sign of a weak safety culture (ibid.). However, it appears 
that lean manufacturing focuses on different sets of assumptions. Instead of working 
harder and faster, it promotes working smarter, with high workforce engagement 
(Pettersen, 2009). It is difficult to relate this result to the literature, as the research 
about the impact of the implementation of lean manufacturing on safety is almost 
non-existent, even despite the fact that, within lean philosophy, accidents are 
considered an extreme form of inefficiency and are to be avoided at all costs 
(Wokutch & Vansandt, 2000). There are some notes and discussions about the subject 
in the grey literature (Campbell, 2009; Hallowell, Veltri, & Johnson, 2001; Manuele, 
2007; Savasta, 2003). Although an advantage of these publications is the shared 
knowledge of experts, the papers are not based on data and rigurous statistical 
analysis. There were three articles found in peer-reviewed journals discussing this 
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issue. Two of them report a positive impact of lean systems on safety and one argues 
that the impact was negative.  
Nikolou-Walker & Laver (2009) compared two departments in a 
manufacturing company. In one of them a lean production system was implemented. 
Based on the interviews with employees, the authors concluded that a lean operations 
system improved the production flow, the department itself was better organised (e.g. 
tools and equipment were easily found) and the layout of the process improved as 
well. The new system influenced safety with better signage of hazards, a cleaner work 
environement, fewer trip hazards and better ergonomically designed work stations. A 
minority of employees indicated the negative impact of the system on their work, as 
they felt anxious and stressed due to the change in the production process. These two 
studies demonstrate a clear similarity between the effect described in them and the 
benefits of implementing lean manufacturing tools in a cleaning department like 
KANBAN or help chain. 
Saurin and Ferreira (2009) studied the impact of the lean manufacturing 
system on working conditions. They interviewed Health & Safety experts from the 
company after the process of implementation was accomplished. The safety 
specialists reported dramatic positive changes in terms of culture and safety. They 
said that the engagement of top management increased and it was understood that 
safety is not only a concern of the H&S department. The system also improved 
housekeeping by establishing storage areas and controlling stock. According to shop-
floor employees from the same company, the improvement in housekeeping was the 
most noticeable change.  
However, these results were not confirmed by Brown (2007). He found that in 
a Chinese factory the implementation of a lean manufacturing program increased the 
number of hazards. It exposed employees to a bigger number of risks, increased 
workloads and put employees under stress. However, in his study, the company 
completely redesigned the production process, merging numerous stages of 
production previously conducted by different people in different departments into one 
continuous process of production from the beginning to the end, performed by the 
same individuals.  
This research shows that there is no agreement with regard to the impact of 
lean manufacturing on safety. However, similar results are found with regard to the 
impact of lean systems on working conditions, which is a broader term than safety 
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and includes elements like - work organisation, work content, monotony, pain and 
discomfort, autonomy etc. Ferreira (2006) analysed 52 scientific studies about the 
relationship between lean manufacturing and work conditions, and found that 48% of 
the citations referred to positive impacts and 52% to negative impacts on work 
conditions. She explained that this variation may be caused by: (a) the company’s 
culture and the extent to which safety and ergonomics play a crucial role, (b) the 
different level of maturity of lean systems, (c) the socio-economic context of the 
company (rate of unemployment, labour standards, the role of unions) and (d) the 
extent of the workforce’s engagement in the process of implementation of lean 
production systems.  
If that is the case, it may be argued that in the sponsor company the success of 
the production improvement intervention was a combination of the elements 
identified by Ferreira (2006). It is unlikely that the so-called Hawthorne effect took 
place in the department, as the observed hazards (such as items on the floor) were 
affected directly by the lean manufacturing improvements described above.  
Having discussed the potential reasons that affected the behaviours and 
hazards in the department, what affected the intervention must be considered. On the 
basis of the subject literature (see Chapter 2), the opinions of the experts described in 
the previous chapter (see Chapter 7, Study 2) and the researcher’s first-hand 
experience from the process of implementation, a number of plausible reasons that 
could account for the failure of the intervention might be provided. Zohar & Luria 
(2003) suggest that, in order to make an intervention successful, a manager should be 
involved to affect supervisory behaviours. Although this advice was applied and the 
departmental manager attempted to discuss with supervisors their progress, this 
method did not produce the expected results and the supervisors did not follow the 
process. In fact, the inclusion of the manager should not be crucial, as Zohar’s 
intervention (2002b) demonstrated that significant improvement of safety-behaviours 
and safety climate may be achieved without the engagement of the middle manager. 
The negative outcome suggests that there were other factors in the process of 
implementation that Zohar did not mention in his study.  
As mentioned in the section above - “Difficulties with the process of 
implementation” - supervisors struggled to follow both the production–related items 
and safety-related items. A number of speculative explanations may be offered with 
respect to why the supervisors did not follow the agreed process:  
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1. The departmental manager who was involved in the intervention was 
not convinced by the merits of the program and so did not use all of his 
influencing skills to engage supervisors.  
2. The departmental manager did not have the necessary skills to engage 
supervisors.  
3. The departmental manager did not have sufficient power to influence 
his supervisors.  
4. The supervisors did not think that the intervention could help, but for 
whatever other reason agreed to take it on board. According to Liker 
(2004), people taking part in an intervention, based on standardised 
work for leaders, must be convinced, in the first place, that elements 
put in the standardised work for leaders are important. Therefore the 
conclusion is that it is not enough to create a list of duties and ask 
supervisors and managers to follow it. An important factor is also their 
emotional engagement, understanding the importance of new tasks and 
valuing the outcome that certain behaviours on the list should bring.  
a. Based on the three years of the researcher’s experience of the 
company, it is plausible to suggest that the supervisors 
uncritically accepted the intervention and agreed to follow it, as 
it may be a common pattern of reacting to all new programs 
introduced by the corporation. In the qualitative analysis of the 
focus groups, the participants said that the corporation imposes 
a number of new initiatives on the company every year and they 
cannot refuse to accept it. However, there are no serious 
consequences for not following the introduced programs. Over 
a long period of time, such an approach could develop a pattern 
of behaviours whereby all new initiatives are accepted but not 
necessarily followed up.  
5. The manager and supervisors did not receive training on how to 
influence people positively and, as the analysis of the experts’ 
suggestions shows (see Chapter 7, study 2), providing training and 
providing opportunities to practice new skills is an important element 
of changing leader’s behaviours. Therefore, in this case, without 
training the impact was limited.  
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6. The process of redundancies affected the motivation and engagement 
of supervisors. 
7. Other priorities drew the attention of the manager and supervisors 
away from the intervention. 
These speculative explanations provide an overview of the factors that could 
affect the intervention. From the researcher’s personal experience of the company, 
point 4a appear to be the most plausible. However, it is not possible to evaluate the 
likelihood of the above-listed reasons due to the lack of relevant data. 
This complicated situation and discussion over the causes of the observed 
effects leads to a more generic problem of conducting research in organisation. The 
most common approach practiced by scientists is the administration of questionnaires 
in organisation. It can be done by visiting a company or even by sending surveys by 
post without visiting the place being studied. In the review of the advantages related 
to conducting research in organisations Rynes & McNatt (2001) found that 
approximately a quarter of surveyed authors (141 studies) did not spend any time at 
the organisation they were investigating. The limitation of that approach is the lack of 
insight into contextual variables. This thesis is an example of this problem. If the 
researcher had not been present at the company site for a long period of time, or had 
he just visited it from time to time, he might have attributed the observed change in 
behaviours to his intervention. By doing so he would have made a Type I error, 
concluding that the safety intervention had had an effect, when in fact there had not 
been one. This observation is consistent with the findings of Ryness & McNatt 
(2001). They concluded that “Increased on-site hours (of researchers) were 
associated with significantly greater personal learning, more surprising research 
findings (r = .24), greater likelihood of change implementation, and higher perceived 
quality of the resulting research—characteristics that have all previously been 
identified as factors associated with more significant research projects.”(p.17). 
If that is the case, it may be argued that a large proportion of organisational 
research may involve Type I or Type II errors, incorrectly inferring casual links, or at 
least not fulfilling their potential. From the scientific progress point of view, these 
studies, detached from the phenomena being studied, may contribute to the “scientific 
noise”, which means adding new findings (of questionable relevance) to the pool of 
results, and this process makes it more difficult to retain the results that adequately 
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describe the reality. The overall effect of this may be the slowing down of scientific 
progress.  
8.7. Critical findings  
1. Based on the conclusions from the process of application of the first 
intervention (see Chapter 7) and additional insights from the literature 
about the advantages of integrating a change program with existing 
management tools (see Chapter 8), it was decided to extend the 
Standardised Work for Leaders (SWfL) tools through the inclusion of 
safety-related elements. 
2. Based on discussions with the management and supervisors, a list of 
supervisory behaviours was established. The behaviours concerned 
verbal interactions between supervisors and shop-floor employees on a 
variety of topics related to safety e.g. reminding about safety rules or 
praising safe behaviour. The new behaviours were added to their SWfL 
list containing other, production-related routines. 
3. Supervisors were asked to go through the list at least three times a 
week, interact with at least seven shop-floor workers and deliver the 
evidence of their interactions to the researcher. 
4. Despite new, safety-focused supervisory behaviours having been added 
to the already existing management tool (SWfL), used on a daily basis 
to manage production-related supervisory and managerial routines, the 
method failed to motivate supervisors to follow the prescribed and 
agreed-upon instructions. The speculative explanations for this include 
the lack of managerial engagement, cultural assumptions that a new 
idea must be accepted but not necessarily executed, the lack of training 
provided to the supervisors and managers, or the process of ongoing 
redundancies.   
5. Nevertheless, in the experimental group a statistically significant 
improvement in safety behaviours was observed in the first month of 
the intervention compared to the base line. The improvements 
remained at a fairly constant level until the end of the intervention. In 
the experimental group there was also a statistically significant 
improvement in safety citizenship. In both groups, group-level and 
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organisation-level safety climate as well as job security declined but 
non-significantly. 
6. On the basis of the researcher’s access to contextualised information 
and knowledge about other initiatives undertaken by the company, it is 
argued that the reduced hazards and improved safety citizenship could 
be attributed to the production-improvement-focused intervention, 
implemented simultaneously with the researcher’s safety intervention, 
that reduced the amount of inventory in the department, improved the 
general cleanliness and engaged operatives actively to identify issues 
interfering with production. 
7. The deterioration of the safety climate scores was explained and 
predicted by the job security scores, which were predictably lower after 
the intervention due to the redundancies introduced by the company.  
8. The embedded approach to the research allowed avoiding of Type I 
error by having access to the information that is otherwise inaccessible 
to researchers investigating organisations while remaining detached 
from the phenomenon under study.  
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Chapter 9 
Discussion 
9.1. Safety culture assessment  
9.1.1. Overview 
The main goal of this thesis was to develop safety culture interventions based 
on the theoretical insights. The approach to intervention development was based on 
established theory and practice, and informed by grounded contextual insight. The 
approach broadly followed the recommendations of Galloway (2010). This author 
suggests seven steps to assess safety culture in companies: (a) review of 
documentation, programs and policies; (b) early communication with employees; (c) 
conducting a location walk; (d) discussion with leaders; (e) developing a bespoke / 
customised safety culture survey; (f) conducting focus groups with stakeholders; and 
(g) providing a report on actionable items (see also Kello, 2009; McDonald, Corrigan, 
Daly, & Cromie, 2000).  
While many studies in this domain are limited to either a quantitative or a 
qualitative approach, with by far the majority of studies reflecting the former (see Cox 
& Flin, 1998; Fitzgerald, 2005; Jeffcott, et al., 2006), authors such as Antosen (2009) 
have demonstrated the benefits of adopting a combined-methods approach. 
Antonsen’s approach was taken in this thesis for the process of safety culture 
assessment, especially the use of a mixed-methods design to generate complementary 
insights. In recognition of the potential advantages of a triangulated approach, 
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 offered an in-depth insight into how and in what ways a variety 
of salient variables affect safety culture in the sponsor company. The assessment of 
safety culture(s) was informed by a review of published material in the domains of 
risk taking at work, workplace safety culture / climate, organisational climate and 
organisational change literature.  
The qualitative and quantitative evidence collectively offered insight into not 
only what was important, but also into how the identified variables were important. 
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This insight was used to develop two safety culture interventions, each focused on 
leadership behaviour. One was based on a replication of Zohar’s work on the multi-
level leadership model (2002b), and the second one on an adaptation of Mann’s 
Standardised Work for Leaders model, a technique not previously applied within the 
safety domain (Mann, 2005).   
In general the investigative process described in this thesis may be divided 
into two parts: (a) assessment of safety culture; (b) development, implementation and 
evaluation of safety interventions. The first part is composed by Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
and the second part from Chapters 7 and 8. Therefore it was decided to structure the 
final discussion section according to this division. The research focused on the 
investigation of safety culture will first be discussed along with its limitations and 
conclusions, and the attempt to improve safety through the interventions will then be 
analysed.  
9.1.2. Assessment of safety culture 
Attempts to explore and assess safety cultures within the company were 
conducted in three complementary stages: (a) familiarisation with productive 
processes, procedures documentation, safety performance data and intervention 
history followed by shop-floor visits to each department, individual non-structured 
conversations with a cross-sectional sample of staff representing a wide array of job-
roles and functions across the company; (b) focus group discussions with a cross-
section of staff; and (c) workforce safety culture questionnaire. The order of the 
application of these methods allowed the careful development of insight into the main 
elements affecting employees’ perceptions and behaviour. The non-structured 
conversations helped with understanding the vocabulary used by employees, the tasks 
they performed and their perspectives of hazards and risk. This was valuable in itself, 
while also offering insight into topics that could be explored more rigorously in the 
focus groups and the safety culture survey. The primary limitation of the qualitative 
investigations related to issues of generalisability of the findings. The safety culture 
survey, built on the findings from the focus groups and individual interviews, offered 
an opportunity not only to calculate the distribution of responses but also to explore 
the differences between different groups.  
Separate analyses were conducted on the focus group and survey data, with a 
common objective of identifying component constructs, derived on the basis of a 
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thematic analysis and a factor analysis, respectively. These analyses reflected a high 
degree of commonality in terms of the nameable constructs identified, and their 
constituent facets / components (see Table 35).  
Table 35. Comparison of dimensions of safety culture derived from qualitative and 
quantitative evidence. 
Individual interviews Focus groups Safety culture questionnaire 
 Reactive approach Solving problems 
Leader’s people skills Leadership Leadership 
Reporting Reporting  
Breaking rules Breaking rules Risk taking 
Pressure Pressure  
Communication Communication  
Job security   
 Corporate identity  
 Training  
  Estrangement 
 
Common constructs from the three different trenches of data are highlighted in 
grey. Table 35 indicates that there are two dimensions that were common for all three 
studies: (a) leadership; and (b) breaking rules / risk taking. Time pressure was shared 
by both qualitative studies and reactive approach / solving problems was shared by 
focus groups and the questionnaire results.  
Table 35 shows that the application of three different methods to different 
samples of respondents yielded similar results. On the one hand this is a strong 
argument for the construct validity of the methods used; on the other hand, it shows 
the value of using a mixed-design approach. For example, with regard to “leadership,” 
participants in the individual interviews indicated that the people skills of leaders 
were important to them. This was explored and confirmed in the focus groups, where 
respondents highlighted issues regarding the lack of sufficient frequency of 
interaction with leaders as well as the inconsistency in their approach to safety rules 
enforcement. The focus groups also helped to understand in what ways these concerns 
affect employee attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety. Finally, the survey 
helped to confirm that this is a consistent dimension across departments (α=.87) 
explaining 14.8% of the variance in 2008. The measure also highlighted differences 
between departments, e.g. in 2008 employees from the ceramic core and alloy 
department exhibited the most positive perceptions of their leaders, while workers 
from the mould preparation and foundry departments had the most negative 
perceptions of their supervisors and managers.  
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With regard to the hazard / injury reporting theme, informal conversations 
with shop-floor employees and supervisors indicated that underreporting is a concern 
for them. Focus groups helped to clarify that reporting accidents and minor injuries / 
incidents are two separate issues, where resistance to report the former arises from the 
extensive paper work involved and the issue of blame, whereas unwillingness to 
report the latter comes from the lack of feedback and poor face validity of the 
reporting system.  
Risk taking is another common dimension. Negative behavioural norms 
amongst long-serving staff and leaders, turning a blind eye to infringements by 
leaders, the persistence of irrelevant / outdated safety rules, poorly designed 
equipment and production pressure were all cited as factors contributing to the 
reduction in the motivation of shop-floor employees to comply with safety rules and 
procedures. The relatedness of these components was confirmed by the Principal 
Component Analysis performed on the employee survey data, this variable explaining 
14% of the variance in 2008.  
Beyond these three factors there are two pairs of dimensions shared by 
qualitative work as well as focus groups and the survey. The reactive approach / 
solving problems, despite the different labels, appear to refer to the same 
phenomenon: employees’ perspective that supervisors and managers only engage with 
hazards and safety issues following an incident / near-miss, and are not responsive to 
employee concerns. The employee focus groups revealed high levels of frustration 
and demotivation to engage with safety issues due to what was perceived to be a 
reactive approach to safety on the part of managers and supervisors. The survey 
evidence appeared to confirm the salience of this dimension, which was found to 
explain 13.8% of the variance in 2008. The scale also revealed significant variance 
between departments, with effect size of differences ω2=.040 in 2008.  
A communication dimension was also identified in both qualitative studies. 
Qualitative findings highlighted an array of facets of communication in terms of 
linkages with employee safety performance, and specifically: feedback from manager 
over safety concerns raised by employees, the profile of safety issues at staff meetings 
and the quality of the safety information passed on at shift handovers. Questionnaire 
items related to communication were scattered around different factors. The Principal 
Component Analysis did not isolate communication as a separate component. 
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There are also four dimensions identified by particular methods and not 
confirmed by others. Individual interviews indicated “job security” as a concern. In 
2007 in individual interviews employees expressed their concern that in the case of an 
economical downturn they may lose their jobs. That became a prophecy, as in 2008 
the company started a redundancy program. Focus group results indicated that 
“training” may be a serious limitation for strong safety performance, as new comers 
did not receive sufficient on-the-job training on the risks associated with their tasks. 
The focus group results also suggested that “corporate identity” was a factor affecting 
management to a large degree, mostly in a negative way, due to the leadership style of 
the corporate representatives, who tended to impose tasks on the local managers 
without consultation or analysis of that available resources. Finally, an 
“estrangement” factor was extracted from the survey data (α=.70) explaining 9.9% of 
the variance in 2008. The effect size for the differences between departments was 
ω2=.026 in 2008. 
The fact that the safety culture dimensions differ to some extent appear to be a 
natural effect of applying different methods to research the same phenomena. For 
example, Lee (1998) used focus groups in the nuclear power station to develop a 
safety survey. The PCA analysis produced 19 factors that aligned with only five out 
of the seven themes identified in his focus group analysis. The potential for a 
discrepancy between qualitative and quantitative results was also empirically 
confirmed by Sackmann (1991), who suggested a compromise between using 
interviews and questionnaires after the consideration of the limits of both methods. 
The differences in the findings stemming from the application of different methods 
appear to be inevitable and are caused by the limitations of particular methods and 
methodologies (see Chapter 3), the imperfections of the researcher and the 
extraordinary complexity of the researched phenomenon (including work environment 
and the human element) (Shipman, 1997).  
All of the identified themes - irrespective of the method of the investigation 
applied - have already been acknowledged in previous research. Possibly the most 
extensive coverage was devoted to the “leadership” dimension (Hahn & Murphy, 
2007; Hayes, et al., 1998; Prussia, et al., 2003) (for a full list see Chapter 5). 
Similarly, elements relating to “hazard / incident reporting” are already reported in 
Edmondson (1996), Fung, et al., (2005), and others; “risk taking and rule breaking” in 
Lawton (1998) and Mohamed (2003); “reactive approach” in Fleming & Lardner 
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(2002a) and Marais, et al., (2006); “communication” in Berends (1996) and Cox & 
Cheyne (2000); “job security” in Probst (2003) and Probst & Brubaker (2001); 
“training” in Diaz-Cabrera, et al., (2007) and Lawrie, et al., (2006); and 
“estrangement” in Cummings & Manring (1977) and Efraty, et al. (1992).  
The only dimension not found in the literature but identified in the focus 
groups was the “corporate identity” (see Chapter 5). It is perceived as a very 
contextualised aspect stemming from the recent take over of the company by a large 
multinational corporation.  
Although the majority of identified constructs have previously been identified 
in the subject literature, the composition of elements is unique to this study. A number 
of attempts has been made to establish a universal model of safety culture (Clarke, 
2000; Farrington-Darby, et al., 2005; Seo, et al., 2004) but the transparent 
inconsistency in the findings, beyond a small number of core variables: “management 
commitment, “supervisor commitment” and “compliance with rules” raises questions 
over the logic and credibility of this endeavour (see Chapter 2). An alternative 
perspective is that different variables with different emphasis / relative importance 
between different workplaces (possibly within the same organisation) should be 
expected, i.e. combinations of cultural dimensions may depend strongly on contextual 
variables in different workplace contexts (Guldenmund, 2000). In this sense the 
current study research confirms the findings from the literature in appearing to 
identify a set of variables that reflect findings from other studies, but with a structure / 
relative salience of its own.  
It is held that the value of this study lies not in confirming or refuting the 
results in the literature, but in offering a contextualised understanding of the work 
environment and of the employees’ safety-related perceptions.   
9.1.3. Alternative strategies 
With regard to alternative research designs that could have been applied, it 
would have been possible to change the order of application of methods. Some 
researchers (e.g. Donald & Young, 1996; Fitzgerald, 2005), for example, advocate 
using an established safety culture survey in the first instance and exploring the 
results with employees through focus groups. A strength is said to be the insight that 
can be derived from the contextualised discussion and articulation of issues. This 
approach is more time-efficient as it does not require the analysis of qualitative 
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material in order to develop a contextualised safety culture survey. However, a 
potential disadvantage of that approach, as Galloway (2010) notes, is that using a 
generic off-the-shelf survey may contribute to overlooking important elements of 
culture that are specific to a particular organisation. Although at the time of 
configuring the research design the researcher was aware of this alternative, it was 
argued that beginning the research with less structured qualitative work would have a 
two-fold advantage: contextualising the understanding of the local culture from the 
very beginning and helping the researcher to develop his own understanding of the 
concept of safety culture and its constituent elements in the company.  
A further alternative considered was to apply participant observation 
techniques as part of an ethnographic approach, at least in the initial stages of the 
study. Although there are a number of advantages of an ethnographic approach in 
terms of its potential to produce highly detailed insights into the behaviour of 
employees and the underlying rationale and underpinning orientations, a disadvantage 
is that it is highly labour-intensive, raises questions over the generalisability of 
findings due to the inevitably small sample and, more pragmatically, there are 
obstacles to securing senior management permission to gain access to employees at 
this level.  
With regard to alternative methods of data analysis for the qualitative data 
gathered, a number of concurrent methods of analysis of verbatim data exist. 
Thematic analysis was chosen over narrative analysis, interpretative 
phenomenological analysis, grounded theory, content analysis or discourse analysis as 
it offered the outcome most suitable for the development of the planned safety culture 
questionnaire, which in turn, informed the decisions over the selection of topics and 
departments for intervention.  
Finally, with regard to alternative methods of quantitative assessment and 
characterisation of safety cultures, there is an abundance of questionnaires available in 
the literature. The researcher found more than 40 measures published. However, it 
was decided to build one based on qualitative insight to ensure a high level of 
embeddedness of items in the company’s context. The adopted strategy turned out to 
be successful, as the five-factor solution that was derived explained 55% of the 
variance in 2008 and 60% in 2009.  
Chapter 9 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 242 
 
9.1.4. Limitations 
The study has a number of limitations. First, the sample used in each method 
was limited and does not allow for the generalisation of the findings to the population. 
Individuals for unstructured interviews were chosen on the basis of their availability, 
rather than in any systematic or random fashion, and at times the researcher was 
guided in terms of who to talk to by members of the Health and Safety team. The 
focus groups involved five of the largest production departments, based on the 
assumption that the participants would represent the perspectives of the functions that 
employed the most people on the site. However, smaller departments were omitted. 
With regard to both qualitative studies, a further limitation relates to the lack of a 
second coder with whom a similarity of attributed codes and definitions could be 
compared and correlated (Shadish, Cook, & Coampbell, 2002). 
With regard to the quantitative measure, the response rate to the safety culture 
survey was modest: 43% in 2008 and 35% in 2009. On the one hand it covered less 
than half of the workforce; on the other hand, in order to calculate statistical 
differences only large departments with ±20 people were chosen, offering insight into 
only a limited number of divisions. Therefore smaller groups were not involved and 
hence the scope for understanding the sub-cultures of small departments was limited.  
Something of a holy grail in safety culture arena is demonstrating a connection 
between employee survey data and accident rates. As demonstrated in the literature 
review (see Chapter 2), consideration was given to correlate the obtained results with 
an injury rate. However, due to the anonymous character of surveys (see Campbell, 
Vasquez, Behnke, & Kinscherff, 2009), individuals from this research could not be 
linked to their injury record from the organisational database. Therefore it was not 
possible to establish a link between employees’ perceptions of safety and their injury 
rate.  
Moreover, it is possible that all data gathered from respondents could suffer 
from the evaluation apprehension bias, in which researched individuals claimed that 
safety is better than it really is due to their fear of being identified. However, such 
effects should be minimised due to the fact that no personal data were gathered at any 
stage of research. Alternatively, it might be argued that, as the company was going 
through a protracted process of ongoing redundancies over the period of 2008-2010, 
those respondents who were concerned over their job security might have been 
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motivated to present safety as worse than in reality, as a form of expressing their 
dissatisfaction with the company (see Williams, 2009). Ultimately it is not possible to 
provide a definitive answer on this issue. 
9.1.5. Construct validity 
There are two aspects of this study related to construct validity. The first one is 
related to the concept of safety culture in general and the second one to the properties 
of the qualitative and quantitative measures. Regarding the first, a literature review 
was conducted in the first instance to ensure that this research would be aligned with 
the established research tradition in this domain in order to maximise its potential to 
contribute to established insights. Furthermore, a multi-methods design was applied in 
order to avoid previously identified limitations attributable to mono-method bias (see 
Shadish, et al., 2002). The second aspect will be divided into two parts: qualitative 
and quantitative. 
Validity of qualitative tools 
A number of techniques were undertaken to satisfy the validity criteria 
proposed by Lincoln & Guba (1985). In order to establish the “credibility” criterion of 
the qualitative research (labels used originally by the authors), “prolonged 
engagement”, “persistent observation”, “triangulation” and “peer debriefing” 
techniques were applied. The first one is “prolonged engagement”. The authors 
suggest that the researcher should be engaged in exploring a problem for a relatively 
long time in order to become intimately familiar with it. In the case of this thesis, 
being seconded to the sponsor’s plant allowed exactly that – emergence in the context. 
The authors also recommend using different research methods, a process called 
“triangulation” (see Chapter 3), in order to enhance the findings. That was achieved 
by conducting individual and group interviews. Finally, reviewing the research with 
peer researchers, “peer debriefing”, offered additional insight into the process of 
research. In order to establish “transferability,” an extensive description of the results 
was offered (see Chapter 5). To comply with the “confirmability” standard, 
“triangulation” and “audit trail” (showing all steps taken in the analysis) were applied 
(see Chapter 5). In order to comply with the “dependability” standard, an external 
audit of the analysis process and of the results was conducted by academic experts 
(N=2). Furthermore, the “methodological coherence” (see Barret, Mayan, Morse, 
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Olson, & Spiers, 2002) was ensuring that the research method addressed the research 
question directly. With regard to the appropriateness of the sample (Barret, et al., 
2002), it may be argued that the individuals being interviewed on the shop floor did 
not constitute a representative sample of the company’s employees, as they were 
chosen on the basis of convenience. However, the participants of the focus groups 
were drawn from the largest departments, and it is argued that the findings from those 
group discussions are very likely to represent fairly the views of general population of 
employees.  
Validity of the quantitative tool 
The validity of the safety culture questionnaire was assessed to a limited 
extent. The face validity / coherence of items was assessed through appraisal by and 
discussion with safety experts – members of the sponsor company’s safety department 
- (N=4), academic experts (N=2) and a sample of employees during the pilot study 
(N=10). Content validity was further assessed by a) comparing the generated items 
with items of other safety surveys published in the literature, b) comparing the 
devised factors with safety culture dimensions reported in the literature, and c) by 
comparing it with safety climate and safety culture definitions.  
The factor scales derived from the survey data statistically differentiated 
between departments and functional positions, providing some support for the 
concurrent validity; however, as no accident data could be linked to the survey data, it 
was not possible to establish whether the survey results differentiate groups according 
to the injury rate.  
Discriminant validity (evidence that the developed measure is not related with 
measures it should not be related to) was not calculated due to the lack of appropriate 
data as measures not related to safety climate were not used in the study.  
9.1.6. External validity 
Questions might be raised over the generalisability of the results of the safety 
culture survey beyond the study organisation. The data obtained provided information 
about employees’ concerns related to safety, its consequence on their motivation as 
well as morale and its distribution across departments. The findings are composed by 
a set of constructs that mirror those found elsewhere. However, their combination and 
salience relative to the other factors that other studies have found – combined with the 
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general observation that there is notable variability between studies in the array of 
identified constructs - limits the utility of the findings in terms of viewing them as a 
set of universal constructs. Rather, these are the key constructs in this context.  
9.1.7. Practical utility of outcomes 
The comprehensive assessment of the company’s safety culture has a number 
of valuable benefits. First, it offers the company an understanding of the two types of 
insight of employees’ orientations, namely, attitudes and behaviours related to safety. 
The survey results offer a profile of what were believed to be a range of key variables 
affecting safety culture across the organisation and permitted an examination of 
testable differences between a range of demographic groupings, e.g. by job role or by 
department. The qualitative evidence provided detailed information about aspects of 
shared concerns and their impact on employees’ attitudes and behaviour.  
Taken collectively, the qualitative and quantitative insights allow the 
development of specific changes to address safety culture in the organization, in 
essence a contribution to organisational learning. Moreover, a comprehensive 
approach to the discovered issues may potentially improve the safety culture of the 
company and, assuming a linkage between culture and injury rate, reduce the number 
of injuries and accidents. The results offer a guide for the development of a short-term 
and a long-term improvement plan that in the long run could help to drive the safety 
culture of the company in a more positive direction.  
Moreover, the results indicated that there is a strong positive and negative 
impact of the corporation on both the leadership and general safety in the plant. The 
obtained findings may help the corporate leaders to devise a strategy of reinforcing 
the positive impact it has and of diminishing the negative effect it has, especially on 
the leadership style of the company which in turn affects employees.  
It is worth emphasising, however, that addressing the majority or all of the 
revealed problems requires substantial resources, both human and financial, and these 
could not have been offered by this research or the researcher himself. It was not the 
aim of this thesis to develop comprehensive strategic plans for the company, but to 
develop and apply an intervention.  
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9.2. Evaluating interventions 
9.2.1. Overview 
Due to the limited resources, not all safety-related concerns assessed by the 
interviews, group discussions and culture survey could be addressed. In that context it 
was decided to focus on a single but potentially influential factor affecting safety 
culture: leadership. The literature was reviewed in order to identify published 
interventions focused on that aspect of organisational performance. This revealed that 
the safety-related evidence base on changing management behaviours is sparse; 
however, Zohar & Luria (2003) report very positive results. It was therefore decided 
to attempt to replicate this technique. The method is based on upward feedback 
(subordinates reporting on their immediate superior). A variation was to link this with 
the findings of Day (2000), which highlight the merits of a broader perspective of 
feedback from multiple sources, i.e. the 360-degree feedback technique, widely used 
outside the safety domain. In order to evaluate the potential impact of the intervention 
a number of measures related to leaders’ effects on safety culture were chosen and 
planned to be applied before and after the implementation of the intervention. 
Additionally, to measure the impact of the intervention on safety conditions and shop-
floor workers an observational checklist was devised. A number of steps were 
undertaken to communicate the incoming initiative, including poster communication, 
meeting with management and discussions with blue-collar workers. The management 
and shop-floor workers agreed to participate.  
The mechanism on which this intervention relied were the principles of 
cognitive bias, which assigns greater weight to short-term results (e.g. time gained 
after a shortcut or PPE-related discomfort) than long-term (e.g. longer exposure to the 
hazard) when choosing alternatives for behaviour (Barron & Erev, 2003). The unsafe 
behaviour, which infrequently and rarely causes injuries or accidents, immediately 
reinforces the unsafe behaviour. The managerial task is to outweigh these benefits. 
Zohar & Luria  (2003) suggest using short-term rewards as a part of the ABC 
(Antecedents-Behaviour-Consequences) framework.  
Zohar’s approach is based on the behavioural approach that suggests 
modifying antecedents and consequences in order to modify particular behaviours. 
However, he innovated by claiming that the antecedents and consequences for shop-
floor workers can be delivered by supervisors and that, in order to engage them, 
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middle managers must play a similar role by providing relevant antecedents and 
consequences. Zohar also claims that these safety-related supervisory behaviours are a 
key influence in defining the safety climate, which in turn is related to the rate of 
micro-injuries (Zohar, 2002a).  
Despite attempts to enhance ownership of the intervention amongst 
supervisors and shop-floor workers (see Chapters 7), after the second week of the 
intervention the shop-floor employees ceased to complete feedback forms and, as the 
intervention was based on their feedback, it had to be stopped.  
The discrepancy between the success of Zohar’s study and this one was 
significant. Despite following most of Zohar’s recommendations, the intervention 
failed. It was decided to explore this discrepancy. To this end a sample of shop-floor 
workers and supervisors were interviewed and the findings were discussed with a 
panel of experts (safety practitioners) who had extensive practical experience and 
theoretical knowledge of the subject.  
Four intervention participants agreed to discuss their experience with the 
implementation process: two supervisors and two shop-floor workers. They indicated 
that low trust towards managers and the researcher, their role definition, face validity, 
negative past experiences, non-transparent communication and alienation were the 
factors that affected their motivation to participate.  
Furthermore, the interviews with experts coming from a variety of 
backgrounds, including academics, internal safety managers, external safety 
consultants and leadership coaches suggested that more factors ought to be taken into 
consideration before the implementation of any program than Zohar’s study 
suggested. These included a strong recognition of leaders’ motivations and 
contextualising the intervention. The experts suggested a number of practical steps to 
apply before and during the intervention, including the types of questions to ask, the 
content of the training sessions and meetings, ways of auditing safety and culture, and 
the best ways to cooperate with junior management and shop-floor workers (for a full 
review, see Chapter 7).  
Following the lessons learned from the failed intervention and experts’ advice, 
supported by the relevant literature on the need to merge new change programs with 
the pre-existing working style in companies (see Chapter 8), it was decided to make 
an attempt to develop a second intervention in a different department. The research 
design was similar to the previous one: pre-test / post-test evaluation with the 
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inclusion of a control group, using the same efficiency assessment methods. However, 
the intervention mechanism was different this time. Although still focused on 
leadership, it used a pre-existing company tool used to ensure supervisory compliance 
with the required production-related tasks. The tool - called Standardised Work for 
Leaders - was extended by safety elements focusing on interactions about safety 
between supervisors and shop-floor workers. The intervention lasted six months and 
the observational measure indicated a significant improvement of safety performance 
during the intervention compared to the baseline (p<.05, ω2=.28). However, it is 
debatable whether the improvement may be attributed to the intervention itself, as 
supervisors followed the agreed instructions to a minimal extent. Moreover, at the 
same time a production-focused intervention was being applied in the experimental 
group. With regard to success measures, only one additional safety citizenship 
behaviour resulted in significant improvement (p<.05, r=.31) after the intervention 
compared to the baseline. The intervention did not result in the improvement of safety 
climate, neither at the organisational nor group level.  
Zohar’s intervention is unique in the sense of applying a very structured 
approach to the behaviour modification of supervisors. This approach stands in 
opposition to methods dominating the field, which are focused more on general 
leadership development rather than on strictly changing certain types of behaviours 
(see Lyons, 2006; Ryan, 2008; Van Velsor, McCauley, & Ruderman, 2010). The 
leadership development programs are more generic, focused on improving skills and 
knowledge and on developing self-awareness in the relationship with co-workers. 
They also usually take a long time to complete or are only based on one-off event e.g. 
classical 360-degree feedback (ibid.). Moreover, the majority of such programs are 
targeted at middle and junior managers (ibid.) and not supervisors. The supervisors, in 
most cases, receive training on specific skills. Behavioural analysis is also applied to 
the management representatives, as suggested by Krause (2005), but no paper was 
found by the researcher describing the application and evaluation of that method.  
9.2.2. Barriers to implementation 
Although two different tools were used with every intervention (360-degree 
feedback and Standardised Work for Leaders) and despite the fact that the second 
intervention lasted six months, the implementation of both initiatives encountered 
some barriers - very rapid and unexpected ones for the first program and more subtle 
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for the second one. The first intervention participants indicated that they refused to 
provide regular feedback because they felt threatened by a combination of elements. 
Concerns over being identified and punished for expressing opinions about 
management dominated the conversation. Participants felt that they could be 
identified on the basis of their opinion. In small groups working together for a number 
of years all group members know who holds particular attitudes. Therefore 
participants were convinced that they do not have to put their name on the forms to be 
recognised; it was enough to see their scores. Additionally, they did not trust the 
researcher to keep the feedback forms safe, as they had trusted external consultants in 
the past and had been disappointed. They also felt disappointed by the management 
and preferred avoiding any engagement to avoid a repetition of the past. They also did 
not clearly understand what this intervention was for and were afraid it may have a 
detrimental effect on their work. Unfortunately the intervention also took place during 
the redundancies process, which reinforced fears over being made redundant. In their 
perception it was better not to risk expressing any opinions about the management. 
These were very contextual variables specific to their department.  
The second intervention, which took place in a very different operational unit, 
had a dissimilar profile and so the barriers were different. The initiative in the 
cleaning department did not directly engage shop-floor workers but was more focused 
on close cooperation between supervisors and a manager. The direct obstacle to the 
implementation process was the attitude of supervisors, who pledged their support and 
cooperation but did not keep their promises. It created a serious challenge for 
cooperation, as every week they provided a number of reasons explaining their lack of 
engagement and insisted that next week everything would go according to the plan. 
This impasse lasted for the whole period of the intervention. In theory their manager 
should review their progress with the supervisors, but although he tried, he was 
unsuccessful. The main argument provided by supervisors was the lack of time and 
pressure to focus on other things. However, it was noted that they also struggled to 
follow up with other elements related to production processes from their standardised 
list. There were a number of hypotheses for why this happened and they are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 8.  
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9.2.3. Alternative strategies 
With regard to changing the improvements of the intervention programs, they 
could benefit from providing training to supervisors and managers on interacting with 
shop-floor workers - specifically, on how to give positive feedback without 
embarrassment and how to provide negative feedback without blame or aggression. A 
number of training types could be considered, but possibly the one based on role play 
could be very relevant to this situation (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008).  
With regard to the safety interventions in general the number of alternative 
interventions was infinite. A number of other elements of the assessed safety culture 
could also be addressed. However, the main point supporting the chosen interventions 
stems from research showing that leadership has the biggest impact on safety culture.  
However, based on the knowledge and experience developed during the three 
years of this doctoral studentship, the researcher would approach the whole 
intervention differently. Instead of finding a method in the literature, an in-depth 
interview with the plant manager and corporate safety directors would be conducted 
in the first instance to understand their priorities and needs as well as the interpretive 
framework that they apply to create the meaning of the current situation. 
Understanding their top three priorities and their relevance to safety would be the 
most important basis for the development of intervention foundations. Following that, 
an informal conversation with a sample of employees from different departments and 
functional positions would be held to probe their past experiences, level of trust 
towards management, strength of estrangement, communication and safety needs. A 
relationship with the Union would be established very early to understand their past 
experiences in change implementation programs. However, the next steps would 
strongly depend on the findings. It could be coordinating groups responsible for 
particular safety-related projects or improving safety policies, focusing on the three 
main behaviours responsible for the majority of injuries or executive coaching. The 
answer to what has to be improved and how would directly depend on the context of 
the company.  
Furthermore, behavioural analysis could have been conducted to understand 
the antecedents and consequences that were reinforcing supervisory and managerial 
reluctance to follow the agreed instructions. That could have possibly helped to alter 
them and make the intervention more successful.  
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The challenges faced during the implementation of safety culture interventions 
are similar to other interventions in organisational settings. There is a body of 
literature on the subject of organisational / occupational stress and health 
interventions that struggle with the process of implementation and evaluation of 
interventions.  
There are a number of papers that discuss the factors responsible for the 
successful implementation of health-related interventions, but similarly to the safety 
culture literature, there is little agreement on what is required. For example, one group 
of researchers (NytrØ, Saksvik, Mikkelsen, Bohle, & Quinlan, 2000; Saksvik, Nytrø, 
Dahl-Jørgensen, & Mikkelsen, 2002) identified four important ingredients: 1. Social 
climate of learning from failure, 2. Multi-level participation and negotiations, 3. 
Insight into tacit behaviours that could undermine interventions, and 4. Roles and 
responsibilities during and after the period of intervention. Nielsen, Randall, & 
Albertsen (2007) suggested that the participants’ positive appraisal of an intervention 
is a determinant of success. However, the authors noted that the same intervention 
may be perceived differently by different employees within the same intervention 
group, by different groups or in different organisational settings. Biron, Gatrell, & 
Cooper (2010) added changing organisational context, low ownership of stakeholders 
and flaws in the intervention design, and Weiner, Lewis, & Linnan (2009) even 
developed a theory of implementation and listed even more variables, such as 1. 
Organisational readiness for change, 2. Implementation policies and procedures, 3. 
implementation climate,  and 4. fit with values. 
Jointly with the variables affecting intervention implementation identified in 
this thesis, this gives a long list of things to consider. Analysing the list of factors 
supporting the effective implementation of organisational change, it may be 
concluded that there is no agreement regarding the factors. Every study highlighted a 
different set of variables. All the variables listed in the health-related literature differ 
from the variables identified in this Ph.D. thesis. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this. As this Ph.D. research demonstrated, context is of crucial importance, 
shaping the process of implementation and possible outcomes. Therefore, as all of the 
aforementioned studies were conducted in different organisations, the process of 
implementation and barriers were potentially different. If the details of context affect 
the intervention implementation, it may not be possible to develop a blueprint of 
instructions discussing how to implement and intervention in any organisation. An 
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alternative explanation is that there is no developed theory of intervention 
implementation that could help with the interpretation of the process of 
implementation. Yet another explanation may refer to the limitations of the evaluation 
process. If qualitative methods are used, then the analysis is conducted on words and 
meanings shared by the interviewees, which will differ between different groups. If 
that was the case, possibly a large number of studies could help with identifying 
variables common to the majority of studies. That could also help in the development 
of a theory.  
However, independently of the aforementioned explanations, there is another 
limitation to the aforementioned studies and identified barriers to implementation – 
the usefulness of this knowledge in the process of the implementation. The list of the 
variables affecting the process of implementation appears to be a list of ‘what’ to do, 
not ‘how’ to do it. For this reason practitioners could potentially ask in what way 
having that list of variables could help with the implementation. The answer could be: 
by addressing these variables. But this answer still does not suggest how to address 
them. The community of researchers has recognised the need for developing ‘how’ 
and the description of many attempts have been offered mainly through suggestions 
on how to advance the process of evaluation of intervention and decode the so-called 
‘black box’ and focus on the process rather than on the outcome. Cox, Karanika, 
Griffiths, & Houdmont (2007, p. 353) defined process as “the flow of activities; 
essentially who did what, when, why and to what effect”. However, the current 
attempts to describe ‘how’ are still describing ‘what’. For example, Nilsen (2007), in 
an attempt to describe ‘how’ to implement interventions, suggests a process that 
includes securing resources, delivering programme components, ensuring exposure to 
the programme and including the context. However, the process suggested by Nilsen 
appears to be a list of different variables, suggesting ‘what’ rather than ‘how’.  
Two different studies used process evaluation techniques better to understand 
why interventions succeed or fail.  Nielsen, Fredslund, Christensen, & Albertsen 
(2006) tried to understand why the same intervention applied in different working 
groups resulted in different outcomes. The authors used mixed-methods research to 
evaluate a health improvement intervention in Dutch canteens. The reasons they 
found were very contextual and specific to different groups. Some reasons for failure 
pointed out by the researchers were related to the confusion of roles and 
responsibilities, lack of cooperation between the two canteens, replacement of the 
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leading project manager, organisational changes unrelated to the intervention, change 
fatigue, conflicts between employees, other ongoing interventions, different 
leadership styles of canteen managers, and limited management support. Furthermore, 
on the basis of the interviews they conducted, they questioned whether the observed 
changes were due to the intervention itself or to managers who wanted to initiate 
similar changes anyway.  
The authors indicated that they listed the most important barriers, suggesting 
that there were other elements affecting the process not described in the article. If the 
researchers had known about these barriers before the implementation of their 
intervention, would this have prevented it from happening? This is a very important 
question about the potential usage of knowledge about the implementation barriers. If 
they had known that there was a conflict between employees that consumed a lot of 
energy and attention, would they have been able to remove it? This is a somewhat 
rhetorical question without an answer, but it highlights a very important problem – 
how to use the information from the research.  The translation of ‘what’ into ‘how’ 
may be potentially the biggest challenge for the scientists investigating the 
effectiveness of intervention implementations. In that sense the results of the research 
in the health-related arena are similar to the results of this Ph.D. study. Even the 
attempts to understand the barriers preventing the implementation success do not 
provide answer on ‘how’ to prevent it from happening in the future. From the 
experience of the researcher it may be worth exploring the skills that the change agent 
must demonstrate in order to be successful, but that would be a major change in the 
paradigm. 
9.2.4. Efficiency measures 
Furthermore, it would be ideal to link the behavioural observations of 
individuals with their safety climate and other related scores. That would allow the 
elucidation of the relationship between safety perceptions and behaviours. However, it 
could not be done due to the anonymity rule for occupational survey research 
(Campbell, et al., 2009).  
Also, with regard to alternative methods that could be used, there are plenty of 
them available in the subject literature. However, Zohar’s method was chosen as it 
solely focuses on leaders as a source of climate and refers to very specific behaviours 
that shape climate. Therefore it was argued that it would be the most relevant and 
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sensitive method in the context of implementing an intervention focused on 
supervisory behaviours. There could also be other methods used in addition to LMX 
and safety citizenship; however, that was limited by the administrative constraints 
such as the limited time of employees off the shop floor.   
Additionally, individual interviews could have been conducted with the 
participants of the second intervention in order to test the hypotheses about the lack of 
engagement of supervisors and managers and possibly gain additional understanding 
of the processes hidden from the researcher.  
Additional feedback from shop floor workers could also have been gathered in 
order to reflect the frequency of supervisory interactions with workers. However, 
there was an inherent risk involved that the blue-collar workers would behave 
similarly to the participants of the first intervention and refuse cooperation.  
9.2.5. Limitations 
Except the limitations related to the measurement tools described in the 
previous section of this discussion, there are a number of reliability concerns linked to 
the observational measure. Due to the lack of resources the inter-rater reliability could 
not be calculated and so the observational list was only assessed with regard to face 
validity.  
9.2.6. Threats to internal validity 
Campbel & Stanley (1963), Campbel (1969), and more recently Shadish, et al. 
(2002) offered an extensive discussion of the threats to the internal validity of 
interventions and some of them may be relevant to the second intervention described 
in Chapter 8. First, due to the constraints in selecting samples for the experimental 
and control groups, it may be argued that the qualities of individuals engaged in the 
intervention (blue collars) differed in both interventions in both groups and that 
difference was not controlled for. Furthermore, both groups had different leaders 
(supervisors and managers) and, as was demonstrated, it is the leaders who are 
responsible for shaping the culture that becomes a frame of reference for behaviours 
(Schein, 2004).  
Furthermore, during the second intervention in the experimental group there 
were other improvement programs being implemented, with special attention paid to 
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production flow, which is likely to have affected not only the production but also 
housekeeping (see the discussion in Chapter 7).  
9.2.7. External validity 
The generalisation of the findings is substantially constrained by the 
contextual factors that played a strong role during the process of implementation and 
affected internal validity: low motivation of supervisors, redundancies, using a pre-
existing management tool and the implementation of lean manufacturing. The 
combination of these elements limit the generalisability as it is unlikely that any other 
company would be in a similar situation. Furthermore, the small sample - two 
supervisors and one manager - does not allow generalisation.  
9.3. Interpretation 
The insights about the implementation process and the inquiry into the 
perspectives of intervention participants add valuable knowledge about the 
importance of context during the application of a change intervention. That is even 
more important in the light of the limited understanding of the process of 
implementation published in the literature. Papers describing safety improvement 
interventions offer limited insights into why what they did worked (e.g. Donald & 
Young, 1996; Fitzgerald, 2005; Rasmussen, et al., 2006). Moreover, as the word limit 
for scientific publication is restricted, it is not possible to tell the full story and 
describe the majority of the contextual variables affecting upon the effectiveness of 
the intervention (ibid.).  
The results of this research address these limitations. First, it allows a more 
comprehensive description of the context, which is additionally enhanced by the 
researcher’s presence in the sponsor company. It also helps to understand why the 
majority of change programs fail. Smith (2002) analysed 48 different types of change 
programs and concluded that the median success rate was 33%. Vinson, Pung and 
Gonzalez-Blanch (2006), on the basis of data from 1536 executives, concluded that 
fewer than 40% of attempts to introduce performance improvement programs were 
successful. These data show that despite six decades of research on organisational 
change (see Bridges, 1980; Jannsen, 1982; Lewin, Cartwright, & Argyle, 1952; 
Musselwhite, 2004; Spencer, 1990), the process of implementation has not been 
mastered. Additionally, there is still a lot of confusion with regard to establishing 
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what works and why, as there is very little agreement on what predicts a successful 
change (Anderson & Anderson, 2001; Cummings & Manring, 1977; Kotter & Cohen, 
2002; Olive, O'Connor, & Mannan, 2006).  
What this study shows is that the context is everything. The first unsuccessful 
intervention helped to understand what went wrong; the second strongly suggests that 
a multitude of improvements going on at the same time may influence the internal 
validity of any intervention. Each organisation has a unique history, properties that are 
temporal and stable in time, unique policies and procedures, and unique leadership. 
Even though the majority of studies suggest the crucial role of management 
engagement, contextual factors (like aging hourly workmen, as shown by Sim & 
Rogers, (2009)) may overburden even the most engaged management. Therefore it is 
argued that (a) understanding the subjective motivators of the workforce and (b) 
addressing related issues may be the main drivers winning the hearts and minds of 
employees. Obviously, the skill to listen and manage these difficulties is no less 
important.  
That above general conclusions stemming from this study appear to be 
supported by the recent study of McKinsey (Keller, Meaney, & Pung, 2010) on the 
sample of 2512 executive directors. The results indicate that, according to the senior 
managers, engaging employees collaboratively throughout the company and for the 
whole period of transformation was one of the most important predictors of success. 
Another predictor was related to the capabilities of leadership, who pay attention to 
personal concerns of employees, can recognise their mind sets and focus their 
attention on strengths rather than problems. The advantage of that study is the 
impressively large sample of executive directors, not often achievable in scientific 
studies. The limitation is that it was based on the subjective perceptions and not 
subject-independent evaluation. Nevertheless, their results are consistent with the 
recent evaluation of the effectiveness of 17 safety improvement projects in 29 
companies in the Netherlands (Hale, Guldenmund, van Loenhout, & Oh, 2010). Their 
results indicated that the most successful companies ensured the constructive dialogue 
between blue-collar workers and management, provided motivation to middle 
managers and strengthened learning loops in the safety management system.  
However, a question arises in that context relating to behaviour-based 
interventions. They rarely consider the opinions of blue-collar workers and focus 
strongly on managing resistance to a new program (Hopkins, 2006), despite the fact 
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that the research shows that this approach is quite effective (Krause, 1999). There are 
a number of possible answers to this question. First, there is international, 
intercultural variability in what people accept as standard. That point was indicated by 
one of the experts with experience of managing safety at sites in different countries 
(see Chapter 8, Study 2). Although research on applying the same intervention in 
different cultures is not known to the researcher, it may be possible that the culture of 
the U.S.A., where the majority of BBS programs are implemented (Krause, 1999), is 
different to the culture of the UK or other countries. Therefore, on the basis of the 
available evidence, we know that BBS programs are effective in the U.S.A. but we do 
not know about other countries. Furthermore, it is unknown what percentage of 
companies in which the BBS program failed declined to take part in the study. That 
questions the validity of the evaluation studies, as it is argued that the evaluation is 
based only on successful studies.  
Having a change method is not enough. There are a number of other factors 
that affect implementation and these must be known beforehand. This research helps 
better to understand what these factors are.  
9.4. Practical significance of the outcomes 
As the generalisability of these findings is very limited the results are 
significant mostly for the sponsor company. The first intervention study offers a 
number of themes that must be addressed in order both to: implement any new 
improvement intervention and improve cultural elements, allowing an increasingly 
mature response to safety management concerns. Moreover, it offers a step-by-step 
instructions on how to implement a program. The second study offered the 
understanding that having a method for change is not enough to engage key players if 
there is no internal motivation to participate. The conclusion from these findings is 
that the first stage before implementing any program at the middle-management level 
and below should be preceded by the in-depth analysis of the contextual factors, 
including personal motivators.   
The ANOVA analysis between functional positions showed that the perception 
of shop-floor workers differs from the perception of supervisors and that the 
perception of supervisors was more in line with the perception of managers. In 
Chapter 7 the regression showed that job insecurity predicts a more negative 
perception of the safety engagement of supervisors but not of top management. 
Chapter 9 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 258 
 
Maybe that is because job security affects supervisors as well; they focus more on 
production and spend less time on safety and that is clearly visible for workers 
whereas actions and behaviours, policies etc. do not easily change with redundancies. 
Therefore in times of redundancies even more effort should be expended on safety. 
9.5. Further Research 
The studies in this thesis revealed a number of areas that need further 
empirical investigation. The literature review identified the following areas requiring 
additional research:  
• The analysis of the behaviours of supervisors and managers showed 
that the behaviours of supervisors are much better understood than 
those of managers, so further research should focus on better 
understanding specific managerial behaviours and their impact on 
safety culture.  
• The analysis of safety culture interventions indicated that safety culture 
may be improved by providing training to senior leaders in 
transformational leadership (Mullen & Kelloway, 2009), so further 
research should focus on what type of training should be given to 
which groups, and under what conditions it is the most effective, as 
well as, in what national cultures it works and at what levels of safety 
culture maturity. 
• The conclusions of the first chapter suggest that safety culture research 
does not analyse the underlying assumptions and language as the 
researchers of organisational culture do, so this is another area for 
future research. 
• It remains unclear what mechanism underlies the linkage between 
safety climate and behaviours / injuries and whether the impact of 
safety climate is direct or mediated by other elements. 
The failure of the first intervention helped to understand what was blocking 
employees’ motivation to participate, but it did not provide insight on how to change 
it, although the interviews with experts shed some light on the process of “how” more 
research is needed in order to establish: 
• How to build or recover trust between managers and blue-collar 
workers. 
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• How to develop trust between blue-collar workers and a change agent. 
• How to redesign / modify role definitions held by employees. 
• How to overcome negative expectations stemming from past negative 
experiences with change programs. 
• How to communicate successfully in the context of a planned workers 
organisational change. 
• How to overcome the negative consequences stemming from 
alienation. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the general conclusions from this research 
suggesting that context is most important and that its elements should be addressed in 
the first instance, it is argued that further research on methods for improving safety 
culture should focus not on developing general tools but on developing the best 
methods that help deeply to understand the context of a particular company and on 
developing an understanding of what personal qualities of change agents and leaders 
at different levels of hierarchy affect employees’ perceptions.  
Despite the investigation into the first intervention participants’ motives and 
into the experience of practitioners with implementing change programs, the question 
of whether addressing all these elements would guarantee success remains 
unanswered. Furthermore, it is probable that the list of variables affecting the process 
of implementation listed on the basis of the interviews with change participants and 
experts is not complete. Therefore there may be yet other factors influencing the 
process of implementation.  
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Theme:  Psychology  
Project Title:  Developing effective safety culture interventions in the manufacturing 
sector  
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Host Institution:   Bath  
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Additional contribution 
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THE PROJECT  
Proposed Start Date :   01/12/2006  
Proposed Finish Date :  02/12/2009  
 
Project Description:  
Developing safety culture interventions in the manufacturing sector.  
Aim  
To play an active role in assisting the company to develop and implement 
effective workplace health and safety climate improvement interventions.  
Objectives  
To gain a detailed insight into variables that impact upon health and safety 
culture at the company. To conduct a comprehensive review of the published 
literature and expert understandings of successful workplace health and safety 
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interventions. Based upon an assessment of health and safety culture at the company; 
published findings and expert insights, provide advice and hands on assistance to the 
safety department to develop a bespoke set of interventions for the company. Develop 
measures for monitoring the effectiveness of safety climate interventions developed at 
the company. Provide an account of the intervention process and associated 
organisational learning.  
This applied study will explore latent influences on employee risk taking and 
risk management practice at the Sponsor Company. It will focus on developing 
sustainable risk management interventions, designed to bring about a measurable 
improvement in health and safety culture and reductions in work related ill health and 
accidents. It will build upon established insights from the safety culture / safety 
climate paradigm and broader insights from the organisational change and 
behavioural intervention literatures. To date, there have been very few rigorous 
studies that focus on how organisations go about developing interventions that 
enhance safety culture. The majority of academic activity in this area, while offering 
valuable insights into a range of variables said to define and impact upon safety 
culture, offers rather less on how and in what ways these variables are important. 
Insight at this level is needed before moving to the stage of developing and applying 
effective safety culture interventions.  
Work related ill health and occupational accidents constitute a significant cost 
to individuals, their families, employers and the wider community; moreover their 
reduction is a key component of the Government's public health and social exclusion 
agendas. (For further details please refer to 'Securing Health Together', Health& 
Safety Commission (HSC), July2000)  
The twentieth century witnessed major advances in standards of workplace 
health and safety, principally through material improvements in working conditions 
and the design of intrinsically less hazardous systems of work. Many safety 
professionals, academic researchers and the workplace health and safety regulator 
(HSC/E) consider that benefits from this approach have plateaued (Kennedy, 2004). 
As a consequence, over the last two decades, there has been an increased focus on 
employee behaviour, in particular aspects relating to non-compliance with safe 
practice and volitional risk taking.  
Largely due to the applied nature of the research need, i.e. real world 
(workplace) solutions, the focus for psychological research in this area has not been 
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on exploring individual differences, but upon social and cultural influences on 
employee behaviour. Individual difference research in this area has been effectively 
abandoned, due to the overwhelming evidence of the greater salience of social and 
cultural influences (Royal Society, 1992).  
What has become known as the 'safety culture / safety climate' paradigm 
focuses on normative influences on behaviour, specifically the “…beliefs, norms, 
attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices that are concerned with the 
exposure of employees, managers, customs and members of the public to conditions 
considered dangerous or injurious.” (Turner et al 1989). The key premise here is that 
though gaining an understanding of those variables that define and influence safety 
culture, workplace interventions can be developed that will engender change and 
improvement  
Understanding which variables are important and how they impact on 
behaviour in a given organisational context requires a probing and exploratory 
approach. Interventions designed to enhance health and safety performance also need 
to be culturally relevant and of good fit with the organisational context (Weyman et al 
2003 & 2006).  
Psychometric techniques have been widely applied in this area, with the 
purpose of discovering the universal set of variables that impact upon safety culture 
and climate. This somewhat theoretical body of work (Royal Society 1992) has 
reached a level of maturity and consensus over a range of constructs, including: 
leadership style, management commitment; practicability of rules / procedures and 
openness / blame (see Cox & Flin, 1998; Collins, 2002). Beyond these, notable 
viability has been found between organisations, both with regard to the constructs 
identified and the manner in which they operate. This finding highlights the need for 
research methodologies in this area to be focused on exploring contextual influences, 
particularly where the research aim relates to organisational interventions (Weyman et 
al 2006).  
The proposed study will build upon insights from previous safety culture work 
undertaken by Dr Weyman, in particular work in the mining industry and the railways 
sector. In the first instance a combined -qualitative and quantitative - methods, 
approach will be used to develop a detailed contextual insight into variables that 
impact upon and define the safety culture(s) at the sponsor company, and their relative 
strength. It is envisaged that this activity will involve individual depth interviews and 
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/ or focused group discussions with a cross section of personnel, as a precursor to the 
development of a staff survey measure. The latter will provide a benchmark of current 
performance and identify points of strength and weakness, and act as a point of 
comparison for assessing change over time. This data will also provide the initial 
basis for the consideration of interventions options. Formulation of the interventions 
themselves will draw upon published evidence of effectiveness and the review of 
expert / practitioner insights, combined within insights from the contextual data 
gathered at the sponsor company.  
An action research approach is envisaged, with the researcher embedded 
within the company safety department. The researcher will actively participate in the 
change process, by gathering qualitative and quantitative evidence to inform 
managerial decision-making, via the safety department, while at the same time 
gathering principally qualitative data on the organisational dynamics that surround the 
change process. In essence the sponsor company will go through a process of 
characterising and benchmarking its current practice, identifying salient influences on 
health and safety behaviour, devise and implement a bespoke set of intervention 
measures and monitor their effectiveness.  
The principal output from this research will be a detailed insight into and 
account of how work organisations might go about tacking safety culture issues, in 
particular the process of organisational learning associated with developing and 
implementing successful in-house interventions, i.e. what works and how do you 
make it happen. Findings from this research will be of relevance to industry, health 
and safety professionals; workplace regulators and academics.  
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Project Abstract: 
 
Developing effective safety culture interventions in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Workplace accidents and work related ill health negatively impact upon on the 
well-being of employees, their families and the wider community; impose costs and 
resource burdens on local health and social care services; and can threaten the future 
viability of employing organisations. Workplace accidents and ill health have been 
calculated to cost employer’s an average of£741.00 per employee per day.  
This study is about finding innovative ways to reduce employee risk taking at 
work and, by implication, the incidence of accidents / ill health and associated costs. 
Organisational psychologists from the universities of Bath and Plymouth are working 
with a local manufacturing company, providing expertise on human behaviour and 
behavioural change. The focus for this work is on developing initiatives that bring 
about measurable, sustainable improvements in workplace safety culture. A 
successful outcome will provide the opportunity for the participating business to 
become as a flagship organisation and exemplar of good workplace risk management 
practice for the region. The findings from this research will provide valuable insights 
to employers and health and safety practitioners, on effective strategies for reducing 
risk taking at work. It is intended that the findings from this work will be publicised 
across the South-West region using established knowledge transfer networks and 
business forums. It is also intended that the findings will be published in 
internationally recognised peer reviewed journals.  
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Alignment with proposed theme: 
This proposal talks to the theme of psychology, specifically the applied 
organisational psychology of workplace safety culture / climate.  
Notable debate exists over what is meant by the concepts of safety climate and 
culture, the extent to which they can be considered discrete, as well as over the range 
of variables that engender positive or negative influence (see Cox & Flin, 1998). With 
regard to those variables thought to impact upon organisational safety culture/climate, 
insights from previous research exhibit notable variability. However, there is almost 
universal agreement over the centrality of 'senior management commitment'. Other 
identified effects relate to: ‘leadership style’; 'supervisor commitment'; 'levels of 
workforce involvement; poor communication and feedback'; 'attitudes to hazards', 
‘performance pressure’; 'staff roles / responsibilities', 'compliance with rules / 
procedures' and the ‘prevalence of a 'blame culture'. This project will build upon the 
array of established insights from the safety culture / climate paradigm, taking these to 
the stage of developing workplace interventions, designed to bring about 
improvements in workplace performance.  
There have been very few studies of organisational learning and the 
organisational dynamics associated with addressing issues of safety culture. This issue 
was a key focus of recent safety culture work in the railway sector (Weyman et al, 
2006) and is also the focus for HSE funded work on the introduction of work related 
Stress Management Standards (Cox et al, ongoing). The action research approach 
proposed for the current study will aim to provide a richly patinated insight into these 
issues.  
An important theoretical issue in this area surrounds tensions between 
approaches focused on identifying universal latent constructs and, the smaller number 
of, more recent studies that have emphasised the need to take account of the cultural 
uniqueness of organisations. In short, the majority of studies to date have been 'top-
down' and, as a consequence, have been said to be methodologically a cultural. 
Further evidence of the need to take account of the specifics of organisational context 
is provided by the fact that while as many as 500 UK organisations are known to have 
used generic, off-the-shelf, psychometric staff survey measures, it seems that their 
safety culture initiatives tend to stagnate following analysis of the survey results. The 
use of generic question sets not only appears to limit the degree of contextual insight 
but, if used in isolation, at best, restricts this to the identification of 'which' variables 
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appear important, rather than the more salient issues of 'why' and 'in what way'. 
Experience has demonstrated that a detailed insight into issues of why and in what 
way is critical when devising appropriately framed, contextually relevant remedial 
interventions (Weyman, et al 2006). The combined methods approach proposed for 
the current study will bring the methodological benefits of a grounded approach to 
explore potentially important contextual variables, linked with traditional quantitative, 
survey based, approaches to test the relative strength of associations. Quantification is 
also necessary to provide a benchmark of performance and point of comparison 
against which to assess impact.  
Nature of the proposed collaboration: 
Assuming a successful application to GWR for funding, the studentship will 
be advertised in the national and academic press. The sponsor company will be 
invited to participate in the interview process, and no appointment will be made 
unless all panel members are satisfied that the selected candidate possesses the 
necessary skills and aptitude to undertake the work. It is envisaged that the researcher 
employed on this project will be based, for at least two thirds of the three-year study 
period, at the sponsor company site. A high level of contact between the researcher 
and the sponsor company is considered essential in view of the subject matter and 
proposed methodology for this studentship.  
The outputs from the research and the benefits to the sponsor company will be 
greatly enhanced through the researcher developing a detailed insight into the 
organisation and its working practices. It is considered that the most effective means 
of achieving this would be to embed the researcher within the safety team at the 
sponsor company, such that he/she operates as an integral part of that team. 
Agreement has been secured for this approach. Although the researcher may 
foreseeably become involved in the general activity of safety department, particularly 
where this would contribute to his/her understanding of the organisation and the 
approach to risk management, he/she will be focused on the process of identifying and 
developing a range of safety culture improvement interventions.  
The academic supervisors will provide direction to the researcher on the 
design of the interventions, performance measurement and a degree of technical 
support / advice to the sponsor company on safety climate and related human factors 
issues. There will be formal quarterly meetings between at least two of the supervisors 
Mr Effer, Head of Quality, and Mr Turner, Head of Safety at the sponsor company, to 
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assess progress. This will be supplemented by contact between one or more 
supervisors and Mr Turner by telephone or e-mail at least once per month to assess 
progress.  
 
Is the research linked with  
other GWR studentship  
applications?:    Yes 
 
Please outline the links with other GWR applications 
 Dr Hellier is a proposed second supervisor on additional GWR application 
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Making Electronic Shared Work Spaces\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" led by Professor Jan 
Noyes at the University of Bristol.  
The supervision team have worked in the Applied Psychology field for many 
years and have a range of regional contacts who will enrich and help disseminate the 
proposed research. These include; Human Engineering Ltd (Bristol), Qinetiq, BAe 
Systems, DML and the Emergency Planning Society.  
 
SUPERVISION:  
Lead HEI Supervisor: Dr Andrew Weyman  
Email:   aw290@bath.c.uk  
Address:  Department of Psychology University of Bath Claverton 
Down Bath  
Contact telephone:  01225 385279  
  
Experience of working  
with business:  Often (more than 3 times)  
  
Relevant academic experience:  
Dr Weyman is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at Bath 
August 2006 - date. His specialist area is the psychology of risk: risk perception; risk 
communication; organisational safety culture and health and safety risk management 
systems  
From1992 -2006 he was employed by the Health and Safety Executive as 
Principal Scientist. During this period he acted as head of the Social and 
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Organisational Factors Unit at the Health & Safety Laboratory (2000 -2004) and as a 
policy analyst / advisor in the HSE's Social Science Unit, in London.  
Prior to Joining HSE Dr Weyman worked as a consultant and as a lecturer in 
the university sector.  
Dr Weyman managed a team of six researchers as Head of the Social and 
Organisational Factors Unit at HSL. He has previously jointly supervised two post-
doctoral and one doctoral studentship. He is experienced in collaborative working 
with UK universities, having previously undertaken joint projects with the universities 
of Nottingham, Cardiff; UEA and Manchester.  
 
Examples of Previous Research in this area  
2003 -2005 Exploring issues of safety climate in train operating companies - HSL led 
project in collaboration with University of East Anglia. Value £158.000.00  
Weyman AK & Kelly, CJ (2000) -Risk perception and risk communication in the 
workplace. A review of literature - HSE Contract Research Series Report. 
CRR 198/2000.HSE Books, HMSO.  
Duff R; Robertson IT; Phillips RA; Marsh. TW; Weyman AK & Cooper D (1998) - 
'Improving safety on construction sites by changing personnel behaviour', 
Phase II. UMIST -HSE Contract research report series No: CRR 137/1999. 
HSE Books, HMSO.  
Weyman AK & Dickety N ¬ Development of a behavioural safety measure to monitor 
workplace transport safety interventions. HSE Report Number 
IR/L./ERG/6/03, 2004.  
Weyman AK & Marlow P - Development of a psychometric measure of manual 
handling safety culture for the offshore industry. HSE Report Number 
IR/L./ERG/2304, 2004.  
O’Hara R; Dickety, NP; & Weyman, AK ¬‘Good practice in assessing workplace 
risks in small and medium sized enterprises’ HSE Report Number 
IR/L./RAS/14/02, May, 2002.  
Weyman AK; Jackson JA -‘Developing behavioural benchmarking measures to asses 
slip and trip hazards management in the food retail sector. HSE Report 
Number IR/L.//ES/03/01  
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Weyman, AK & Anderson, M -'An assessment of the introduction of risk 
management systems in the UK mining industry'. HSE Report No: 
IR/L/EBS/98/23. December, 1997.  
 
2nd HEI supervisor Dr Elizabeth Hellier  
  
Experience of working  
With business:   Often(more than3 times)  
  
Other HEI supervisor: Professor Judy Edworthy  
 
Arrangements for supervision 
The research student will be jointly supervised by Dr Andrew Weyman, 
Department of Psychology, University of Bath; Dr Hellier and Professor Edworthy 
Department of Psychology, University of Plymouth.  
The successful candidate will have access to the usual supervision 
arrangements and support structures available to post-graduate research students in 
Psychology at the University of Bath.  
Meetings between the researcher and Dr Weyman will be held fortnightly, and 
with Dr Hellier once a month and Prof Edworthy every two months. The researcher 
will also be expected to maintain regular contact with all three supervisors via e-mail, 
throughout the period of study.. The three academic supervisors will meet formally to 
discuss progress on a quarterly basis and maintain contact by e-mail or telephone at 
other times.  
As noted elsewhere, there will be formal quarterly meetings between at least 
two of the supervisors Mr Effer, Head of Quality and Mr Turner Head of Safety at the 
sponsor company to assess progress. This will be supplemented by contact between 
one or more supervisors and Mr Turner by telephone or e-mail at least once per month 
to assess progress.  
The researcher will provide written reports on progress to Mr Neil Effer, Head 
of Quality at the sponsor company on a quarterly basis. These reports will be 
submitted to Mr Turner and the academic supervisors in the first instance.  
 
SW Economic Benefits:  
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Additional R&D  
expenditure in the region  Yes 
Details:  
Helping an organisation  
develop a new technology  
or process    Yes 
 
Details: 
This proposal represents an opportunity for the sponsor company to develop 
and showcase regional 'best practice' in terms of the development and implementation 
of effective workplace health and safety management improvement interventions.  
 
Improving systems or  
techniques within the  
region     Yes 
 
Details: 
The project as the potential to produce measurable reductions in intrinsic risk, 
employee risk taking and the likelihood of accidents and ill health. The sponsor 
company is a significant employer in the South-West region, with approximately 800 
employees at its manufacturing plant. The sponsor company has well developed 
safety management systems and has a good health and safety record. However, like 
other good performing businesses it embraces its social responsibility to strive 
towards continuous improvement.  
Priorities for improvement at the sponsor company include reductions in 
musculo-skeletal injuries; slip and trip related injures; injuries from being struck by 
moving vehicles and exposure to harmful substances. These topics are all currently 
priorities under the Health and Safety Executive's Revitalising Health and Safety 
initiative. As such work on these topics is closely aligned with central and local 
government health and safety regulatory priorities.  
Reductions in the number and severity of injuries have transparent benefits to 
employees associated with the avoidance of injury and ill health and hardship for 
victims and their dependents. Benefits to the employer include reductions in sickness-
absence payments, compensation claims and staff substitution costs. Benefits to the 
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wider community include reductions in the burden on health and social services 
associated with the care of victims and their dependents as well as broader impacts on 
community well-being. The average cost to an employer of an employee being 
absence from work for a period of three consecutive days has been calculated to be 
£2234.00. The total cost of workplace accidents and ill health, including externalities, 
in Great Britain in the financial year 2001/02 was estimated to be £20.32billion (HSE 
2006 http://www.hse.gov.uk/lau/pdfs/handbook.pdf).  
This research will also provide an opportunity for the sponsor company to be 
identified as a flagship organisation and exemplar of good workplace risk 
management practice in the region. Publicising the learning from the sponsor 
company’s experience could be used to assist other employers in the region, and 
elsewhere, to learn by the company's experience, though, for example, local 
initiatives; established regional business links such as the South-West Manufacturing 
Advisory Service and other Knowledge Transfer Networks (KTNs). The provision of 
regular feedback on progress to representatives of regional Local Authority (LA) 
workplace health and safety inspectors and the regional Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) Offices will provide an opportunity for further dissemination of the key 
learning points from the work at the sponsor company. As part of the Fit For work; Fit 
for Life and Fit For Tomorrow (Fit3) initiative HSE and LA enforcement bodies have 
been tasked with identifying examples of good practice for controlling musculo-
skeletal; slip and trip and workplace transport risks for dissemination amongst 
employers. There is potential to use these bodies as a conduit to stimulate equivalent 
practice amongst other employers in the region. The supervisors have an established 
network of contact within the Health and Safety Executive and linkages with regional 
Local Authority workplace health and safety regulators  
 
Enhancing information  
about the SW   Yes 
 
Details:  
The academic collaborators are established international leaders in their field 
and would expect to disseminate the findings of this research at national and 
international conferences and in international publications. High quality research 
Appendix A 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 330 
 
originating in SW academic institutions and in collaboration with SW industry will 
enhance the reputation of the SW as a centre for excellence for safety research.  
 
Other    No  
Details:  
 
OTHER BENEFITS:  
Benefits for the external partner (including potential monetary value): 
 The cost of work related accidents and ill health to employers is high and 
significant, particularly when damage to property, compensation claims, downtime 
and other indirect costs are taken into account. The average cost to an employer of an 
employee being absent due to an accident or work related ill health for a period of 
three consecutive days has been calculated to be £2234.00. The average cost of 
accidents and work related ill health to employers has been calculated at £148.00 per 
employee per annum (source HSE INDG355 03/02).  
 
Minor accidents  
Even minor accidents can have significant financial implications for 
employers –in terms of lost production, investigation costs, compensation claims etc. 
The cost of minor accidents can add up over a year. The HSE offers case study 
examples of minor accident costs amounting to 37% of profits in one company; in 
another, 8.5% of tender price; and in a third 5% of running costs (HSE 2004).  
 
Major and fatal accidents  
Major accidents resulting in fatalities or serious injuries can impose a high 
cost on businesses - this can sometimes amount to six or seven figure sums. By way 
of illustration: the following example, again provided by the HSE, relates to an 
accident where an employee sustained a broken limb, and the company was 
prosecuted under the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974:  
Wages for injured employee £10,000  
Disruptions to production £8,000  
Additional over time payments £3,000  
Wages for replacement employee £7,000  
Managerial lost-time £4,000  
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Legal expenses &court costs £3,000  
Fines under HSWA £4,000  
Rise in liability insurance premium £6,000  
Total cost to the employer £45,000.00  
 
Uninsured losses  
With a few exceptions, all employers need to have liability insurance, to cover 
injuries and ill-health sustained by their employees. Insurance policies do not cover 
ALL of the costs of accidents. Insurance protects employers from large compensation 
outlays, but many indirect costs are not covered. The cost of uninsured losses varies 
by type of business and type of incident, but is generally accepted as exceeding the 
insured sum. The average uninsured loss for an employee sustaining a lost-time 
accident or ill health has been calculated to be £2,097.00 (source HSE INDG355 
03/02).  
 
Major accidents can also lead to corporate reputational damage, which can 
have negative implications for future profitability. Where corporate or personal 
failures lead to major accidents, legal action may be taken against individuals and 
companies for manslaughter. It is foreseeable that there will be changes in the law in 
this area in the near future, as outlined in the draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill, 
March2006.  
 
As noted elsewhere the financial benefits associated with this research relate to 
direct benefits to the sponsor company, arising from reductions in accidents and ill 
health and associated losses. Reductions in accidents / ill health have the potential to 
contribute to the long-term viability and sustainability of the company. Benefits to 
other employers in the region will arise from the dissemination of information on 
‘what works’ when introducing behaviourally based workplace risk reduction 
measures. The take up of good-practice based on the sponsor company experience has 
the potential to bring equivalent gains in terms of profitability and sustainability in 
other regional businesses.  
In summary, direct benefits to the sponsor company is arising from the 
introduction of behaviourally based safety culture interventions include:  
Reductions in sickness-absence payments,  
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Reductions in compensation claims  
Reduced staff substitution costs  
Reduced down-time  
Increased profitability - and associated implications for future sustainability 
and / or growth.  
Reduced likelihood of a fatal or serious incident -including potential costs of 
damage to plant and infrastructure and damage to reputation as an employer. 
Enhanced corporate profile and prestige -this research will provide an opportunity for 
the sponsor company to act as a flagship organisation and exemplar of good 
workplace risk management practice in the region.  
 
Has the partner worked  
With the HEI sector  
previously?    No 
 
Details:  
Potential for future research collaboration 
 
The sponsor company in a medium to large scale employer. The company 
produces high grade cast metal components for the aeronautical industry. It uses 
cutting-edge technology in its manufacturing processes,  
e.g. lost-wax casting techniques. The maintenance of exemplary quality in its 
production processes and its products is an essential feature in the manufacture of 
safety critical components. In view of the size and breadth of activity undertaken at 
the company, it is felt that there exists considerable scope for future collaborative 
work with this industrial partner, in a range of spheres.  
A more complete picture of the potential scope for future collaboration will be 
possible as understandings of the activity of the organisations are revealed during the 
course of the proposed research project.  
Based upon current insights it would appear that the cutting-edge work 
undertaken by this organisation would offer opportunities for collaboration in 
developing and improving manufacturing technologies; metallurgy and other 
materials technologies; aspects relating to quality systems as well as ergonomics 
aspects of task design and manufacturing processes.  
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1. A list of papers that describe the process of finding factors of safety 
culture analyzed by meta-research studies in order to find common indicators of 
safety culture 
 
 
 (Seo, 
et al., 
2004) 
(Clarke, 
2000) 
(Flin, 
et al., 
2000) 
(Farrington-
Darby, et al., 
2005) 
(Wiegmann, et 
al., 2004) 
(HSE, 
2005b) 
1.  Zohar (1980) x x x    
2.  (Brown & 
Holmes, 1986) 
x x x    
3.  (Cox & Cox, 
1991) 
x x x    
4.  (Dedobbeleer & 
Beland, 1991) 
x x x  x  
5.  (Niskanen, 1994) x x x    
6.  (Coyle, et al., 
1995) 
x x     
7.  (Diaz & Cabrera, 
1997) 
x x x    
8.  (Williamson, et 
al., 1997) 
x x x    
9.  (Cheyne, et al., 
1998) 
x x     
10.  (Mearns, Flin, 
Gordon, & 
Fleming, 1998) 
x x    x 
11.  (Brown, et al., 
2000) 
x   x   
12.  (Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
x   x   
13.  (Lee & Harrison, 
2000) 
x      
14.  (Glendon & 
Litherland, 2001) 
x      
15.  (O'Toole, 2002) x      
16.  (Mearns, et al., 
2003) 
x      
17.  (HSE, 1997)   x x   
18.  (Cooper & 
Philips, 1994) 
 x     
19.  (Hofmann & 
Stetzer, 1996) 
 x     
20.  (Cox, Tomas, 
Cheyne, & Oliver, 
1998) 
 x     
21.  (Donald & 
Canter, 1994) 
 x x    
22.  (Alexander, Cox, 
& Cheyne, 1995) 
 x x    
23.  (Lee, 1998)  x x   x 
24.  (Rundmo, 1992)   x    
Appendix B 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 336 
 
25.  (Ostrom, 
Wilhelmsen, & 
Kaplan, 1993) 
  x    
26.  (Budworth, 1997)   x    
27.  (Mearns, Flin, 
Fleming, & 
Gordon, 1997) 
  x    
28.  (Carroll, 1998)   x    
29.  (Phillips, Cooper, 
Sutherland, & 
Makin, 1993) 
  x    
30.  (Janssens, et al., 
1995) 
  x    
31.  (DePasquale & 
Geller, 1999) 
   x   
32.  (Elzer, Kluwe, & 
Boussoffara, 
2000) 
   x   
33.  (Lingard & 
Rowlinson, 1997) 
   x   
34.  (Pidgeon, 2001)    x   
35.  (Reason, 1997)    x  x 
36.  (Simard & 
Marchand, 1997) 
   x   
37.  (O'Dea & Flin, 
2001) 
   x   
38.  (Cooper, 2000)    x   
39.  (Geller, 1997)    x   
40.  (Van Vuuren, 
2000) 
   x   
41.  (Cullen, 2001)    x   
42.  (Hale, et al., 
2003) 
   x   
43.  (Fleming, Flin, 
Mearns, & 
Gordon, 1996) 
    x  
44.  (Flin, et al., 2000)     x  
45.  (Gordon, et al., 
1996) 
    x  
46.  (Meshkati, 1997)     x  
47.  (Yule, Flin, & 
Murdy, 2001) 
    x  
48.  (Zohar, 2000)     x  
49.  (Eiff, 1999)     x  
50.  (DePasquale & 
Geller, 1999) 
    x  
51.  (Reason, 1990)     x  
52.  (HSE, 1998)      x 
53.  (HSC, 2001)      x 
54.  (HSE, 1999)      x 
55.  (HSC, 1997)      x 
56.  (HSC, 2003)      x 
57.  (Fleming, 2001)      x 
58.  (HSC, 1993)      x 
59.  (Guest, Peccei, & 
Thomas, 1994) 
     x 
60.  (Clarke, 1998)      x 
61.  (HSE, 2003a)      x 
62.  (HSE, 2003b)      x 
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Table B2. Categorised supervisory behaviours identified in the subject 
literature 
Category Sub-
category 
Behaviours Reference 
Leads by 
example 
 Shows a model to obey safety rules  (Wu, 2005) 
Encourages safe working by setting a good example (Fleming, 1999) 
Cares about safety more than the average worker  (Mearns, Flin, et 
al., 2001) 
Pays less attention to safety problems than most 
other supervisors in this company (R).  
(Zohar, 2000) 
Has positive safety behaviour,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Shows me the safe way to do the task when I carry 
out an unsafe behaviour  
(Diaz-Cabrera, et 
al., 2007) 
Places worker safety as a top priority  
 
(Thompson, et al., 
1998) 
Communica
tion 
Explains/ 
educates 
about 
safety 
Helps employees to recognize the importance of 
safety  
(Wu, 2005) 
Explains the concept of safety clearly. (Wu, 2005) 
Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to 
act safely.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Spends time helping us learn to see problems before 
they arise.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Gives me clear instructions  
 
(Mearns, et al., 
2003) 
Discuses 
safety 
Approaches workers during work to discuss safety 
issues.  
(Zohar, 2000) 
Discusses safety issues with others  (Lu & Shang, 
2005) 
Discusses with me what is the most adequate 
solution to avoid the situation happening again  
(Diaz-Cabrera, et 
al., 2007) 
Discusses safety issues with others  (Hayes, et al., 
1998) 
Encourages to share and discuss issues openly and 
feels  
(Influencing 
factors – Andy’s 
materials) 
Discusses how to improve safety with us  (Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Provides 
safety 
vision 
Draws a picture to describe a safety vision.  (Wu, 2005) 
Praises for 
safety 
behaviours 
Shows his/her appreciation when employees 
accomplish their safety business 
(Wu, 2005) 
 
Welcomes 
reporting 
safety 
Often praises workers’ safety behaviour.  (Wu, 2005) 
Says a “good word” to workers who pay special 
attention to safety.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
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Praises for working safely  (Mearns, et al., 
2003) 
Says a good word whenever he sees a job done 
according to the safety rules.  
(Zohar, 2000) 
Praise for working safely  (Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
Praises safe work behaviours  (Lu & Shang, 
2005) 
Praises safe work behaviours  
 
(Hayes, et al., 
1998) 
Modestly accepts employees’ advice to improve 
safety.  
(Wu, 2005) 
 
Repeats 
safety 
importanc
e 
Seriously considers any worker's suggestions for 
improving safety.  
(Zohar, 2000) 
Welcomes reporting safety hazards/incidents,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Is a good resource for solving safety problems,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Very helpful if you asked for advice on safety 
matters.  
(Fung, et al., 
2005) 
Values my ideas about improving safety and health  (Seo, et al., 2004) 
Values my ideas about improving safety when 
significant changes to working practices are 
suggested.  
(Mohamed, 2003) 
Often declares safety policy.  (Wu, 2005) 
 
Consequen
ces 
Frequently communicates safety issues to employees.  (Wu, 2005) 
Regularly provides employees with safety 
information. 
 
I talk more about safety than productivity  (Fleming, 1999) 
Frequently tells us about the hazards in our work.  (Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Reminds workers who need reminders to work 
safely.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Frequently talks about safety issues throughout the 
work week.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Usually engages in regular safety talks,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Keeps workers informed of safety rules  (Hayes, et al., 
1998) 
When I carry out an unsafe behaviour my immediate 
superior tells me off and warns about a possible 
sanction  
(Diaz-Cabrera, et 
al., 2007) 
feedback 
 
 
Rewards safe behaviours  
 
(Hayes, et al., 
1998) 
We get feedback about our performance.  (Taylor & 
Thomas III, 2003) 
Studies new knowledge regarding safety 
continuously.  
 
(Wu, 2005) 
Develops 
safety 
knowledge 
 Treats employees kindly when dealing with safety 
business 
(Wu, 2005) 
Fairness  
 
Is able to suppress his personal biases and almost 
always treat me fairly  
(Thompson, et al., 
1998) 
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Considers my viewpoint when making decisions that 
affect me  
(Thompson, et al., 
1998) 
He is fair in making my job assignments  (Thompson, et al., 
1998) 
Is fair on decision that affect my future promotability  
 
(Thompson, et al., 
1998) 
Sets up a harmonious atmosphere to improve 
relationship among employees.  
(Wu, 2005) 
Cares about 
personal 
issues of his 
group 
members 
 
 
Is trying to solve the conflicts among employees.  (Wu, 2005) 
Is aware of how his subordinates are thinking and 
feeling  
(Fleming, 1999) 
Protects subordinates from feeling under pressure to 
meet deadlines  
(Fleming, 1999) 
Is sensitive to the personal problems of members of 
his work group  
(Mearns, Flin, et 
al., 2001) 
Allocates safety resources fairly.  (Wu, 2005) 
Allocates 
resources 
 
 
Explicitly indicates that he/she may allocate 
resources to improve safety facilities   
(Wu & Lee, 
2003) 
Makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to 
do the job safely.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Audits employees’ safety performance regularly.  (Wu, 2005) 
Monitors/ob
serves/ 
controls 
behaviours 
 
 
Pays close attention to workers’ safety.  (Wu & Lee, 
2003) 
Frequently walks through the work place and 
understands the safe condition.  
(Wu & Lee, 
2003) 
Visit the worksite three or more times a shift  (Fleming, 1999) 
I carry out safety inspections with my subordinates  (Fleming, 1999) 
Frequently checks to see if we are all obeying the 
safety rules.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Watches more often when a worker has violated 
some safety rule.  
(Zohar, 2000) 
Only keeps track of major safety problems and 
overlooks routine problems (R).  
(Zohar, 2000) 
Requests employees to obey safety rules.  (Wu, 2005) 
Asks employees to enforce regulations of safety and 
health management thoroughly.  
(Wu, 2005) 
Allows employees to involve setting safety goals.  (Wu & Lee, 
2003) 
Engages in 
safety 
 
 
Involves his subordinates in decision making  (Fleming, 1999) 
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Involves work group members in risk assessments  (Fleming, 1999) 
Workers are involved in setting safety goals  (Lu & Shang, 
2005) 
Workers are involved in setting safety decisions  (Lu & Shang, 
2005) 
Involves workers in setting safety goals  (Hayes, et al., 
1998) 
Encourages employees to participate safety activities  (Wu, 2005) 
Visits the work site frequently to encourage safe 
working  
(Fleming, 1999) 
Encourages safe behaviours  (Lu & Shang, 
2005) 
Puts into practice the safety recommendations 
proposed by employees.  
(Wu & Lee, 
2003) 
Acts based 
on 
suggestion 
 
 
My suggestions about safety would be acted on if I 
expressed them to my lead supervisor.  
(Taylor & 
Thomas III, 2003) 
Acts on safety suggestions from employees  (Lu & Shang, 
2005) 
Acts on safety suggestions  
 
(Hayes, et al., 
1998) 
Emphasizes safety procedures when we are working 
under pressure.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Does not 
turn a blind 
eye 
 
 
Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls 
behind schedule.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Is strict about working safely when we are tired or 
stressed.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Does not approve of me taking shortcuts to get a job 
done quickly  
(Mearns, et al., 
2003) 
Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor wants 
us to work faster, rather than by the rules (R).  
(Zohar, 2000) 
As long as work remains on schedule, my supervisor 
doesn't care how this has been achieved (R).  
(Zohar, 2000) 
Supervisors would not compromise safety.  
 
(Taylor & 
Thomas III, 2003) 
My supervisor can be trusted.  (Taylor & 
Thomas III, 2003) 
Trust  My supervisor protects confidential sensitive 
information.  
(Taylor & 
Thomas III, 2003) 
Supervisor makes realistic promises and keeps them.  (Taylor & 
Thomas III, 2003) 
He is trustworthy  (Mearns, et al., 
2003) 
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Table B3. Categorised managerial behaviours identified in the subject 
literature 
Category Sub-
category 
Behaviours Reference 
Does not 
turn a blind 
eye 
 Is strict about working safely when work falls 
behind schedule.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Does not put the job before the safety of its 
employees  
 
(Thompson, et al., 
1998) 
Communica
tion 
Provides 
safety 
informatio
n 
Provides detailed safety reports to workers (e.g., 
injuries, near accidents).  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Provides workers with a lot of information on 
safety issues.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
Provides enough safety education programs  (Lu & Shang, 
2005) 
Clearly communicates safety issues to all levels 
within the organization,  
(Mohamed, 2003) 
Continues to bring safety information to site 
employees’ attention,  
(Mohamed, 2003) 
Undertakes campaigns to promote safe working 
practices.  
(Mohamed, 2003) 
Is a good resource for solving safety problems,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Provides safety information  (Hayes, et al., 
1998) 
Keeps workers informed of hazards  
 
(Hayes, et al., 
1998) 
Discusses 
safety 
Managers encourage meetings with employees and 
directors to discuss safety matters.  
(Fernandez-Muniz, 
et al., 2007) 
Usually engages in regular safety talks,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Informally discusses safety issues with employees  (Seo, et al., 2004) 
Praises for 
safety 
behaviours 
Praises site employees for working safely,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Welcomes 
reporting 
safety 
Encourages feedback from site employees on safety 
issues,  
(Mohamed, 2003) 
Welcomes reporting safety hazards/incidents,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Values my ideas about improving safety when 
significant changes to working practices are 
suggested.  
(Mohamed, 2003) 
Encourages employees to report all safety related 
incidents  
(Seo, et al., 2004) 
Is open to new ideas on safety issues  
 
(Thompson, et al., 
1998) 
Promoting 
based on 
safety 
records 
Considers a person’s safety behaviour when 
moving–promoting people.  
(Zohar & Luria, 
2005) 
 
Prevents 
safety 
problems 
Appears not only when there is a problem  (Mearns, Flin, et 
al., 2001) 
Acts only after accidents have occurred (R)  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Considers 
safety 
 Shows interest in my safety  (Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
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important Clearly considers the safety of employees of great 
importance  
(Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
Considers safety to be equally as important as 
production  
(Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
Managers take responsibility for health and safety 
as well as quality and productivity.  
(Fernandez-Muniz, 
et al., 2007) 
 Expresses concern if safety procedures are not 
adhered to,  
(Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
Believes safety is very important,  (Mohamed, 2003) 
Senior management takes safety seriously.  (Fung, et al., 2005) 
Visibly demonstrates support for employees safety  
 
(Seo, et al., 2004) 
Trust  Management can be trusted.  (Taylor & Thomas 
III, 2003) 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1. Question set for focus groups 
Introduction and warm up: 
Moderator to explain: 
1. The purpose of the group discussion session, and the rationale 
underlying the research interest in safety culture. 
2. Participants to be made aware that they are under no obligation to take 
part in the proceedings. 
3. Participants to be assured of their guaranteed anonymity and the non-
attributive nature of the recording of responses. 
4. Participants to be reminded of trade union’s support of the discussion 
sessions. 
 
Discussion format: 
1. What is it like to work for this company? 
2. What is it like to work in your department?  
• What is good and what is not so good? 
• What would it take to make it better? 
3. Tell me about safety at this company. 
• Is it a safe place to work? 
• Is it a place where accidents happen a lot? 
• How committed are senior managers at this company to 
employee safety? 
4. What are the main hazards where you work? 
• How do you deal with these hazards? 
5. Could you tell me about initial training that new comers get when start 
working in your department? 
• Does the training cover Health and Safety issues? 
6. Do you know about safety rules in your department?  
• How easy are they to follow?  
• How often do people bend / break the rules – examples? 
• How do supervisors react when safety rules are broken? 
7. Do hazards get reported? 
8. Do accidents get reported? 
• If not, why? 
• Recall a recent accident you know about. Could you tell me 
about that situation?  
o Why did it happen? 
9. How would you describe the company’s approach to accident 
investigations?  
10. Comment on solving reported problems 
• Recall a situation when you reported a safety problem and 
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wanted to sort it out. Tell me about that situation. 
o (if unsolved) how did it affect you? 
• What happens when you report a safety related problem? 
• What does your supervisor do with the reported issue? 
• Do you get feedback about reported issues? 
11. What are the priorities in your department? 
• Where is safety? 
12. Do you feel production pressure on you? 
• Is it difficult to meet production targets? 
o What are the consequences for not reaching targets? 
o Who puts pressure on you for unattained targets? 
o Is there any pressure from you workmates? 
13. Do you have time limits for doing your tasks? 
• Do you feel time pressure? 
• Do you feel a need to bit the clock? 
• What happens if you don’t bit the clock? 
• What happens if you bit the clock? 
14. Do people have the resources necessary to do their job safely? 
• Recall a situation when somebody in your department did not 
have the resources necessary to do the job safely. Could you 
tell me about that situation? 
• How did it affect the way they did their job? 
• How often do you have to improvise? 
15. What about respect for your work? 
• Do you feel that the company looks after you? 
o Does your supervisor look after you? 
16. Is there anything else I should have asked about? 
 
Table C2. The full list of codes resulted from the initial coding 
1. Accident investigation (AI)  2. Lack of resources – man 
power 
3. PPE 
4. Blame,  5. Used to be better 6. Preferred shift pattern  
7. Blind eye,  8. Leadership,  9. Pressure – from workmates  
10. Breaking rules  11. Maintenance 12. Pressure,  
13. Claims  14. Managerial skills  15. Production pressure  
16. Communication  17. Managers - LMX 18. Reactive approach  
19. Communication – using 
posters  
20. Managers – no personal 
relation  
21. Recognition – advantages  
22. Consequences of lack of 
reaction  
23. Managers – people skills  24. Recognition,  
25. Contractors 26. Managers - skills managers  27. Reporting claims  
28. Contradicting messages 29. Managers, 30. Reporting hazards  
31. Contradictory messages  32. Minor injuries  33. Reporting,  
34. Corporate 35. Money  36. Role of H&S  
37. Co-workers  38. Motivation to work 39. Rules breaking  
40. Cutting corners  41. Motivation to work – co-
workers,  
42. Safety leadership,  
43. Differences in priority – 
managerial decisions  
44. Motivation to work – co-
workers,  
45. Secondary risks  
46. Emotions  47. Motivation to work - job 
itself  
48. Shift leader - functions  
Appendix C 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 345 
 
49. External motivation  50. Motivation to work - 
money,  
51. Shift leader - role shift 
leaders – limited power  
52. Feedback 53. Motivation to work - pride  54. Supervision 
55. Feedback – need for 56. Motivation to work – 
variety of tasks  
57. Supervision  - lack of in 
nightshifts  
58. Feedback – newsletter 59. Need for feedback  60. Supervision – actions 
undertaken  
61. Group consistency  62. No feedback  63. Supervision – difficult to 
find them  
64. H&s  65. Not effective resolving  66. Supervision - fairness  
67. H&s role  68. Old equipment,  69. Supervision - fairness  
70. H&S team  71. Old company’s culture  72. Supervision - inconsistency  
73. Health effects  (HE)  74. Organization of department  75. Supervision – lack of and 
consequences  
76. Housekeeping  77. Organizational learning  78. Supervision - not enough  
79. IFE 80. Paperwork  81. Supervision – not on the 
shop floor  
82. Improvisation  83. Passivity,  84. Supervision – support for 
safety  
85. Investigation  86. Physical conditions (pc)  87. Supervisory practices  
88. Lack of equipment,  89. Pc – lack of room  90. Time pressure,  
91. Lack of feedback  92. Pc - lightning  93. Training – safety on job 
limited  
94. Lack of reaction  95. Personal time  96. Training, 
97. Lack of reaction - 
consequences  
98. Physical conditions (PC) – 
lack of spare space  
99. Turnover,  
100. Lack of reaction – 
postponed solution  
101. Poor organization  102. Underreporting,  
103. Lack of resources  104. Positive perception of 
company’s approach to 
safety  
105. Undertaken risks  
106. Lack of resources – lifting 
gear  
107. Postponed reaction   
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Appendix D 
 
INSTRUCTION 
This is a questionnaire to assess different aspects of safety in the company. It 
consists of a set of demographic questions and 30 statements related to safety. Each 
statement is followed by a series of possible responses: strongly disagree, disagree, 
neutral, agree and strongly agree. Read each statement carefully and decide to what 
extent you agree or disagree. Indicate your answer by circling the corresponding 
answer. Please respond to every statement. Do not spend too long on each statement. 
It is important that you answer each question as honestly as possible. ALL 
INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED WITH THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.  
 
1. Gender: 
A) Male 
B) Female 
2. Age:  
A) 25 years or less 
B) 26 – 45 years 
C) 46 years or more 
3. How long have you worked for this company?: 
A) less than 12 months 
B) 1 – 4 years 
C) 5-10 years  
D) 11 years or more 
       TURN THE PAGE   
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4. Position: 
A) Operator       move to question ‘5. 
Department’ below 
B) Team leader/shift leader/cell leader    move to question ‘5. 
Department’ below 
C) Supervisor      move to question 1 on the next page 
D) Manager      move to question 1 on the next page 
E) Office positions     move to question 1 on the next page 
 (all office employees except supervisors and managers) 
F) Other………………………………   move to question ‘5’ below 
5. Department: 
A) ABS 
B) Ceramic core 
C) Cleaning (pre-finishing) 
D) Core Removal 
E) Despatch & Packing 
F) Development centre 
G) E.D.M. 
H) Engineering  
I) Finance 
J) Foundry 
K) Grain Inspection 
L) HEA Chem. Lab 
M) HEA Maintenance 
N) HEA Production 
O) Heat treatment 
P) Human resources 
Q) H&S 
R) Large Finishing 
 
S) Large Wax 
T) Layout 
U) Maintenance  
V) Met Lab 
W) Monoshell 
X) Mould prep. 
Y) Production Control 
Z) Quality 
AA) Sales 
BB) Salvage 
CC) Small Finishing 
DD) Small Wax 
EE) Stores & Goods in 
FF) Tool room 
GG) IT 
HH) X-Ray 
       HH)   
Other…………………………… 
      MOVE TO THE NEXT PAGE  
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. Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree/ 
neutral 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Most of the time I have all the necessary 
resources to do my job safely 
1 2 3 4 5 
The management of my department are 
genuinely concerned about health and safety of 
employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
People are worried that if they say too much 
about safety problems, they will be seen as 
trouble-makers 
1 2 3 4 5 
Managers in my department place a high priority 
on fixing safety problems identified by operators 
1 2 3 4 5 
There are some safety problems in my 
department which have not been solved for a 
number of years 
1 2 3 4 5 
My supervisor regularly reminds operators to 
work safely 
1 2 3 4 5 
In my department when you ask for safety things 
to be fixed they usually get sorted quickly  
1 2 3 4 5 
People in my department get regular praise for 
working safely  
1 2 3 4 5 
The supervisors of my department sometimes 
allows “favourite” employees to break safety 
rules 
1 2 3 4 5 
In my department safety is sometimes sacrificed 
for the sake of production 
1 2 3 4 5 
The supervisors in my department sometimes 
encourage operators to take risks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sometimes I feel under pressure from my 
workmates to work in an unsafe manner 
1 2 3 4 5 
People in my department often take risks by 
cutting corners with safety 
1 2 3 4 5 
The managers of my department see safety as 
the number one priority when setting production 
speeds and schedules 
1 2 3 4 5 
Newcomers in my department receive good 
quality  training on the risks associated with 
their job 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
TURN THE PAGE  
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Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree/ 
neutral 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Accident investigations in my department are 
generally effective in identifying the root causes 
of incidents 
1 2 3 4 5 
In my department, what operators have to say 
about safety problems is not taken into 
consideration 
1 2 3 4 5 
People I work with are reluctant to use the IFE 
books to report incidents   
1 2 3 4 5 
The supervisors of my department tends to 
blame people who have an accident 
1 2 3 4 5 
In my department supervisors often turn a blind 
eye to unsafe practices  
1 2 3 4 5 
When you report safety problems the 
management of the department are quick to give 
feedback on what actions have been taken 
1 2 3 4 5 
In my department safety problems are only 
addressed when there is going to be a safety 
audit 
1 2 3 4 5 
In my department people regularly take risks to 
achieve output targets  
1 2 3 4 5 
I see IFE books as a useful tool to improve / 
maintain safety in my department 
1 2 3 4 5 
The supervisors in my department lead by 
example in complying with safety rules 
1 2 3 4 5 
There are good communications in my 
department about safety issues 
1 2 3 4 5 
The supervisors in my department frequently 
check to see if all employees are obeying the 
safety rules 
1 2 3 4 5 
The supervisors of my department discuss how 
to improve safety with operators 
1 2 3 4 5 
Where I work people are reluctant to report 
minor injuries 
1 2 3 4 5 
In my department hazards only tend to be 
removed after somebody has had an accident 
1 2 3 4 5 
           
THANK YOU! 
  
Appendix D 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 351 
 
Table D1. Results of one-way ANOVA comparison for between job grades for 2008 
data 
2008 
 Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Effect 
size24 
factor 1 
leadership 
Between 
Groups 
810.447 5 162.089 6.591 .000 0.24 
Within 
Groups 
10550.302 429 24.593 
  
 
Total 11360.749 434 
   
 
factor 2 
solving 
problems 
Between 
Groups 
984.192 5 196.838 10.336 .000 0.31 
Within 
Groups 
7941.359 417 19.044 
  
 
Total 8925.551 422 
   
 
factor 3 Risk 
taking 
Between 
Groups 
1247.512 5 249.502 7.327 .000 0.26 
Within 
Groups 
14642.678 430 34.053 
  
 
Total 15890.190 435 
   
 
factor 4 
estrangement 
Between 
Groups 
540.934 5 108.187 8.175 .000 0.27 
Within 
Groups 
5518.300 417 13.233 
  
 
Total 6059.234 422 
   
 
 
Table D2. Results of one-way ANOVA comparison for between job grades for 2009 
data 
2009 
 Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Effect 
size25 
factor 1 
leadership 
Between 
Groups 
910.479 5 182.096 9.129 .000 0.35 
Within 
Groups 
5405.752 271 19.947 
  
 
Total 6316.231 276 
   
 
factor 2 
solving 
problems 
Between 
Groups 
677.919 5 135.584 9.763 .000 0.37 
Within 
Groups 
3680.073 265 13.887 
  
 
Total 4357.993 270 
   
 
factor 3 Risk 
taking 
Between 
Groups 
2044.195 5 408.839 16.043 .000 0.46 
Within 
Groups 
6880.859 270 25.485 
  
 
                                                 
24 Calculated with an equation of omega squared (ω2) (Field, 2005): ω2 = SSM− (dfM)MSR
SST+ MSR  
25 Calculated with an equation of omega squared (ω2) (Field, 2005): ω2 = SSM− (dfM)MSR
SST+ MSR  
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Total 8925.054 275 
   
 
factor 4 
estrangement 
Between 
Groups 
784.972 5 156.994 11.995 .000 0.40 
Within 
Groups 
3533.767 270 13.088 
  
 
Total 4318.739 275 
   
 
 
Table D3. The results of Hochberg test for comparison between job grades for 
2008 data 
2008 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) Position (J) Position 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
factor 1 
leadership 
operator team/shift/cell 
leader 
-.20934 .89912 1.000 -2.8558 2.4371 
supervisor -4.62764* 1.20472 .002 -8.1736 -1.0816 
manager -4.57209* 1.12079 .001 -7.8710 -1.2731 
office positions -1.97685 .81893 .216 -4.3873 .4336 
other -.72263 .93724 1.000 -3.4813 2.0360 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
operator .20934 .89912 1.000 -2.4371 2.8558 
supervisor -4.41830* 1.44554 .035 -8.6731 -.1635 
manager -4.36275* 1.37637 .024 -8.4140 -.3115 
office positions -1.76751 1.14405 .857 -5.1349 1.5999 
other -.51328 1.23152 1.000 -4.1381 3.1116 
supervisor operator 4.62764* 1.20472 .002 1.0816 8.1736 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.41830* 1.44554 .035 .1635 8.6731 
manager .05556 1.59291 1.000 -4.6330 4.7441 
office positions 2.65079 1.39707 .591 -1.4614 6.7629 
other 3.90502 1.46955 .115 -.4205 8.2305 
manager operator 4.57209* 1.12079 .001 1.2731 7.8710 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.36275* 1.37637 .024 .3115 8.4140 
supervisor -.05556 1.59291 1.000 -4.7441 4.6330 
office positions 2.59524 1.32538 .540 -1.3059 6.4964 
other 3.84946 1.40157 .090 -.2759 7.9749 
office 
positions 
operator 1.97685 .81893 .216 -.4336 4.3873 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
1.76751 1.14405 .857 -1.5999 5.1349 
supervisor -2.65079 1.39707 .591 -6.7629 1.4614 
manager -2.59524 1.32538 .540 -6.4964 1.3059 
other 1.25422 1.17425 .993 -2.2021 4.7105 
other operator .72263 .93724 1.000 -2.0360 3.4813 
team/shift/cell .51328 1.23152 1.000 -3.1116 4.1381 
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leader 
supervisor -3.90502 1.46955 .115 -8.2305 .4205 
manager -3.84946 1.40157 .090 -7.9749 .2759 
office positions -1.25422 1.17425 .993 -4.7105 2.2021 
factor 2 
solving 
problems 
operator team/shift/cell 
leader 
.74379 .79301 .998 -1.5907 3.0783 
supervisor -2.35098 1.06149 .338 -5.4758 .7739 
manager -4.08114* .98773 .001 -6.9889 -1.1734 
office positions -3.93828* .72262 .000 -6.0656 -1.8110 
other -1.97822 .82648 .227 -4.4113 .4548 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
operator -.74379 .79301 .998 -3.0783 1.5907 
supervisor -3.09477 1.27205 .207 -6.8395 .6500 
manager -4.82493* 1.21119 .001 -8.3905 -1.2594 
office positions -4.68207* 1.00675 .000 -7.6458 -1.7183 
other -2.72201 1.08372 .170 -5.9123 .4683 
supervisor operator 2.35098 1.06149 .338 -.7739 5.4758 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
3.09477 1.27205 .207 -.6500 6.8395 
manager -1.73016 1.40173 .974 -5.8567 2.3963 
office positions -1.58730 1.22940 .962 -5.2065 2.0319 
other .37276 1.29318 1.000 -3.4342 4.1797 
manager operator 4.08114* .98773 .001 1.1734 6.9889 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.82493* 1.21119 .001 1.2594 8.3905 
supervisor 1.73016 1.40173 .974 -2.3963 5.8567 
office positions .14286 1.16631 1.000 -3.2906 3.5763 
other 2.10292 1.23336 .749 -1.5279 5.7338 
office 
positions 
operator 3.93828* .72262 .000 1.8110 6.0656 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.68207* 1.00675 .000 1.7183 7.6458 
supervisor 1.58730 1.22940 .962 -2.0319 5.2065 
manager -.14286 1.16631 1.000 -3.5763 3.2906 
other 1.96006 1.03332 .592 -1.0819 5.0020 
other operator 1.97822 .82648 .227 -.4548 4.4113 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
2.72201 1.08372 .170 -.4683 5.9123 
supervisor -.37276 1.29318 1.000 -4.1797 3.4342 
manager -2.10292 1.23336 .749 -5.7338 1.5279 
office positions -1.96006 1.03332 .592 -5.0020 1.0819 
factor 3 Risk 
taking 
operator team/shift/cell 
leader 
.24219 1.05782 1.000 -2.8714 3.3557 
supervisor -3.54866 1.41748 .173 -7.7208 .6235 
manager -4.73120* 1.31870 .006 -8.6126 -.8498 
office positions -4.35025* .96343 .000 -7.1860 -1.5145 
other -1.94472 1.10268 .703 -5.1903 1.3009 
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team/shift/cell 
leader 
operator -.24219 1.05782 1.000 -3.3557 2.8714 
supervisor -3.79085 1.70099 .328 -8.7975 1.2158 
manager -4.97339* 1.61960 .033 -9.7405 -.2063 
office positions -4.59244* 1.34623 .011 -8.5549 -.6300 
other -2.18691 1.44915 .878 -6.4523 2.0785 
supervisor operator 3.54866 1.41748 .173 -.6235 7.7208 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
3.79085 1.70099 .328 -1.2158 8.7975 
manager -1.18254 1.87440 1.000 -6.6996 4.3345 
office positions -.80159 1.64396 1.000 -5.6404 4.0372 
other 1.60394 1.72925 .998 -3.4859 6.6938 
manager operator 4.73120* 1.31870 .006 .8498 8.6126 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.97339* 1.61960 .033 .2063 9.7405 
supervisor 1.18254 1.87440 1.000 -4.3345 6.6996 
office positions .38095 1.55960 1.000 -4.2095 4.9714 
other 2.78648 1.64925 .761 -2.0679 7.6408 
office 
positions 
operator 4.35025* .96343 .000 1.5145 7.1860 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.59244* 1.34623 .011 .6300 8.5549 
supervisor .80159 1.64396 1.000 -4.0372 5.6404 
manager -.38095 1.55960 1.000 -4.9714 4.2095 
other 2.40553 1.38176 .721 -1.6615 6.4726 
other operator 1.94472 1.10268 .703 -1.3009 5.1903 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
2.18691 1.44915 .878 -2.0785 6.4523 
supervisor -1.60394 1.72925 .998 -6.6938 3.4859 
manager -2.78648 1.64925 .761 -7.6408 2.0679 
office positions -2.40553 1.38176 .721 -6.4726 1.6615 
factor 4 
estrangement 
operator team/shift/cell 
leader 
.77893 .66105 .983 -1.1671 2.7250 
supervisor -2.18512 .88485 .189 -4.7900 .4198 
manager -3.14544* .82337 .002 -5.5693 -.7216 
office positions -2.74067* .60237 .000 -4.5140 -.9674 
other -.99336 .68895 .910 -3.0215 1.0348 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
operator -.77893 .66105 .983 -2.7250 1.1671 
supervisor -2.96405 1.06038 .078 -6.0857 .1575 
manager -3.92437* 1.00964 .002 -6.8966 -.9521 
office positions -3.51961* .83922 .001 -5.9902 -1.0491 
other -1.77230 .90338 .537 -4.4317 .8871 
supervisor operator 2.18512 .88485 .189 -.4198 4.7900 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
2.96405 1.06038 .078 -.1575 6.0857 
manager -.96032 1.16848 1.000 -4.4002 2.4795 
office positions -.55556 1.02482 1.000 -3.5725 2.4614 
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other 1.19176 1.07799 .991 -1.9817 4.3652 
manager operator 3.14544* .82337 .002 .7216 5.5693 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
3.92437* 1.00964 .002 .9521 6.8966 
supervisor .96032 1.16848 1.000 -2.4795 4.4002 
office positions .40476 .97223 1.000 -2.4574 3.2669 
other 2.15207 1.02812 .429 -.8746 5.1787 
office 
positions 
operator 2.74067* .60237 .000 .9674 4.5140 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
3.51961* .83922 .001 1.0491 5.9902 
supervisor .55556 1.02482 1.000 -2.4614 3.5725 
manager -.40476 .97223 1.000 -3.2669 2.4574 
other 1.74731 .86137 .481 -.7884 4.2831 
other operator .99336 .68895 .910 -1.0348 3.0215 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
1.77230 .90338 .537 -.8871 4.4317 
supervisor -1.19176 1.07799 .991 -4.3652 1.9817 
manager -2.15207 1.02812 .429 -5.1787 .8746 
office positions -1.74731 .86137 .481 -4.2831 .7884 
 
Table D4. The results of Gabriel test for comparison between job grades for 
2009 data 
2009 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) Position (J) Position 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
factor 1 
leadership 
operator team/shift/cell 
leader 
-1.03894 .90749 .975 -3.5395 1.4616 
supervisor -5.94610* 1.29233 .000 -9.3013 -2.5909 
manager -3.91600* 1.00149 .000 -6.6294 -1.2026 
office positions -3.47687* .79648 .000 -5.7203 -1.2335 
other -2.53687 .96623 .069 -5.1708 .0971 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
operator 1.03894 .90749 .975 -1.4616 3.5395 
supervisor -4.90716* 1.49072 .013 -9.2248 -.5895 
manager -2.87706 1.24705 .277 -6.5529 .7987 
office positions -2.43793 1.08928 .319 -5.6438 .7679 
other -1.49793 1.21891 .974 -5.0943 2.0985 
supervisor operator 5.94610* 1.29233 .000 2.5909 9.3013 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.90716* 1.49072 .013 .5895 9.2248 
manager 2.03010 1.54974 .953 -2.5003 6.5605 
office positions 2.46923 1.42587 .677 -1.5913 6.5297 
other 3.40923 1.52719 .308 -1.0418 7.8603 
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manager operator 3.91600* 1.00149 .000 1.2026 6.6294 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
2.87706 1.24705 .277 -.7987 6.5529 
supervisor -2.03010 1.54974 .953 -6.5605 2.5003 
office positions .43913 1.16875 1.000 -2.9795 3.8578 
other 1.37913 1.29042 .993 -2.4301 5.1883 
office 
positions 
operator 3.47687* .79648 .000 1.2335 5.7203 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
2.43793 1.08928 .319 -.7679 5.6438 
supervisor -2.46923 1.42587 .677 -6.5297 1.5913 
manager -.43913 1.16875 1.000 -3.8578 2.9795 
other .94000 1.13868 1.000 -2.3992 4.2792 
other operator 2.53687 .96623 .069 -.0971 5.1708 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
1.49793 1.21891 .974 -2.0985 5.0943 
supervisor -3.40923 1.52719 .308 -7.8603 1.0418 
manager -1.37913 1.29042 .993 -5.1883 2.4301 
office positions -.94000 1.13868 1.000 -4.2792 2.3992 
factor 2 
solving 
problems 
operator team/shift/cell 
leader 
.67757 .77056 .998 -1.4460 2.8012 
supervisor -3.73727* 1.07983 .002 -6.5485 -.9260 
manager -3.73393* .83760 .000 -6.0095 -1.4583 
office positions -2.72958* .66706 .000 -4.6130 -.8462 
other -2.66958* .80826 .006 -4.8789 -.4602 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
operator -.67757 .77056 .998 -2.8012 1.4460 
supervisor -4.41484* 1.25068 .006 -8.0437 -.7860 
manager -4.41149* 1.04869 .001 -7.5047 -1.3183 
office positions -3.40714* .91823 .004 -6.1081 -.7062 
other -3.34714* 1.02540 .018 -6.3741 -.3202 
supervisor operator 3.73727* 1.07983 .002 .9260 6.5485 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.41484* 1.25068 .006 .7860 8.0437 
manager .00334 1.29307 1.000 -3.7775 3.7842 
office positions 1.00769 1.18971 .999 -2.3809 4.3963 
other 1.06769 1.27425 .999 -2.6469 4.7823 
manager operator 3.73393* .83760 .000 1.4583 6.0095 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.41149* 1.04869 .001 1.3183 7.5047 
supervisor -.00334 1.29307 1.000 -3.7842 3.7775 
office positions 1.00435 .97517 .995 -1.8486 3.8573 
other 1.06435 1.07669 .997 -2.1146 4.2433 
office 
positions 
operator 2.72958* .66706 .000 .8462 4.6130 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
3.40714* .91823 .004 .7062 6.1081 
supervisor -1.00769 1.18971 .999 -4.3963 2.3809 
manager -1.00435 .97517 .995 -3.8573 1.8486 
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other .06000 .95008 1.000 -2.7267 2.8467 
other operator 2.66958* .80826 .006 .4602 4.8789 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
3.34714* 1.02540 .018 .3202 6.3741 
supervisor -1.06769 1.27425 .999 -4.7823 2.6469 
manager -1.06435 1.07669 .997 -4.2433 2.1146 
office positions -.06000 .95008 1.000 -2.8467 2.7267 
factor 3 Risk 
taking 
operator team/shift/cell 
leader 
.18706 1.02632 1.000 -2.6424 3.0165 
supervisor -7.04636* 1.46113 .000 -10.8419 -3.2508 
manager -6.25372* 1.13251 .000 -9.3237 -3.1837 
office positions -5.07329* .90093 .000 -7.6121 -2.5345 
other -4.80329* 1.09268 .000 -7.7835 -1.8230 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
operator -.18706 1.02632 1.000 -3.0165 2.6424 
supervisor -7.23342* 1.68497 .000 -12.1139 -2.3530 
manager -6.44078* 1.40954 .000 -10.5957 -2.2859 
office positions -5.26034* 1.23122 .000 -8.8840 -1.6366 
other -4.99034* 1.37774 .005 -9.0555 -.9252 
supervisor operator 7.04636* 1.46113 .000 3.2508 10.8419 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
7.23342* 1.68497 .000 2.3530 12.1139 
manager .79264 1.75168 1.000 -4.3283 5.9136 
office positions 1.97308 1.61167 .966 -2.6167 6.5628 
other 2.24308 1.72619 .954 -2.7881 7.2743 
manager operator 6.25372* 1.13251 .000 3.1837 9.3237 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
6.44078* 1.40954 .000 2.2859 10.5957 
supervisor -.79264 1.75168 1.000 -5.9136 4.3283 
office positions 1.18043 1.32104 .999 -2.6838 5.0446 
other 1.45043 1.45857 .997 -2.8553 5.7561 
office 
positions 
operator 5.07329* .90093 .000 2.5345 7.6121 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
5.26034* 1.23122 .000 1.6366 8.8840 
supervisor -1.97308 1.61167 .966 -6.5628 2.6167 
manager -1.18043 1.32104 .999 -5.0446 2.6838 
other .27000 1.28705 1.000 -3.5045 4.0445 
other operator 4.80329* 1.09268 .000 1.8230 7.7835 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.99034* 1.37774 .005 .9252 9.0555 
supervisor -2.24308 1.72619 .954 -7.2743 2.7881 
manager -1.45043 1.45857 .997 -5.7561 2.8553 
office positions -.27000 1.28705 1.000 -4.0445 3.5045 
factor 4 
estrangement 
operator team/shift/cell 
leader 
-.03912 .74596 1.000 -2.0895 2.0113 
supervisor -3.97593* 1.04681 .000 -6.6938 -1.2581 
manager -4.40402* .81122 .000 -6.6020 -2.2061 
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office positions -3.08554* .64516 .000 -4.9028 -1.2683 
other -2.72054* .78266 .003 -4.8542 -.5869 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
operator .03912 .74596 1.000 -2.0113 2.0895 
supervisor -3.93681* 1.21417 .016 -7.4591 -.4145 
manager -4.36491* 1.01807 .000 -7.3673 -1.3625 
office positions -3.04643* .89142 .010 -5.6681 -.4247 
other -2.68143 .99546 .106 -5.6195 .2566 
supervisor operator 3.97593* 1.04681 .000 1.2581 6.6938 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
3.93681* 1.21417 .016 .4145 7.4591 
manager -.42809 1.25531 1.000 -4.0979 3.2418 
office positions .89038 1.15498 1.000 -2.3988 4.1795 
other 1.25538 1.23705 .995 -2.3502 4.8609 
manager operator 4.40402* .81122 .000 2.2061 6.6020 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
4.36491* 1.01807 .000 1.3625 7.3673 
supervisor .42809 1.25531 1.000 -3.2418 4.0979 
office positions 1.31848 .94670 .925 -1.4508 4.0877 
other 1.68348 1.04526 .816 -1.4021 4.7691 
office 
positions 
operator 3.08554* .64516 .000 1.2683 4.9028 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
3.04643* .89142 .010 .4247 5.6681 
supervisor -.89038 1.15498 1.000 -4.1795 2.3988 
manager -1.31848 .94670 .925 -4.0877 1.4508 
other .36500 .92235 1.000 -2.3399 3.0699 
other operator 2.72054* .78266 .003 .5869 4.8542 
team/shift/cell 
leader 
2.68143 .99546 .106 -.2566 5.6195 
supervisor -1.25538 1.23705 .995 -4.8609 2.3502 
manager -1.68348 1.04526 .816 -4.7691 1.4021 
office positions -.36500 .92235 1.000 -3.0699 2.3399 
 
Table D5. Results of Levene statistic of inter-departmental differences for data 
sets from 2008 and 2009 
 
2008 2009 
 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
factor 1 leadership 2.129 8 277 .033 2.329 4 131 .059 
factor 2 solving 
problems 
2.155 8 269 .031 1.080 4 129 .369 
factor 3 breaking rules 1.270 8 278 .259 .765 4 130 .550 
factor 4 estrangement 1.637 8 269 .114 1.266 4 130 .287 
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Table D6. Results of one-way ANOVA of inter-departmental differences for 
2008 data set 
ANOVA 2008 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Effect 
size26 
factor 1 leadership Between 
Groups 
459.269 8 57.409 2.319 .020 0.18 
Within 
Groups 
6858.227 277 24.759 
  
Total 7317.497 285 
   
factor 2 solving 
problems 
Between 
Groups 
1044.866 8 130.608 7.807 .000 0.40 
Within 
Groups 
4500.011 269 16.729 
  
Total 5544.878 277 
   
 
factor 3 risk 
taking 
Between 
Groups 
905.203 8 113.150 3.627 .000 0.26 
Within 
Groups 
8672.051 278 31.194 
  
Total 9577.254 286 
   
factor 4 
estrangement 
Between 
Groups 
379.976 8 47.497 3.552 .001 0.26 
Within 
Groups 
3597.347 269 13.373     
Total 3977.324 277 
     
 
Table D7. Results of one-way ANOVA of inter-departmental differences for 
2009 data set 
ANOVA 
2009 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Effect 
size27 
factor 1 
leadership 
Between 
Groups 
37.926 4 9.482 .545 .703 ω2 
negative. 
No square 
root 
possible 
Within 
Groups 
2278.074 131 17.390     
Total 2316.000 135       
factor 2 solving 
problems 
Between 
Groups 
186.037 4 46.509 4.980 .001 0.32 
Within 
Groups 
1204.747 129 9.339     
Total 1390.784 133       
factor 3 breaking 
rules 
Between 
Groups 
223.899 4 55.975 2.834 .027 0.22 
Within 
Groups 
2567.804 130 19.752     
Total 2791.704 134       
                                                 
26 Calculated with an equation of omega squared (ω2) (Field, 2005): ω2 = SSM− (dfM)MSR
SST+ MSR  
27 Calculated with an equation of omega squared (ω2) (Field, 2005): ω2 = SSM− (dfM)MSR
SST+ MSR  
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factor 4 
estrangement 
Between 
Groups 
149.241 4 37.310 3.439 .010 0.25 
Within 
Groups 
1410.359 130 10.849     
Total 1559.600 134       
 
Table D8.Results of Games-Howell test of inter-departmental differences for 
2008 data set 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
departments 
only with 
more than 20 
people 
(J) 
departments 
only with 
more than 20 
people 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
factor 1 
leadership 
  
ceramic 
core 
  
foundry 3.80223* 1.10401 .026 .2667 7.3377 
HEA 
production 
-.05303 1.36337 1.000 -4.5061 4.4000 
large 
finishing 
1.32554 1.15725 .965 -2.3868 5.0379 
large wax 1.49697 .98005 .839 -1.6455 4.6395 
monoshell 1.53907 1.26467 .948 -2.6189 5.6971 
mould 
prep. 
5.32197* 1.32759 .023 .5515 10.0925 
small 
finishing 
2.32855 1.67967 .894 -3.3129 7.9700 
small wax 1.91235 1.01330 .624 -1.3223 5.1470 
foundry 
  
ceramic 
core 
-3.80223* 1.10401 .026 -7.3377 -.2667 
HEA 
production 
-3.85526 1.38034 .146 -8.3528 .6422 
large 
finishing 
-2.47669 1.17719 .479 -6.2450 1.2916 
large wax -2.30526 1.00352 .358 -5.5140 .9035 
monoshell -2.26316 1.28294 .704 -6.4679 1.9415 
mould 
prep. 
1.51974 1.34501 .960 -3.2777 6.3172 
small 
finishing 
-1.47368 1.69347 .993 -7.1471 4.1997 
small wax -1.88988 1.03601 .666 -5.1895 1.4098 
HEA 
production 
  
ceramic 
core 
.05303 1.36337 1.000 -4.4000 4.5061 
foundry 3.85526 1.38034 .146 -.6422 8.3528 
large 
finishing 
1.37857 1.42328 .987 -3.2471 6.0043 
large wax 1.55000 1.28335 .950 -2.6754 5.7754 
monoshell 1.59211 1.51191 .978 -3.3559 6.5401 
mould 
prep. 
5.37500* 1.56492 .049 .0204 10.7296 
small 
finishing 
2.38158 1.87291 .933 -3.8004 8.5635 
small wax 1.96538 1.30892 .848 -2.3242 6.2550 
large 
finishing   
ceramic 
core 
-1.32554 1.15725 .965 -5.0379 2.3868 
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foundry 2.47669 1.17719 .479 -1.2916 6.2450 
HEA 
production 
-1.37857 1.42328 .987 -6.0043 3.2471 
large wax .17143 1.06180 1.000 -3.2373 3.5801 
monoshell .21353 1.32903 1.000 -4.1287 4.5557 
mould 
prep. 
3.99643 1.38904 .162 -.8922 8.8850 
small 
finishing 
1.00301 1.72865 1.000 -4.7615 6.7675 
small wax .58681 1.09257 1.000 -2.9069 4.0805 
large wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.49697 .98005 .839 -4.6395 1.6455 
foundry 2.30526 1.00352 .358 -.9035 5.5140 
HEA 
production 
-1.55000 1.28335 .950 -5.7754 2.6754 
large 
finishing 
-.17143 1.06180 1.000 -3.5801 3.2373 
monoshell .04211 1.17796 1.000 -3.8716 3.9559 
mould 
prep. 
3.82500 1.24526 .140 -.8133 8.4633 
small 
finishing 
.83158 1.61539 1.000 -4.6538 6.3170 
small wax .41538 .90275 1.000 -2.4431 3.2738 
monoshell 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.53907 1.26467 .948 -5.6971 2.6189 
foundry 2.26316 1.28294 .704 -1.9415 6.4679 
HEA 
production 
-1.59211 1.51191 .978 -6.5401 3.3559 
large 
finishing 
-.21353 1.32903 1.000 -4.5557 4.1287 
large wax -.04211 1.17796 1.000 -3.9559 3.8716 
mould 
prep. 
3.78289 1.47972 .267 -1.3744 8.9402 
small 
finishing 
.78947 1.80233 1.000 -5.2044 6.7834 
small wax .37328 1.20576 1.000 -3.6078 4.3544 
mould 
prep. 
  
ceramic 
core 
-5.32197* 1.32759 .023 -10.0925 -.5515 
foundry -1.51974 1.34501 .960 -6.3172 3.2777 
HEA 
production 
-5.37500* 1.56492 .049 -10.7296 -.0204 
large 
finishing 
-3.99643 1.38904 .162 -8.8850 .8922 
large wax -3.82500 1.24526 .140 -8.4633 .8133 
monoshell -3.78289 1.47972 .267 -8.9402 1.3744 
small 
finishing 
-2.99342 1.84702 .785 -9.2600 3.2731 
small wax -3.40962 1.27160 .242 -8.0765 1.2573 
small 
finishing 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.32855 1.67967 .894 -7.9700 3.3129 
foundry 1.47368 1.69347 .993 -4.1997 7.1471 
HEA 
production 
-2.38158 1.87291 .933 -8.5635 3.8004 
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large 
finishing 
-1.00301 1.72865 1.000 -6.7675 4.7615 
large wax -.83158 1.61539 1.000 -6.3170 4.6538 
monoshell -.78947 1.80233 1.000 -6.7834 5.2044 
mould 
prep. 
2.99342 1.84702 .785 -3.2731 9.2600 
small wax -.41619 1.63578 1.000 -5.9461 5.1137 
small wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.91235 1.01330 .624 -5.1470 1.3223 
foundry 1.88988 1.03601 .666 -1.4098 5.1895 
HEA 
production 
-1.96538 1.30892 .848 -6.2550 2.3242 
large 
finishing 
-.58681 1.09257 1.000 -4.0805 2.9069 
large wax -.41538 .90275 1.000 -3.2738 2.4431 
monoshell -.37328 1.20576 1.000 -4.3544 3.6078 
mould 
prep. 
3.40962 1.27160 .242 -1.2573 8.0765 
small 
finishing 
.41619 1.63578 1.000 -5.1137 5.9461 
factor 2 
solving 
problems 
  
ceramic 
core 
  
foundry 5.48736* .87091 .000 2.6831 8.2916 
HEA 
production 
-.16129 1.00575 1.000 -3.4921 3.1695 
large 
finishing 
4.75300* .83028 .000 2.0782 7.4278 
large wax 3.58871* .66530 .000 1.4606 5.7168 
monoshell 4.00538* 1.05054 .019 .4512 7.5596 
mould 
prep. 
7.58871* 1.14513 .001 3.1568 12.0207 
small 
finishing 
3.73345 1.37083 .194 -.9508 8.4177 
small wax 2.75934* .73306 .009 .4292 5.0895 
foundry 
  
ceramic 
core 
-5.48736* .87091 .000 -8.2916 -2.6831 
HEA 
production 
-5.64865* 1.15922 .000 -9.4111 -1.8862 
large 
finishing 
-.73436 1.01075 .998 -3.9698 2.5010 
large wax -1.89865 .88028 .446 -4.7257 .9284 
monoshell -1.48198 1.19829 .943 -5.4229 2.4590 
mould 
prep. 
2.10135 1.28202 .771 -2.5029 6.7056 
small 
finishing 
-1.75391 1.48708 .955 -6.7158 3.2080 
small wax -2.72801 .93255 .099 -5.7056 .2496 
HEA 
production 
  
ceramic 
core 
.16129 1.00575 1.000 -3.1695 3.4921 
foundry 5.64865* 1.15922 .000 1.8862 9.4111 
large 
finishing 
4.91429* 1.12901 .002 1.2392 8.5894 
large wax 3.75000* 1.01387 .019 .4013 7.0987 
monoshell 4.16667 1.29959 .061 -.1063 8.4397 
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mould 
prep. 
7.75000* 1.37718 .001 2.9204 12.5796 
small 
finishing 
3.89474 1.56986 .277 -1.3084 9.0978 
small wax 2.92063 1.05957 .160 -.5466 6.3878 
large 
finishing 
  
ceramic 
core 
-4.75300* .83028 .000 -7.4278 -2.0782 
foundry .73436 1.01075 .998 -2.5010 3.9698 
HEA 
production 
-4.91429* 1.12901 .002 -8.5894 -1.2392 
large wax -1.16429 .84010 .899 -3.8626 1.5340 
monoshell -.74762 1.16909 .999 -4.6087 3.1135 
mould 
prep. 
2.83571 1.25478 .423 -1.7237 7.3951 
small 
finishing 
-1.01955 1.46366 .998 -5.9230 3.8839 
small wax -1.99365 .89472 .399 -4.8498 .8625 
large wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-3.58871* .66530 .000 -5.7168 -1.4606 
foundry 1.89865 .88028 .446 -.9284 4.7257 
HEA 
production 
-3.75000* 1.01387 .019 -7.0987 -.4013 
large 
finishing 
1.16429 .84010 .899 -1.5340 3.8626 
monoshell .41667 1.05832 1.000 -3.1530 3.9864 
mould 
prep. 
4.00000 1.15227 .087 -.4339 8.4339 
small 
finishing 
.14474 1.37680 1.000 -4.5513 4.8408 
small wax -.82937 .74417 .971 -3.1865 1.5278 
monoshell 
  
ceramic 
core 
-4.00538* 1.05054 .019 -7.5596 -.4512 
foundry 1.48198 1.19829 .943 -2.4590 5.4229 
HEA 
production 
-4.16667 1.29959 .061 -8.4397 .1063 
large 
finishing 
.74762 1.16909 .999 -3.1135 4.6087 
large wax -.41667 1.05832 1.000 -3.9864 3.1530 
mould 
prep. 
3.58333 1.41023 .276 -1.3558 8.5224 
small 
finishing 
-.27193 1.59893 1.000 -5.5780 5.0341 
small wax -1.24603 1.10218 .965 -4.9199 2.4279 
mould 
prep. 
  
ceramic 
core 
-7.58871* 1.14513 .001 -12.0207 -3.1568 
foundry -2.10135 1.28202 .771 -6.7056 2.5029 
HEA 
production 
-7.75000* 1.37718 .001 -12.5796 -2.9204 
large 
finishing 
-2.83571 1.25478 .423 -7.3951 1.7237 
large wax -4.00000 1.15227 .087 -8.4339 .4339 
monoshell -3.58333 1.41023 .276 -8.5224 1.3558 
small -3.85526 1.66261 .371 -9.5196 1.8091 
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finishing 
small wax -4.82937* 1.19268 .031 -9.2957 -.3631 
small 
finishing 
  
ceramic 
core 
-3.73345 1.37083 .194 -8.4177 .9508 
foundry 1.75391 1.48708 .955 -3.2080 6.7158 
HEA 
production 
-3.89474 1.56986 .277 -9.0978 1.3084 
large 
finishing 
1.01955 1.46366 .998 -3.8839 5.9230 
large wax -.14474 1.37680 1.000 -4.8408 4.5513 
monoshell .27193 1.59893 1.000 -5.0341 5.5780 
mould 
prep. 
3.85526 1.66261 .371 -1.8091 9.5196 
small wax -.97410 1.41079 .998 -5.7451 3.7969 
small wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.75934* .73306 .009 -5.0895 -.4292 
foundry 2.72801 .93255 .099 -.2496 5.7056 
HEA 
production 
-2.92063 1.05957 .160 -6.3878 .5466 
large 
finishing 
1.99365 .89472 .399 -.8625 4.8498 
large wax .82937 .74417 .971 -1.5278 3.1865 
monoshell 1.24603 1.10218 .965 -2.4279 4.9199 
mould 
prep. 
4.82937* 1.19268 .031 .3631 9.2957 
small 
finishing 
.97410 1.41079 .998 -3.7969 5.7451 
factor 3 
breaking rules 
  
ceramic 
core 
  
foundry 5.13313* 1.21745 .002 1.2360 9.0302 
HEA 
production 
.84804 1.60115 1.000 -4.4091 6.1052 
large 
finishing 
1.06471 1.12850 .989 -2.5529 4.6823 
large wax 2.13137 1.07702 .563 -1.3146 5.5774 
monoshell -.78793 1.43731 1.000 -5.5362 3.9603 
mould 
prep. 
5.63971 1.96004 .202 -1.9046 13.1840 
small 
finishing 
1.36997 1.69223 .996 -4.2907 7.0307 
small wax .57240 1.13786 1.000 -3.0490 4.1938 
foundry 
  
ceramic 
core 
-5.13313* 1.21745 .002 -9.0302 -1.2360 
HEA 
production 
-4.28509 1.64772 .217 -9.6694 1.0992 
large 
finishing 
-4.06842* 1.19365 .028 -7.8887 -.2481 
large wax -3.00175 1.14512 .196 -6.6625 .6590 
monoshell -5.92105* 1.48902 .008 -10.8096 -1.0325 
mould 
prep. 
.50658 1.99827 1.000 -7.0675 8.0807 
small 
finishing 
-3.76316 1.73636 .449 -9.5352 2.0089 
small wax -4.56073* 1.20251 .008 -8.3869 -.7345 
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HEA 
production 
  
ceramic 
core 
-.84804 1.60115 1.000 -6.1052 4.4091 
foundry 4.28509 1.64772 .217 -1.0992 9.6694 
large 
finishing 
.21667 1.58313 1.000 -4.9904 5.4238 
large wax 1.28333 1.54687 .995 -3.8231 6.3897 
monoshell -1.63596 1.81623 .992 -7.5802 4.3082 
mould 
prep. 
4.79167 2.25268 .490 -3.2144 12.7977 
small 
finishing 
.52193 2.02397 1.000 -6.1156 7.1595 
small wax -.27564 1.58982 1.000 -5.4912 4.9399 
large 
finishing 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.06471 1.12850 .989 -4.6823 2.5529 
foundry 4.06842* 1.19365 .028 .2481 7.8887 
HEA 
production 
-.21667 1.58313 1.000 -5.4238 4.9904 
large wax 1.06667 1.05005 .983 -2.2887 4.4220 
monoshell -1.85263 1.41721 .922 -6.5451 2.8398 
mould 
prep. 
4.57500 1.94536 .396 -2.9593 12.1093 
small 
finishing 
.30526 1.67520 1.000 -5.3119 5.9225 
small wax -.49231 1.11237 1.000 -4.0283 3.0437 
large wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.13137 1.07702 .563 -5.5774 1.3146 
foundry 3.00175 1.14512 .196 -.6590 6.6625 
HEA 
production 
-1.28333 1.54687 .995 -6.3897 3.8231 
large 
finishing 
-1.06667 1.05005 .983 -4.4220 2.2887 
monoshell -2.91930 1.37658 .478 -7.4991 1.6605 
mould 
prep. 
3.50833 1.91596 .666 -4.0096 11.0263 
small 
finishing 
-.76140 1.64096 1.000 -6.2919 4.7691 
small wax -1.55897 1.06011 .867 -4.9152 1.7973 
monoshell 
  
ceramic 
core 
.78793 1.43731 1.000 -3.9603 5.5362 
foundry 5.92105* 1.48902 .008 1.0325 10.8096 
HEA 
production 
1.63596 1.81623 .992 -4.3082 7.5802 
large 
finishing 
1.85263 1.41721 .922 -2.8398 6.5451 
large wax 2.91930 1.37658 .478 -1.6605 7.4991 
mould 
prep. 
6.42763 2.13934 .146 -1.3768 14.2321 
small 
finishing 
2.15789 1.89701 .964 -4.1155 8.4313 
small wax 1.36032 1.42468 .988 -3.3387 6.0594 
mould 
prep.   
ceramic 
core 
-5.63971 1.96004 .202 -13.1840 1.9046 
foundry -.50658 1.99827 1.000 -8.0807 7.0675 
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HEA 
production 
-4.79167 2.25268 .490 -12.7977 3.2144 
large 
finishing 
-4.57500 1.94536 .396 -12.1093 2.9593 
large wax -3.50833 1.91596 .666 -11.0263 4.0096 
monoshell -6.42763 2.13934 .146 -14.2321 1.3768 
small 
finishing 
-4.26974 2.31831 .657 -12.4576 3.9181 
small wax -5.06731 1.95080 .293 -12.5988 2.4641 
small 
finishing 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.36997 1.69223 .996 -7.0307 4.2907 
foundry 3.76316 1.73636 .449 -2.0089 9.5352 
HEA 
production 
-.52193 2.02397 1.000 -7.1595 6.1156 
large 
finishing 
-.30526 1.67520 1.000 -5.9225 5.3119 
large wax .76140 1.64096 1.000 -4.7691 6.2919 
monoshell -2.15789 1.89701 .964 -8.4313 4.1155 
mould 
prep. 
4.26974 2.31831 .657 -3.9181 12.4576 
small wax -.79757 1.68152 1.000 -6.4222 4.8270 
small wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-.57240 1.13786 1.000 -4.1938 3.0490 
foundry 4.56073* 1.20251 .008 .7345 8.3869 
HEA 
production 
.27564 1.58982 1.000 -4.9399 5.4912 
large 
finishing 
.49231 1.11237 1.000 -3.0437 4.0283 
large wax 1.55897 1.06011 .867 -1.7973 4.9152 
monoshell -1.36032 1.42468 .988 -6.0594 3.3387 
mould 
prep. 
5.06731 1.95080 .293 -2.4641 12.5988 
small 
finishing 
.79757 1.68152 1.000 -4.8270 6.4222 
factor 4 
estrangement 
  
ceramic 
core 
  
foundry 3.47515* .88626 .007 .6229 6.3274 
HEA 
production 
-.55540 1.05991 1.000 -3.9976 2.8868 
large 
finishing 
1.49677 .95491 .818 -1.5704 4.5640 
large wax 2.23314 .84911 .197 -.5044 4.9706 
monoshell 1.65233 .91598 .679 -1.3272 4.6318 
mould 
prep. 
3.22177 1.36287 .376 -1.8189 8.2624 
small 
finishing 
2.57046 1.02951 .262 -.7910 5.9319 
small wax 1.27138 .87317 .871 -1.5316 4.0744 
foundry 
  
ceramic 
core 
-3.47515* .88626 .007 -6.3274 -.6229 
HEA 
production 
-4.03055* .96933 .004 -7.1991 -.8620 
large 
finishing 
-1.97838 .85326 .346 -4.7130 .7563 
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large wax -1.24201 .73293 .748 -3.5825 1.0984 
monoshell -1.82282 .80946 .392 -4.4642 .8186 
mould 
prep. 
-.25338 1.29368 1.000 -5.2160 4.7092 
small 
finishing 
-.90469 .93599 .987 -3.9870 2.1776 
small wax -2.20378 .76067 .103 -4.6222 .2147 
HEA 
production 
  
ceramic 
core 
.55540 1.05991 1.000 -2.8868 3.9976 
foundry 4.03055* .96933 .004 .8620 7.1991 
large 
finishing 
2.05217 1.03247 .559 -1.3020 5.4064 
large wax 2.78854 .93548 .101 -.2832 5.8603 
monoshell 2.20773 .99658 .417 -1.0674 5.4828 
mould 
prep. 
3.77717 1.41829 .244 -1.3642 8.9186 
small 
finishing 
3.12586 1.10183 .136 -.4853 6.7371 
small wax 1.82678 .95738 .612 -1.3007 4.9542 
large 
finishing 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.49677 .95491 .818 -4.5640 1.5704 
foundry 1.97838 .85326 .346 -.7563 4.7130 
HEA 
production 
-2.05217 1.03247 .559 -5.4064 1.3020 
large wax .73636 .81460 .992 -1.8760 3.3487 
monoshell .15556 .88409 1.000 -2.7156 3.0267 
mould 
prep. 
1.72500 1.34164 .918 -3.2855 6.7355 
small 
finishing 
1.07368 1.00124 .975 -2.1976 4.3450 
small wax -.22540 .83966 1.000 -2.9072 2.4564 
large wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.23314 .84911 .197 -4.9706 .5044 
foundry 1.24201 .73293 .748 -1.0984 3.5825 
HEA 
production 
-2.78854 .93548 .101 -5.8603 .2832 
large 
finishing 
-.73636 .81460 .992 -3.3487 1.8760 
monoshell -.58081 .76860 .997 -3.0990 1.9373 
mould 
prep. 
.98864 1.26851 .995 -3.9574 5.9347 
small 
finishing 
.33732 .90089 1.000 -2.6467 3.3214 
small wax -.96176 .71704 .916 -3.2335 1.3100 
monoshell 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.65233 .91598 .679 -4.6318 1.3272 
foundry 1.82282 .80946 .392 -.8186 4.4642 
HEA 
production 
-2.20773 .99658 .417 -5.4828 1.0674 
large 
finishing 
-.15556 .88409 1.000 -3.0267 2.7156 
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large wax .58081 .76860 .997 -1.9373 3.0990 
mould 
prep. 
1.56944 1.31422 .942 -3.4249 6.5638 
small 
finishing 
.91813 .96418 .988 -2.2751 4.1114 
small wax -.38095 .79510 1.000 -2.9672 2.2053 
mould 
prep. 
  
ceramic 
core 
-3.22177 1.36287 .376 -8.2624 1.8189 
foundry .25338 1.29368 1.000 -4.7092 5.2160 
HEA 
production 
-3.77717 1.41829 .244 -8.9186 1.3642 
large 
finishing 
-1.72500 1.34164 .918 -6.7355 3.2855 
large wax -.98864 1.26851 .995 -5.9347 3.9574 
monoshell -1.56944 1.31422 .942 -6.5638 3.4249 
small 
finishing 
-.65132 1.39572 1.000 -5.7628 4.4601 
small wax -1.95040 1.28474 .825 -6.9031 3.0023 
small 
finishing 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.57046 1.02951 .262 -5.9319 .7910 
foundry .90469 .93599 .987 -2.1776 3.9870 
HEA 
production 
-3.12586 1.10183 .136 -6.7371 .4853 
large 
finishing 
-1.07368 1.00124 .975 -4.3450 2.1976 
large wax -.33732 .90089 1.000 -3.3214 2.6467 
monoshell -.91813 .96418 .988 -4.1114 2.2751 
mould 
prep. 
.65132 1.39572 1.000 -4.4601 5.7628 
small wax -1.29908 .92361 .888 -4.3389 1.7408 
small wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.27138 .87317 .871 -4.0744 1.5316 
foundry 2.20378 .76067 .103 -.2147 4.6222 
HEA 
production 
-1.82678 .95738 .612 -4.9542 1.3007 
large 
finishing 
.22540 .83966 1.000 -2.4564 2.9072 
large wax .96176 .71704 .916 -1.3100 3.2335 
monoshell .38095 .79510 1.000 -2.2053 2.9672 
mould 
prep. 
1.95040 1.28474 .825 -3.0023 6.9031 
small 
finishing 
1.29908 .92361 .888 -1.7408 4.3389 
 
Table D9. Results of Gabriel test of inter-departmental differences for 2009 
data set 
Dependent 
Variable 
Departments Departments Mean 
Differenc
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
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e (I-J) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
factor 1 
leadership 
  
ceramic 
core 
  
cleanin
g 
1.67636 1.2190
3 
.840 -1.7902 5.1429 
foundry 1.40559 1.2080
1 
.937 -2.0284 4.8396 
large 
wax 
1.19192 1.1285
0 
.964 -1.9950 4.3788 
small 
wax 
1.22896 1.1977
1 
.972 -2.1743 4.6322 
cleanin
g 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.67636 1.2190
3 
.840 -5.1429 1.7902 
foundry -.27077 1.1680
9 
1.00
0 
-3.5940 3.0525 
large 
wax 
-.48444 1.0856
6 
1.00
0 
-3.5606 2.5917 
small 
wax 
-.44741 1.1574
4 
1.00
0 
-3.7399 2.8451 
foundry 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.40559 1.2080
1 
.937 -4.8396 2.0284 
cleanin
g 
.27077 1.1680
9 
1.00
0 
-3.0525 3.5940 
large 
wax 
-.21368 1.0732
6 
1.00
0 
-3.2573 2.8299 
small 
wax 
-.17664 1.1458
2 
1.00
0 
-3.4365 3.0833 
large 
wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.19192 1.1285
0 
.964 -4.3788 1.9950 
cleanin
g 
.48444 1.0856
6 
1.00
0 
-2.5917 3.5606 
foundry .21368 1.0732
6 
1.00
0 
-2.8299 3.2573 
small 
wax 
.03704 1.0616
6 
1.00
0 
-2.9758 3.0499 
small 
wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.22896 1.1977
1 
.972 -4.6322 2.1743 
cleanin
g 
.44741 1.1574
4 
1.00
0 
-2.8451 3.7399 
foundry .17664 1.1458
2 
1.00
0 
-3.0833 3.4365 
large 
wax 
-.03704 1.0616
6 
1.00
0 
-3.0499 2.9758 
factor 2 
solving 
problems 
  
ceramic 
core 
  
cleanin
g 
3.60474* .91135 .001 1.0113 6.1982 
foundry 1.48601 .88527 .624 -1.0312 4.0032 
large 
wax 
2.93687* .82700 .005 .6008 5.2729 
small 
wax 
2.42761 .87772 .062 -.0670 4.9222 
cleanin
g 
  
ceramic 
core 
-3.60474* .91135 .001 -6.1982 -1.0113 
foundry -2.11873 .87478 .154 -4.6071 .3696 
large 
wax 
-.66787 .81576 .994 -2.9751 1.6394 
small 
wax 
-1.17713 .86715 .850 -3.6429 1.2887 
foundry 
  
ceramic 
core 
-1.48601 .88527 .624 -4.0032 1.0312 
cleanin
g 
2.11873 .87478 .154 -.3696 4.6071 
large 
wax 
1.45085 .78652 .490 -.7801 3.6819 
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small 
wax 
.94160 .83970 .950 -1.4480 3.3312 
large 
wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.93687* .82700 .005 -5.2729 -.6008 
cleanin
g 
.66787 .81576 .994 -1.6394 2.9751 
foundry -1.45085 .78652 .490 -3.6819 .7801 
small 
wax 
-.50926 .77802 .999 -2.7177 1.6992 
small 
wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.42761 .87772 .062 -4.9222 .0670 
cleanin
g 
1.17713 .86715 .850 -1.2887 3.6429 
foundry -.94160 .83970 .950 -3.3312 1.4480 
large 
wax 
.50926 .77802 .999 -1.6992 2.7177 
factor 3 
breaking 
rules 
  
ceramic 
core 
  
cleanin
g 
2.72909 1.2992
0 
.313 -.9659 6.4241 
foundry 3.60909 1.2992
0 
.060 -.0859 7.3041 
large 
wax 
2.38131 1.2027
1 
.384 -1.0156 5.7782 
small 
wax 
.59428 1.2764
8 
1.00
0 
-3.0332 4.2218 
cleanin
g 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.72909 1.2992
0 
.313 -6.4241 .9659 
foundry .88000 1.2570
6 
.999 -2.6970 4.4570 
large 
wax 
-.34778 1.1570
5 
1.00
0 
-3.6267 2.9311 
small 
wax 
-2.13481 1.2335
6 
.584 -5.6443 1.3746 
foundry 
  
ceramic 
core 
-3.60909 1.2992
0 
.060 -7.3041 .0859 
cleanin
g 
-.88000 1.2570
6 
.999 -4.4570 2.6970 
large 
wax 
-1.22778 1.1570
5 
.964 -4.5067 2.0511 
small 
wax 
-3.01481 1.2335
6 
.146 -6.5243 .4946 
large 
wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.38131 1.2027
1 
.384 -5.7782 1.0156 
cleanin
g 
.34778 1.1570
5 
1.00
0 
-2.9311 3.6267 
foundry 1.22778 1.1570
5 
.964 -2.0511 4.5067 
small 
wax 
-1.78704 1.1314
8 
.699 -4.9984 1.4243 
small 
wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-.59428 1.2764
8 
1.00
0 
-4.2218 3.0332 
cleanin
g 
2.13481 1.2335
6 
.584 -1.3746 5.6443 
foundry 3.01481 1.2335
6 
.146 -.4946 6.5243 
large 
wax 
1.78704 1.1314
8 
.699 -1.4243 4.9984 
factor 4 
estrangemen
t 
  
ceramic 
core 
  
cleanin
g 
3.09636* .96285 .016 .3580 5.8348 
foundry 2.40559 .95415 .120 -.3071 5.1183 
large 
wax 
2.99351* .89616 .010 .4603 5.5267 
small 
wax 
2.28451 .94602 .156 -.4039 4.9729 
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cleanin
g 
  
ceramic 
core 
-3.09636* .96285 .016 -5.8348 -.3580 
foundry -.69077 .92262 .997 -3.3160 1.9344 
large 
wax 
-.10286 .86251 1.00
0 
-2.5485 2.3428 
small 
wax 
-.81185 .91420 .990 -3.4127 1.7890 
foundry 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.40559 .95415 .120 -5.1183 .3071 
cleanin
g 
.69077 .92262 .997 -1.9344 3.3160 
large 
wax 
.58791 .85278 .999 -1.8320 cleaning7
9 
small 
wax 
-.12108 .90503 1.00
0 
-2.6962 2.4541 
large 
wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.99351* .89616 .010 -5.5267 -.4603 
cleanin
g 
.10286 .86251 1.00
0 
-2.3428 2.5485 
foundry -.58791 .85278 .999 -
cleaning79 
1.8320 
small 
wax 
-.70899 .84367 .993 -3.1046 1.6867 
small 
wax 
  
ceramic 
core 
-2.28451 .94602 .156 -4.9729 .4039 
cleanin
g 
.81185 .91420 .990 -1.7890 3.4127 
foundry .12108 .90503 1.00
0 
-2.4541 2.6962 
large 
wax 
.70899 .84367 .993 -1.6867 3.1046 
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Appendix E 
OBSERVATIONAL CHECKLIST FOR THE ALLOY DEPARTMENT 
Area: 
…………………… 
Date/Time: 
……………………………………………….. 
Observer: 
……………………………….. 
Please use the space below to record any comments: 
 
 #SAFE #UNSAFE N/A Comments 
Fork truck on the move     
1. Operating at safe speed for conditions 
& obeying speed limit (3m/h – 4km/h 
inside; 5m/h – 8hm/h outside) 
    
2. Seat belts worn in vehicle      
3. Complete stop at pedestrian 
intersections and vehicle doors 
    
4. Employee is looking in direction of 
travel and vision is not obstructed 
    
5. Loads stable and properly placed on 
forks during transport 
    
6. Pedestrians not within 3 ft. (91cm) 
next to vehicle in operation  
    
7. Forks raised above 6 inches (15 cm) 
height when not lifting 
    
Fork truck parked     
8. Parked vehicles: parking brake set, 
forks lowered 
    
9. Vehicle ignition turned off when 
unattended 
    
10. Not parked in walkway     
11. Suspended loads left unattended     
12. Wheel chocks on one wheel when 
forklift is parked outside 
    
13. Forklift (or other vehicle) blocking 
thoroughfare [inviting non certificated 
drivers to move it] 
    
14. Keys left in a truck     
Tracks     
15. Tractors attached to trailers are turned 
off with parking brakes set 
    
16. Drive off barriers in place on vacated 
docks with open doors 
    
Totals     
% Safety Performance Level = ==
eTotalUnsaf+TotalSafe
TotalSafe 100
..........................
.........................100 ⋅


⋅





                      
% 
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Area: 
……………………… 
Date/Time: 
…………………………………………….. 
Observer: 
…………………………….. 
Please use the space below to record any comments: 
 
 #SAFE #UNSAFE N/A Comments 
Work areas     
1. Floors are clean & free from debris, oil & 
dirt. 
    
2. Tools & any other material is not left to sit 
directly on the floor. 
    
3. No heavy items or sharp items are placed on 
top of machines, cabinets & equipment. 
    
Path Ways     
4. Designated walkways are clean & free from 
debris, oil & dirt. 
    
5. Designated walkways are free from 
obstructions or other trip hazards 
    
Others     
6. Nothing leans against the walls     
7. Nothing leans against the columns     
8. Nothing leans against machines     
9. Cranes’ hooks are placed in the dock 
stations if not operating or rest safely 
    
10. Keys left in the crane control panel (so 
anyone can operate it) 
    
Totals     
% Safety Performance Level = ==
eTotalUnsaf+TotalSafe
TotalSafe 100
..........................
.........................100 ⋅


⋅





                      
% 
 
Area: 
…………………………… 
Date/Time: 
…………………………………….. 
Observer: 
……………………………….. 
Please use the space below to record any comments: 
 
 #SAFE #UNSAFE N/A Comments 
1. Gloves - appropriate specification for task – 
used with contact with sharp edges, hot objects, 
chemicals 
    
2. Respirators/dust mask – wearing - Breathing 
protection should be worn in areas where there 
is dust 
    
3. Footwear     
4. High visibility jacket     
5. Hard hat     
6. Safety glasses     
7. Ear defender (Earplugs/ earmuffs)     
8. If doing hot work (grinding, welding) – 
does he wear a correct PPE 
    
Totals     
% Safety Performance Level = ==
eTotalUnsaf+TotalSafe
TotalSafe 100
..........................
.........................100 ⋅


⋅





                      
% 
 
Appendix E 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 375 
 
Below you will find a set of questions asking your opinion about health and 
safety at the company. Please complete the questions below about you and your job. 
Please try to respond to every statement and answer as honestly as possible. Do not 
spend more than 30 seconds on each statement. THE SURVEY IS ANONYMOUS 
AND NONE OF YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE PASSED TO THE COMPANY IN A 
FORM THAT ALLOWS INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES TO BE IDENTIFED. 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding these questionnaires or the 
feedback program in general please do not hesitate to call me or speak to me. All 
your suggestions are very welcomed and will stay confidential. 
 
Marcin Nazaruk 
Ext. 2811  
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ORGANISATION-LEVEL SAFETY CLIMATE 
 
Top management in this plant–company . . . 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree/ 
neutral 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1. Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told 
about safety hazards. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Insists on thorough and regular safety audits 
and inspections. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Tries to continually improve safety levels in 
each department. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Provides all the equipment needed to do the 
job safely. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Is strict about working safely when work falls 
behind schedule. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Quickly corrects any safety hazard (even if 
it’s costly). 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Provides detailed safety reports to workers 
(e.g., injuries, near accidents). 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Considers a person’s safety behaviour when 
moving–promoting people. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Requires each manager to help improve safety 
in his– her department. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Invests a lot of time and money in safety 
training for workers. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Uses any available information to improve 
existing safety rules. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Listens carefully to workers’ ideas about 
improving safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Considers safety when setting production 
speed and schedules. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Provides workers with a lot of information 
on safety issues. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Regularly holds safety-awareness events 
(e.g., presentations, ceremonies). 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Gives safety personnel the power they need 
to do their job. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
GROUP-LEVEL SAFETY CLIMATE 
 
My direct supervisor . . . 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree/ 
neutral 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1. Makes sure we receive all the equipment 
needed to do the job safely. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Frequently checks to see if we are all obeying 
the safety rules. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Discusses how to improve safety with us. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get 
us to act safely. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Emphasizes safety procedures when we are 
working under pressure. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Frequently tells us about the hazards in our 
work. 1 2 3 4 5 
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7. Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls 
behind schedule. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Is strict about working safely when we are 
tired or stressed. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Reminds workers who need reminders to 
work safely. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Makes sure we follow all the safety rules 
(not just the most important ones). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Insists that we obey safety rules when fixing 
equipment or machines. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Says a “good word” to workers who pay 
special attention to safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Is strict about safety at the end of the shift, 
when we want to go home. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Spends time helping us learn to see problems 
before they arise. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Frequently talks about safety issues 
throughout the work week. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Insists we wear our protective equipment 
even if it is uncomfortable. 1 2 3 4 5 
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SAFETY CITIZENSHIP 
 
We would like to know whether you feel certain 
activities are an expected part of your official 
job responsibilities or if you consider them 
above and beyond what is expected in your job. 
Expect
ed part 
of my 
job 
 
Slightl
y 
beyond 
what is 
expect
ed for 
my job 
Moderate
ly 
beyond 
what is 
expected 
for my 
job  
Much 
beyond 
what is 
expect
ed for 
my job 
Definite
ly 
beyond 
what is 
expecte
d for 
my job 
1. Volunteering for safety committees ................  
2. Helping teach safety procedures to new 
crew members .........................................................  
3. Assisting others to make sure they perform 
their work safely .....................................................  
4. Getting involved in safety activities to help 
my crew work more safely .....................................  
5. Helping other crew members learn about 
safe work practices .................................................  
6. Helping others with safety related 
responsibilities ........................................................  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
7. Making safety-related recommendations 
about work activities ...............................................  
8. Speaking up and encouraging others to get 
involved in safety issues .........................................  
9. Expressing opinions on safety matters even 
if others disagree .....................................................  
10. Raising safety concerns during planning 
sessions ...................................................................   
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
11. Protecting fellow crew members from 
safety hazards .........................................................  
12. Going out of my way to look out for the 
safety of other crew members .................................  
13. Taking action to protect other crew 
members from risky situations ................................  
14. Trying to prevent other crew members from 
being injured on the job ..........................................  
15. Taking action to stop safety violations in 
order to protect the well-being of other crew 
members .................................................................  
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
 
5 
16. Explaining to other crew members that I 
will report safety violations ....................................  
17. Telling other crew members to follow safe 
working procedures ................................................  
18. Monitoring new crew members to ensure 
they are performing safely ......................................  
19. Reporting crew members that violate safety 
procedures ...............................................................  
20. Telling new crew members that violations 
of safety procedures will not be tolerated ...............  
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
 
5 
21. Attending safety meetings ...............................   
22. Attending non-mandatory safety oriented 
meetings ..................................................................   
23. Keeping informed of changes in safety 
policies and procedures ..........................................   
24. Trying to improve safety procedures ...............   
25. Trying to change the way the job is done to 
make it safer ...........................................................   
26. Trying to change policies and procedures to 
make them safer ......................................................   
27. Making suggestions to improve the safety 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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of a job ....................................................................   
 
LMX 
Do you usually know how 
satisfied your supervisor is 
with what you do? 
 
Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very Often 
How well does your 
supervisor understand your 
job problems and needs? 
 
Not a Bit A Little A Fair 
Amount 
Quite a Bit A Great 
Deal 
How well does your 
supervisor recognize your 
potential? 
 
Not at All A Little Moderately Mostly Fully 
Regardless of how much 
formal authority he has built 
into his position, what are the 
chances that your supervisor 
would use his power to help 
you solve problems in your 
work? 
 
None Small Moderate High Very High 
Again, regardless of the 
amount of formal authority 
your supervisor has, what are 
the chances that he would 
“bail you out,” at his 
expense? 
 
None Small Moderate High Very High 
I have enough confidence in 
my supervisor that I would 
defend and justify his 
decision if he was not present 
to do so? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
How would you characterize 
your working relationship 
with your supervisor? 
 
 
Extremely 
ineffective 
Worse than 
average 
Average Better than 
average 
Extremely 
effective 
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THE FUTURE OF YOUR JOB 
What is the FUTURE OF YOUR JOB with this organization like?  Finish the 
sentence with every adjective from the list below and circle appropriate answer: 
Future of my job in this company is…. 
Sure..................................................................... Yes ? No 
Unpredictable............................................... Yes ? No 
Up in the air..................................................... Yes ? No 
Secure................................................................ Yes ? No 
Stable................................................................. Yes ? No 
Questionable................................................. Yes ? No 
Unknown.......................................................... Yes ? No 
Well established......................................... Yes ? No 
My job is almost guaranteed............... Yes ? No 
Uncertain......................................................... Yes ? No 
Can depend on being here....................... Yes ? No 
Future is vague............................................. Yes ? No 
Unclear............................................................. Yes ? No 
Permanent position if I want it.......... Yes ? No 
Certain.............................................................. Yes ? No 
This job might not be around too long.. Yes ? No 
Unspecified...................................................... Yes ? No 
Insecure............................................................ Yes ? No 
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FEEDBACK – TO SUPERVISORS FROM SHOP-FLOOR WORKERS 
Read each statement carefully. Indicate your answer by putting a cross in the 
appropriate box. Please respond to every statement. It is important that you answer 
each question honestly.  
ALL INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED WITH THE STRICTEST 
CONFIDENCE.  
1. How often did your 
supervisor(s) 
acknowledged you for 
working safely during 
the last 3 days?  
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
2. How often did your 
supervisor(s) talk to 
you, during the last 3 
days, about safety 
(including 
housekeeping)? 
Never 
 
Move 
to Q.4 
Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
3. How often 
was/were your 
supervisor(s) polite and 
respectful (even if 
joking) when he talked 
to you about safety 
during the last 3 days? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
4. How often did your 
supervisor(s) ask, 
during the last 3 days, 
about your opinion 
regarding safety issues 
associated with your 
job?  
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
5. How often did your 
supervisor(s) make 
sure, during the last 3 
days, that safety rules 
were followed even 
when there was a lot of 
pressure to get the job 
done? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
6. How often did your 
supervisor(s) set a good 
example, during the 
last 3 days, by 
complying with safety 
rules? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
7. During the last 3 
days I gave my 
1. YES 
2. NO – stop and submit the form 
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supervisor(s) an idea on 
how to improve safety. 
8. How often did your 
supervisor(s) welcome 
and value any 
suggestions you made 
on how to improve 
safety? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
9. My supervisor 
updated me on the 
progress of the reported 
idea within 24h. 
1. YES 
2. NO  
Additional comments (all will stay confidential) 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
FEEDBACK – TO SUPERVISORS FROM MANAGERS 
Read each statement carefully. Indicate your answer by putting a cross in the 
appropriate box. Please respond to every statement. It is important that you answer 
each question honestly.  
ALL INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED WITH THE STRICTEST 
CONFIDENCE.  
By “my supervisor” please consider one of the following persons, accordingly 
to your working area: (here names of supervisors). 
 
1. How often did the 
supervisors update you, 
during the last 3 days, 
about news and issues 
re safety without being 
asked? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
2. How often did the 
supervisors come up 
with safety ideas, 
during the last 3 days, 
on how to improve 
safety? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
Is there anything else that you think should be taken into consideration? 
Additional comments (all will stay confidential) 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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FEEDBACK – TO SUPERVISORS FROM PEERS 
Read each statement carefully. Indicate your answer by putting a cross in the 
appropriate box. Please respond to every statement. It is important that you answer 
each question honestly. 
ALL INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED WITH THE STRICTEST 
CONFIDENCE. 
By “other supervisor” please consider one of the following persons, 
accordingly to your working area: (here names of supervisors). 
1. How often did 
other supervisors 
share safety 
information with you 
during the last 3 
days? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
2. How often, 
during the last 3 
days, did you and 
other supervisors 
discuss how to solve 
encountered safety 
problems? 
Never 
 
Move 
to 
Q.4. 
Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
3. How often did 
other supervisors 
show respect for 
other people’s 
opinion when you 
discussed safety 
together, during the 
last 3 days? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
4. How often did 
other supervisors 
offer you help 
whenever you asked 
for it, during the 
last 3 days? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
Is there anything else that you think should be taken into consideration? 
Additional comments (all will stay confidential) 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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FEEDBACK – TO MANAGER FROM SHOP-FLOOR WORKERS 
Read each statement carefully. Indicate your answer by putting a cross in the 
appropriate box. Please respond to every statement. It is important that you answer 
each question honestly.  
ALL INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED WITH THE STRICTEST 
CONFIDENCE.  
1. How often did your 
manager(s) 
acknowledged you 
for working safely 
during the last 3 
days? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
2. How often did your 
manager(s) talk to 
you during the last 
3 days about 
safety? 
Never 
 
Move 
to Q.4 
Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
3. How often 
was/were your 
manager(s) polite and 
respectful (even if 
joking) when he talked 
to you about safety 
during the last 3 days? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
4. How often did your 
manager(s) ask during 
the last 3 days about 
your opinion regarding 
safety issues associated 
with your job?  
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
5. How often 
was/were your 
manager(s) strict, 
during the last 3 days, 
about working safely 
when work fell behind 
schedule? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
6. During the last 3 
days I gave my 
manager(s) an idea on 
how to improve safety 
1.   YES 
2. NO – stop and submit the form 
7. How often did your 
manager(s) welcome 
and value any 
suggestions you made 
on how to improve 
safety 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
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8. My manager(s) 
updated me on the 
progress of the reported 
idea within 24h 
1. YES 
2. NO 
9. My manager(s) 
acted decisively when I 
raised a safety concern 
1.       YES 
2. NO  
Additional comments (all will stay confidential) 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
FEEDBACK – TO MANAGERS FROM SUPERVISORS 
Read each statement carefully. Indicate your answer by putting a cross in the 
appropriate box. Please respond to every statement. It is important that you answer 
each question honestly.  
ALL INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED WITH THE STRICTEST 
CONFIDENCE.  
By “my manager” please consider one of the following persons, accordingly 
to your working area: (here names of managers)  
1. During the last 3 
days I gave my 
manager(s) an idea on 
how to improve safety 
1. YES 
2. NO   – Move to Q.5 
2. How often did 
your manager(s) 
welcome and value any 
suggestions you made 
on how to improve 
safety, during the last 
3 days? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
3. How often did 
your manager discuss 
with you, during the 
last 3 days, what is the 
best solution for the 
raised safety problems? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
4. How often did 
your manager(s) act 
decisively when you 
raised a safety concern 
during the last 3 days? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
5. How often did 
your manager(s) clearly 
communicate his/their 
expectations towards 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Fairly 
Often 
Very 
Often 
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your performance re 
safety, during the last 
3 days? 
Is there anything else that you think should be taken into consideration? 
Additional comments (all will stay confidential) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
PROMPTS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH INTERVENTION 
PARTICIPANTS 
Interviews with supervisors: 
Reminder: 360-degree feedback, feedback from different groups of employees 
regarding behaviours that support safety. 
1. What did supervisors think when I tried to present the idea 
a. what were the strengths and weaknesses of the idea; 
b. what the biggest obstacle for supervisors to engage in the 
program; 
c. what did the supervisors think about the potential effectiveness 
of the program; 
d. what was the biggest obstacle for supervisors to modify their 
behaviour; 
2. Why do you think employees refused to fill out the feedback forms? 
 
Interviews with operatives: 
Reminder: 360-degree feedback, feedback from different groups of employees 
re behaviours that support safety. 
1. What did your colleagues think when I tried to present the idea 
a. what were the strengths and weaknesses of the idea; 
b. what the biggest obstacle for your mates to engage in the 
program; 
c. what did your co-workers think about the potential 
effectiveness of the program; 
d. what was the biggest obstacle for shop-floor employees to fill 
out the forms; 
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INTRODUCTION OF EXPERTS (QUOTES FROM SELF 
INTRODUCTION) 
Bill Sims – the CEO of Bill Sims Company, U.S.A. 
By 1983 I had done a quality improvement process for Coca-Cola nationally 
throughout their whole facilities in the U.S.A. I have done work for North Railroad, 
Du-Pont, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Golf Stream Aerospace, McDonalds and 
our approach has been originally through the door of developing incentive systems 
and recognition systems, and some of the early efforts were product-driven. We 
quickly learned that social reinforcers could be paired with the tangible reinforcers, 
and we learned that coupling the social reinforcement with the tangible was extremely 
powerful if done the right way, so that is our entry now. We are a full-blown 
behaviour-based company offering behaviour-based solutions around the world that 
sometimes include the use of gift items as tangible reinforcers – it just depends on 
what that company needs. 
 
Ken Lucas – Director of Hasmsl, UK  
I started my career with Mars UK. I was responsible for site maintenance and 
infrastructure. I ended up being the Mars H&S and environment manager. I retired 
from them in 2002 and joined IOSH as a technical and sales manager for a couple of 
years and then started my own business. In terms of H&S experience I travelled the 
world a lot with Mars because they are a global corporation so I learned a great deal.  
 
Kate Blackford – former consultant for Ryder MARSH International 
Experienced in implementing behavioural interventions in a variety of 
industries: I have done work with paper manufacturers, construction companies, food 
production, can making and metals. 
 
Mark Taylor28 
I am a chartered industrial and occupational psychologist recognised by the 
BPS. I am also a registered economist and associate of the International Institute of 
Risk and Safety Management. I have been working in the field of behaviour-based 
safety for the past 15 years working for a number of consultancies including applied 
                                                 
28 Did not agree to disclose his position or the name of the company. 
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behavioural scientists, and Ryder MARSH as the cooperation director. I was an 
associate director in charge of behavioural risk, currently moving positions to take 
charge of Health & Safety security and environment. 
 
Prof. Andrew Hale – Chairman of ‘Hastam’ 
“Andrew was a founder member of the Aston University Department of Safety 
& Hygiene, where he worked from 1972-1984. While at Aston he developed the first 
MSc course in Safety & Hygiene and was one of the initiators of NEBOSH. From 
1984 to 2009 he was Professor of Safety Science at the Delft University of 
Technology in the Netherlands, developing and running a multidisciplinary group of 
researchers and lecturers, working in all branches of safety, from occupational and 
construction to transport, home and leisure. This work included developing the first 
university Masters courses for safety in the Netherlands. His group in Delft won the 
president’s medal of the Ergonomics Society in 2000. He continues to supervise PhD 
students at Delft. 
He is a chartered psychologist and registered member of the Ergonomics 
Society. He is a chartered fellow of IOSH and was given its Distinguished Service 
Award in 1987. In 2007 he received a similar award for his services to its Dutch 
equivalent NVVK, as well as the Distinguished Service Award of RoSPA for his 
contribution to the subject area throughout his career.”29 
 
Dr Shelly Jeffcot – Senior Research Fellow in the NHMRC Centre for 
Research Excellence in Patient Safety (CRE-PS). University of Melbourne, Australia 
I work at the Centre of Research Excellence in H&S at the University in 
Melbourne. My background is in psychology and looking at safety critical systems 
that have predominantly been health care but also in the rail sector in the UK. Most of 
the work that I have done has been survey based or interview and focus groups. I have 
quite a wide knowledge of the literature around safety culture and the different 
interventions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
29 http://www.hastam.co.uk/personnel/arh.htm 
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Dr Kathryn Mearns – Senior lecturer at the University of Aberdeen 
Since the early 1990s I have been involved in developing measurement 
instruments for safety culture and/or safety climate with the offshore industry and 
building on work conducted by recent psychologist Conrad Rundmo looking at risk 
perception in offshore workers and then moving on to looking at safety attitudes, 
perception of safety, safety satisfaction, risk perception, issues to do with perception 
of management commitment to safety and supervisors’ commitment to safety. More 
recently I have been involved in work looking at safety culture throughout the 
European countries and that’s pretty much Europe-wide, and I started that work about 
four years ago again trying to develop an instrument that measured I guess a wider 
range of factors than a safety climate questionnaire would.  
 
Alistair Schofield - managing director of leadership and management experts 
Extensor Ltd. 
“Alistair had used training and development programmes to lay the 
foundations for change within the organisations he had worked for. However, his 
disillusionment with the training industry had led him to develop and lead his own 
programmes that were intrinsically linked to the business goals. It is on the basis of 
this experience that Alistair established Extensor.”30 
 
Conrad Pots 
“I worked for the United Nations, went overseas for seven years, based in the 
South Pacific, setting up management training centres and psychological centres. My 
discipline was psychology as well as business, basically came out to work for very 
large organisations and set off my own consultancy about 20-25 years ago. I worked 
with most of the top 1000 companies in the UK, done a lot of work with them 
overseas, worked for a number of business schools like Imperial College, did 
leadership, team building and a lot of executive coaching” 
 
Phil Hayes – leadership coach working for Management Futures 
“I have been working in the field of leadership development and coaching for 
about 20 years or so – a little bit more - and currently I am executive director of 
                                                 
30 http://www.extensor.co.uk/programme_leaders.html 
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Management Futures Ltd. which is a company that specialise in coaching, coach 
training and leadership development activities; as part of that I had a career in social 
services as a social worker.” 
 
Chris Henderson - Principal and founder of Leadership Connections Ltd. 
“I have spent most of my career working for companies large part working for 
Boots and Barclays, but half my career I spent as a director of HR, about half I spent 
as a director in a number of other functions, including property, operations, strategy 
and others. About 4-5 years ago I set up my own consultancy business and now do a 
variety of work, most of it around leadership development in a variety of forms, one-
to-one coaching, development programs and others.” 
 
Lorraine Calland – Founder and Director of ‘Passion at Work’ 
I was involved in production, marketing, sales, customer service and logistics 
and in most of these areas I had some kind of management role, so my kind of direct 
experience is managing and leading teams, but I moved in 1989 - I actually went 
freelance as a training and development consultant and I have been involved in a 
business since then. We have been involved in some huge projects that involved 
culture change, some of which lasted, in fact one of them lasted for about 10 years, so 
some of the work we have done has been very big and other projects were quite small 
so there is a real mix of experience that we have, but it’s a long experience. 
 
John Nevitt – Chair of the IOSH Food and Drink Group, Group Health and 
Safety manager for Tulip UK - a multinational food manufacturing company.  
“In the UK we have 19 operational sites and distribution plants. We currently 
employ about 8500 employees in the UK. My responsibility is the production of 
policy and strategy across UK and liaison with the Danish head office. I am also an 
adviser to the British Meat Processes Association and a member of the European 
H&S agency - one of the specialist councils where I act as an adviser.” 
 
Robin Phillips 
“I was a full-time researcher working for the University of Manchester, 
Institute of Science and Technology. My area of expertise and research was 
behavioural applied safety in the area of safety in the construction sector. I left 
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Manchester and joined Marsh Risk Consulting, part of Marsh McLenon, as the 
European leader, again behaviour-based safety and now I work for the Mace Lee 
construction firm, again delivering behaviour-based safety, another H&S sort of 
program. 
 
Paul Mahoney – working in a group of H&S advisers for food company.31  
 
Tom Chamber – Safety, Health and Environmental manager for the Greencore 
Group. 
“I have been directly employed in SH&E management for 20 years. I am a 
Chartered member of the Institute of Occupational Safety & Health. I am the current 
Vice Chair of the IOSH Group Management Committee and the Immediate Past Chair 
of the IOSH Food & Drinks Group. I also currently represent the Chilled Foods 
Association at the Food Manufacturing Forum.” 
 
                                                 
31 Did not agree to provide more details. 
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Appendix F 
 
SAFETY ELEMENTS OF THE STANDARDISED WORK FOR LEADERS 
 YES NO ACTIONS TAKEN 
Did you observe that everyone in the 
department is obeying safety rules  
YES NO  
Did you interact with an operator to 
share any of his/her ideas to improve 
safety 
YES NO  
Did you check with an operator if he 
noticed any environment issue that 
can potentially harm his workmate 
YES NO  
Did you educate an operator about 
the hazard related to the work being 
performed 
YES NO  
Did you recognize an operator for 
performing the task to the safety 
standards 
YES NO  
Did you remind an operator on any 
of the safety rules 
YES NO  
Did you check with an operator if he 
came close to injuring himself 
recently 
YES NO  
 
OBSERVATIONAL CHECKLIST FOR CLEANING DEPARTMENT 
 
Area: Cleaning 
 
Date/Time:……………………………… 
 
Observer:……………… 
 #SAFE #UNSAFE N/A 
Mobile equipment - on the move    
1. Operating at safe speed for conditions & obeying speed 
limit (3m/h – 4km/h inside; 5m/h – 8hm/h outside) 
   
2. Employee is looking in direction of travel and vision is not 
obstructed 
   
3. Loads stable and properly placed on forks during transport    
4. Pedestrians not within 3 ft. (91cm) next to vehicle in 
operation  
   
Mobile equipment - parked    
5. Not parked in walkway    
6. Wheel chocks on one wheel when forklift is parked outside    
7. Keys left in a truck    
Walkways    
11. Tools/castings/rubbish/trolleys/stillages or anything 
else left in the walkways 
       
12. Congested walkways with work/traffic        
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Storage - Stillages     
8. Fixtures or other things put on the top of stillages    
9. Stacked unsafely or over head height level    
10. Fixtures or other sharp pieces protrude over the edge of 
stillage 
   
11. Left in the work-traffic area    
Storage - Trolleys    
12. A fixture or other piece may fall from a trolley (too many 
on or protrudes over the edge)  
   
13. Trolleys are left in the work place traffic areas    
14. Plastic boxes stacked unevenly    
Tools/castings/rubbish or anything else    
13. Left on the floor in working area (creates a trip hazard)    
14. Left up against walls or machines    
Blocked access – tools/castings, rubbish or anything else is 
blocking access to: 
   
15. Machines    
16. Fire extinguishers    
17. Fire exit/ the shortest emergency path    
Behaviour PPE    
18. Proper PPE set is being worn (gloves, footwear, highvis 
jacket, safety glasses, earplugs) 
   
Behaviour – manual handling    
19. If a person is carrying sth - heavier than 10 kilo    
20. If a person is picking sth up - from below the knees 
height improperly 
   
Hoists    
9. A hook or chain does not rest safely (incl. Hanging in 
the walkway) 
   
Space    
10. Congested work areas with people/stock    
Totals    
% Safety Performance Level = 
==
eTotalUnsaf+TotalSafe
TotalSafe 100
..........................
.........................100 ⋅


⋅





                      % 
 
 
 
Table F1. Mauchly’s test gauging the assumption of sphericity (Finishing department) 
Within Subjects Effect 
Mauchly's W 
Approx. 
Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
  Month .013 26.651 14 .030 .524 .801 .200 
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Table F2. Significance of differences between months corrected with Greenhouse-
Geisser (Finishing department) 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Month Sphericity 
Assumed 
710.744 5 142.149 3.624 .008 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
710.744 2.618 271.511 3.624 .035 
Huynh-Feldt 710.744 4.006 177.435 3.624 .015 
Lower-bound 710.744 1.000 710.744 3.624 .093 
Error(Month) Sphericity 
Assumed 
1568.824 40 39.221 
  
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1568.824 20.942 74.913 
  
Huynh-Feldt 1568.824 32.045 48.956 
  
Lower-bound 1568.824 8.000 196.103 
  
 
 
Table F3. Results of application of simple contrast to calculate differences between 
the first month and the following months (Finishing department) 
Source Month Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Month Month 2 vs. Month 
1 
481.071 1 481.071 5.554 .046 
Month 3 vs. Month 
1 
829.440 1 829.440 18.877 .002 
Month 4 vs. Month 
1 
942.490 1 942.490 7.042 .029 
Month 5 vs. Month 
1 
839.068 1 839.068 28.583 .001 
Month 6 vs. Month 
1 
918.090 1 918.090 7.688 .024 
Error(month) Month 2 vs. Month 
1 
692.889 8 86.611 
  
Month 3 vs. Month 
1 
351.520 8 43.940 
  
Month 4 vs. Month 
1 
1070.640 8 133.830 
  
Month 5 vs. Month 
1 
234.842 8 29.355 
  
Month 6 vs. Month 
1 
955.400 8 119.425 
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Table F4. Results of application of repeated contrasts (Finishing department) 
Source Month 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Month Month 1 vs. Month 
2 
481.071 1 481.071 5.554 .046 
Month 2 vs. Month 
3 
47.151 1 47.151 .324 .585 
Month 3 vs. Month 
4 
3.610 1 3.610 .035 .855 
Month 4 vs. Month 
5 
3.004 1 3.004 .046 .836 
Month 5 vs. Month 
6 
1.778 1 1.778 .031 .865 
Error(month) Month 1 vs. Month 
2 
692.889 8 86.611 
  
Month 2 vs. Month 
3 
1165.049 8 145.631 
  
Month 3 vs. Month 
4 
815.220 8 101.903 
  
Month 4 vs. Month 
5 
527.236 8 65.904 
  
Month 5 vs. Month 
6 
462.162 8 57.770 
  
 
Table F5. Mauchly’s test gauging the assumption of sphericity (EDM 
department) 
Within Subjects Effect 
Mauchly's W 
Approx. 
Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilona 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
  month .074 15.872 14 .358 .521 .796 .200 
 
Table F6. Significance of differences between months corrected with greenhouse-
Geisser (EDM department) 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
month Sphericity 
Assumed 
92.588 5 18.518 1.597 .183 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
92.588 2.607 35.511 1.597 .223 
Huynh-Feldt 92.588 3.981 23.260 1.597 .199 
Lower-bound 92.588 1.000 92.588 1.597 .242 
Error(month) Sphericity 
Assumed 
463.733 40 11.593 
  
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
463.733 20.859 22.232 
  
Huynh-Feldt 463.733 31.844 14.562 
  
Lower-bound 463.733 8.000 57.967 
  
 
Table F7. The significance values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig. 
Organisation-level 
safety climate 
.076 74 .200* 
Group-level safety 
climate 
.066 74 .200* 
Job security .187 74 .000 
LMX .118 74 .013 
Safety citizenship .130 74 .003 
 
Table F8. The results of the correlation procedure.  
 Organisation-
level safety 
climate 
Group-
level 
safety 
climate 
Job 
security LMX 
Safety 
citizenship 
Kendall's 
tau_b 
Organisation-
level safety 
climate 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .550** .150 .249** -.046 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .058 .001 .525 
N 100 100 80 96 91 
Group-level 
safety 
climate 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.550** 1.000 .339** .368** .005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 .943 
N 100 101 81 97 91 
Job security Correlation 
Coefficient 
.150 .339** 1.000 .233** .016 
Sig. (2-tailed) .058 .000 . .004 .843 
N 80 81 81 79 76 
LMX Correlation 
Coefficient 
.249** .368** .233** 1.000 .005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .004 . .949 
N 96 97 79 97 89 
Safety 
citizenship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.046 .005 .016 .005 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .525 .943 .843 .949 . 
N 91 91 76 89 91 
  
Table F9. Simple regression analysis – does ‘Job security’ predict the strength 
of ‘Group-level safety climate’ 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 1 .525a .276 .267 8.31557 
 
Table F10. Analysis of variance (job security vs group level safety climate) 
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Model Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
1 Regression 2080.394 1 2080.394 30.086 .000a 
Residual 5462.742 79 69.149 
  
Total 7543.136 80 
   
 
Table F11. Simple regression analysis – does ‘Job security’ predict the 
strength of ‘LMX’ 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
  1 .402
a .162 .151 5.06124 
 
Table F12. Analysis of variance (job security vs LMX) 
Model 
Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 381.079 1 381.079 14.877 .000a 
Residual 1972.440 77 25.616     
Total 2353.519 78       
 
Table F13. Simple regression analysis – does ‘Job security’ predict the 
strength of ‘Organisation – Level Safety Climate’ 
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 
1 .314a .099 .087 8.76724 
 
Table F14. Analysis of variance (job security vs. ‘Organisation – Level Safety 
Climate’) 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
1 Regression 655.552 1 655.552 8.529 .005a 
Residual 5995.436 78 76.865 
  
Total 6650.988 79 
   
 
Table F15. Analysis of variance (job security vs. ‘safety citizenship’) 
Model 
Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 409.550 1 409.550 .754 .388a 
Residual 40176.239 74 542.922     
Total 40585.789 75       
 
Appendix F 
 
Developing Safety Culture Interventions in the Manufacturing Sector                 399 
 
Table F16. Results of two-way ANOVA analysis for the cleaning department 
(experimental group) and EDM department (control group). 
Measured 
variables 
Cleaning – experimental group EDM – control group 
Group level 
safety 
climate 
Pre-test, N=41 Post-test, N=24 Pre-test, N=18 Post-test, N=18 
M=50.87 SD=10.0 M=46.75 SD=10.3 M=50.11 SD=7.1 M=50.05 SD=8.0 
Source Type IV 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Pre-test / Post-test 98.791 1 98.791 1.131 .290 
Department 36.376 1 36.376 .416 .520 
Pre / Post vs. Department 93.613 1 93.613 1.072 .303 
 
Organisatio
n level 
safety 
climate 
Pre-test, N=41 Post-test, N=24 Pre-test, N=17 Post-test, N=18 
M=51.07 SD=10.2 M=46.37 SD=10.5 M=52.76 SD=5.3 M=51.94 SD=6.7 
Source Type IV 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Pre-test / Post-test 168.775 1 168.775 2.021 .158 
Department 292.191 1 292.191 3.498 .064 
Pre / Post vs. Department 83.344 1 83.344 .998 .320 
 
Job security Pre-test, N=35 Post-test, N=18 Pre-test, N=12 Post-test, N=16 
M=14.85 SD=13.7 M=10.11 SD=12.6 M=10.5 SD=8.6 M=6.18 SD=6.7 
Source Type IV 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Pre-test Post-test 356.831 1 356.831 2.583 .112 
Department 298.186 1 298.186 2.159 .146 
Pre / Post vs. Department .817 1 .817 .006 .939 
 
Leader- 
member 
exchange 
Pre-test, N=41 Post-test, N=21 Pre-test, N=17 Post-test, N=18 
M=19.24 SD=5.6 M=20.42 SD=6.8 M=18.76 SD=5.2 M=21.16 SD=4.4 
Source Type IV 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Pre-test Post-test 69.017 1 69.017 2.158 .145 
Department .360 1 .360 .011 .916 
Pre / Post vs. Department 7.950 1 7.950 .249 .619 
 
Safety 
citizenship 
Pre-test, N=36 Post-test, N=21 Pre-test, N=16 Post-test, N=18 
M=69.47 SD=22.3 M=54 SD=24.8 M=54.43 SD=26.6 M=46.16 SD=13.1 
Source Type IV 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Pre-test Post-test 2914.064 1 2914.064 5.852 .018 
Department 2703.239 1 2703.239 5.429 .022 
Pre / Post vs. Department 268.076 1 268.076 .538 .465 
 
 
 
